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The cultural politics of climate change activism in the UK as public pedagogy (2005-2011)

Direct action, relocalisation, and professional activism

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Declaration

I, Callum McGregor, hereby certify that this doctoral thesis has been composed by me, that it is my own work and that it has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

Signature **Date**

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Abstract

This thesis is a study of the cultural politics of environmentalism in an era of climate change and the public curriculum that it generates. Scientists and the policy elite alone are unlikely to solve the 'wicked problem' of climate change, even in the unlikely scenario that consensus was reached and concerted international action was forthcoming. Increasingly, it is recognised that institutional learning through technocratic refinements of the status quo are inadequate. Although there is widespread belief that anthropogenic global warming is an urgent problem, political action has not followed scientific knowledge, because we have been slow to recognise the problem's cultural implications. A range of voices within the environmental movement (broadly conceived) have increasingly challenged technocratic policy framing, with new ways of thinking. By widening the debate these critical voices increase the possibility of learning to react in new ways, which increase the capacity for collective agency. Based on this assessment, the aim of this thesis is to explore the ways in which the cultural politics of particular activist milieus generate public curriculum, through catalyzing the relationship between the cultural politics of civil society and the political culture of the state. From the 1960s onwards, the environmental movement has undergone a process of differentiation and specialisation, such that distinct cultural formations – oriented around direct action, relocalisation, and professional campaigning – emerged. Different ideal typical modes of "climate change communication" – agonistic pluralism, public participation, and social marketing (Carvalho & Peterson, 2012) – can be mapped onto the public pedagogies of these activist cultures. Political theorist Chantal Mouffe (2005, p. 20) uses the term agonistic pluralism to describe a situation where the "adversary" is understood in a productive sense to be "a crucial category for democratic politics": where this is denied, we/they relations are understood to be "antagonistic" in the sense that conflicting parties do not recognise the legitimacy of one another. This view recognises the power play and affective commitments that determine modes of political association. On the other hand, "public participation" views politics as constituted through non-partisan rational deliberation in legitimate public fora. Finally, "social marketing" approaches discard the notion of people as rational decision makers, but also discard the principle of public participation in favour of the notion that political communication can be improved through expert evidence-based interventions. Cultures of direct climate action tend towards agonistic communicative styles, characterised by contestatory moments and a public pedagogy of "defining the enemy" (Newman, 1994). On the other hand, this approach has been perceived as problematic by movement intellectuals in relocalisation movements, who have argued that the non-politicised experimental practices of local communities, which engage optimistically with a sense of the possible, may in the long run, be more productive of the kind of mass cultural value shift required in order to tackle climate change. More recently, reflecting their own situated organisational structures and actor-networks, knowledge workers in the professional campaigning sector have increasingly applied insights from social psychology, behavioural economics, and cognitive science in order to find ways that engage tacit cultural values and norms in their public pedagogical efforts. In seeking to ascertain the ideal conditions for communication, the ENGO sector aligns most closely with a 'social marketing approach' to public pedagogy. Working with the 'agonistic' discourse theory of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau, I believe that all cultures of activism necessarily engage in a contingent politics of articulation, at the heart of which lies antagonism and hegemonic struggle. In this thesis, I construct an intertextual research model, capable of exploring the contingent processes of articulation within cultures of climate change activism, between them, and between the movement at large, and the wider public, as they engage (implicitly or explicitly) in hegemonic struggles that provide moments of educative potential to activists, bystanders and politicians. I argue that the public pedagogies of these cultures of activism cohere around the articulation of what Laclau (2005) would call "empty signifiers", which link particular claims, interests, and identities through creating a frontier separating them from an outside, which partially constitutes the inside's identity.

Contents

Chapter 1

Introduction: climate change, education and the role of social movements in widening the debate

Introduction

> [C]limate change is too urgent and important to suffer 'death by formal curriculum' (Kagawa & Selby, 2010, p. 242).

This thesis is a study of the curriculum generated through the cultural politics of climate change activism in the UK. As an educational researcher, I aim to answer two broad questions through studying the knowledge products of particular cultures of activism: (1) what is it about climate change that poses a challenge to communicative and educative efforts; (2) what is the role of social movements in addressing these challenges? To address the first question, three broad areas of challenge can be identified: (1) there are challenges derived from the complex epistemological nature of the problem as a scientific construct; (2) this scientific complexity does not stand in isolation from other aspects of our lives, but "overlaps with socio-political complexity"; (3) these co-implicated complexities pose unique challenges to our cognitive and psychosocial processes (Gonzalez-Guadiano & Meira-Cartea, 2010, pp. 18-27). In this opening chapter, I would like to explicate these three areas of concern, before moving on to outline in broad terms the role that social movements and their knowledges might play in addressing these concerns.

Scientists and the policy elite alone are unlikely to solve the 'wicked problem' of climate change, even in the unlikely scenario that consensus was reached and concerted international action was forthcoming. Increasingly, it is recognised that institutional learning through technocratic refinements of the status quo are inadequate. Although there is widespread belief that anthropogenic global warming is an urgent problem, political action has not followed scientific knowledge, because we have been slow to recognise the problem's cultural implications.

A range of voices within the environmental movement (broadly conceived) have increasingly challenged technocratic policy framing with new ways of thinking. By widening the debate, these critical voices increase the possibility of learning to react in new ways, which increase the capacity for collective agency. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to explore the ways in which the cultural politics of particular activist milieux generate public curriculum, through catalyzing the dialectical relationship between the cultural politics of civil society and the political culture of the state. From the 1960s onwards, the environmental movement has undergone a process of differentiation and specialisation, such that distinct cultural formations – oriented around direct action, relocalisation, and professional campaigning – with their own 'cognitive praxis' have emerged (Jamison, 2001).

Based on these distinctions, the aim of the thesis is to examine the curriculum generated through three activist cultures. For direct action, I study the cultural politics of the Camp for Climate Action (CCA hereafter); for community-based action, I study the Transition movement; finally, for professional activism, I study the work of environmental non-governmental organisation (ENGO hereafter) coalition Common Cause. Each of these activist milieux were chosen because they are arguably the most successful and visible examples in the UK of their respective types. They have been researched through applying concepts from discourse theory (Howarth, 2000) to the examination of a diverse and large corpus of movement ephemera – interpreted as curricular artefacts - including blogs, web material, press

releases, pamphlets, as well as books, newspaper articles, and so on. I will now move on to explore why the epistemic complexity of climate change as a scientific and a socio-political phenomenon, poses cognitive challenges to educative approaches. Having set out the problem and outlined the rationale, I will distil these into research questions. Finally, I will outline how the rest of the thesis is organised.

The epistemic complexity of climate change

> Right now there is no path leading from my changing the lightbulbs in my home straight to the Earth's destiny: such a stair has no step; such a ladder has no rung. I would have to jump, and this would be quite a *salto mortale*! All assemblages need intermediaries: satellites, sensors, mathematical formulae, and climate models, to be sure, but also nation states, NGOs, consciousness, morality and responsibility. Can this lesson of assembly be followed? (Latour, 2011, p. 7).

Climate change is arguably the most formidable manifestation of what sociologists like to call the structure/agency problematic. The gap between individual agency and the autonomous functioning of this complex system at times seems insurmountable. What we call climate change is, in fact, a "hybrid theme essentially founded on uncertainty" deriving from "the impossibility of controlling – or even identifying – all of the relevant variables", and understanding how they are linked (Gonzalez-Guadiano & Meira-Cartea, 2010, p. 13). Thus, I find it useful to differentiate between the small 'p' politics of climate change (the politics of its construction as a scientific phenomenon) and the large 'P' politics of its causes, solutions and thus, attributions of responsibility.

From science to policy?

How, then, do we follow the 'lesson of assembly', and what role do movements play? The first myth to dispel is that there is a simple linear direction of travel,

whereupon the hermetically sealed bubble of scientific knowledge travels 'downstream' to inform policy responses (Demeritt, 2001, p. 309; Jamison, 2001). The science of climate change *has* influenced its politics, but (often tacit) political expectations of policy relevance have shaped scientific practice (Demeritt, 2001, p. 308). Drawing on the work of Donna Haraway, and Latour's actor-network theory (ANT), Demeritt (p. 312) understands that "nature and other things in the world are disclosed to us through practical engagements that configure them in ways that are recognizable *for* us and transforming of *us*". The important point about Demeritt's argument is that the aggregation of empirical knowledge under a phenomenon called 'climate change' has significant consequences for what scientific practices become dominant in informing policy. First, the 'climate' is a statistical abstraction, gleaned from the aggregation of measurements of surface variables (most often temperature, precipitation and wind) defined as "the average weather conditions of a region over a period" conventionally 30 years (IPCC, 2007, p. 78). Consequently, 'climate change' is defined by the IPCC (ibid.) in the following way:

> Climate change refers to a change in the state of the *climate* that can be identified (e.g., by using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer.

These definitions, Demeritt (2001, p. 312) would argue, are the "artefacts" of "social practices and conventions" that make them possible. These artefacts have produced a global scale that has been critiqued by many for ignoring the "uneven political economy of greenhouse gas emissions" (p. 313). Three-dimensional climate modelling based on mathematical algorithms has become one of the most important technical tools at our disposal as a species, in that it renders a more messy reality analytically manageable. Nevertheless, the epistemic community of climate modelling is based on such technically esoteric knowledge that not only non-scientists, but also scientists using different methods are located – with a fragmented and partial understanding – downstream of its claims (p. 314).

Indeed, even amongst the climate modelling "epistemic community", because models are produced by multiple actors across multiple sites and because research often involves "modifying a subset of variables produced elsewhere", the distinction between producer and user is problematic (Lahsen, 2007, p. 903). Lahsen argues that distributed co-production, psycho-social investment in one's own work, and reliance on marginalised empirical scientists to compare real world data with models, are the main factors contributing to uncertainty *within* the scientific community.

General Circulation Models (GCMs) have emerged as "the primary means by which global warming is understood" (Demeritt, 2001, p. 315). GCMs "simulate the behaviour of the climate system by dividing the earth into a three dimensional grid and using supercomputers to solve mathematical equations representing exchanges of energy between the grid points" (p. 315). On the one hand, the increasing sophistication of models fostered interdisciplinarity by acting as a hub – a Lingua Franca – into which scientists with diverse approaches had to *translate* their knowledges. On the other hand, climate scientists have to "travel" further to translate their understandings into the common language (Demeritt, 2001).

The absence of dialogical spaces

A lively debate within the climate science community developed, as the modelling community gradually became hegemonic. Much like the World Systems approach used to produce the environmentalist landmark "Limits to Growth" (LtG hereafter), the value of climate models lies more in their public pedagogical power as heuristics, yet they are often misrepresented as infallible and wrongly endowed with predictive capacity. For some within this epistemic community, the problem with esoteric climate science is seen as educational, characterised by the lack of dialogical spaces for brokerage and translation between lay, political, and scientific knowledge (e.g. Shackley, 1996, pp. 548-9). As a consequence, the heuristic, rather than the

predictive, identity of models has not always been transparent. Yet, there are those who believe that the media should take more responsibility for representing consensus knowledge, and that tackling climate change is not best served by emphasising uncertainty (Edwards, 1996, p. 556).

These concerns can be located in a more general critique of deficit models of public understanding of science. Wynne (2006, p. 212) argues that across scientific disciplines (including environmental science, but also including many other contentious fields such as genomics) there is often a lack of institutional reflection on relations with the public, coupled with exaggerated truth claims. Consequently, a "public mistrust of science" fallacy is continually reproduced in which "incompetent publics, irresponsible and misinforming media, and non-governmental organisations" become convenient scapegoats (p. 212). Wynne, at the time of writing, reflects upon the six years since the UK House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology recommended a cultural shift towards mutual education between scientists and publics, and judges that such a shift has not occurred. He argues that institutions continue to construct the "public mistrust" fallacy by inventing a public who demand zero risk; have misguided views on the degree of certainty that any scientific endeavour can claim; are ignorant of the (presumed) benefits of their applied findings; and who are incapable of epistemic nuance and ambivalence (p. 216).

In the context of both public understandings of, and attitudes towards, climate change, this takes on particular importance. Environmentalists have lamented the role they have been forced to play in defending climate science in the public arena, despite being unqualified to do so (Bird, et al., 2009, p. 55). Thus, one reason why learning the 'lesson of assembly' is an important educational task is because climate sceptics thrive on, and are incensed by, the fact that there is no single empirical data point or observation that reveals the unmediated reality of climate change: it is the aggregation of observations made by an assemblage of infrastructure through which

observations must be translated through computer modelling processes (Demeritt, 2001; Edwards, 2010; Gonzalez-Guadiano & Meira-Cartea, 2010; Latour, 2011). The solution, in this context, is the creation of public fora through which trust in the social process of such endeavour is made transparent.

Thus, to return to the parallels between LtG and climate modelling, there are two sides to the debate, which highlight more general issues with approaches to educating the public around complex ecological problems. On the one hand, in the same way that LtG was successful as a public pedagogical tool in communicating that unchecked exponential growth is impossible, and that the world should be viewed holistically as a set of interlocking systems, climate models have been successful in providing the shared background assumptions for a hybrid science/policy epistemic community, and educating the public about the global scale of the human contribution to climate change since industrialisation (Edwards, 1996; Eastin, et al., 2011; Mearns, 2012). Like the LtG models then, the value of GCMs lies in their heuristic ability to construct a global-scale vision of what some geologists call the "anthropocene" – that is, a world finally divorced from a reified 'nature' or 'environment', whose trajectory is affected by human activity on a grand scale.

On the other hand, both approaches share a technocratic orientation underpinned by a faith in a top-down, consensual, managerialist approach that favours technological solutions to the detriment of socio-political implications (Edwards, 1996, p. 154; Eastin, et al., 2011, p. 17). The primary issue with this is that in both cases a public pedagogy of alarmism, combined with the lack of any clear political road map or mechanisms for public dialogue, deprives the vast majority of people of any sense of collective agency.

Uncertainty and the lack of dialogical space combine with pernicious consequences. As a solution to this structure/agency problem, Latour has argued that we need more sensitising loops that connect our lives to the construction of this vast assemblage

that is climate science – not merely scientific (the pre-'translated' local practices that constitute this 'global' issue), but artistic, cultural, emotional, social, and so on. On this, Latour seems to be suggesting not only that an understanding of the complexity of the 'upstream' assembly of climate science will politicise us: he is also suggesting – if I have interpreted his recent Gifford lectures correctly (Latour, 2013) – that the idea of creating a fecund network of sensitising loops is about what climate change communications scholar George Marshall calls breaking the issue down "into smaller components that play to our strengths, that are more immediate, that are more personal" (Marshall, 2007, p. 11). This being said, I remain circumspect about the potential to link the 'small p' politics of the study of local actor-networks in this respect to the 'large P' Politics of social movements (Jamison, 2006, p. 46).

Over the last decade, we have witnessed a significant growth industry of climate change communications from ENGOs, think tanks and various dedicated research institutions such as the highly regarded Climate Outreach Information Network (COIN) in the UK. So, it would appear as though progress is being made in this area. Strategies relate to the creation of dialogical and deliberative fora (Vandenabeele, et al., 2011), linguistic communication strategies (Segnit & Ereaut, 2006; Segnit & Ereaut, 2007; Futerra, 2009), and, in some cases, how to directly counter sceptic claims (Bird, et al., 2009, pp. 54-56). In many cases, as Monbiot (2006) points out, citizen journalists and the blogs of climate scientists now regularly deconstruct the claims of 'sceptic' pseudo-science. Yet, what set of circumstances gives sceptics' claims populist appeal?

Jamison (2004) on this issue is instructive: he argues that the (in)famous Bjorn Lomborg was only able to gain such political traction and public acceptance because of populist backlash to a technocratic greening of society by the Danish Social Democratic Party. He warns that a situation where the state funds the majority of environmental research, is ideologically committed to a green programme, but implements it *technocratically*, is a particularly toxic combination. When the Liberal

party was subsequently voted in, Lomborg found a willing home in a party intent on state rollback and looking for epistemic legitimation of an ideological predilection to public spending cutbacks. Jamison suggests that stronger connections between experts and the general public must be fostered in order to avoid the fomenting of a populist backlash against unaccountable technocracies. This involves dissolving the binary created between lay/expert in addressing "matters of fact", by treating climate change instead as a shared "matter of concern".

Having looked in a reasonable amount of depth at the epistemic and political heterogeneity of the climate science epistemic community, and the scalar production of the phenomenon of 'global' climate change, I now move on to look at how all of this is intertwined with socio-political complexity, and the consequences of this for educational efforts.

Socio-political complexity

As an environmental-ecological issue, arguments made about climate change "are complex refractions of struggles being waged in other realms" – including institutional arrangements, labour processes, social relations, technological and organisational forms – which play out in our situated experience of everyday life (Harvey, 1996; 2010). Important consequences follow from this, in asking what role education has to play in climate change, and what role social movements have to play in such education. Firstly, anthropogenic climate change is intertwined with another complex autonomously functioning system of production: exchange and consumption based on capital accumulation.

The two are, of course, related: technological advance and profit seeking made possible the extraction of fossil fuels, which 'turbo charged' our species development. Our learned ability over the past 150 years, to extract and convert the energy of ancient sunlight, powers all of this. As a consequence, burning fossil fuels

to obtain this energy "short circuits, so to speak, the long loop of the carbon cycle, which passes through the lithosphere and spreads over hundreds of millions of years,…so it accumulates" (Tanuro, 2010, p. 92). This has been referred to by ecosocialists as the ultimate contradiction of captial accumulation, as the irrational management of the social metabolism of humanity and nature destroys the conditions that make accumulation possible (O'Connor, 1998). Can there, as proponents of Ecological Modernization (EM) suggest, be a rapprochement between our relation to nature and the logic of captial accumulation, and what might this mean politically? Below, I explore this question through discussing the epistemic construction of the carbon economy as a form of public pedagogy.

The carbon economy: calculation as discourse

As Paterson and Stripple (2007, p. 149) put it, "the spatiality of climate politics is…sung into existence". The production of space, and in particular its scalar construction, is partially socially constructed and enacted, related to questions of who has the power to make a geographical space a meaningful place of political action (Lefebvre, 2000[1974]; Soja, 1996; Harvey, 1996; Kurtz, 2003; Smith, 2001). Moreover, questions of space, materiality and meaning can be considered mutually constituting, to the extent that we can speak of something like a socio-spatial dialectic (Massey, 2005). What is at stake is *how* power is enacted to produce space and through what technologies?

Santos (2008, p. 156) argues that in cognitive capitalism, techno-science becomes the primary tool in subordinating the material to the informational. This interpretation takes on particular significance in relation to the measurement, regulation and trade of greenhouse gas emissions, through assigning economic value to the world's carbon sinks. A recent technical article entitled, "Can the uncertainty of full carbon accounting of forest ecosystems be made acceptable to policy makers?" concludes that heuristics and uncertainty cannot be avoided in carbon accounting, and that,

indeed, it is uncertain whether the statistical methods employed to measure this uncertainty are even fit for purpose (Shividenko, et al., 2010, pp. 154-155).

Nothing less than the struggle to bring in material processes and all their geographical, social and cultural contingencies into a calculable space of equivalence is what is at stake. As the hegemonic policy response to-date, carbon markets ride roughshod over sociomaterial and geographical contingencies, through the desire of expert epistemic networks, who – in a process akin to self-fulfilling prophecy – are forced to make questionable equivalences between very different places and practices in order to 'hem in' carbon dioxide equivalent (CO_2e), so as to give it a calculable exchange-value (Lohmann, 2008; Bumpus, 2011; Lansing, 2011). Yet, this was not inevitable. Other choices have been framed out of the discussion. For example, cap and convergence, fee and dividends, and carbon taxes (Eastin, et al., 2011). In the case of offsets, certain 'additionality' calculations are part of discursive formations intended to express the use-value of particular local spaces in the language of potential CO_2e savings, rather than meeting any other number of local agricultural, industrial or social needs (Lansing, 2011).

In other words, a particular change in the metabolic relationship between human and land through the application of labour power may result in less CO_2e than otherwise would have been the case without this change, but the value in a global-scale regime of carbon cycle management (Kyoto) is not realised in actual CO_2e: it is demonstrated as a commodity, only through speculative calculation, so that the non-owner of the commodity can be assured of its use-value! (Lansing, 2011, pp. 747-748). The calculation is not a mere abstraction, but is constitutive of the *salto mortale* necessary to throw the carbon sequestering ability of one particular place into relation with the emitting ability of another, thousands of miles away (Marx, 1867 [1976], p. 200). Of course, once brought into relation with one another as commodities, the key is that no ethical distinction is made between "survival emissions" and "luxury emissions" (Bailey, et al., 2011, p. 694).

The carbon economy must be understood as the product of government policy: it was the most politically expedient solution to emerge from dialogues resulting in the Kyoto protocol (Boyd, et al., 2011). The carbon economy is composed of emissions trading schemes, the largest of which is the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), and offsetting schemes, controlled mainly through the UN-controlled Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), but also through voluntary markets. Bailey et al. (2011, p. 690) make a key distinction between the CDM and the EU ETS: while the CDM takes social and environmental goals into account, the EU ETS aims chiefly to reduce emissions from energy producers and energy intensive industries, and is therefore judged in more instrumental terms than the CDM.

Descheneau and Paterson's (2011) compelling account of the social construction of carbon describes it as a dual discursive process, of mobilising the desire of those involved, and routinizing their own practices by borrowing from the discursive formations of pre-existing financial accounting practices. The "former animates the markets while the latter enables the markets to become normalized for financiers" (p. 662).

Firstly, as Descheneau and Paterson (p. 668) identify, for private individuals at least, the construction of demand for the offset market relies upon the construction of a guilty subject motivated to "'do good' by investing in offset projects", and directing guilt in particular ways such as "going on a low carbon diet", which is motivated by "the relationship between desire, denial, the treat" and so on (p. 662). Indeed, Nerlich and Koteyko (2009) have argued that the application of moralistic frames in UK journalism uses exactly this vocabulary in order to lend such concepts resonance amongst the general public.

However, the majority of voluntary demand (80%) is corporate, not individual (Schmidt, 2009). Descheneau and Paterson (p. 669) argued that *industry internal* marketing schemes invoked the "normativity of climate change" as an urgent issue. Such intra-market advertising uses particular lexical and visual tropes to reinforce the notion that carbon markets are "reliable" and "secure" in the face of such a "wicked threat".

If the legitimacy of markets is discursively established by invoking reliability and security, then the authors argue that subjects are "motivated" by discursive strategies that invoke the need for developing "speedy" solutions for the sake of people and planet (p. 671). The perceived temporality of the issue emerges as a key stake, where it is argued that the speed and efficiency of market processes is advantageous in making the problem tractable. This is nothing less than a discursive attempt to bring the temporality of climate change outside the slow temporality of democratic politics, and into the space/times of late capitalism.

Secondly, borrowing from the pre-existing tools of financial markets normalises and routinizes the trade in carbon. One example that the authors give is the establishment of a Carbon Rating Agency (CRA) that borrows directly from the structure of credit ratings (AAA down to D), so that potential traders can quickly assess the riskiness of particular CDM or Joint Implementation (JI) projects (p. 672). Financial derivative instruments such as "options, futures and swaps" are directly borrowed from financial markets (p. 673). In this sense, the epistemic community of those directly involved in the carbon trade is said to be constructed between desire and routine. Nevertheless, direct borrowing of the discourses and practices of financial markets generated discursive opportunities for critical analyses from social movements: the ENGOs invoked the trope of "sub-prime carbon" (Friends of the Earth US, 2009) as the dynamics behind the unravelling of finance capital were slowly publicised.

Lovell and MacKenzie (2011) argue that since the tools of the accountancy profession are key to making carbon fungible, they must be brought into the light of scrutiny. From 2005, the accountancy profession has sought to discursively position itself as well-placed to take the lead on the governance of climate change because of the debate occurring over "how best to integrate EU ETS carbon credits within financial accounts" (p. 714). The authors' empirical findings that this technical debate occurred "behind closed doors", with little integration of wider debates over "the principle of valuing the environment and accounting for environmental assets and liabilities" (p. 715), reinforces the difference between literal accountability and ethical accountability.

They note that, despite a slow start, we now see the emergence of international epistemic communities "connected through their accounting expertise and shared professional culture and values" such as:

> The Climate Disclosure Standards Board (CDSB), formed in 2007, whose Technical Working Group comprises accountants and representatives from the major international accountancy professional bodies…The CDSB has the objective of developing a global framework for corporate reporting on climate change, and is pressing for climate change to be integrated into mainstream financial reports (Lovell & MacKenzie, 2011, pp. 723-724).

Such practices are integral to ensuring the spatial flexibility of capital (as compared with state mechanisms), which has been the key driver behind the ascendency of carbon markets. The construction of markets overcame tensions inherent in the scalar politics involved in implementing pollution taxes, as nation states were "reluctant to cede tax raising powers to the EU" (Bailey, et al., 2011, p. 687). Although the UK (and Germany) voiced concerns about the extent to which the EU ETS could be reconciled with the commitments of national legislation, it was seen as ultimately more flexible, and no doubt more politically viable, than a national to regional up-scaling of environmental taxation. Ultimately, EU negotiations leading to

the implementation of the EU ETS saw it politically reframed, from it being viewed sceptically as an ineffectual tactical device to avoid real change, to a "practical device for realising the ambitions of EM" (p. 691). Thus, at the heart of difficulties in implementing the EU ETS are tensions between the technocratic logic of EM and the social consequences of uneven geographical development.

There are tensions between those traders who rely on the environmental integrity of the market and those seeking to exploit it for quick gain but, on an even more systemic level, the market logic of wanting maximum reductions with minimum cost leads to some perverse outcomes: targeting the removal of hydrofluorocarbons and giving waste sites payment for capturing and burning methane – which are inevitably positioned where the poor live – are easier 'wins' than investing in renewables development (Lohmann, 2005; Bailey, et al., 2011).

In terms of the materiality of the offset market and the projects developed, two different kinds of carbon sink can be distinguished: those sequestering projects "built from land, forests, soils, water, even parts of the oceans. Fast growing eucalyptus monocultures, for example, may be established on cheap land in the South and the carbon they 'sequester' then sold" (Lohmann, 2005, pp. 208-209).

The second type is more complex: it involves Northern emitters buying into projects in a Southern country which still emit greenhouse gases, albeit less than would "'otherwise' be the case" so Northern emitters can buy-in to schemes that can show that, despite emitting greenhouse gases, they emit less than if they operated in a less-environmentally friendly manner, so to speak (p. 209). For example, if a power plant in Africa burns methane, this can act as a recipient of offset funds because it is ostensibly less harmful in terms of CO_2e emissions than if it was a coal fired power plant (p. 209).

And, of course, this all says nothing of the difficulty of outsourced emissions from the production of goods and export of goods that the inhabitants of particular producing territories will not enjoy, or embedded carbon in transportation chains which emit across territories. There is indeed a "dialectical tension between the production of space in international carbon markets and local socio-natural relations" (Bumpus, 2011, p. 614), which is highlighted through activist practice and codified as activist knowledge, as an alternative curriculum of space.

And so, in identifying agents who have reduced carbon emissions, "[n]egotiators and their technical advisors have had to supress the candidacy of actors who happen to be resistant to quantification", such as movement activists working on both the supply and demand side of carbon reduction, with deleterious consequences, since "policy change and political movements are powerful factors in systemic change" (Lohmann, 2005, p. 214). And thus, the disentanglement, or black boxing, of such processes can be read as an "attempt to repress knowledge of the plurality of alternative futures" and an "attempt to repress popular participation in the taking of alternative decisions." (p. 222). In short, the carbon economy, when articulated into political discourse, is communicated as a kind of public pedagogy, which 'befuddles' the "concerned middle-class public" into thinking something is being done, and equates agency with technocratic expertise.

The challenge for the cultural politics of climate change

All of this signals an important point in the argument: the challenges of climate change education are centrally to do with "the total *disconnect* between the range, nature, and scale of the phenomena [that together constitute climate change] and the set of emotions, habits of thoughts, and feelings that would be necessary to handle those crises—not even to act in response to them, but simply to give them more than a passing ear." (Latour, 2011, p. 2).

Belief in the importance of tackling climate change is widespread, but frighteningly superficial: the best attitudinal evidence we have of this can be seen in national surveys where its relative importance compared to other issues is assessed. For example, in Scotland, 18% of respondents perceived climate change as the most pressing issue facing the world, with only the economy (19%) and the 'war on terror' (20%) being perceived as more important. However, when the same question is asked, but for issues facing Scotland rather than the world, only 4% of respondents identified the issue as being most important (Davidson, et al., 2008). Action on climate change is much more likely to be supported in the global abstract than in the local particular.

As climate change communicator George Marshall (2005, p. 7) has argued, the result is a bystander effect, whereby – when we consider that 80% of people in the UK believe climate change to be a major threat – there is "a crowd of 40 million people in Britain alone waiting for someone to take responsibility". Consequently, the principal task of the cultural politics of any nascent social movements concerned to tackle climate change - that is, the task of catalysing the dialectic between political culture of the state and the cultural politics of everyday life - would, on the face of it, appear to be the great *salto mortale* that still eludes us. The pertinent point is that this disconnect is exacerbated by a top-down technocratic hegemony.

In this context, it is my view that Nancy Fraser's (2005) argument for reframing justice in a globalising world helps us to understand the need to question the decision rules about whose voices are heard in decision making fora. When questions of justice, crowded out by market norms and technocratic procedures, are brought to the fore, new foci emerge. Fraser's (2005, p. 72) argument is useful because she reminds us that, "it is not only the substance of justice, but also the frame which is in dispute" (2005, p. 72), such that struggles over material redistribution and political and cultural recognition are always implicitly circumscribed by the issue of who is

represented in the political space. The three dimensions of justice are, therefore, to do with *distribution*, *recognition*, and *representation*. Representation can itself be bifurcated into two kinds of question: the first is, "do the boundaries of the political community wrongly exclude some who are actually entitled to representation?" (p. 75). The second is, "do the community's decision rules accord equal voice in public deliberations and fair representation in public decision-making to all members?" (p. 75). Whilst the former is concerned with boundary work, the latter is concerned with who is involved in setting the boundaries.

In *distributive* justice terms, richer nations have, over the course of their material development, used more than their fair share of atmospheric space as a part of the global commons. This is perhaps the most intuitive concept of 'justice' thinking in relation to climate change – the historical 'ecological debt' frame. However, distribution not only covers climate finance and the right to pollute in order to develop, but the distribution of technology and knowledge needed for adaptation and mitigation, and the attendant issue of intellectual property rights. It also speaks to the colonial 'land grabbing' practices of energy companies for fossil fuel extraction, and the extraction of profit through land rents.

As regards *recognition*, the concept of climate justice finds its genealogical roots in environmental justice struggles (Hill, 2003, p. 28), as campaigners and communities of resistance assert that the consequences of climate change are visited disproportionately on particular intersectional identities. Finally, *representation* – the framing of political space – is possibly the most troublesome concept, because the abstract nature of the threat creates ruptures between cause/effect, perpetrator/victim, and depending on how we see the "butterfly effect" of causality, chains of responsibility can seem too complex to be adduced in any practical sense. As Majority World negotiators argue, emissions resulting from the production and transport of commodities produced in developing nations, but consumed by developed nations, are effectively 'outsourced'. Nevertheless, market distortions

obfuscate these complexities. The representational dimension in fact reframes climate justice, as an issue of what Santos et al (2007, p. xxix) call 'cognitive justice'; meaning that the hegemonic epistemic community should be challenged by "knowledges and criteria of rigour that operate credibly in other social practices regarded as subaltern". This may take place through "invented spaces" of participation, , as opposed to merely "invited spaces" of participation(Miraftab, 2004). This distinction captures the difference between those participatory spaces that are claimed, subverted and informal (invented) and those that are presented to groups and officially sanctioned (invited).

This socio-political complexity that emerges when questions of distribution, recognition, and representation are brought to the fore, requires not only situated learning engagements, related to both demand reduction through community action, and lifestyle change but "sophisticated deliberation and reflexive engagement with climate change justice questions that span the local/global and present/future time-space configurations" (Lotz-Sisitka, 2010, p. 82). However, an important issue to confront is that abstract justice claims do not necessarily motivate change. "Learning the lesson of assembly" in relation to climate change knowledge, and conceptualising climate justice as an issue of cognitive justice involving a complicated reframing of political space/time, and cause and effect, implies a radical democratisation of knowledge, and optimism of the will. Below I address the cognitive and psychosocial barriers to implementation of such democratic ideals, and ask whether or not they are even realistic given the time frame?

Cognitive challenges

As an educational researcher concerned with how to change mental perceptions, I am particularly interested in the cognitive challenges posed by climate change. As I have argued above, these must not be considered in isolation from other moments in the social process (Harvey, 1996). The cognitive and psychosocial challenges posed by

climate change have been well addressed by a growing literature on climate change communication. This section will be brief, because the rest of the thesis is dedicated to considering such issues. Firstly, on the difference between acute and chronic problems: as a chronic problem, in the realm of everyday life, climate change is "very low in the hierarchy of needs" (Gonzalez-Guadiano & Meira-Cartea, 2010, p. 28). It is in this sense of climate change as an epistemological construct (not a material reality) , that it is considered a post-material and middle class cultural concern[i]. Inglehart's (1990) post-materialist thesis, based loosely on Maslow's needs hierarchy, states that increasing material prosperity creates more cognitive space to consider 'quality of life' issues including ecological, or environmental concerns.

However, this connection between cultural values and material wealth is not so simple: comparative work undertaken by sociologist Hanno Sandvik found as national wealth increases, concern for the climate decreases (Norgaard, 2011, p. 402). By using data on GDP and rates of annual growth as independent variables, and treating concern about climate change – drawing on data from a global online survey indicating degree of concern about climate change – as a dependent variable, Sandvik (2008, p. 339) found evidence to support his hypothesis that "the cognition of our species is biased in a way that enables us to supress 'uncomfortable truths'" (Sandvik, 2008, p. 339). In other words, there are significant psychological gains to be made in denying the issue's salience, when one's material wealth depends on emitting highly. .

The broader point here is that "people learn to think through socialization into different 'thought communities'" (Norgaard, 2011, p. 408), and so the trouble with connecting an abstract acceptance of climate change with everyday life is the process of cognitive dissonance occurring when the implications of acting clash with cultural values and norms attuned to specific political economic circumstances.

Fundamentally, this problem is compounded by what has been understood – through insights from psychology and behavioural economics – as our species-level, evolutionarily evolved cognitive short-comings: these are our tendency to favour short-term over long-term gains, our intuitive reasoning impinging on our abilities to think probabilistically, our bias towards problem solving in situations where causes and effects can be analysed in terms of middle-sized objects that can be visually perceived (Marshall, 2007; Jamieson, 2011; McGeevor, in Pykett, et al., 2011). In other words, climate change's "causes and effects are temporally and physically unbounded", and many of its effects will be relatively invisible since they will involve 'statistical' rather than 'identifiable' lives (Jamieson, 2011, p. 49).

Finally, we must add to this mix the controversy over alarmist rhetoric. It has long since been argued by myriad climate change communicators and movement intellectuals (Segnit & Ereaut, 2006; Hopkins, 2008a) that saturating people with so-called 'depressing' information through alarmist rhetoric further strengthens the process of cultural denial, in order to overcome feelings of low self-efficacy and cognitive dissonance. As I go on to argue, the discursive space for the cultures of activism I study opened from 2005 onwards, whereupon popular discourse became saturated with public pedagogies of disaster in relation to climate change, promulgated by the popular press, by politicians, and in films such as "An Inconvenient Truth" and "The Day After Tomorrow". Such public pedagogies were frequently 'alarmist' in tone.

For example, at the G8 meeting in 2005, then Prime Minister Tony Blair proclaimed that "we have a window of only 10-15 years to take the steps we need to avoid crossing a catastrophic tipping point" (Risbey, 2007, p. 27). One problem, as identified by many commentators including climate scientists (see for example Hulme, 2006), was a seeming disjunction between objective assessment of urgency, as espoused by the climate science epistemic community, and more alarmist public rhetoric. Nevertheless, as Risbey (2007) argues, although cultural strategies may

recognise the pernicious effects of alarmist rhetoric, the language used by scientists is more accurately described as reflecting an *alarmin*g situation, rather than being *alarmist.* Having outlined the three inter-related dimensions of educational challenge (epistemological, socio-political and cognitive) in the context of climate change, the next section explores how social movements might contribute to addressing these challenges.

Social movement learning in context

Social movement learning (SML) "refers to: (a) learning by persons who are part of any social movement; and (b) learning by persons outside of a social movement as a result of the actions taken or simply by the existence of social movements" (Clover & Hall, 2010, p. 164). As Foucault (in Rochon, 1998, p.239) recognised, social movements from the 1960s have changed "the attitudes and mentality of other people, people who do not belong to these movements", yet this is seldom acknowledged (Clover & Hall, 2010, p. 164).

Clover and Hall (2010, p.165) go so far as to contend that, "[a]ll of us, no matter whether we are formally informed of the intricacies of climate change or not, have been learning about climate change because of the nearly thirty years of work done by activists and movements". Activists "learn in" social movements, and bystander publics, politicians and even antagonists "learn from" social movements (Hall, et al., 2011) as they produce knowledge and affect cultural values and norms over time (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991; Johnston & Klandermans, 1995; Rochon, 1998; Earl, 2004; Williams, 2004). In the context of climate activism, Plows (2008, p. 101) writes:

> Publics can become directly engaged in protest activity or in other ways encounter the resources and discourses developed by countercultural networks. Routes of transmission include interface at the local

> community level…,or through encountering movement frames 'mediated' through the media".

For reasons detailed above, climate change education must necessarily engage with issues of political economy, issues of cultural change, and the intersection between them. In other words, diverse activist practices recognise the need to move beyond information dumping and lobbying, to re-catalysing the dialectic between the cultural politics of civil society and the political culture of the state. The cultural politics of social movements is educational, and education is a form of cultural politics. In fact, we can relate cultural politics to three different levels of the systematisation of 'knowing' within such activist practices.

SML can be informal or non-formal. *Non-formal* learning refers to any space created by social movement actors with a purposively pedagogical dimension. *Informal* learning is often self-directed learning, but can also be collective; it is often incidental, and accidental; it is situated, embodied and therefore often tacit and messy (Schugurensky & Myers, 2003; Conway, 2006; Haluza-DeLay, 2008; Clover & Hall, 2010; Crowther, et al., 2012).

Janet Conway (2006) makes an argument for three distinct forms of knowing in social movements, which *increase* in their respective levels of *systematisation*: "*tacit and practical knowledge*" produced through the situated and unacknowledged 'learning through doing' of everyday practice (as 'communities of practice'); *praxis*, in which "reflections on political practice in engagement with other theories and concepts inform further practice", or "the dialectical unity of theory and practice", as Holst (2002, p. 79) neatly puts it; and *knowledge production*, meaning "active, intentional knowledge production processes in which the intellectual development of self and others is a central dimension of capacity building for political struggle" (Conway, 2006, pp. 21-22). Cultural politics is enacted in and through these different levels of knowing, through prosaic and ongoing acts of organizing, through

contesting hegemonic representations and interpretations of issues, and through non-formal but explicitly popular educational activities (Conway, 2006, pp. 12-13).

At this point, however, it is pertinent to note that different activist cultures (direct action, community-based, and professional), with their own distinct actor-networks, enact different kinds of cultural politics (Jamison, 2001). As a result, different ideal typical 'modes' of climate change communication can be mapped onto the public pedagogy of various activist cultures. Cultures of direct climate action tend towards a public pedagogy of 'agonistic pluralism'; cultures of relocalisation tend towards a public pedagogy of 'consensus', based on more ostensibly open, non-politicised kinds of public participation; the ENGO sector, reflecting its own situated organisational structures and actor-networks, aligns most closely with a 'social marketing approach' to public pedagogy, in seeking to ascertain the ideal conditions for communication. Political theorist Chantal Mouffe (2005, p. 20) uses the term agonistic pluralism to describe a situation where the "adversary" is understood in a productive sense to be "a crucial category for democratic politics": where this is denied, we/they relations are understood to be "antagonistic", in the sense that conflicting parties do not recognise the legitimacy of one another. This view recognises the power play and affective commitments that determine modes of political association. On the other hand, "public participation" views politics as constituted through non-partisan rational deliberation in legitimate public fora. Finally, "social marketing" approaches discard the notion of people as rational decision makers, but also discard the principle of participation in favour of the notion that political communication can be improved through expert evidence-based interventions.

These divergent approaches reflect processes of differentiation and specialisation that have occurred over the years as the environmental movement has produced different 'cognitive regimes' of 'green knowledge' (Jamison, 2001). This process, dubbed 'cognitive praxis', by sociologists Eyerman and Jamison (1991) is a particularly

useful theory of social movements in the context of this thesis. To understand social movements as cognitive praxis is to understand them as 'cognitive territories', 'new conceptual spaces', which are productive of social learning through tensions and dynamic interactions between different individuals and groups acting in that space (p. 55). Social movement intellectuals coalesce to form 'critical communities' (Rochon, 1998), from which 'cosmological' knowledge (worldviews), 'organisational' knowledge, and 'technological' knowledge emerge (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991). These knowledge interests are the attempts of the authors to appropriate Habermas's transcendental knowledge constitutive interests, and 'operationalise' them as heuristic empirical indicators: distinct types of knowledge that can be observed, and emerge from the interactions within and between particular situated actor-networks.

Activists collectively 'learn through doing', as they draw upon the knowledge resources of previous social movements (p.57). Such knowledge exists in a dialectical relationship between resistance to the knowledge structures of the status quo and incorporation into them. In other words, as representations produced by movements are incorporated into the discourse of institutionalised actors, the 'cognitive' space for the existence of the movement is reduced. Thus, the professional campaigning groups and networks are said to represent incorporation into dominant cultural forms, whilst more 'militant' forms of direct action and alternative community experiments represent 'residual cultural formations' (Jamison, 2001). The (cosmological, organisational and technological) knowledge generated by these cultural formations is mapped in this thesis as a kind of public curriculum, generating processes of social learning *within* activist cultures over time, and *from* activist cultures amongst the wider public.

It is important to emphasise that culture in the theory of cognitive praxis is conceptualised after Raymond Williams, in its situated material and spatial context, not merely as a social psychological trait, or as discourse (understood in the

linguistic sense). Therefore, in this thesis, I also argue, taking a materialist view of culture, that the insurgent discourses of all of these activist practices are also intrinsically bound to the production of space. As Paulo Freire (1972, p. 90) puts it:

> People, as beings "in a situation", find themselves rooted in temporal-spatial conditions which mark them and which they also mark. They will tend to reflect on their own "situationality" to the extent that they are challenged by it to act upon it.

Through the spatial interventions of direct action protest, through translocal prefigurative cultural practices, through the framing efforts of activists, and through the grey literature of 'civil society' research, the analyses of these critical communities form a powerful, but often ignored, curriculum for wider society. In adopting cognitive praxis as an orienting concept, I investigate how its very premises have come to be reflexively challenged by climate activist-intellectuals. Furthermore, through engaging with discourse theory, I critically explore such challenges and their wider implications for political praxis. Based on what I have explored in this opening chapter, I present the following research questions, guiding this thesis:

Research Questions

This thesis addresses the following research questions:

- What are the cultural politics of direct action in relation to climate change? What curriculum is generated through this cultural politics?

- What are the cultural politics of community action in relation to climate change? What curriculum is generated through this cultural politics?

- What are the cultural politics of professional activism in relation to climate change? What curriculum is generated through this cultural politics?

- What dialogue can be observed across these activist cultures and, where it exists, has it been generative of praxis, and thus social movement learning?

- What can be learned about the cognitive praxis of climate change activism?

- What can discourse theory add to our understanding of climate activism as public pedagogy?

Structure of the thesis

The following chapter, entitled "The conceptual value and limitations of public pedagogy as a framing concept", situates this cultural work in the wider context of public pedagogy, and explores the conceptual value and limitations of public pedagogy as a framing concept. The term 'public pedagogy' has come to represent a diverse body of scholarship, connected through an interest in species of pedagogical power operating 'outside' of formal educational institutions. Despite debates over the term itself (to do with the very nature of the 'public' and the 'pedagogical'), this move allows me usefully to locate my work in a wider body of scholarship concerned with the pedagogical and curricular potential of popular culture, everyday life, struggles over public space, hegemonic discourse, and public intellectualism and social activism (Sandlin, et al., 2011). I argue that climate activism can usefully be conceptualised as producing public curriculum, positioned against the public pedagogy of neoliberalism, and 'in and against' the pedagogical state. 'Social movement learning' in civil society is generative of pedagogical counter-power, the consequences of which are ambivalent and uncertain. The value of this chapter, then, is in explicating Antonio Gramsci's (1971) maxim that all hegemonic relationships are intrinsically educational. The substantive focus of this chapter is in explaining what the terms 'neoliberal public pedagogy' and 'the pedagogical state' mean in this

context, so that we understand better how climate activism might be positioned both in and against such public pedagogies.

This leads into chapter three, which explores the contours of social movement learning itself, in the context of climate change. This chapter, entitled "Social movement theory in context", begins with the (seemingly obvious) rationale that a coherent theory of social movement learning requires both a coherent theory of social movements and a coherent theory of learning. Yet, this is important because different theoretical understandings of social movements, which reflect different assumptions about human rationality and agency, inflect differently on how any learning generated through their activity is understood. In this context, I explore three different cultural theories of social movements: new social movement theory, framing theory and discourse theory. This exploration serves two purposes: (1) the tensions between each of these perspectives reflect, in theoretical terms, practical tensions both within and between the cultures of activism that I study in this thesis; (2) I make the case that the discourse theory, supplemented by a focus on theories of space, is particularly valuable in bringing fresh insights to bear on the cultural politics of climate activism.

Having set out the problem motivating the thesis, explained its rationale and aims, and explored relevant literatures, chapter four, entitled "Research methods: deploying discourse theory", gives an account of my operationalisation of discourse theory, and outlines my approach to data collection and analysis. Discourse theorists "are concerned with how, under what conditions, and for what reasons, discourses are constructed, contested and change" (Howarth, 2000, p. 131). I am essentially interested in answering these kinds of questions in order to gain insight into how a dislocatory moment has produced the conditions for antagonisms, from which overlapping but distinct articulations of cultural political projects in relation to climate change arose. Thus, I am interested in applying these questions in order to

learn about the implications of these projects for the cognitive and political praxis of climate change activism.

Deploying post-structuralist discourse theory does not imply a kind of 'methodological anarchism' where 'anything goes', but neither does it necessitate a mechanical application of particular procedural logics (Howarth, 2000, p. 134). What discourse theory does provide is a distinctive theoretical logic, which can be applied to particular empirical contexts without stripping them of their historical singularity and contingency. Situated partly in a hermeneutic tradition of empirical research – but importantly, departing from it in the sense that it does not aim simply to distinguish true meanings from 'surface' obfuscations – the veracity of my interpretation of empirical material will be determined in large by scholarly judgement of my application of a distinctive set of theoretical logics to the subject at hand. Yet, although there is no one algorithmic replicable procedure, I have found the work of Lene Hansen (2006) particularly useful as a heuristic guide of how to operationalise key concepts from discourse theory. I draw upon her work in order to construct an intertextual research model premised upon the investigation of three ethically, spatially and temporally constituted 'basic discourses' or 'Selves', as she puts it, derived from Jamison's (2001) analysis of three cultures of activism, which developed over a number of decades through the cognitive praxis of 'green knowledge'.

Having outlined the 'whys' and 'hows' of my research, chapters five, six and seven, constitute the substantive interpretive analyses of these three cultures of activism. Chapter five, entitled "Direct climate action as public pedagogy: the cultural politics of the Camp for Climate Action", explores how the cultural politics of this culture of activism was generative of public pedagogy, using discourse theory to explore the pedagogical and political problems and possibilities which emerged from such a cultural politics. As the equivalential chain articulating the meaning of radical 'Climate Action' grew to unite more interests in opposition to the political stagnation

and contradiction represented by institutional responses to climate change, the movement gained a significant window of discursive opportunity to educate the wider public, but fissures within its nascent identity posed questions of its efficacy as a public pedagogical force. The valorisation of direct action and ephemeral spatial interventions, as well as an analysis of the fetishisation of carbon, was produced through these resulting tensions.

In dialogue with, and in contrast to, chapter five and the cultural politics of DA, chapter six uses discourse theory to explore how the Transition movement enacts a different public pedagogy through differentiating itself from the cultural politics of direct action. Rather than becoming mired in critique, and sensitive to the dangers of alienating the broader public through creating yet more activist 'lifestyle ghettos', activist-intellectuals in the Transition movement began the construction of a nascent identity based on 'engaged optimism', and the creation of 'post-political' place-based narratives, based on the 'theory of anyway' (Astyk, 2007). This means that the movement based its cultural strategy on the notion that the things we need to do to collectively tackle climate change (and peak oil) must seem like the things we would be likely to be doing anyway, even if it were no longer a problem. This, in turn, so the argument goes, means creating cultural narratives, based on a sense of universal morality and virtue, that both appeal broadly and transcend traditional political boundaries. Although the cultural politics of Transition makes a strategically intelligent discursive move in order to mobilise people around the empty signifier of Transition, its own denial of its contingency on a constitutive outside can be read as a hegemonic manoeuvre replete with its own ambivalences. I therefore explore these ambivalences as a result of the cleavage of the political from the cultural. By refusing to engage in agonistic politics, I show how particular concepts central to Transition culture can so easily become floating signifiers incorporated into alternative chains of equivalence that reconfigure political frontiers in favour of the status quo.

One potentially problematic aspect of Transition culture's denial of agonistic politics that I identify is its readiness to invoke a politics of 'bottom up' change, of 'community' and of the 'grassroots', without confronting power. This is a problem because by ignoring the political economy of the formation of movement intellectuals, and invoking exaggerated claims of grassrootism and horizontal associationalism, the structural barriers to participation, as well as more insidious and distributed forms of power, are obfuscated. In reality, Transition culture stems from the application of psychological insights developed through collaboration with intellectuals and knowledge workers from academia and professional campaigning networks In fact, intertextual links between Transition culture and the cultural politics of professional campaigning network Common Cause show strong links between the cognitive praxis of both cultures of activism.

The final substantive chapter, entitled "Professional activism: the cultural politics of Common Cause", explores how the cultural politics of professional ENGOs have looked to expand the intellectual terrain, and have also influenced the cultural politics of relocalisation. Although there are significant tensions and differences between the cultural politics of Common Cause and the Transition movement, they are united by a belief in universal values and a questioning of the Enlightenment subject. In this chapter, I examine how these cultures of activism can be understood as undergoing a process of meta-learning through which they are actually questioning the very premise of the 'cognitive' in the cognitive praxis. Yet, I argue in this chapter that there is a fundamental tension at play: much is made of questioning the myth of Homo economicus and the Enlightenment subject, without any reflection on the irony of interventions grounded in an evidence-based approach to culture change, which rely on the epistemic validity of the academy to promulgate woolly notions of the Common Good. Thus, in this chapter, I use discourse theory to examine the potential of such approaches in the context of climate change, and the problems that arise when culture change is co-opted into an ideology of scientism; where Common Values can be unproblematically identified by epistemic

communities of culture change experts who then devise interventions and tools to implement them, in the governance of an irrational public. Although claims to epistemic legitimacy through evidence-based policy are seductive, their popularisation amongst the wider environmental movement and influence upon the wider public do not always make clear that such work is part of a far-reaching process of territorial expansion by psychology, cognitive science and behavioural economics. In fact, such an approach does not at all challenge, but re-enforces the humanist ideal that there is indeed space for a theory of 'transformative learning' (Mezirow, 1995) in relation to climate change.

In the concluding chapter, I offer reflections on the thesis, reflexively considering themes emerging from the research in the context of the research questions articulated in this chapter, and considering areas for future research. I ask what the consequences of my investigation reveal about the cognitive and political praxis of climate activism. In doing so, I reflect on the problematic of the three competing temporalities that we face: the temporality of capital accumulation; the temporality of anthropogenic climate change and the temporality of democratic politics, and consider the structure/agency problematic in this context. I acknowledge the limitations of the thesis, but also its theoretical contributions.

Chapter 2

Beyond climate change: The conceptual value of public pedagogy as a framing concept

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I defined the research problem, framed broadly by two overarching questions: what are the educational challenges related to addressing climate change?; and what role might social movements play in addressing these challenges? In identifying the challenges, I analysed the complexities of knowledge production in the science/policy nexus, and then went on to outline the co-implicated cognitive and psychosocial challenges that result. I finished by outlining a set of specific research questions guiding the thesis.

The dominant discourses of climate change emanating from the science/policy nexus are characterised by a particularly toxic combination: a public pedagogy of fear, combined with technocratic pedagogies, which educate the wider public that the problem can be made tractable through the bird's eye view interventions of experts, in lieu of significant civil society participation. To put it simply we could say that this thesis addresses the tensions between two aspects of public pedagogy: the 'official' one that derives from the hybrid 'science/policy' epistemic community, and the one that emerges from critical communities, composed of activist-intellectuals.

I argued in the introduction that climate change poses particular and profound challenges to the cultural politics of social movements for a multitude of reasons, which are all connected to "the total *disconnect* between the range, nature, and scale of the phenomena [that together constitute climate change] and the set of emotions,

habits of thoughts, and feelings that would be necessary to handle those crises—not even to act in response to them, but simply to give them more than a passing ear" (Latour, 2011, p. 2). This, in my view has to do with what cultural theorist Slavoj Žižek (2009, p. 154) calls waiting for the 'Big Other'. We all hope to be guided by a 'subject supposed to know', when no such subject exists! This to me would suggest the final abandonment of the kinds of teleological reasoning driving both laissez-faire liberalism through to the kind of Marxism that the Second International flirted with. On the one hand, the current trajectory of humanity is unsustainable, yet on the other, science tells us that we do not have time for the glacial pace of old notions of 'historical necessity'. Ultimately, the challenge of climate change dislocates the underlying humanist narratives of adult education, and forces us to reflect on whether or not there is space for a theory of 'transformative learning' (Mezirow, 1995) in relation to climate change.

Nevertheless, I would contend that the problem cannot be construed as one of 'human nature' holding back political action. Firstly, I do not believe in teleological or totalising accounts of 'human nature'. Secondly, climate change is not a post-political problem. It is a problem of overuse – of carbon sinks, of fossil fuels – driven by a hegemonic economic system which aspires to an ideal of 3% annual compound growth in order to function and reproduce itself (Harvey, 2010). As a result, our dominant, and often tacit, cultural values and norms reinforce "a worldview which embraces [conspicuous] consumption as a fair reward for a lifetime's dedication to the growth economy" (Marshall, 2007, p. 4). The problem becomes a double bind. To the extent that climate change movements are embroiled in a battle for hearts and minds, their pedagogical dimensions are about much more than the promulgation of climate science: they are located in and against the public pedagogies of the state-corporate nexus.

The public pedagogy triad: market, state, civil society

It is in this context that it is useful to situate a theoretical exploration of social movement learning and education, and its so-called 'sister activity' (Hall, 2009, p. 46), knowledge production, in the broader frame of 'public pedagogy'. Broadly speaking, public pedagogy is a term that has come to represent scholarship interested in the process of learning and education occurring outside formal institutional contexts. In the only comprehensive review (covering 420 publications) of the public pedagogy literature, Sandlin et al (2011, p. 338) identify five primary categories, four of which are relevant in the context of climate activism: "popular culture and everyday life; informal institutions and public spaces; dominant cultural discourses; and public intellectualism and social activism". The grouping pertaining to the relationship between formal schooling and citizenship that Sandlin et al identify is beyond the scope of my study. This being said, given the significant role of social movements in shaping knowledge on climate change (Jamison, 2010), it would be sociologically valuable to investigate the extent to which such knowledge has breached the formal curriculum. As social movement scholar Zald (2000a) points out, this is one of the more neglected cultural consequences of social movements. As such, investigating the relationship between formal schooling and social movements in the context of learning and knowledge production, would certainly be a fruitful avenue of future research.

That idea that popular culture and, more broadly, everyday life is a learning project through which cultural identities are reproduced and contested owes a debt to feminist scholarship (Luke, 1996). As I have already argued, the primary challenges for the cultural politics of climate activism are about how the abstract carries into the 'thematic universe' of the everyday (Freire, 1972). As regards the strand of literature focusing on the educative potential of public spaces, climate activism is principally about the right to the 'production of space' (Lefebvre, 2000[1974]): whether this

takes the shape of a cultural re-engagement with 'place' through community building, or the spatial interventions of direct action ('invented' rather than 'invited' spaces of public participation), the 'recommonsing' of our discourse only makes sense in the context of concrete spatial interventions. Finally, as I have argued, tackling climate change is primarily about challenging dominant cultural discourses, and it is the role of public intellectualism and social activism in rising to this challenge that I am concerned with here.

Public pedagogy is a term that captures the confluence of cultural politics and education, and has been championed over the years by Henry Giroux, who in turn, has been influenced by scholarship from the Birmingham Centre for Cultural Studies (established in 1964). As a signifier, the term public pedagogy has its uses, and its limits. In what follows I would like to make both clear. In the widest general terms, public pedagogy is concerned with forms of education and learning occurring outside formal educational institutions: it is used to circumscribe an imbroglio of scholarship undertaken by those who "position informal spaces of learning such as popular culture, the Internet, public spaces such as museums and parks, and other civic and commercial spaces, including both old and new social movements, as *sites of pedagogy containing possibilities for both reproduction and resistance*" (Sandlin, et al., 2010, p. 2, my italics).

The primary utility of this concept, in relation to climate activism, lies in this final sentence. The term 'public pedagogy' finds its value in taking seriously "[what] many cultural studies theorists failed to take seriously, [namely] Antonio Gramsci's insight that "[e]very relationship of 'hegemony' is necessarily an educational relationship"— with its implication that education as a cultural pedagogical practice takes place across multiple sites as it signals how, within diverse contexts, education makes us both subjects of and subject to relations of power" (Giroux, 2010, p. 492). To discuss a nascent climate change movement as public pedagogy then is, after radical educator and social movement learning scholar Griff Foley (1999, p. 26), to

read it in the widest sense as "the struggle between insurgent and dominant discourses".

For the sake of clarity of thought, I invite the reader to conceptualise public pedagogy within the conceptual triumvirate of state-market-civil society (no particular order). The very point being that *each* of these categories is, of course, a chaotic abstraction, which cannot be cleaved from its counterparts. To reify any of these categories is to ignore that they are relationally constituted events and processes.

Thus, at any given time, the major function of public pedagogical practices may be to patrol the boundaries between these categories or, conversely, to clarify the actual processes by which such categories are constructed, boundaries naturalised, and connections between them obfuscated. Many 'Left' scholars, who diverge in fundamental ways, nevertheless agree that state, market, and civil society as sociomaterial 'entanglements' are of course irreducible, but that the discursive practices that serve to 'black box' their boundaries and shape our mental conceptions of what we believe to be true, are nevertheless real enough in their consequences (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987, pp. 176-193; Harvey, 2010; Hall, 2011, p. 716).

Thus, dialectical materialists would speak of *fetishisation*, through which reified categories gain dominion over our mental conceptions to the extent that we become ignorant of the sociomaterial practices that constitute them. Post-Marxist discourse theorists speak of *over-determination* in much the same way, whilst rejecting *a priori* totalities, and the 'new materialists' (also whilst rejecting *a priori* totalities) and those who utilise the language of science and technology studies (STS), speak of the *black boxing* "of specific practices and assemblages of the human and non-human" through representational practices (Edwards, 2010, p. 19). Theoretical differences aside, the common point is that the public pedagogy of climate activism in disrupting problematic constructions of state and market as if they were natural

categories, is a form of 'border pedagogy' (Giroux 1991, p.51), underpinned by a concern to render visible the shifting borders that "undermine and reterritorialize different configurations of culture, power and knowledge".

Scholars of public pedagogy have made powerful arguments that the possibilities for democratic politics have been severely undermined by sites, modes, mechanisms, spaces of neoliberal and corporate public pedagogy (e.g. Giroux, 2010; Graham & Luke, 2011; Luke, 1996). Yet, these so-called public pedagogies are not monolithic. It is in this sense that I find the term public pedagogy most useful: it speaks to the contested practices through which dominant worldviews "root themselves in the contradictory elements of common sense, popular life and consciousness" (Hall, 2011, p. 713), and through which social movements contest the status quo through hegemonic struggle to articulate diverse struggles and demands under populist identities (Gramsci, 1971, p. 350; Laclau, 2005; Giroux, 2000, p. 354; Melucci, 1996, p. 75; Laclau & Mouffe, 1987).As I go on to argue, social movement milieus as agents of public pedagogy in relation to climate change are positioned in and against the public pedagogies of "neoliberal corporate culture" (Giroux, 2010) and various manifestations of the "pedagogical state" (Newman, 2010). In making this claim, it is necessary for me to unpack these respective terms and address their critiques.

Neoliberal public pedagogy

Giroux (2010, p. 487) argued, borrowing a turn of phrase from Raymond Williams, that neoliberalism functions as a mode of 'permanent education', through which the "possibility for democratic politics" is undermined. Thus, the insurgent discourses of climate activists seek to increase "the capacity to conceptualize a meaningful sense of the public itself" (Sandlin, et al., 2011, p. 353). It seems to me that there is general academic sense in education studies in which it has become unfashionable or intellectually facile to talk about neoliberalism. Such critics, often influenced by

thinkers such as Bruno Latour and the thought styles of Actor Network Theory (ANT), ask questions such as "[W]here has it been compiled? Where is it? Where can I find it?" (Fenwick, 2010, p. 182).

To unpack *neoliberalism* as public pedagogy is to understand that the term itself is what Karl Marx would have called a 'chaotic abstraction' – that is, a first approximation, to which we "then need to add further determinations to reproduce the concrete in thought" (Hall, 2011, p. 706). As Stuart Hall (2011, p. 708) understands it, neoliberalism is a contingent ensemble of ideas, policies, and strategies held to together through sheer ideology.

From the 1970s onwards, neoliberalism emerged as a moral project underpinned by a faith in "the superiority of individualized, market-based competition over other modes of organisation" (Mudge, 2008, pp. 706-707). Its "*intellectual face* is distinguished by (a) its Anglo-American-anchored transnationality; (b) its historical gestation within the institutions of welfare capitalism and the Cold War divide and (c) an unadulterated emphasis on the (disembedded) market as the source and arbiter of human freedoms" (Mudge, 2008, p. 704). This is not the place for a genealogy of neoliberalism[ii]; rather it is my stated intention to adumbrate something of its so-called pedagogical character.

Giroux (2010, pp. 490-491) argues that "culture plays a central role in producing narratives, metaphors, images, and desiring maps that exercise a powerful pedagogical force over how people think about themselves and their relationship to others". His concern is that given the "enormous concentration of ownership and power among a limited number of corporations that now control diverse media technologies and markets", "the translating and pedagogical possibilities of culture are under assault, particularly as the *forces of neoliberalism* dissolve public issues into utterly privatized and individualistic concerns" (my italics).

Considering reasons for healthy scepticism over the utility of this concept, sociologist James Scott's (1990) "weapons of the weak" thesis immediately springs to my mind: in his influential critique of hegemony, Scott argued that people are not simply interpellated by – do not 'internalise' – ideology, but develop 'backstage' what he called "hidden transcripts", by which he meant dissenting discourses, whilst the appearance of hegemonic consent was performed, or enacted 'front stage' as a matter of necessity. Scott argued that "orthopraxy" – behaving *as if* one subscribes to a set of beliefs and ideas under coercive power – may be the starting point of all ideological processes. Therefore, in explicating the uses and limits of the term 'neoliberal public pedagogy', it is useful to keep this in mind.

Nevertheless, it is surely undeniable that today there is a genuine sense in which "[t]he historical rise of the price system as the primary political reality in which corporate profits signify general economic wellbeing reflects nothing less than the infusion of corporate consciousness throughout whole societies" (Graham & Luke, 2011, p. 117). Whether 'internalised' or not, public discourse subjugates social relations to market metaphors and, conversely, the market is nominalised and imbued with human emotion; "it 'thinks' this, 'does' that, 'feels' the other, 'gets panicky', 'loses confidence', 'believes'" (Hall, 2011, p. 722).

From the 1990s onwards, neoliberal *public* pedagogy has become so in a very literal sense, as the insidious erosion of the private and public sectors has gathered steam (particularly during the ascendency of New Labour), through public-private partnerships, ushering in a kind of corporate 'habitus' (Bourdieu, 1998), throughout public services euphemistically referred to in business-speak as 'culture change' (Hall, 2011, p. 715). Following from this, *accountability*, that is the "literal duty of care in the administration and expenditure of budgeted monies" (Graham & Luke, 2011, p. 110), has become increasingly cleaved from any sense of embodied ethical *responsibility* connoted by accountability, in the wider sense.

At its most fundamental level, as I have argued, the *cultural politics* of such public pedagogy involves discursive work designed to 'black box' the esoteric workings of new corporatism and neoliberalism, such that disjunctions between ownership and responsibility, between accountability in a moral and financial sense, and between actual human industry and business are kept in place and naturalised. Secondly, the inner workings of the state-finance nexus, considered as the central nervous system of capitalism, must be obfuscated, to the extent that it is natural to speak of only the market:

> The prevailing market discourse is, of course, a matter of ideological representation… [Markets] require the external power of state and law to establish and regulate them…This does not mean that markets are simply manufactured fictions. Indeed, they are only too real! They are 'false' because they offer partial explanations as an account of whole processes (Hall, 2011, p. 716) .

The cultural politics of such ideology functions through suturing together contradictory lines of argument and emotional investments which are discursively effective even if they are not logically coherent (Hall, 2011, p. 713). The construction of what Laclau (2005) calls "populist identity" is central to such a public pedagogy. Laclau understands populism to be a political logic, understood not as mere rhetoric or a set of characteristics of a species of political action, but as a reflection of a non-essentialist ontology based on relations of exteriority[iii]. This requires a particular understanding of hegemony as *the process by which an ideological discourse seeks to become so, through denial of its dependency on a 'constitutive outside', and refusal of its own contingent status* (Howarth, 2000, p. 123).

In the case of neoliberalism, different discursive formations have been sutured together from what has been available and credible at different historical moments.

In the UK, Thatcherism articulated links between "Englishness, the family, tradition and patriotism, on the one hand and classical liberal ideas about the free market and *Homo economicus* on the other" (Howarth, 2000, p. 9). These seemingly incommensurate elements were connected only by that which they stood in opposition *against* which, in this historical moment, was a moribund and crisis ridden social democracy.

Critiques of the concept of neoliberal public pedagogy

Yet to the extent that such processes of hegemonic articulation are contingent, emergent, and historically specific, cultural theorist and popular educator Glenn Savage (2010) argues that such nuances are not clear, particularly in Giroux's work. Savage charges much of the public pedagogy literature with a cynicism which fails to recognise the quotidian possibilities for resistance. It should be said that Savage's argument in this sense fails to attend adequately to feminist articulations of public pedagogy (Sandlin, et al., 2011, p. 346). Nevertheless, his arguments are clear in setting out the potential limits of public pedagogy.

Savage is concerned that the accounts of neoliberal public pedagogy are far too close in proximity to discredited notions of false consciousness, inculcated through "capitalist brainwashing" via mass media socialisation and the culture industries (Savage, 2010, p. 108). Although I share Savage's concern with unhelpful caricatures of 'descending' power, I would argue that Giroux himself never expresses such facile understandings. Giroux's writing is of course polemical, sometimes seemingly written as a wake-up call. On this, I feel it is simply a matter of taste for his tone. Indeed, the charge that Giroux's concept of neoliberal public pedagogy represents a monolithic ideological force is simply careless:

> Inherent in the attempt by dominant groups to transform rather than displace the ideological and cultural terrain of subordinated groups, dominant ideology itself is compromised and exist in a far from pure, uncontaminated state. Needless to say, the culture of subordinated groups never confronts the dominant culture in either a completely supine or totally resistant fashion (Giroux, 1992, p. `187)

To emphasise the extent of the success of neoliberalism as an ideological project, the London riots provides a good example. After the London riots in the summer of 2011, outrage at another incidence of perceived institutional racism where police shot dead Mark Duggan, found its expression through acts of consumerism. David Harvey (2011), responding to political and media branding of rioters as 'feral', described this as merely one more manifestation of the "animal spirit" of feral capitalism: "Thatcherism unchained the feral instincts of capitalism (the "animal spirits" of the entrepreneur they coyly named it) and nothing has transpired to curb them since" (Harvey, 2011).

> Since talk about poverty and inequality is virtually taboo, politicians address the young as 'aspirational'. But everything depends on how, and into what 'culture' aspirations are channelled….[The marginalised] resentful that society wants to control but will not invest in them; despairing at being unable to imagine a future for themselves; and lacking a politics capable of articulating any of this (Hall, 2011, pp. 722-723).

Across the board, attitudes towards the poor and marginalised are hardening. A recent study by the Rowntree Foundation, using data from the British Social Attitudes Survey, has even shown that the attitudes of Labour voters towards the poor have shifted since the late '80s, towards a belief in personal agency and individual responsibility: apparently, "47% of Labour supporters surveyed in 2011 said if benefits were not as generous, people would learn to stand on their own feet, up from 17% in 1987" (Ramesh, 2013, n-p). Whether the sense that the 'ordinary person' is getting a raw deal is channelled into support for movements like UK Uncut, or Occupy, or whether it is capitalised on by populist Right politics (as is

happening in the UK currently with UKIP), is a contingent upon discursive articulation. Certainly, it is ominous that it is perceived by many that there is no credible Left political party prepared to stand with nascent movements and articulate a coherent stance amenable to the mainstream.

Yet, again, I would like to reemphasise my disagreement with totalising 'false consciousness' explanations on two counts: firstly, citizens have 'learned' publically, at least since the unprecedented scale of the anti-war mobilizations in 2003, that when consent fails, coercive power can do what it wants anyway. People have 'learned' the hard way that Charles Tilly's (2004) social movement criteria of displays of "worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment", through "politics by other means" are no guarantors of being listened to by our elected representatives.

As people have publically learned the limits of MP letter writing and marching, despondency seems a natural consequence. In this case, 'weapons on the weak' might increasingly be reduced to hedonic escape tinged with a dark irony; what Gamson (1992, p. 21) calls "cynical chic", to denote the response to powerlessness whereby people overemphasise their cynicism to demonstrate that "they have not been fooled into wasting their time on something they cannot influence".

This issue of *wasting time* brings me neatly to what I regard as a criminally neglected argument in the structure/agency debates of the public pedagogy literature. Culture as a pedagogical resource is increasingly stymied by the network time of late capitalism, which many commentators (Hartman & Darab, 2012) have argued is insidiously creeping into all aspects of our lives, exerting what could be argued to be an embodied cognitive mode of disciplining biopower. 'Fast-time', what Erikson (2001) has called the 'tyranny of the moment', is partly to do with the way that technological advances changed the way we work, play and differentiate between the two. This, so the argument goes, marks a differentiation from a so-called 'Fordist' 'clock-time'. In order to avoid a technologically determinist reading, it helps to

understand that such changes are related to the need for capital accumulation to overcome geographical boundaries. Hassan (2009, p. 335) argues that, until the 1970s, new cultural forms had the time to evolve dialectically in relation to the dynamics of capital, "or organically as new independent forms". Yet, he argues that we are now at a point where digital network time has locked in cultural production to a "recursive mode" of recycling at worst, and bricolage at best.

Network time, and the overabundance of information that we deal with at work, at home, whilst socialising and so on, is said to squeeze out the slow-time required for reflective thought, meditative thought, and ultimately non-instrumentalised creative and critical thought. For example, sociologist Gemma Edwards's (2008, p. 305) empirical study of work intensification in the education sector found that around 85% of rank and file members of the National Union of Teachers never attended union general meetings and around 4 out of 10 surveyed cited 'too many work commitments', or 'care commitments' as the reasons for non-attendance (p. 307). Ultimately work intensification contributed to "a lack of time at work to reflect, discuss issues, collectivize them and make them their priority for action" (p. 307). In the information rich but culturally stagnant network time of daily life, cognitive attention becomes a key commodity, as individuals struggle to allocate it across the overabundance of information sources that demand it (Hassan, 2009, p. 352; Bouchard, 2011, p. 292).

In this context, the embodied political economy of attention should be of more importance to public pedagogy scholars: it augments Savage's critique of public pedagogy as neoliberal brainwashing, by suggesting that the individual is not *brainwashed*, but is *washed out*, to the point where their physiological-cognitive reserves for critical political thought, and addressing wicked problems such as structural economic issues and climate change, are low priority. The crux of this argument is that our own subjectivities are subject to the requirement of capital to overcome spatial and temporal pressures:

> [C]ultural studies seeks understanding through specific forms of "reading" to identify cracks of "resistance" (Hall 1973; Fiske and Hartley 1978) in the controlling edifice of the culture industries (especially television), where again no edifice really exists – only capitalism dealing chaotically and opportunistically with its deepest contradiction through constant fixes in time and space (Hassan, 2009, p. 354).

Thinking about space/time as a product of political economy, and therefore something political, enriches Savage's critique of public pedagogy. A good example, in the context of the rise of the populist Right, is given below (James, 2013):

> We live in time. If a worker lacks a good understanding of capitalism, if she votes for a right wing populist party (such as has just happened in the UK with UKIP making considerable gains in recent council elections) then this is not because she is stupid and not because the plutocratic class has manipulated her mind by inserting an ideological (i.e.: epistemic) veil between the real world and some delusional one. If a worker spends 8 hours of her day at work, operating in two temporalities via her body and her immersion in a disembodying digital temporality, and must suffer the chronic overstimulation of her evolved attentional capacities, thereby generating a near permanent level of chronic anxiety…then it is no wonder that she doesn't have a good understanding of the political and economic condition of her age. There is no time for it! Chronic overstimulation and under nutrition mean her brain is burned out, exhausted, and she must get to bed rather than crack open a copy of *Capital* or *Hatred of Democracy*.

It is important to emphasise that the 'tyranny of the moment' is not strictly something new to the advent of 'network time'; Paulo Freire (1972) argued that people living in poverty know all about the tyranny of the moment: dealing with perpetual crises, and working long hours for unfair wages, robs one of time as a resource. This condition is simply amplified in an era of cognitive capitalism. The consequence for the public pedagogy debates, and thus for my study is quite clear: an interest in the pedagogical potential of public space or lack thereof, should not be cleaved from the *temporal.*

The second strand of the public pedagogy critique is centred round the idea that the use of 'public' to describe the commodification of our cultural lives is an obvious misnomer. With this I agree although I'm not sure whether this gripe goes any deeper than invective over semantics: Savage argues that the socio-spatial polarisation resulting from uneven geographical development renders the very term 'public' problematic, because the resulting uneven distribution of social capital means that it makes more sense to speak of a plurality of publics (Savage, 2010, p. 104).

Furthermore, Savage (2010, p. 105) asks, "with the exception of exclusively state-owned libraries, museums, gardens and other such spaces, which citizens might not necessarily access, to what extent can we feasibly suggest that "public space" has ever existed, since the first line was drawn in the sand?". Ultimately, he argues that "ideologies of corporatisation" might be preferable to the "oxymoronic" term "neoliberal public pedagogy" (2010, p. 106). Of course, many of our public spaces are more correctly quasi-public in their ownership and degree of openness with the consequence that the public/private dichotomy is often unhelpful. Indeed, the central thesis of Castells's recent most work "Networks of outrage and hope" (2012) is that current social movements exist in 'hybrid spaces', combining the space of place and in the space of flows, which are simultaneously local and global, private and public. Thus, I do not have much of a rejoinder to this other than to say that the phrase public pedagogy emphasises that the public and the pedagogical are two intertwined stakes of political struggle, as the public sphere, and paternalistic state power is eroded by the market. Since obscuring the irreducibility of the state and the market has been shown to be a necessary part of the cultural politics of neoliberalism more generally, I move on below to make the argument that pedagogical power has emerged as a form of soft power, supplementing, and in some cases ostensibly supplanting more so-called 'paternalistic' forms of governance. Yet, I also argue that harder, more coercive forms of power are re-enforced through 'raced' post-911 disaster pedagogies.

In and against the pedagogical state?

In the UK, the death and resurrection of neoliberal discourse under New Labour's Third Way project heralded in the era of what has been referred to as the pedagogical state. This is used in different contexts to describe a situation in which pedagogical power replaces state coercion and 'harder' techniques of governance. This understanding takes on particular significance and multiple inflections in the context of environmental activism.

Newman (2010) and Pykett (2010) both helpfully question the notion of a coherent turn towards a "governmentality of the self" under neoliberalism; the former identifying four policy strands relating to a 'pedagogical state', which can be discerned from an historically complex assemblage of practices, actors and projects: these can be summarised as training for education and flexible capitalism; capacity-building for self-provision and self-management; moral regulation; and public participation and deliberative democracy.

The point that I would like to begin with is that the pedagogical state as a concept can easily slip into caricature if one is not careful with its various inflections. Its 'Moral regulation', or 'remoralisation' component can be read as a particularly Anglo-American phenomenon: a response to the "crisis of cultural security" (Green, 2007, p. 565) faced by the state in a globalised risk society, and one in which signifiers such as 'community', 'social capital' and 'resilience' are prescribed with classed, raced, and gendered implications. In other words, remoralisation can be read as an ideological response to social issues arising as a result of a 'performative' competition state losing its grasp on paternalistic authority in a "postmodern" polity.

Thus, whilst some argue that the pedagogical state is primarily about performativity (roughly speaking, a term catachrestically applied from the regulation of 'inputs' and 'outputs' in a cybernetic system) – the cultivation of self-reliant and flexible citizens

through pedagogical interventions – there is a quest for alternative ethical and moral frames, in the face of the "abstracted abnormalities and anomic potential" (Green, 2007, p. 559) of the neoliberal polity, which has seen a revival of neoconservative values promulgated in a variety of public pedagogical spaces.

This is compounded by the 'post-9/11' context, where moral regulation is linked to 'disaster pedagogies' (Preston, et al., 2011). Preston (2012) argues that public disaster education, in a post-9/11 context, is embedded into the fabric of everyday lives through security alerts, routines of securitisation, and media promulgation. Why might this be relevant to climate activism? My answer is that as climate change moves into the realm of the political, it is necessarily imbricated in a wider politics of economy, development, immigration and energy. The state's preparedness to apply tropes such as 'domestic extremism' to the uptake of direct action tactics can be interpreted as a public pedagogical device, designed to justify the systematic surveillance and repression of political activism. Social movement scholar Alexandra Plows (2008, p. 94) has rightly argued that "given the hard times for UK civil liberties in a post '9-11' climate, the continuing impact and uptake of [environmental] protest tactics deserves recognition". Post-structuralist philosopher and sociologist Baudrillard (Paillard, 2011, p. 343) has posited that the 'War on Terror' has become a kind of symbolic virus of the imagination, through which "Western powers have imposed a kind of security terror on themselves". As I will go on to argue, Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory, particularly their radical reworking of Gramsci's theory of hegemony, and Mouffe's theory of agonistic democracy, are invaluable in understanding what is at stake in this respect. The natural consequnce of the post-partisan myth is that when antagonisms arise, they are denied channels of legitimate 'agonistic expression', the result being the emergence of populist identities, both secular and sectarian, Right and Left. As I will show over the course of the thesis, the cultural politics of environmentalism in an era of climate change increasingly tends towards consensus oriented approaches, which seek to expunge the dimension of antagonism from the political.

The relevance does not end with direct action. Preston et al. (2011), are the first academics that have identified parallels between the discourse of 'post 9-11' disaster pedagogies and the discourse of community learning, with interesting implications for the public pedagogy of community activism against climate change. It appears that 'community resilience' is a quintessential 'floating signifier' – meaning, a signifier whose meaning is ambiguous enough to be appropriated by various interests into various chains of equivalence (explained more fully in the following chapter)– used in the context of national security and 'preparedness for emergencies', as well as responding to climate change and austerity. Preston, et al., in interviews with policy makers and community practitioners, found the 'absent presence' of race was a key feature of such discourse:

> Community Resilience is associated with 'Dunkirk Spirit' and 'Britishness'. In interviews with policy makers and practitioners, community resilience invoked themes of "localism and romanticised communities as sharing a collective (British) spirit of survival and counterpoised the metropolitan as anonymized and unsafe. "Race is therefore 'absent' in not being directly made, but always 'present' in terms of the racial associations which fetishized Britishness and stereotypically white, rural/suburban forms of social capital." (Preston, et al., 2011, p. 759)

Thus, as I argue in the forthcoming chapters, the post-partisan preoccupation with consensus, mixed with insights from psychology, and heavy reliance on the invocation of 'local community' in the relocalisation movement is problematic because in marginalising an agonistic approach to cultural politics, the power play constituting any stable social formation is obfuscated. In the Transition Towns movement, a survivalist element to its cultural identity often lurks barely supressed beneath front stage discourses of engaged optimism. Transition Culture also invokes notions of 'Dunkirk Spirit', as a narrative that bridges the need to relocalise for sustainability with relatable cultural mores.

More generally, the tropes of ‘community’, ‘resilience’, and ‘social capital’ – as well as being floating signifiers deployed with good intentions by relocalisation movements – are policy prescriptions for the marginalised – in lieu of any redistributive measures (Levitas, 2005; Worley, 2005; Robinson, 2007). As positive as such concepts can be, they may also be deployed in such a way that they reinforce the status quo. To be more specific, such tropes are ambivalent, and can be used to reproduce privileged class positions, and maintain divisions along raced and gendered lines. This is explored in more depth in chapters six and seven.

Finally, a very different way in which the notion of the pedagogical state is relevant relates to a range of strategies, which can be considered soft interventions designed to shape the subjectivities and behaviours of citizens in relation to pro-environmental behaviours. In this context, the performative state perpetuates the so-called ‘governance trap’ (where citizens and the state both attribute primary responsibility for acting to one another) through seeking to shape behaviour at an individual and household level in a way which obscures obvious tensions between neoliberal economics and sustainability (Webb, 2012).

This relates more to the notion of policy interventions informed by “*epistemological drivers*” such as “behavioural economics, psychology and the neurosciences”, and “*mechanisms*” such as “spatial design and (choice) architecture; temporal ordering; measures to rationalize the brain; and prompting social norms via culture change strategies, social motivation and segmentation, and the development of peer-to-peer pressure” (Jones, et al., 2010, p. 486). Such interventions can be considered pedagogical to the extent that they aim to ‘re-educate the habitus’ (Haluza-DeLay, 2008) (our structurally constrained habitual practices) and exercise a kind of technocratic control over citizens’ social learning capacities, through drawing upon academic insights into the relationship between the cognitive, social and material worlds. This aspect of pedagogical power, deployed by ENGOs, community activists, and Government social research departments, is quickly gaining legitimacy,

although often with very little critical scrutiny regarding its limits as well as possibilities in catalysing the relationship between the cultural politics of everyday life and political culture. ENGOs are productively applying insights from such disciplines to move beyond the piecemeal and short-termist interventions of social marketing, and towards a more holistic reorientation of our cultural values. In particular, ENGOs increasingly recognise the need to contest values and market norms of neoliberal public pedagogy. Yet, they assume that the Common Good and a universal value base is something that can be unproblematically identified through empirical research, and that expert knowledge workers can be entrusted with the task of devising cultural and pedagogical strategies for transformation. Again, I argue that the essentialist and totalising view of culture, mixed with a post-political view of evidence-based policy, is ambivalent and questionable.

In short, the portrayal of the state as a monolithic public pedagogical agent is misleading. In this thesis, I argue that discourse theory can be fruitfully deployed in order to analyse the ambivalences and productive tensions generated through the cultural politics of climate activism.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have positioned the cultural politics of climate activism in the wider context of public pedagogy. I have explored the rationale for this, and in doing so have looked at the limits and possibilities of such a positioning. I explained the various inflections of the term public pedagogy and argued that it can be disaggregated into the public pedagogy of the market, the state, and civil society. I explored the notion of neoliberal public pedagogy as set out by Henry Giroux with the intention of arguing that climate activists operating in civil society are positioned against such a public pedagogy. Nevertheless, I argued that these categories are reified generalities that barely reflect the multi-scalar interaction of persons, networks, organisations, institutions, cities and so on, that constitute them. Thus, the

very operation of public pedagogical practices is often to patrol the boundaries of these categories. I argued that the notion of neoliberal public pedagogy cannot be fruitfully explained in terms of Marxian notions of false consciousness (as opposed to the true path of Grand Historical Time) and that reality is far more contingent, and emergent, even whilst it is saturated with power. I attempted to explain the notion of being both in and against the pedagogical state as well as its various connotations in the context of this study. In doing all of this, I have set up the idea that the public pedagogy of climate activism emerges through hegemonic struggle. In the following chapter, I develop this line of thought by arguing that the post-structuralist discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe (1987) provides the most promising basis for understanding the cultural politics of climate activism in this way. I couch this argument in a wider discussion of the cultural turn in social movement theory, explaining the main tenets, strengths and weaknesses of new social movement theory and framing theory in relation to discourse theory. Such an in-depth exploration of social movement theory is necessary in order to understand how these different perspectives, and the tensions between them, are inflected in the practices of different cultures of activism.

Chapter 3

Social movement theory in context: implications for the public pedagogy of climate activism

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I situated the ideational work of climate change oriented social movements in the broader frame of public pedagogy. The primary reason for doing so was to emphasise that the knowledge making and educational capacity of social movements focused in one way or another on climate change is necessarily polemical; positioned 'in and against' the "pedagogies of everyday life" (Luke, 1996), 'neoliberal' and 'corporate public pedagogies' (Giroux, 2005; Giroux, 2010), 'raced' neoconservative 'disaster pedagogies' in a post-9/11 context (Preston, 2012), as well as the pro-environmental change strategies and community rhetoric of the 'pedagogical state', more generally (Pykett, 2010; Newman, 2010).

This point deserves close scrutiny, as it bears directly on how we might understand social movements themselves. Alain Touraine, for instance, argued that "[c]ultural innovation is not truly linked to a social movement unless it is polemical, in which case it comes into conflict with the mechanisms of cultural reproduction maintained by the dominant class" (Touraine, 1977, p. 330). If this is what I take to be the case, then I will have to either occlude various non-confrontational pedagogical practices that I would recognise as being part of a broader climate 'movement', or else allow for a more capacious concept of social movements. For instance, Goodwin and

Jasper (1999, p. 35) argue that "[m]oral or "prefigurative" movements, that put unorthodox values or norms into practice – including religious movements, utopian communities and self-help movements – challenge dominant cultural beliefs and ideologies without directly confronting, and in some cases intentionally avoiding, the state or polity members". In the case of climate change, there are certainly utopian community practices and self-help practices, which align with such understandings.

Moreover, there are a number of studies of "social movement learning", which would stretch some of the more rigid definitions of social movements available in the sociological literature (Gouin, 2009; Parrish & Taylor, 2007; Sandlin & Walther, 2009; Flowers & Swan, 2011; Jubas, 2011). These studies use the term social movement learning to address movements based on ethical consumption; faith; less valorised forms of community struggle in everyday life; the reclamation of time through 'living simply', and 'slow food', where simply 'slowing down' is considered to be counter-hegemonic. It sometimes seems as though the subjects of such studies are only nominally connected by an interest in 'social movement learning'.

This review chapter is partly based on the premise that any coherent theory of social movement learning in context must combine two co-implicated components: a theory of social movements and a theory of learning. I proposed in chapter one that three 'modes' of climate change communication – *social marketing, deliberative democracy, and agonistic pluralism* (Carvalho & Peterson, 2012) – can be mapped onto the cognitive praxis, and thus, the public pedagogy of climate change movements. In this broad context, I will explore the extent to which, and in what ways, existing cultural theories of social movements help us to develop our understanding of climate activism and its educative potential. I ask the question, 'what is the right kind of cultural theory?' Expanding on the previous chapter, which essentially framed public pedagogy as hegemonic struggle, I make the case for Laclau and Mouffe's (1987) discourse theory, which retains key insights from Antonio Gramsci's understanding of hegemony, but moves beyond it. I situate my

argument for discourse theory in a wider 'cultural turn' in social movement theory, which includes new social movement theory and framing theory. Crudely speaking, new social movement theory speaks to 'deliberative democracy' approaches, framing theory speaks to 'social marketing' approaches, and discourse theory speaks to 'agonistic pluralism' approaches. It is vital to explore each of these approaches in some depth precisely because they reflect, in theoretical terms, important tensions occurring both within and between the concrete practices of each culture of activism studied. I explore new social movement theory and framing theory first, in order that I can place my argument for discourse theory in a context where it is clear to the reader how it differs from, and improves upon, these accounts of the cultural work of social movements.

Over the course of this chapter, I make it clear that I think social movements can be defined in terms of relations of exteriority: that is to say, they are emergent, contingent and reliant upon an outside that partially constitutes their inside. Consequently, they create identities that strive for a necessary, yet impossible, fullness. This is one primary reason why I find discourse theory so useful. I have no problem accepting that a social movement can encapsulate cultural practices that are *implicitly* anti-status quo, but are *strategically* non-confrontational. The more interesting question to me is the extent to which confrontation and power can be avoided, and the consequences of particular activist cultures' disavowal of confrontational repertoires in constructing a strong movement around climate change.

Why culture?

It is necessary to place my discussion of cultural theories of social movements in theoretical and historical context before I begin. In particular, a concise discussion of the rational turn in social movement theory is necessary because I think it helps to explain particular tensions evident in concrete practices of climate activism around

the empirical and the normative, as well as reason and affect. *Pre-1960s* social movement studies tended to characterize social movements in pathological terms: participants were looked upon as irrational, and protest leaders were depicted in Freudian terms as acting out unconscious psychological urges (Flacks, 2005, p. 6). Notable studies which characterise social movements in pathological terms are Eric Hoffer's "The True Believer" (1951) and Theodore Adorno *et al*'s "The Authoritarian Personality" (1950). This "dispositional perspective" holds that "movement participants will differ importantly from non-participants in terms of various personal and cognitive traits or dispositions" (Snow & McAdam, 2000, p. 43).

The *post '60s* period was marked by a significant shift in perspective, as many academics participating in social action during the previous decade could not accept such explanations of change efforts that they were both involved in and sympathized with. Thus, by simply recasting social movements as "politics by other means", Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) emerged in the late '60s as an alternative to, and criticism of, dominant theories, which incorporated social movements to other forms of impulsive, and somewhat irrational, behaviour, by depicting them as rational responses to the cost and rewards of different lines of action regarding a specific conflict with authority in the context of institutionalised power relations (Jenkins, 1983, p. 528; della Porta & Diani, 1999, p. 139; Piven, 1995, p. 137). RMT argues that, since grievances are to be found consistently throughout society, to define movements in terms of grievances holds no analytical utility. Later, Political Opportunity Theory (POT) emerged as what were seen by its proponents as a refinement of RMT. In POT, it is posited that social movements emerge as a result of expanding political opportunities, such as the degree of institutional openness, stability, alliance formation, and capacity for repression (Kriesi, et al., 1995; della Porta & Diani, 1999, pp. 223-225; Goodwin & Jasper, 1999).

There is an extent to which such theories are useful for understanding climate change activism. Existing studies of direct climate action have used the 'political opportunity' model to explain activists as rational actors responding to institutional failure and policy contradiction (Pearse, et al., 2010, p. 79; Plows, 2008, pp. 95-99). As Schlembach (2011, p. 195) observes, one of the features distinguishing the climate movement in its various manifestations from established incarnations of the green movement is an "epistemological shift" to "legitimization of activism resulting partly from the close observance of official sources of climate science".

To put it simply, it is clear that the mainstream political acceptance of anthropogenic climate change as a chronic threat, which emerged in the early millennium, provided political opportunities for activists to highlight the irrationality of trying to square the circle of long-term climate change policy and short-term goals of economic growth. This approach to theorising and justifying activism may seem all the more appealing precisely because of the historical pathologisation of collective protest. Existing scholarship has highlighted the fact that this identification of political opportunities then opens the space for various repertoires of climate action from direct action directed at the state and corporations (Pearse, et al., 2010; Plows, 2008), to collective action at the local level to reduce emissions (Nerlich & Koteyko, 2009).

In terms of public pedagogy, we can say that climate activists *learn to* mobilise resources, and that the wider public *learns from* the mobilisation of such resources. However, climate activists do not learn to mobilise these resources *tabula rasa*: latent 'capacity' is 'built' through 'cycles of protest' (Tarrow, 1991):

> Previous generations of [environmental] activists have accrued tangible resources —knowledge about campaign issues, political institutions, repertoires of action, 'ways of doing things', social networks, specific resource centres…which provide resources for new generations of activists (Plows, 2008, pp. 100-101).

Moreover, it could be argued that these theories of social movements do not account for the cultural work taking place in the "submerged networks" of everyday life (Melucci, 1996). Arguably, affective ties, cultural values and norms and meanings are necessary, in order to explain participation in collective action which may be high stakes, or for which there is no obvious instrumental pay-off for individual participants (Jasper, 2010). Cultural theorists of social movements have argued that there is "no such thing as objective political opportunities,…they are all interpreted through cultural filters" (Goodwin & Jasper, 1999, pp. 31-35). My suggestion is that culture provides a hinge between structure and agency, which more instrumental theories of social movements are ill equipped to account for. However, to what extent can culture be regarded as a resource to be rationally mobilised? Moving on, I explore how New Social Movement Theory (NSMT) addresses this question.

New Social Movement Theory

In this section, I focus on NSMT generally, albeit with a particular focus on the contributions of the critical theorist Jurgen Habermas. The reason that this is important in the wider context of the thesis is that Habermas's NSMT is actually a theory of social learning, grounded in his distinctive discourse theory of deliberative democracy. The goal of this theory is to formulate context-free, universally applicable axioms, from which the validity and rationality of discourse in the public sphere can be judged. As such, it provides an 'ideal type' of public pedagogy, which is reflected in the organisational cognitive praxis of different cultures of climate activism.

Generally, NSMT has "provided a shared perspective for such European theorists as Alain Touraine (France), Alberto Melucci (Italy), Jürgen Habermas (Germany), and Manuel Castells (Spain) who sought to construct a macro societal paradigm for explaining the rise of movements in society" (Waters, 2008, p. 63). The first distinction that should be made is the separation of actually existing NSMs, and the

theories that they inspired. NSMT is an unashamedly teleological and macro-sociological body of theory, which emerged as an interpretation of European student movements, and subsequent waves of student protest in North America, in the 1960s and '70s, that ostensibly could not be accounted for by the Marxian and Parsonian modes of sociological explanation dominant in critical sociology of the time (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991, pp. 19-23; Waters, 2008).

It is well-documented that the critical historical-geographical moment for the development of NSMT was May 1968, France. A student-led and instigated movement which articulated so-called 'post-material' demands, successfully forged alliances with the French working class and the trade unions, to the extent that, at the zenith of the protests, over eight million people went on strike and the legitimacy of the French Government was put under severe strain (Hannigan, 1985; Eyerman & Jamison, 1991; Welton, 1993; Waters, 2008). The unfolding of the movement and its demands, were rooted in what radical educator Freire (1972) called "ontological vocation", that is, an intellectual questioning of the whole of human experience and purpose; this questioning, centred around demands for freedom, real participatory democracy and autonomy, provided the concrete historical circumstances required for critical Marxists, such as Henri Lefebvre and Touraine, to reconceptualise the critical site for contestation as *alienation in everyday life, and culture,* rather than the point of production (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991; Welton, 1993; Waters, 2008).

Subsequently, seemingly heterogeneous protests spread throughout the 'Global North', related to issues of ecology, animal rights, women's rights, LGBT, sexuality, personal and local autonomy, held together, on the face of it, by a common membership base that was young, white, and educated. A questioning of the promethean faith in our productive capacity, and even the seeds of what we would now call post-humanism, were brought into question by these movements, who saw evidence of nuclear militarization of nation states and ecological degradation as justification for their endeavours. Welton (1993, p. 160) argued that actually existing

NSMs combined "four basic principles weaving through particular movements: ecology, social responsibility, grassroots democracy [and] non-violence".

NSMT was a theory which developed around the idea of the *emergence* of identity and ideological consciousness in response to situations where existing norms fail to provide guidance as to a course of action. In this sense, the *theory* itself was not so new in that it could be seen as a development of what was called "emergent norm theory" (Turner & Killian, 1957; Turner & Killian, 1972), which evolved from the work of the symbolic interactionists in which cultural innovators suggest courses of action, which may or may not be taken up more widely and become new norms (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991, p. 13; Hannigan, 1985, p. 435; Hannigan, 2006, p. 139). However, emergent norm theory and symbolic interactionist approaches have been critiqued for failing to take account of the particularity of the socio-historical moment and, as such, can be regarded as the antithesis of structural functionalist approaches that "looked for the societal determinants of collective behaviour" (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991, p. 13).

This was addressed by NSMT, which situated the symbolic interaction of emergent norm theory in a macro-societal theory. NSM theorists believed that social movements could only be understood within a wider analysis of the particular socio-historical moment from which they emerge. NSM theorists believed that social conflicts took the shape of cultural confrontations because of a systemic shift towards 'post-industrial' capitalism, where technocratic control of culture and its commodification were epoch defining concerns (Touraine, 1977; Habermas, 1981; Melucci, 1996). Habermas understood and explained this through his thesis that the most important axis of conflict from which movements arose was not capital/labour, but was between what he called the logic of the "systemworld" and the "lifeworld" (Habermas, 1981, p. 202)[iv]. Roughly speaking, the systemworld is the state-market nexus, and is driven by the "functional rationality" of commodification and bureaucratisation. The rationality of the system world is applied to strategic and

purposive ends in order to reproduce the system. On the other hand, the lifeworld consists of public (work, education, leisure) and private (e.g. family) spheres of everyday life, where reason becomes "communicative rationality", driven by normative, ethical and aesthetic concerns (Habermas, 1981; Welton, 2001; Edwards, 2008).

Social movements emerge from "legitimacy crises": roughly speaking, situations where the "resources" of the lifeworld are marshalled to reason against the irrationality of systemworld logics in particular contexts. These "lifeworld resources", namely social networks, cultural formations and identities, are at once productive of, and produced though, a so-called "universal pragmatics" of communicative action (Edwards, 2008). The conditions for this "universal pragmatics", rest upon three pillars of intersubjective communication, which Habermas calls "validity claims": propositional truth, the sincerity of the speech act and the rightness of norms (Habermas, 1979). In other words, one asks of one's interlocutor, 'does s/he have reason to say this?', 'does s/he mean what s/he says?', and (to me, the most problematic) 'is this right according to intersubjectively established norms?'.

It is because these claims can only be verified through rigorous intersubjective communication that there is a deeply participatory principle at work. I would like to suggest to the reader that it is a scholastic justification of the kind of consensus approaches to climate politics at work in different cultures of activism. In this way, NSMT provides a potential bridge between the rational and the cultural turn in social movement theory, as culture itself is a resource to be rationally mobilised (Edwards, 2008, p. 302). In the words of Habermas himself, "the rationalization of action is deposited not only in the forces of production, but also – mediated through the dynamics of social movements – in forms of social integration" (Habermas, 1979, p.120).

It is clear that such a position requires one to take a very optimistic view of human reason and intentionality. As a post-structuralist, I find these conditions fundamentally questionable. It is not the 'propositional truth' condition that bothers me, so much as much as the other two. I would argue that norms and ideals are the result of the repetition of power-infused material practices, and not the result of some kind of transcendental intersubjective rationality. Following from this, the entire notion of the sincerity of a sovereign 'Self' is arguably problematic. Moreover, I would argue that people, despite tacitly recognising elements of insincerity in intersubjective encounters, often 'validate' claims because they believe that they *should* act in 'good faith'.

Generally, post-structuralist theorists of hegemony such as Chantal Mouffe are not convinced by his rule-based linguistification of democracy, or the "epistemic function ascribed to democratic will formation" whereby the legitimacy of the democratic procedure is derived from "the general accessibility of a deliberative process, whose structure grounds an expectation of rationally acceptable results" (Mouffe, 2005, p. 86). The fundamental disagreement between Habermasian discourse theory and the post-structuralist discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe (1987), is between the political 'moment' properly conceived of as popular participation in power-free rational dialogue, and the establishment of political frontiers within which such encounters might be imagined to occur.

At this juncture, I think that it is important to make an ontological point in relation to NSM theory: with these notions of epochal shifts towards 'post-industrial' conflicts and systemworld/lifeworld conflicts, NSMT simply replaces the capital/labour metanarrative with others. Because I take a post-structuralist position, I am sceptical of these totalising accounts. In my assessment, it is fair to say that NSMT vacillates between grand abstractions and the notion of micro-level 'emergence theory' in a problematic fashion. Touraine, as the ultimate macro-reductionist NSM theorist,

understood social movements as “the conflict of agents of the social classes struggling for control of the system of historical action” (Touraine, 1977, p. 298).

For example, although Touraine’s sociological intervention into actually existing NSMTs recognised their fragmented and sometimes overlapping nature, he believed them to be different from a true ‘Social Movement’; a monolithic antagonistic force set against the incumbent force, and locked into a battle for the direction of History. He argued that a true Social Movement involves a principle of Identity, of Opposition and of Totality and that “the conflict causes the adversary to appear, as it *shapes the consciousness of the actors confronting one another*” (Touraine, 1977, p. 312). In this sense, it could be argued that NSMT simply describes a teleological process of social learning, where social actors become more accomplished in solving social problems, through the application of reason within a liberal democracy. Hence, it is important to emphasise the word ‘evolutionary’ in Habermas’s humanist notion of “social evolutionary learning” (Habermas, 1979).

Implications for the public pedagogy of climate activism

Where might climate movements fit into the meta-narrative of NSMT? Are they part of a broader movement to define the direction of historicity (Touraine, 1977)? What are they opposed to? Capitalism, globalism, neoliberalism? The ‘programmed society? the ‘systemworld’? Or they are they more pragmatic? Much climate change activism seems to favour a kind of micro-politics averse to such grand narratives and imposed meanings (Scott-Cato & Hillier, 2010). This suspicion of what has been described as the ‘theoretical Leninism’ of NSMT’s grand ambitions is present in relocalisation movements, as well as the anarchistic and Zapatista-inspired roots of the alter-globalisation movement, from which DA climate activists draw inspiration. The most coherent identity to emerge from climate activism to date has been around the idea of Climate Justice, yet it does not seem as of yet that there is any coherent

collective identity at movement level that unites the heterogeneous practices, organisations, networks and subjectivities, which constitute climate activism (Jamison, 2010).

This is an important issue, and one that I will expand upon in the chapters to come. Yet, for now, I will say that Alberto Melucci's NSMT concept of 'metamorphosis' is potentially useful. Melucci argued that a feature of NSM activism was that personal passion and commitment for progressive social change in general, helped to maintain a general 'activist identity' over time, that allowed an individual to metamorphose in reaction to shifting realities, and juggle multiple identity commitments both within and outside activism (Melucci, 1995). In the context of climate change activism, the consequences of this are ambivalent. One the one hand, it recognises that individuals are reflexive and passionate creatures (King, 2004), and that a tendency towards climate change activism will often be related to a general passion for broader, more universal social justice concerns. On the other hand, it recognises the identity processes supporting the maintenance of a kind of 'activist' disposition, whereby passionate career activists take on the role of social change experts at the expense of the 'everyday'.

Another test of the utility of NSMT for climate change activism lies in examining the principles of participatory democracy, which traditionally underpin green movement practice (Welton, 1993, pp. 162-163). The pertinent question for climate change politics to address is does, and indeed should, tackling climate change have any logical connection to these participatory theories of agency? In other words, can we separate means from ends? This is where the insights of NSMT are as valuable to climate activism as they have ever been to the environmental movement, more generally: whilst 'Third Way' environmentalists such as Anthony Giddens (2009, p. 70) would argue that we *can* separate means from ends, through "ecological modernization" thinking – where there is an "overlap between low-carbon technologies, forms of business practice and lifestyles with economic

competitiveness" (Giddens, 2009, p. 70) – NSMT's insights about discontent arising from control over information and culture in the 'programmed society' remain convincing. To the extent that climate governance is formulated within unaccountable technocratic networks, driven by instrumental logics of functionality, the cultural mandate required for action may not emerge.

Thus, the implications of NSMT for understanding learning occurring in and from climate activism are considerable. Actors engaged in normatively oriented rational discourse, upon encountering lifeworld/systemworld tensions, are confronted with the blocked 'learning capacity' of society (Habermas, 1979; Eder, 1993). Social movements have been variously postulated as sites *par excellence* of this process of social learning. As entities containing the so-called "latent learning capacity" of society, social movements are not merely reactive phenomena either. Partly, they are understood as prefigurative 'cultural laboratories'; that is to say, they create microcosms of what could be, including worldviews, forms of social organisation and technologies for living (Melucci, 1996). In this sense, Melucci understood the activities of NSMs to be symbolic. Direct action 'climate camps' and community-based relocalisation initiatives both exemplify this tendency. Transition initiatives, in particular, use the phrase "scalable microcosms of hope" to describe this. The Transition approach is to network these place-based cultural experiments in a larger ecosystem of Transition initiatives, thus creating a learning system of what Scott-Cato and Hillier (2010) have called "social innovation". In fact, Scott-Cato and Hillier liken these practices to Freirian pedagogy of creative praxis, whereupon people act creatively to read and write the world, and in doing so change themselves. If practices work, they spread.

NSMT recognises that unless fragmented projects are able to unite to recognise their epochal role in capturing the zeitgeist, they are doomed to marginality. Thus, NSMs exist on the "periphery" of mainstream culture and find their way into public consciousness through (1) networks created by "alternative publics", differentiated

by “density of connection, complexity of organisation and spatial range” (Welton, 2001, p. 30); (2) “episodic publics” of face-to-face interaction in everyday life; (3) “abstract publics” composed of the producers, consumers and channels of mass media (ibid.). Congruent, to an extent, with the “neoliberal public pedagogy” arguments of the previous chapter, NSMT argues that the ‘publicness’ of these publics is increasingly eroded by media power, by political power, and by corporate power all of which: (1) combine to render climate change a complex global problem, which can be made more tractable through market mechanisms combined with technocratic management; (2) render citizen agency in individualistic and consumerist language (e.g. the ‘do a little change a lot’ approach of many carbon reduction campaigns) (Shove, 2010; Webb, 2012).

Thus, NSMT is capacious enough to encompass what has been called the “relational turn” in social movement theory, which locates their power in the social networks they create (c.f. Diani, 2000). Viewing social networks as a ‘lifeworld resource’, simply “places cultural and ideological factors…in a relational perspective” (Diani, 2000, p.22). From this perspective, the network approach has been indispensable to social movement studies through theorising a dialectical link between social networks and culture through which “a linkage only exists to the extent that a shared discourse enables actors to recognise their interdependence (Diani, 2003, p. 5). In this sense we can say that “networks are the media of cognitive praxis” (Carroll & Ratner, 1996, p. 604). Networks are important to learning in this context because they focus our attention on the fact that social innovation occurs at the interface of people’s structural position in social networks, and the knowledge resources and skills that people bring (Campbell, 2005, p. 65; von Bülow, 2011, p. 169).

Network accounts not only of social movements, but of society, have been indispensable to the NSMT of Alberto Melucci (1996) and Manuel Castells (1996; 2012) who attribute the networked organisational forms of contemporary social movements to a wider systemic shift towards a decentred “network society”. There is

a tension here between the horizontal network as an actually existing state of affairs and as a normative principle, which is important to grasp. As spatial imaginaries, the language of the network is often part of a cultural logic, which works alongside other concepts such as 'open space', 'horizontality', and 'rhizomatic'. It may therefore prove important to investigate the extent to which such imaginaries as employed by intellectuals involved with climate activism (e.g. Scott-Cato & Hillier, 2010), differ from empirical reality and mask power relationships.

Overall then, unlike theories of ecological modernization, through which learning to tackle climate change results from the refinement of technological, institutional and economic arrangements, NSMT understands social learning at a societal scale to occur in the non-instrumental realm:

> Whereas Marx localized the learning processes important for evolution in the dimension of objectivating thought – of technical and organizational knowledge, of instrumental and strategic action, in short, of productive forces – there are good reasons meanwhile for assuming that learning processes also take place in the dimension of moral insight, practical knowledge, communicative action, and the consensual regulation of action conflicts – learning processes that are deposited in more mature forms of social integration, in new *productive relations*, and that in turn first make possible the introduction of new productive forces" (Habermas, 1979, p. 98).

Through a bracketing of commitments, power and instrumental concerns, citizens come together with a desire to communicate rationally. This theory appeals to those who have not given up on the idea that the democratic governance of society can be grounded on completely rational grounds. Rationality and Enlightenment reason provide a basis for processes of open communication and participation in economic and administrative structures, through which universally acceptable cultural norms can be enacted. The use of peer-reviewed climate science to highlight irrational policy and justify activist interventions often creates the communicative space that operates "between facts and norms" (Habermas, 1996). These movements then "shift

public opinion; alter the parameters of organised will formation; and exert pressure on parliaments, courts and administrations in favour of specific policies" (Welton, 2001, p.276).

There are a number of issues with this approach: firstly, there are arguments about the limits of rational dialogue, deliberation, environmental ethics, the application of cognitive rules and a calculating appreciation of the facts. For example, Haluza-DeLay (2008) argues that such theories ignore the fact that much of what we learn takes place through structured habitual practices. This learning is tacit in the sense that everyday skills and behaviours are learned, routinised, then forgotten by the conscious mind, but not the body (2008, p. 212). This 'learning' occurs in a structured field of possibilities, such that the notion of a sovereign individual who behaves rationally and freely is troublesome (Shove, 2010).

As a 'wicked problem', climate change pushes the limits of our cognitive architecture, and our intuitive spatial and temporal perceptive abilities. As discussed in chapter one, this creates complex issues around the role of technical knowledge, organisational knowledge, and ethical knowledge. It creates issues around how we respond effectively, as well as how we adduce responsibility for action. Meanwhile, the climate science community tell us that the climate is changing 'rapidly' and that we have a limited window of opportunity for action (Risbey, 2007). Surveying the scientific literature, Risbey (2007, p. 28) argues that it is legitimate to use the term' 'rapid' if the "system changes more quickly than our ability to respond", and finds that, in several critical contexts, "the term 'rapid' seems appropriate". This view has only been reinforced by the recently published fifth assessment report of the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2013).

What is pertinent here is that it is that deliberative democracy is a slow grind. There is a legitimate question here over whether or not our 'social learning capacity' is up to the challenge of moving at the pace required, and if it is not, there are serious

questions to be asked about the consequences for democracy. In the last chapter, I argued that that ideology critique is of limited utility if there is a disjuncture between abstract recognition of injustice and the rhythms and habitual practices of daily life. But most importantly, I would suggest that we must interrogate the credibility of the notion that *power* can be bracketed in processes of communicative action aimed towards intersubjective consensus, where unencumbered individuals only come to the table with their desire to communicate. Habermas contends not only that technical rationality has subordinated normative and aesthetic values, but that to solve our social and ecological problems we must come to a consensus about what norms we want to have enacted" (Brulle, 1995, p. 322).

Overall, we have seen that NSMT embodies a rationalistic approach to cultural politics and to learning. It has much to commend it in the context of climate change – particularly its analysis of the insidious mission creep of the 'systemworld', how this provokes 'legitimacy crises', and its deeply participatory principles. However, social movement against climate change, given the urgency of the timescale discussed, should arguably offer something more than rational dialogue, since it is not a problem that we are responding rationally to. For example, empirical evidence suggests that across the Western world, increasing scientific certainty has not led to long-term increased public concern about climate change (Ratter, et al., 2012, p. 7).

Looking at current empirical evidence, one might highlight research drawing on aggregate public opinion trends from the 27 EU countries (including the UK), as well as the US, which found that both concern and beliefs about climate change are most strongly determined by economic conditions. This research found that labour market conditions explain opinion trends better than weather extremes, media cycles and partisan politics: "a shift in the national unemployment rate from 5 to 9% in Europe…reduces the percentage of people reporting that global warming is a very serious problem by about 10 [percentage] points" (Scruggs & Benegal, 2012, p. 513). What surprised the researchers was that belief also decreased: whilst this change in

concern might be explained as a simple public goods dilemma in trying economic circumstances, a change in *belief* is harder to explain: the explanation offered was that because the perceived steps taken required to ameliorate climate change conflict with those perceived to be necessary to improving the economy, climate change *beliefs* are altered to overcome "cognitive dissonance" (Scruggs & Benegal, 2012, p. 508).

In a time-limited situation, what alternative ways of thinking exist? I will argue that framing theory and discourse theory provide alternatives. Part of the cultural strategy of the public pedagogical efforts of climate activism is to win over sympathetic onlookers through building bridges between the discourse and practices of movement milieus and the wider public. This is not merely a rational process but involves targeting pre-existing and often tacit values, norms, tastes, preferences and so on. In the literature on social movements this concept has been most thoroughly developed through framing theory. Framing theory exemplifies a more instrumental approach to communication, whilst emphasising its supposedly non-rational aspects. I move on to explore this below.

Framing theory

The concept of 'frame' in sociology is popularly attributed to the work of Erving Goffman (1974, p. 464), who deployed the term to describe hierarchical "cognitive schemas of interpretation that…function to organize experience and guide action". More generally, between 1970 and 1980, the term gained currency and was developed in the fields of cognitive science, linguistics and artificial intelligence (Donati, 1992, p. 140; Oliver & Johnston, 2000, p. 188). In the social movement literature, there is significant conceptual entanglement within the ideational triad of discourse, ideology and frame (Johnston, 2002).This should not be surprising since each of these terms on its own is subject to multiple interpretations. However, for the current context, Howarth's (2000, p. 3) distinction is useful.

> Positivists and empiricists argue that discourses are best visualised as 'frames' or 'cognitive schemata', by which they mean the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate or motivate collective action.

Frames are hierarchical cognitive structures including roles, relations to roles, and relations to other frames, which are said to be physiologically realised in the brain's neural circuitry and also linked to emotions (Lakoff, 2010, p. 71). Frames are systems, which must be strengthened over time with repetition. In this light, the framing approach to social movement studies connects most with the 'social marketing' approach to climate change communication, through which discourse is treated as something which can be rationally manipulated with the desired cultural outcomes (Carvalho & Peterson, 2012). It is important to explore framing theory because it has been taken up and developed by sectors of the professional environmental movement in the context of climate change. As such, it embodies an approach quite distinct from the one above and from the agonistic approach I argue for below. In other words, this section reflects, in theoretical terms, concrete tensions occurring in the practices of actually existing cultures of climate activism. From the 1980's onwards, framing theory became of interest to political scientists and sociologists interested in social movements because it appeared to provide insight into how frames rendered particular events meaningful for different audiences, thus mobilising people and widening movement constituencies (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 3). To link with my account of NSMT above, frames were understood to be resources to be mobilised by activists (Williams, 2004, p. 92).

Throughout the 1990s, as the framing perspective grew in popularity, a wide variety of framing mechanisms were posited, and numerous attempts were made to define various features of "collective action frames" (Benford & Snow, 2000). In this sense, framing theorists sought to do two things: firstly, they sought to introduce dynamism into theories of ideology, rather than reifying it; secondly, they sought to develop

concepts that rendered ideological and cultural work more amenable to empirical investigation (Snow & Benford, 2002). Collective action frames perform certain tasks, chiefly providing a "diagnosis" (problem defining), a "prognosis" (what is to be done), and providing "motivation" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 615). Similarly, Gamson (1992) posits that collective action frames have an identity component, an agency component, and an injustice component. However, there has been debate over the role of the injustice component in social movement framing. This debate retains a prominent role in my analysis of climate activism. The cosmological (knowledge pertaining to the development of coherent worldviews), organisational and technological dimensions of cognitive praxis, have in fact been understood by some social movement scholars as an attempt to "relate the representations produced by specific movements with more general forms of symbolic production" (della Porta & Diani, 1999, p. 79). The key concern in framing theory is how to bridge and align the collective action frames of movement milieus in ways that capture the attention of, and speak to the often tacit cultural values and norms of the wider public.

Implications for the public pedagogy of climate activism

The literature on framing is of obvious relevance to climate activism and its cultural politics, since it seeks to identify the discursive mechanisms through which scientific genres can be connected to more concrete social justice struggles, and through which discourse can be aligned with the meaning systems, values and norms of popular culture and everyday life, so that they resonate with bystander publics, decision makers and potential adherents. Thus, framing has obvious relevance to the idea of public pedagogy. The notion of framing aligns most closely with the 'social marketing' approach to climate change communication, which emphasises the instrumental dimensions of communication, and draws on cognitive science, linguistics, and social marketing techniques such as segmenting audiences in order to

"ascertain the optimal communication strategies for environmental matters" (Carvalho & Peterson, 2012, p. 9).

As cognitive scientist George Lakoff (2010, p. 72) brought to the attention of environmental activists and communicators, the central import of framing from cognitive science was to challenge the "Trap of Enlightenment Reason", where reason is thought to be "unemotional, logical, abstract, [and] universal", Lakoff argued that "facts must make sense in terms of their system of frames, or they will be ignored", with the implication that "social movements require the coherence provided by coherent framing", and accordingly, provides a number of recommendations, which have, over the period of this study, strongly influenced the cultural strategies of the Environmental NGO sector and relocalisation movements (Crompton & Kasser, 2009; Crompton, 2010; Holmes, et al., 2011; Hopkins, 2011).

One of Lakoff's (2010, p. 74) recommendations has arguably done more than the others to push forward the framing agenda in the context of climate change in recent years: he argues that framing is not merely an issue of shallow linguistic manipulation (in this sense the 'social marketing' moniker may be a little misleading), but that frames are mostly unconscious cognitive structures used to interpret the world that are consolidated through being reinforced over time. Thus, framing climate change should *not* be understood as a short-term messaging issue, relying on catchy slogans. Thus, the dilemma for climate activists of whether to lead by example – through contentious politics, or prefigurative community initiatives – or to change the issue to make it more appealing through framing, is said to be a false choice. Lakoff (2010, p. 79) argues that framing is ubiquitous, that the political Right do it better than the Left, and that what climate activism needs is a *pro-active* framing strategy, focused on moral values of the Left, that doesn't *react* to the Right's dominant frames, thus inadvertently reinforcing them.

For climate activism, and the environmental movement as a whole, the consequences are not only that cultural politics should be treated as a matter of strategic importance, but that such strategy can be rationally planned through applying insights from social psychology, linguistics, and cognitive science. Thus, Lakoff's (2010, p. 79) insistence that "there needs to be cognitive policy as well as material policy" can be interpreted as a form of "green governmentality" (Backstrand & Lovbrand, 2007; Paterson & Stripple, 2010; Luke, 2011). Two questions arise here: the first is to do with democratic implications addressed above in the section on NMST; the second with credibility. First, the very phrase "cognitive policy" might be interpreted as having obvious Orwellian overtones, that seem out of step with the ideals of direct democracy inscribed within the "civic environmentalist" (Backstrand & Lovbrand, 2007) discourse of the green movement. Second, is such an instrumental approach to cultural politics credible? To speak with the previous section, can the 'lifeworld' be considered a 'resource' to be 'mobilised' by cognitive experts (Edwards, 2008), or are there fundamental problems with this view? Such questions are particularly pertinent given the urgency of the 'wicked problem' of climate change. I will address these questions in the section below, but first, I should say something about the content of frames. If climate activists' efforts should fit within a wider, more holistic and universalist 'progressive Left' frame, what can the social movement literature tell us about the general properties of such frames?

As I mentioned above, the social movement literature tells us that the components of any collective action frame perform certain tasks, chiefly providing a "diagnosis" (problem defining), a "prognosis" (what is to be done), and "motivation" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 615). These are particularly challenging tasks in the context of climate change. William Gamson (1992, p. 32) has argued that successful social movements must avoid the trap of framing chronic issues in ways that attribute responsibility to abstract impersonal forces, lest such frames lead to a wider social narrative of resignation. Thus, the public pedagogy of climate activism, through injustice framing, should seek to ascribe responsibility to concrete actors (whether

individual or collective). Nevertheless, as I touched upon in the above section where I explored the definition of social movement, Benford and Snow (2000) point to prefigurative and non-confrontational movements to argue that injustice frames are ubiquitous rather than being necessary. Again, this general issue in the framing literature is particularly salient when applied to the cultural politics of climate change: injustice frame, or no injustice frame? Precisely this question has been the topic of considerable debate amongst activist communities, with some advocating that 'speaking truth to power' be suppressed in order to bring the issue down to earth and mobilise the widest audience possible through a mixture of 'everyday' pragmatism and 'engaged optimism' (Hopkins, 2008a). Below, I move on to more explicitly examine the educational implications of these issues.

In chapter one, I introduced the concept of "critical communities". Critical communities are loose networks of intellectuals who produce new knowledge (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991; Rochon, 1998). In order to convey the ideas of critical communities to a receptive public, frames are said to be 'aligned' by activists to 'resonate' through various processes: "value conversion" is "the replacement of cultural values with new ideas on the same topic about what is important, equitable, or legitimate" (Rochon, 1998, p. 86); "value creation" describes "the development of new ideas, concepts, or categories of analysis that apply to situations that had not previously been the subject of explicit cultural values" (p.86); finally, "value connection refers to "the development of a conceptual link between phenomena previously thought either to be unconnected with each other or connected in a different way" (p. 86). Therefore, it is clear that framing work draws strategically from extant ideologies and ideas developed in various critical communities, as well as the wider cultural stock, and that collective action frames should not be confused with ideologies as has been the tendency in some scholarship (Oliver & Johnston, 2000), for example, by referring to a 'feminist' frame, or a 'liberal' frame.

In reality, the cultural work of social movements blurs these neat analytical distinctions, but they are useful. Value conversion is, of course, the ultimate goal. In the context of climate change, 'value connection' (Rochon, 1998, p. 57), or 'frame bridging' (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 12), occurs routinely by establishing links between everyday behaviours such as flying, home energy use, diet and climate change. Also, bridging frames connect issues of political economy to climate change, as well as issues of gender, race, and poverty. Through doing so, new discourses and analyses ('value creation') emerge, such as those around a Just Transition from reliance on fossil fuels, and the ideals of Climate Justice. In a sense, the framing literature applies directly to the public pedagogy of challenging dominant discourses, and the public pedagogy of neoliberalism. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that sceptics and those with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo create their own bridging frames through a recursive engagement with movements.

Although frame theory posits mechanisms, which help us to understand how people *learn from* social movements; moves us beyond information deficit theories of behaviour change (theories that posit that people just need more or better factual information); and speaks to the notion of what strategies might help the abstract issue of climate change resonate with pre-existing cultural values and norms, there are concerns to be addressed. The main issue, when placed in dialogue with education literature is the unidirectionality of communication implicit in framing: "idea specialists in social movements are never thought to change their thinking—just the way they package their thinking to make it more appealing to someone else" (Oliver & Johnston, 2000, p. 195). Specifically in the context of climate change, critical theorist Brulle (2010, p. 89) has argued that "Lakoff…uses a top-down approach, mobilizing supporters as if they were isolated consumers of ideas rather than citizens. This form of message delivery inhibits the development of a collective community consciousness and mobilization".

Two interrelated issues exist here: the democratic implications for communication,

and the *credibility* of such an account of cultural change. Regarding the former, Lakoff's call for "cognitive policy", was supposed to be a pragmatic wake-up call to environmentalists, and the Left, in general. Nevertheless, this approach, which aligns with modes of governance associated with libertarian paternalism – where policy experts draw upon psychology, cognitive science, linguistics and behavioural economics to "bypass the irrational nature of the human brain" (Pykett, 2012, p. 219) – is about communication experts "targeting emotional registers…and changing social norms via social marketing techniques".

Thus, the choice in this context could be framed as cultural efficacy, versus the idealism of 'green' theories of agency, emphasising rational forms of deliberative democracy. Yet, the workability of such approaches cannot be taken for granted. On the issue of credibility, Marc Steinberg (1999; 1998) argues that framing rests on contradictory epistemological assumptions, which vacillate between social constructionism and rational actor theory. Rather, discourse must be understood to be unstable, dialogical and recursive. Lakoff (2010, p. 72) even makes this point when he argues, for example, that "negating a frame just activates the frame, as when Nixon said,''I am not a crook'' and everyone thought of him as crook". Lakoff's (rather mechanical sounding) advice to climate change communicators is that "the new language must make sense in terms of the existing system of frames. It must work emotionally. And it must be introduced in a communication system that allows for sufficient spread over the population, sufficient repetition, and sufficient trust in the messengers" (p. 72). It can thus be argued that frame theory has little to say about how such change efforts involve "a long process of self-conscious discussion, debate, and political education", which necessarily grapples with "the relation between people's material conditions or material experiences" and their cultural worlds (Oliver & Johnston, 2000, pp. 196-200). It recognises the Enlightenment Reason fallacy yet, in my mind, unconvincingly assumes that cultural technocrats can address this. Thus, whilst NSMT and framing theory have useful things to say, I now move on to argue that discourse theory is more promising.

Discourse theory

Discourse theory – an accepted shorthand for what is alternately called the post-structuralist, or post-Marxist discourse theory developed by Laclau and Mouffe (1987) – is based on the following premises: anti-essentialism, the logic of contingency, and an understanding of 'the political' process as hegemonic struggle, combining the insights of Antonio Gramsci with post-structuralism. It conceives of the cultural politics of climate change in terms of "agonistic pluralism", thus providing an alternative to the rational "public participation" model proposed by Habermas's NSMT and the "social marketing" approach embodied in framing (Carvalho & Peterson, 2012). The reason why it is important to understand these tensions in theoretical terms is that they emerge from the concrete practices of different cultures of activism. Mouffe's (2005) critique of the political process as consensus-oriented intersubjective communication is based on the development of a nuanced ontological position drawing on Gramsci and Derrida, amongst others. Mouffe proposes that the very condition for intersubjective communication within a stable social formation is contingency and antagonism, resolved through the exercise of power. This places Laclau and Mouffe alongside Foucault in being highly sceptical of the Habermas's utopian "ideal speech situation", since "all knowledge claims are conditioned by historical frames of understanding that have been partly constituted and affected by subliminal power relations" (Ingram, 2006, p. 262). For Habermas, the exercise of administrative power requires consensus-oriented communication for its legitimation, hence the scepticism of critical theorist Brulle to the governmental power of framing experts. Whilst for Habermas, this occurs though the bracketing of power, for discourse theorists, all governance involves the reciprocal and productive use of power amongst non-equals.

Thus, Mouffe uses "agonism" to describe a situation in which "we/they" relations are not transcended but are configured in a different way (Mouffe, 2005, p. 20): "While antagonism is a we/they relation in which the two sides are enemies who do not share

any common ground, agonism is a we/they relation where the conflicting parties…recognise the legitimacy of their opponents". Discourse theory has profound implications for our understanding of climate activism and its cultural politics, despite seldom being included in debates over social movement theory, social movement learning, or climate change more generally, for that matter. There are, however, some notable exceptions, with discourse theory being fruitfully applied to the study of anti-airport protest (Griggs & Howarth, 2002; Griggs & Howarth, 2004), the development of the Slow-Food Movement (van Bommel & Spicer, 2011), the challenges of learning through student activism (Zielinska, et al., 2011), and climate politics (Methmann, 2010; Carvalho & Peterson, 2012). Of all of these studies, the value of discourse theory in an educational context might be said to be that "the process of learning…can be understood as filling 'empty signifiers' with concrete meanings" (Zielinska, et al., 2011, p. 262) – a term which I will move on to explain in this section.

Discourse theory is motivated by a commitment to "the radically contingent, non-necessary and relational character of social and political identities" (Gilbert, 2009, p. 14). Emerging in the 1980s from an intellectual context in which Marxist theory and socialist politics were perceived to be in crisis, and inspired by the actually existing 'new social movements', discourse theory nevertheless diverged from the totalising accounts of NSMT. Critical realists have claimed that the post-structuralist foundations of discourse theory are idealist and have even claimed that it denies mind independent reality, yet this is a gross misreading: it is truer to say that discourse theory embraces the materiality of all phenomena, *including language*, yet they argue that the same linguistic contingency opened up by poststructuralist theory can be applied to social structures (Gilbert, 2009, p. 15). *Discourse*, after Foucault, refers to "historically specific systems of meaning which form the identities of subjects and objects" (Howarth, 2000, p. 10). Discourse theory is committed to a view that the relationships which constitute social formations are only 'contingently

obligatory' rather than 'logically necessary' (DeLanda, 2006). This position requires some unpacking.

In structuralist accounts of discourse, meaning is relational and differential; that is, meaning depends on the relations between different elements in a closed (linguistic) system. Linguistic signifiers correspond to signified concepts in an essentially arbitrary way, but are formalised within systems of relational meaning. Jorgensen and Philips (2002, p. 25) use the helpful metaphor of a fishing net in which "all linguistic signs can be thought of as knots in a net". Founding figure of structuralist linguistics, Ferdinand de Saussure, argued that language is "form not substance", and that it consists of "differences without positive terms" (Howarth, 2000, p. 26). Thus, taking the analogy of chess, he argues that any particular piece, for instance a knight, only makes sense within the context of the relational rules constituting the game of chess (p.26). Yet, going further than this, Saussure believed that societies could be understood as consisting of deep symbolic structures, constituted through their relations between systems of elements (p. 28). Thus, structuralism, "rather than assuming society to be…the teleological development of the human spirit…focused on the changing signs and codes that make possible social practices" (p.26).The 'post' in post-structuralism emerged from critiques of the perceived shortcomings of structuralist accounts of the social. First and foremost, the notion that the social is determined by the relations between closed symbolic systems "makes it difficult to provide an adequate account of the historicity of social systems" (Howarth, 2000, p. 28).

Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory retains the insight that identity is relational, but extends this concept beyond the linguistic, and challenges the notion of stable wholes as a priori totalities, giving their components essence as parts of the whole. The 'post' critique draws on insights from the deconstructive philosophy, in order to challenge the closure and fixity of discursive systems: the relations between signifiers are *contingent*, and whilst discourses partially fix meaning, they are

dependent on a 'surplus of meaning', which can never be fully exhausted (Howarth 2000, p. 103). The post-structural critique is too complex to explain here in detail, and is outwith the scope of this chapter. However, some basic understanding is necessary, as the specific manner in which it has informed the work of Laclau and Mouffe has often been subjected to misinterpretation. It is based on the notion that there is no necessary relationship between signs because of the logical impossibility of a private language: signs contain "minimal remainders of meaning" allowing them to be recognised when articulated in different chains of meaning and contexts. This move relies on a rejection of both essences and totalities. Both of these moves imply an ontology and epistemology based on relations of exteriority. This requires some explaining.

Laclau and Mouffe's position, and post-structuralist philosophy in general, contrary to popular misinterpretation, does not ignore the permanencies of human experience, whilst favouring constant flux and metonymic sliding of meaning (Howarth, 2000). Rather, they seek to understand the logic behind the underlying, but in their view, non-necessary and precarious stability of social and political orders. To do this, they must account for the synthesis of the properties of a whole, in a way which moves beyond the dichotomy between methodological individualism ('there is no such thing as Society') and what theorist DeLanda (2006) calls 'organismic' metaphors', where the component parts of structural regularities are reduced to internal moments of closed totalities. Both Hegelian dialectics and Saussurean structuralist linguistics belong to this grouping. Although I have briefly sketched the idea of Saussurean linguistics above, I have not explained Hegelian dialectics. Therefore, a brief explanation is required particularly given the currency that Hegelian thinking continues to have in social and political thought.

For Hegel, the sole purpose of reason was to overcome fixed oppositions such as mind/matter, subjectivity/objectivity, particularity/universality, individual freedom/communal responsibility, rights/duty and so on, by uniting them in a higher

synthesis (Cullen, 1979, p. 50). His dialectical thought was based on a distinction between understanding (Verstand) and reason (Vernunft): for Hegel, "understanding" was "only capable of drawing distinctions and grasping external relations between determinate atoms or monads", whilst "reason" could "grasp the fundamental unity, the becoming, underlying all things" (p. 51). For this reason, Hegel viewed antagonisms as contraries or contradictions (thesis/antithesis) "sublated" (roughly speaking, assimilated) into greater organic totalities (synthesis).

Dialectical relations in this sense, lead to a kind of circular approach to structure and agency, which remains very popular within the social sciences. For example, Anthony Giddens's "structuration theory" is very Hegelian (and by implication I would argue, not particularly helpful in accounting for change): social structures (routines, procedures, resources, laws and so on) allow for agency, but are constructed through it (DeLanda, 2006, p. 10). Another example is Pierre Bourdieu's notion of "the habitus" as the master process structuring dispositions, tastes, attitudes, cultural values, social norms and so on. The habitus is an idealist totality in the sense that it is both structured and structuring; it posits an internal dialectical relation between free will and structures, between objective differences in the social distribution of risk and resources and subjective cognitive states (DeLanda, 2006). Both structuration and the habitus are deployed within sociological theories of practice addressing climate change, and are offered as an alternative to the rationalistic tendencies of NSMT (Haluza-DeLay, 2008) and the positivistic aspirations of behaviour change technologies (Shove, 2010). Despite the popularity of these theories, they still strike me as rather nebulous and circular. If agency is internally related to structure how does real change occur? To account for progressive change, the idea of "synthesis" or "determinate negation" is employed. However, I agree with Laclau's (2005, p. 149) assessment that it is a kind of metaphysical sham.

In accounts of wholes relying on 'relations of interiority', the component parts have no identity other than their relation as parts of the functioning totality. There is a way out: a view of (social, discursive, material) wholes as fully-emergent, based on relations of exteriority, through which abstract micro and macro reductionism is replaced by contingency, and an analysis of social and political formations consisting of a number of inter- and intra-acting units of analysis plugged into one another. In this view, *capacities* and the *potential* of what is not, are as real as the emergent *properties* of any particular historical, political or social ensemble. This, however, does not deny sedimented power. Simply put, relations of externality imply an ontology through which the component parts of any particular ensemble can be "detached from it and plugged into a different assemblage in which its interactions are different" (DeLanda, 2006, p. 10). Thus, we move from a logic of necessity, to a "logic of contingency" (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987). I should make clear that I am reading, somewhat idiosyncratically, but transversally, across a Deleuzian 'materialist' understanding of relations of externality (DeLanda, 2006), and Laclau and Mouffe's poststructuralist understanding. Laclau and Mouffe have been charged with reducing everything to language and even denying mind independent reality, yet this is a misreading: what Laclau and Mouffe do is to take a non-reductionist or transversal view of thought and materiality; of discursive and non-discursive practices:

> Laclau and Mouffe justify this move through a meticulous argument which draws primarily on Derrida's early claim that in the absence of any final principle of meaning or identity outside of a field of contingent relations which can guarantee the consistency, order, finitude and finality of that field - in other words, in the absence of a 'transcendental signified' - the general field of relationality for which 'discourse' is one name cannot be easily delimited. This is a complex manoeuvre in both Derrida and Laclau and Mouffe, and in both cases it has generated a great deal of misunderstanding on the part of readers who have understood their statements to amount to an insistence that there is no other reality than language; in fact, they would be better understood as claims that there is no social practice that is not caught up in a network of unpredictable relations which destabilises its effects and significance,

> much as the effect and significance of linguistic signs is always destabilised by their irreducible relationality (Gilbert, 2009, p. 14).

The subtlety of this position can be seen in Laclau and Mouffe's (1987, p. 107) foundational text where they argue the following:

> [I]f the so-called non-discursive complexes – institutions, techniques, productive organisation, and so on – are analysed, we will find only more or less complex forms of differential positions among objects, which do not arise from a necessity external to the system structuring them and which can therefore only be conceived as discursive articulations (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987)

The point of contention here lies in whether or not Laclau & Mouffe "ontologise", and thus overstretch, post-structural linguistics to explain reality as such (Barnett, 2004), or whether they have creatively applied these ideas in order to arrive at a theory of contingency capable of explaining material processes, albeit through an idiosyncratic vocabulary (as hinted at by Gilbert, 2009). For example, behind the concept of "assemblage" so popular in contemporary materialist theories across the social science, humanities and geography, lies an ontologisation of the geological vocabulary of "double articulation". This "double articulation" process is used as an alternative to the Hegelian understanding of part to whole relations. Raw materials are selected and pre-processed and then are consolidated over time into wholes with properties of their own (Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012, p. 39). Another popular example would be Alain Badiou, who ontologises mathematical set theory (Badiou & Tho, 2007). For him, reality is reduced to multiplicities of mathematical sets, composed of elements not defined through their internal relations with one another, so that set {x,y,z}, for example, is the same as {y, z, x}. Significant theoretical differences notwithstanding, my point is that all of these theorists are trying to find a vocabulary to describe the contingency of reality, with the political implication that other social arrangements are always possible (Bryant, 2011, p. 212). It is open to

debate (but well beyond the scope of this thesis), whether or not any of these vocabularies represents reality better than another.

In discourse theory, insights from hermeneutical philosophy are incorporated to the extent that discourse theory is concerned with "the historically specific rules and conventions that structure the production of *meaning* in a specific social context" (Howarth, 2000, p. 11). However, discourse theory differs from the hermeneutic tradition in that its ultimate goal is not to "reconstitute the common meanings and practices of particular groups and communities", but to instead analyse the way in which "political forces and social actors construct meanings within incomplete and undecidable social structures" (Howarth, 2000, p. 129).

The discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe draws on Gramscian Marxism in order to postulate a distinctive theory of hegemony. Gramsci rejected the "vulgar materialism" and "historical economism" underlying the base structure/super structure dualism, which to his mind was prevalent in common sense forms of Marxism. Gramsci's thought was dialectical – that is, he posited an organic internal relation between thought and being, man and nature, history and matter, subject and object (Gramsci, 2011 [1930-32], p. 190). For this reason, he argued that the superstructure of the "integral state" had a relative autonomy of its own. The integral state was composed of political society and civil society (roughly mapping on to Habermas's systemworld/lifeworld distinction).

Gramsci's concept of building diverse alliances through intellectual work, known as the 'war of position', represented a step forward from the woolly notion of spontaneous economic struggle at the point of production. For Gramsci, civil society was not somehow separate to the state (a la Habermas's Kantian ideal of the 'lifeworld') but was irreducible from it. The institutions of civil society represented the hegemonic aspect of consent, which balanced and reinforced the coercive power of political society (Gramsci, 1971). Gramsci argued against the pejorative

conceptualisation of ideology as a ‘false consciousness’ obscuring one’s actual role in material relations of production. For him, ideology was ‘organically’ related to the historical emergence of any social formation. That is, regardless of the propositional truth value or empirical credibility of particular systems of ideas, they have real ‘material’ effects on political and economic life.

However, for Gramsci, alliances ultimately served the instrumental purpose of securing the intellectual dimension of a class-based proletarian hegemony. Although he argued that the economistic base structure and the “integral state” as the superstructure existed as a unity of opposites in a “historic bloc”, he argued that such blocs were ultimately organised around the antagonisms between a dominant (capitalist) and subjugated (proletariat) social class and between dominant and communist modes of production (Howarth, 2000, p. 91). For Gramsci, the aim was nothing less than to transform the particular claims of the working class into a “’collective will’ that represents universal values or interests” (Howarth, 2000, p. 109). Again, we can see the organismic metaphor at work in the conceptualisation of the whole. Laclau and Mouffe (1987, p.134) wished to retain the notion of the contingent ‘war of position’ but sought to eliminate the notion of a fundamental social class; what they called Gramsci’s “last remainder of essentialism”. Drawing on philosophical critiques of structuralism, they argued instead that it is only because all social relations are contingent that agency is possible at all (Howarth, 2000, p. 110).

Discourse theorist Ernesto Laclau (2005) demonstrates that one of the central difficulties Marx encountered was how to articulate ‘peoples without history’ into the teleological narrative of proletarian hegemony. As Laclau (2005, p. 143) points out, before Marx, the category ‘proletarian’ denoted the ‘passive spectacle’ of poverty and was used in France synonymously with the term ‘nomade’. In this way, the proletariat was a catchall term for “a poor outside any stable social inscription” (p. 143). What Marx did was take the term proletariat and apply it to describe a

privileged agent within an a priori history of production, but in order to do that the 'proletariat' had to be distinguished from the 'lumpenproletariat' – a kind of 'marginal mass', outside the singular logic of capital accumulation (p. 143-148). This 'marginal mass', Laclau argued, could never be fully explained by the notion of the 'industrial reserve army'; used to describe a kind of jobless population functional to the requirements of capital, who, through their maintenance of competition for work, help to maintain the rate of profit. Discourse theorist Laclau (2005, 148) is at pains to point out that, particularly in today's globalised society, the 'peoples without history' have occupied centre stage to the point of shattering the very notion of a teleological historicity".

The difference between a more classically Gramscian-Marxist interpretation and discourse theory is that in the latter, the 'lumpen' to speak with Marx, or the 'dispossessed', 'precariat' or 'informal sector' to use today's vocabulary (Holst, 2011), are simply a heterogeneous grouping amenable to political articulation. However, the Marxist understanding is that such 'peoples without history' now form an "objectively revolutionary" force because their "simple demands for survival can no longer be met within prevailing capitalist relations" (Holst, 2011). As such the task of hegemonic struggle is to move from an 'objectively revolutionary' situation to one of subjective recognition. This is a good example of the idea of the 'internality of relations' as opposed to the 'externality of relations' at work:

> When we think…in terms of internal relations (Allman, 2001), one can see how the existence of oppressor classes and nations is incumbent upon the existence of oppressed classes and nations; one pole of the dialectic cannot exist without the other (Holst, 2011, p.123)

On the other hand, discourse theory, understanding the world though the 'externality of relations' asserts that "antagonism presupposes heterogeneity because the resistance of the antagonized force cannot be logically derived from the form of the antagonizing one" (Laclau, 2005, p. 150). This is not to deny the domination of

globalised capitalism. Rather it is to acknowledge that "globalised capitalism creates myriad points of rupture and antagonisms – ecological crises, imbalance between different sectors of the economy, massive unemployment, and so on" and that "it is impossible to determine a priori who the hegemonic actors in this struggle will be" (Laclau, 2005, p.150).

Thus, the discourse theory understanding of hegemony is reconfigured from a question of instrumental alliance formation for the emergence of a unified, predestined historical subject, to the very nature of 'the political' itself: in other words, hegemony is understood in discourse theory as the process of attempting to create political projects and structures that refuse their own contingency on a 'constitutive outside' (Howarth, 2000; Hansen, 2006), or the "non-recognition of the precarious character of any positivity, of the impossibility of any final suture" (Laclau, 1983, p. 24). Hegemonic projects seek to achieve the impossible task of stabilising meaning within a totality. Gramsci's "'war of position', is, strictly speaking, a logic of displacement of political frontiers" (Laclau, 2005, p. 153).

In order to understand how such frontiers become displaced, Laclau (1990) uses the concept of dislocation. Dislocatory moments are those which cannot be represented within existing orders of discourse. In other words, political frontiers are thrown into question when the logics of equivalence and difference – functioning in hegemonic projects, fail to adequately represent orders of events, subject positions and social structures (Howarth 2000, pp. 131-132). Dislocations are particular historical moments of crisis, whereupon indeterminacy and contingencies become plainly visible to people. The concept of dislocation is similar to the Habermasian concept of "legitimacy crisis". The crucial difference is the emphasis given to antagonism rather than rational consensus in addressing and responding to such moments or crises.

In discourse theory *antagonisms* "represent particular discursive responses to dislocatory experiences", which may, or may not, result in "new collective

imaginaries", known as *subjectivities* (p. 132). Social movements of all political orientations operate according to this logic where heterogeneous subjects make affective investments in forms of identification opposed to crudely identified 'Others'. For example, in South Africa, the Soweto uprisings of 1976 marked the beginning of a dislocation, through which frontiers between "Afrikaan" volk (people) and those (black people, imperialists, English speaking capitalists) denying "the creation of an Afrikaner identity", were reorganised along different axes to do with White/Black, apartheid and 'the people' (Norval, 1996). Thus, the diversity and particularity within the Black Consciousness movement the was smoothed over through a common opposition to 'white racism': In the 1980s the United Democratic Front linked a range of sites and interests including community organising, the student movement, trade unions and women's groups (Howarth, 1997).

As an "equivalential chain" joining the claims of particular collective actors through their opposition to a 'constitutive outside' grows, they become united under "*empty signifiers*", so-called because particularistic claims , demands and interests are linked increasingly only in terms of that which they oppose on the other side of the "dichotomic frontier" (Laclau 2005, p.131). However, because antagonism and indeterminacy are intrinsic parts of social life, political frontiers are unstable and may shift. Laclau (2005, p. 130) introduces the term "*floating signifiers*" to denote those particularistic claims "whose meaning is suspended between two alternative equivalential frontiers".

The floating dimension becomes most visible during moments of crisis "when the symbolic order needs to be radically recast" (Laclau, 2005, p. 132). Hegemony is thus played out between the indeterminacy of the empty and the floating: whilst the empty "concerns the construction of a popular identity once the presence of a stable political frontier is taken for granted, the floating dimension "tries conceptually to apprehend the logic of the displacements of that frontier" (p. 133). For Laclau and Mouffe, subjects are constrained by discourses and structures; yet these discourses

and structures are inherently unstable. As a consequence, discourse theory argues that (1) people, groups, organisations, networks and so on are fully emergent. There is no a priori totality to which they belong; (2) the practices/agency of these emergent wholes are not determined by their relation to any master process, but conversely, individual and collective subjects are not free agents, able to frame issues as they please. Discourse theory thus makes a valuable contribution of the structure/agency debate.

Implications for the public pedagogy of climate activism

One implication of applying these insights to climate activism, is that that it may not be defined as such prior to practical action, but emerges through it. Conversely, what might nominally begin as climate activism, may grow and develop to be about much more than merely climate change. One of the implications that follows from this, is that for actors to successfully respond to dislocatory moments, particular signifiers have to be credible and available to collective actors (Griggs & Howarth, 2004). Consequently climate activists may find themselves drawing upon elements from previous struggles for social and environmental justice; whether or not they implicitly or explicitly differentiate themselves from such struggles, or articulate them into chains of equivalence. As Melucci (1996, p. 207) recognised:

> In its formative stage, a 'movement' always adopts the language of previous struggles. Still unable to define itself in terms of an identity of its own, the new collective actor uses the symbols, the organizational experience, and the forms of action of the movements that preceded it.

Not only this, but particular signifiers are struggled over through recursive processes of dialogue so that meanings may be appropriated, modified or even inverted by opponents. This is not so dissimilar to the message in Lakoff's framing theory. The

difference is in the judgement that this process might be rationally and technocratically managed. A good example is Griggs & Howarth's (2004) study of Heathrow airport expansion protest: These discourse theorists show how anti-airport expansion protest went through several stages in its 'war of position': from a reformist middle-class NIMBY protest, to becoming part of a broader coalition against airport expansion, to making alliances with environmental organisations, rural protection groups, social justice campaigners, and the domestic tourism industry. The campaign also moved from environment versus economy framings to directly contesting the economic rationality of airport expansion with the aim of splitting the opposing side (the 'freedom to fly' coalition), thus realigning the political frontier (Griggs & Howarth, 2004). Thus, pragmatically, this campaign turned away from more universal but abstract arguments about the environment (which could have taken it in the direction of climate change) when it seemed that such framings would trouble the maintenance of the anti-expansion coalition.

Thus, this small example shows how discourse theory has profound implications for how we understand the *potential* of climate activism, and perhaps more specifically on the viability of a cultural politics based on the idea of developing a coherent identity around the idea of tackling climate change. The logic of discourse theory can play a part in explaining how expanding chains of equivalence can be constructed around the idea of tackling climate change (in the same manner as they are for the notions of being 'green' or 'sustainable') such that the very idea of what this means increasingly embodies tensions, as the "dislocatory effects of climate change for hegemonic structures" are dampened by articulating what the idea of climate protection means back into a "global governmentality of climate protection built on globalism, scientism, an ethics of growth and efficiency" (Methmann, 2010, p. 369). By globalism, Methmann is referring to the way in which climate change is rendered as a global issue requiring consensus (see chapter one). Thus, the political arena is constructed as a universe, rather than a pluriverse, to speak with Mouffe (2005). By scientism, Methmann is referring to the ways in which the problem and

its solutions are constructed around the perceived need to link increasing scientific certainty with other forms of calculative rationality in order to establish a global techno-managerial regime (also see chapter 1). By an ethics of growth and efficiency, Methmann is referring to the unquestioned faith that technological innovations and economic growth are mutually constitutive and required, particularly if developing countries are to tackle climate change.

Thus, for Methmann, such a discourse of 'climate protection' had become an empty signifier, which tempered the dislocatory effects of climate change on the idea of sustainable capitalism. By contesting such hegemonic notions of climate protection, climate activists once again re-emphasise the 'floating' dimension of 'climate protection', or 'climate action', as they disrupt its meaning by articulating it into other chains of equivalence encompassing social justice, localisation, anti-capitalism and so on.

Unlike NSMT which, after Habermas, believes that it is possible in the public sphere to "achieve consensus on collective issues through rational argumentation", an application of the fundamental insights of agonistic pluralism to climate politics holds that "rational decisions cannot be reached through communicative exchanges and that a fully inclusive consensus is not possible" (Carvalho & Peterson, 2012, p. 12). The implication for social movement against climate change is that it is contingent upon mobilising alliances of interest and identity (Griggs & Howarth, 2002), which cannot be assumed, but are radically contingent, constructed through practical action, and are reversible. Ultimately, this view holds that a liberal politics of climate change is a non-starter. Given the time-limited nature of climate change, its complex and uncertain epistemological nature and its complex justice implications, I am inclined to agree with Carvalho & Peterson (2012, p. 16) that "climate change policy is the antithesis of an issue likely to be resolved through consensus decision making".

Thus, the post-political golden mean of green as 'beyond left and right' is problematic in this light as the lack of an agonistic conception of the political constructs potential adversaries as enemies, or simply tries to deny the existence of the antagonistic moment, in which case it springs up in more extreme forms in other places. An analogy for this is the contraction and convergence of politics during the era of the Third Way, such that Right populist parties and movements are enjoying resurgence in the UK (e.g. UKIP), Europe (e.g. Golden Dawn) and the United States (e.g. the Tea Party). Thus, although climate change as an environmental phenomenon operates completely independently of our anthropic political relations (we are 'locked-in' to a certain degree of climatic change which cannot be reversed already), the notion that its loaded political implications can be solved through the overcoming of antagonism as simply a failure of rational actors operating in the demarcated political space, is (particularly after the pantomime of Conference of Parties 15) entirely a proposition without credibility. Moreover, the shift towards evidence-based 'cognitive policy' recommended for the green movement, as examined in the section above on framing, appears problematic in this light. Mainly this is because it is problematic that a conception of the common good can easily be assumed and worked towards through application of the rational strategies of culture change experts. As climate change moves into the realm of the political, it is necessarily imbricated in a wider politics of economy, development, immigration, energy security and so on. However, the development of a socially just activist identity suturing together commitments to social justice and climate change cannot be based on the myth of any logically necessary relations: they are contingent, fully-emergent and are forged through hegemonic struggle.

The specific implications of discourse theory for social movement learning are reasonably straightforward to articulate, yet underdeveloped in the literature. As the dislocatory effects of climate change play out in particular real-life spatial contexts, the political meaning of particular struggles are constructed through it, not anterior to it. As Griggs and Howarth (Griggs & Howarth, 2002, p. 45) note, this often throws

radical environmentalists, social justice campaigners, local communities, business interests, employees, employers, sectors of the legal and political establishments into periods of "radical learning" with one another, as stakes, purposes and identities are redefined, and geographical, cultural, and epistemological borders challenged, disrupted and remapped. One direct implication of this contingency is that such public pedagogies are "messy" as Crowther, et al's (Crowther, et al., 2012) study of adult learning through environmental campaigning and several other influential studies of social movement learning underscore (Foley, 1999; Conway, 2006). Although this is commonly recognised, a fundamental difference of perspective remains between the agonistic pluralists and those who think that such messiness can be systematised only through a Marxist political economy based on Hegelian dialectical thought (Holst, 2002, pp. 81-102).

Thus, the basic insight of discourse theory in an educational context is that in emergent collective struggles, "learning…can be understood as filling 'empty signifiers' with concrete meanings" (Zielinska, et al., 2011, p. 262). As I argued above, this begins with taking seriously Gramsci's insight that that hegemony is an educative process whilst significantly altering the meaning of hegemony so that it is understood as the process of seeking to overcode particular configurations of the material and discursive, such that their contingency is suppressed, as is their historical dependence upon a separation from an outside that once made them possible. In other words, an identity becomes hegemonic though the drive to realise the impossibility of pure or full representation. One response to this is that such a project has no anchor, and is doomed to collapse into moral relativism. How can a post-foundational perspective argue for radical democracy? One partial answer is that this perspective constitutes a kind of "enlightenment blackmail", which implies that, if one does not accept wholesale the historically specific rationality of enlightenment humanism, then one has no grounds at all for engaging in political discourse (Foucault, 1984). An agonistic conception of the political holds that irreducible difference within unity is possible.

In the context of discourse theory, I see the public pedagogy of climate activism as a form of what critical education scholar Henry Giroux (1992) has called "border pedagogy". The end of a teleological view of cultural politics does not preclude formative narratives, and in fact arises often from prefigurative practices, or 'structures of feeling' to speak with Raymond Williams. Giroux (1992, p.31) argues that "[b]y 'interrupting' representational practices that make a claim to objectivity, universality, and consensus, critical educators can develop pedagogical conditions in which students can read and write within and against existing cultural codes while simultaneously having the opportunity to create new spaces for producing new forms of knowledge, subjectivity, and identity" (Giroux, 1992, p. 31). Thus, his concept of border pedagogy in this context would be one which always begins with a questioning of how political and cultural spaces have been drawn, and by whom, with regards to issues of recognition and distribution in relation to the human effects of climate change. Giroux (1992, p. 30) explains the concept below:

> Border pedagogy decentres as it remaps. The terrain of learning becomes inextricably linked to the shifting parameters of place, identity, history and power. Border pedagogy shifts the emphasis on the mapping of knowledge/power relationship away from the limited emphasis on the mapping of domination toward the politically strategic issue of engaging the ways in which knowledge can be remapped, reterritorialized, and decentred in the wider interests of rewriting the borders and coordinates of an oppositional cultural politics.

Thus, the "epistemic awareness" of the provisional nature of knowledge; ethical awareness "insofar as the defence and assertion of values is grounded on argumentative movements", and "political awareness", insofar as "historical achievements appear as the product of hegemonic and contingent (and therefore reversible) articulations" (Giroux, 1992, pp. 51-2), leads us away from the view that barriers to learning are found in 'distorted communication': that is to say, social movements possess society's latent learning capacity to overcome instrumental reason through the rational application of communicative action.

If, applying discourse theory to the public pedagogy of climate activism results in border pedagogies, which "undermine and reterritorialize different configurations of culture, power and knowledge" (1991, p. 51), then three defining features can be identified: it "signals forms of transgression in which existing borders forged in domination can be challenged and redefined"; "it speaks to the need to create pedagogical conditions in which [teachers] and students become border crossers in order to understand otherness in its own terms"; consequently, the first step of border pedagogy is to "make visible the historically and socially constructed strengths and limitations of those places and borders we inherit and which frame our discourses and social relations" (Giroux, 1991, pp. 51-2). Thus, ultimately "[w]e should not forget that any political order can only exist because of a division between 'inside' and 'outside'" (Biesta, 2011, p. 151). I move on to finish the chapter by making the case that integrating themes of space into the position I have adopted thus far, strengthens it, and enables a sharper analysis of the public pedagogy of climate activism.

A spatial supplement to discourse theory

Although I have argued above for the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe, there are elements of their writing and theoretical project, which require development. In particular, although they provide a theoretical framework which I think is superior to both NSMT and framing theory, the material-spatial implications of their work require to be unpacked since, in many instances, climate activism is emerges through material struggles over the production of space, which come to make sense as meaningful social practices. Henri Lefebvre (2000 [1974], p. 44), the French philosopher of space puts it well:

> What is an ideology without a space to which it refers, a space which it describes, whose vocabulary and links it makes use of, and whose code it embodies…Ideology per se might well be said to consist primarily in a discourse upon social space.

Broadly speaking, the spatial turn is concerned with a rapprochement of the social and the spatial. However, we can think of the spatial turn on a continuum bookended by strong and weak versions. In the weak version, the relational connection between space and social practice is examined through a conceptualisation of space as "simply the site or place wherein processes and practices take place" (Howarth, 2006, p. 109). In the stronger version, space is "conceded 'emergent properties' and 'causal powers'"(p. 109). There are also those sceptical of what they see as a valorisation of space, which brings little added value to comprehending and explaining social processes. Dialogue between political/cultural geographers and discourse theorists has produced some interesting poststructuralist conceptions of space. Doreen Massey (1995, p. 284), in dialogue with Chantal Mouffe, reasoned that the concept of 'place' in geography is analogous to the notion of 'identity' in discourse theory, and since Mouffe's position was to take a transversal view of the discursive and material from the outset, I find myself able to accept this argument without difficulty. Place, as space imbued with historically constituted and contingent identity, it is undecidable, multiple, heterogeneous, and thus can never be fully realised (Howarth, 2006, p. 117). These thinkers would not dispute the dominant role of capitalism in processes of uneven geographical development, just that resistance to it can only be conceptualised through a kind of dialectical reversal of its internal logic. Thus, the making of a geographically bounded space into a place is seen as a hegemonic act.

Where thinkers such as Doreen Massey and Laclau disagree is in the abstract formalism of space conceptualised in discourse theory: curiously enough for a theory owing in part to a Derridean scepticism of binaries, this assertion rests upon setting up a binary opposition between space and time (Laclau, 1990; Massey, 1995; Howarth, 2006). Spatialising an event entails "eliminating its temporality" according to Lalcau (1991, p. 41). Space is seen as absolute stasis, which conceived as a "Kantian regulative ideal", can never be actualised (Howarth, 2006, p. 122). So, if space is represented as a kind of stasis and closure, time on the other hand is

associated with dynamism and dislocation. Space is therefore, "an (ideological) attempt at closure", whilst "Grand Historical Time" is associated with dislocation, contingency, openness, undecidability, emancipation (Massey, 1992, pp. 26-27).

This depoliticisation of space is what geographer and spatial philosopher Doreen Massey (1992; 1995) takes issue with. She is against the decoupling of space and time, and seeks to understand space politically. Massey argues for a transversal understanding of social and spatial relations. She argues that 'material lived' space and its contingencies shape social relations, whilst the 'social' acts back in complex ways upon the materiality of lived space. The spatial form of the material 'real' may be the result of meaningful social practices, but as Massey (1992, p. 81) argues, "although the location of each (or a set of) a number of phenomena may be directly caused…,the spatial positioning of one in relation to another may not be directly caused". Consequently, "die happenstance juxtapositions", in which the coherence of lived space is disrupted, by unexpected land uses or social relations emerging from unintentionally juxtaposed locations, point to a view where *antagonisms* arise from *dislocated space*. This is an important point, as the 'thrown togetherness' of configurations of people and material resources in geographical space means that material space forms part of the undecidability and contingency of the social.

Recently, attempts have been made to theorise the spatialities of social movements through conceiving of them as assemblages (DeLanda, 2006; McFarlane, 2009; Davies, 2011), which I argue is the most ontologically adequate way of looking at the relationships between knowledge, power and space. Assemblages, after philosopher Gilles Deleuze (a colleague and compatriot of Henry Lefebvre) are "wholes categorised by relations of exteriority" (DeLanda 2006, p. 10). Assemblages are therefore made up of components contingently related through historical processes, rather than Hegelian wholes of 'necessary' relations of interiority. In terms of social science, an assemblage can be regarded as an emergent whole, which can be conceived at a number of analytic scales, from person, to community, to

social movement network, to nation state, to regional institutions such as the EU and so on. Nevertheless, the concept of relations of exteriority ensures no "simple Russian doll relation" (p. 33) between scales, and certainly eschews any linear sense of causality. Assemblages are irreducible, and may form part of multiple assemblages simultaneously across spatial and temporal scales. To me, the focus on *capacity* rather than *property*, or to put it another way, a logic of contingency as opposed to a logic of necessity, highlights obvious similarities between discourse theory and assemblage theory, which are worth exploring.

It is my view that assemblage theory (DeLanda, 2006) and discourse theory (Laclau, 2005) say remarkably similar things despite drawing on different bodies of theory and embarking on different projects. The main difference, for example, between the projects of assemblage theorist DeLanda and discourse theorist Laclau are commitment to a 'realist' mind independent reality-based discursive/non-discursive split, and a transversal view of the discursive and non-discursive, respectively. Both assemblage theory and discourse theory, grounded in ontologies based on relations of exteriority, are both "motivated by a strikingly similar set of objectives" (Gilbert, 2009, p. 16): "in both cases a language is sought…which can capture adequately the historically contingent, non-necessary and ultimately mutable nature of the precise configurations of relationships making up existing social entities", and it is only "on the basis of such an understanding that effective strategies can be enacted for social change".

Whereas in discourse theory, the formation of emergent wholes is expressed in terms of the logics of equivalence and difference (Lalcau and Mouffe, 1987), in assemblage theory, the analogous concepts are territorialisation and deterritorialisation (DeLanda, 2006). The logic of territorialisation applies to any process which increases the internal homogeneity of an assemblage. This includes a literal interpretation of territorialisation, paying particular attention to the "spatial boundaries of actual territories" (p. 13). At the other end of the axis we have

processes that operationalise heterogeneity; destabilising commonality and establishing difference, but also emphasising the literal deterritorialisation spatial boundaries at different scales. This understanding enriches the discourse theory idea of public pedagogy as "border pedagogy" (1992), with a more explicit focus on geographical space:

> [S]pace is open to be shaped by activists who produce relations with other activists ⁄ objects that alter over time, creating assemblages where spatially extensive relations maintain and territorialise organisations. Thus assemblage allows us to understand how activists engage with both a series of spatial structures that, while seemingly giving stability to an organisation, are also constantly being produced by these actors and thus open to change. Seemingly 'local' relations are constitutive of wider networks of connection, and these spatially extensive connections in turn help to territorialise the organisation (Davies, 2011, p. 277).

Thus, it can be argued that a re-politicisation of the spatial (Massey, 2005), and concomitant struggles over the right and capability to exercise control over the production of space (Lefebvre, 2000[1974]), lie at the heart of various cultures of climate activism. It is a struggle between the spatial imaginaries and strategies of activists (whether ENGO professionals, community activists, or DA activists) and hegemonic spatial practices. Doreen Massey's question of who has the power to make a space a place is highly appropriate here, and can be asked and answered in different ways. From a Marxian perspective, the master narrative remains the tension between "creative destruction on the land" (Harvey, 2010, p. 184), or the "productive consumption of space" (Lefebvre, 2000[1974], p. 375) in the interests of creating surplus-value for the few, and the use-value of space as a Commons. We can apply this perspective in two ways: through analysing anthropogenic climate change understood as an *effect* of human activity, and through looking at the human activity itself that, to speak with activist communities, can be understood as the 'root causes'. Climate change is a global spatial construction; its governance is about creating spaces of equivalence, where particular places in all their specificity and heterogeneity are smoothed over as they are brought into regimes of calculation. The

issue is about the overuse of atmospheric space in the context of uneven geographical development. As an issue, its specific human geographical consequences fundamentally challenge the arbitrary nature of the scaling of the Westphalian nation state.

The Marxian understanding of the power over the production of space departs from the insight that market and state power are co-constitutive, but are governed by two contradictory logics: the logic of capital, and territorial logic, respectively (Harvey, 2007, p. 107). The frictionless movement of capital envisioned by free-market ideologues requires the agglomeration of fixed embedded capital in concrete spatial form (Lefebvre, 2000[1974], p. 388; Harvey, 2010, pp. 184-214).

Consequently, "pressure from below must…confront the state in its role as the organiser of space" so that "its ability to intervene in space can and must be turned back against it, by grassroots opposition" (Lefebvre, p. 383). Yet the production of a new space in any particular context through collective efforts involving various 'stakeholder' interests, presupposes moments of antagonism: Lefebvre's (p.380-1) point is that as soon as we move beyond the abstract, and in to the realm of specific conflicts over the production of space, unlikely alliances of interest and identity arise. Thus, as I have argued above, much climate change activism does not arrive ready-made as such.: this has been seen in anti-airport protest, anti-coal protest, and occasionally workers' struggle, where the connection of particularistic interests must be articulated in chains of equivalence with actors concerned with climate change in populist alliances.

The significance of climate politics as struggle over the right to the production of space has already been noted by the nascent literature on climate activism. For example, Pearse, et al (2010, p. 82) analyse Australian climate camps as "spatial interventions mounted as close as possible to the physical site of large-scale carbon emissions…[that] create ideological power as counter-sites. Saunders and Price

(2009) analyse climate camps as heterotopic spaces of alternative social ordering, focusing also on the internal as well as external tensions marking such spatial interventions. From a discourse theory perspective, the important point to note for direct action is that all activist spaces of resistance are simultaneously spaces of domination (Anderson, 2004).

In another context, a number of academic commentators and activist intellectuals have added nuance to the notion of local community activism through analysing the Transition Network as a multi-scalar translocal assemblage, which simultaneously seeks to re-engage people with a sense of place whilst spreading 'rhizomically' (Scott-Cato, 2008; Bailey, et al., 2010; Scott-Cato & Hillier, 2010; Aiken, 2012).

One implication of all of this for learning is that although the scale of particular activist practices is materially enforced to an extent, it is itself a learning process because scale does not exist prior to its discursive articulation (Kurtz, 2003). In this sense, we can speak of the dialectical relationship between learning scale and scales of learning and the outcome between the two[v]. Pedagogically, this idea was expressed by Freire in the language of "generative themes".

> Generative themes can be located in concentric circles, moving from the general to the particular. The broadest epochal unit, which includes a diversified range of units and sub-units—continental, regional, national, and so forth—contain themes of a universal character…Within the smaller circles, we find themes and limit situations characteristic of societies…Within yet smaller circles, thematic diversifications can be found within the same society, divided into areas and sub-areas. These constitute epochal sub-units (Freire, 1972, p. 90).

Thus, the act of discursively shaping the scale of a collective struggle for the sake of claims-making can be read as a Freirian process of reading and writing 'the world' and 'the word'. Scale matters when local struggles 'jump scale' in order to gain cognitive resources from national, regional or transnational organisations in order to

apply them to particularistic struggles (Kinchy, 2010). In this sense, the territorialisation and deterritorialisation of particular assemblages of cognitive and material resources can be considered to be constitutive of learning. In the same sense, place-making is inherently a collective learning act. All of this challenges the overly linguistic and cognitive conceptions of social learning in NSMT and framing theory.

Conclusion

The rational turn in social movement theory, as a reaction against the pathologisation of protest, sought to conceptualise social movements as simply politics by other means. However, rational actor theories are not able to adequately theorise agency without culture. In asking what kind of cultural theory might be most useful, I explored new social movement theory, framing theory and discourse theory as embodying different approaches to the cultural politics of climate activism: drawing upon Carvalho and Peterson (2012), I characterised these as public participation, social marketing and agonistic pluralism. I argued that these types reflect, in theoretical terms, important tensions occurring in the actual practices of social movements addressing climate change. Yet more than this, I made the case for discourse theory as the most useful perspective both analytically and normatively. In the previous chapter, I made the case for conceptualising climate activism as a process of public pedagogy. I argued that this allowed us to see that climate activism is engaged in wider hegemonic struggles, which may generate public learning. Here, I strengthened this argument by explaining and making the case for Laclau and Mouffe's theory of hegemony. I argued that although NSMT is useful to the extent that it can explain climate activism as emerging from systemworld/lifeworld tensions, its teleological reasoning and overly rational and linguistic account of democracy detract from its usefulness. I argued that although framing theory addresses these concerns over rationality, its quasi-technocratic response is confused. I then argued that discourse theory provides a more compelling and convincing account of agency than either NSMT or framing. Finally, I supplemented this with an

enhanced focus on the relationship between discourse theory and space, arguing that this is important because climate activism is about the right to the production of space. Therefore, I showed that the logic of discourse theory can be fruitfully applied in order to understand how public pedagogy emerges through spatial processes. In the following chapter, I move on to operationalise Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory in outlining my methodological approach.

Chapter 4

Research methods: deploying discourse theory

Introduction

Heretofore, I have outlined the purpose and rationale of the thesis, I have detailed the reasons why climate change presents such an educational challenge, and I have attempted to indicate how social movements and their knowledges might widen the debate, and bring new analyses to bear. In chapter two, I framed the educational challenge in the context of a literature on public pedagogy, arguing that the educative challenges of climate activism are not simply about promulgating climate science, or even improving science-society interfaces, but are fundamentally issues of cultural politics. As such the cultural endeavours of climate activists are situated against 'neoliberal' public pedagogy, and in and against the 'pedagogical state'. I outlined the possibilities and limitations of public pedagogy as a framing concept. Ultimately, I argued, the virtue of this perspective is to see education and learning as a process of hegemonic struggle, through which "a ruling bloc can only engage in a political and pedagogical struggle if it prepared to take seriously and articulate some of the values and interests of [those it seeks to govern]" (Giroux, 1992, p. 186).

In the previous chapter, I developed these ideas by exploring three different ways of understanding the cultural politics of climate activism as public pedagogy. I argued for a discourse theoretical perspective, which provides the theoretical grounding for my view that the public pedagogy of climate activism is articulated through hegemonic struggle. Finally, I supplemented my discourse theoretical perspective with a discussion of post-structuralist spatial theory, arguing that the cultural politics of climate activism is irreducible from conflicts over the "production of space"

(Lefebvre, 2000[1974]). Having introduced the thesis, given an account of hegemonic epistemic communities in relation to climate change knowledge, adumbrated the contours of the wider terrain of the debate, and defined the problem as one of cultural politics and hegemonic struggle, this chapter moves on to detail the methodological approach that has defined the forthcoming substantive chapters.

To 'do' cultural politics is, after Stuart Hall (Giroux, 2000, p. 342), to explore struggles over identity, meaning and power "produced and meditated within different social contexts, spatial relations and historical conjunctures". This requires an understanding of the environmental movement as an historical and ongoing *process* of movement building and differentiation (identity), as a source of public pedagogy and cultural change (meaning), through which emergent cultural formations exist in shifting relations "between incorporation and resistance" (Jamison, 2001, p. 27) as they contest hegemonic representations (power) (Giroux, 2000, p. 342; Conway, 2006, pp. 11-12). Eyerman and Jamison (1991) and Jamison (2001), have produced the most thoroughgoing account of this process to-date, which, as we know, they term "cognitive praxis". My task, in this sense, is to extrapolate and explicate the theory of cognitive praxis in this historical moment, as new activist practices enact new cultural practices and 'produce' new knowledge that constitute curricular artefacts.

As I suggested in the previous chapter, a focus on identity, meaning, and power suggests to me an engagement with the theoretical logic and methods of discourse theory (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987; Howarth, 2000; Hansen, 2006). Also, given my desire to follow a broad comparative approach similar to Jamison's (2001), tracking knowledge production over time, through which the cultural politics of climate activism is generative of public curriculum, an approach based on analysing publically available texts as curricular artefacts seems viable. Therefore, in what follows, it is my intention to conceptualise and operationalise a discourse approach.

This chapter lays out the conceptual basis of my research design, drawing primarily on Hansen's (2006) operationalisation of discourse theory, and her model of intertextuality. Section 2 justifies and explains my general research approach—a discourse approach. Following from this, I explain the concept of intertextuality and its significance. I explain that the notion of intertextuality is vital for three main reasons: firstly, it may help us to evidence mutual learning across the milieus under study; secondly, it allows for a design that conceptualises hegemony in the wider public discourse arena; thirdly, it allows for elements of a genealogical approach capable of interrogating some of the more exaggerated claims of 'grassrootism' made of movement knowledge.

Intertextuality is an important orienting concept, but it is not the only one. Therefore, my next move is to introduce other factors feeding into the design of my study. These are the actors involved, events involved, and the temporal perspective. If these considerations, taken together, provide the building blocks of an analytical framework, then the next question to be asked is substantive: how do we identify 'discourses', or 'identities' to begin with? Drawing on Hansen and the work of Eyerman and Jamison (1991), I describe the concept of basic discourses as distinctions of an ideal-type kind that situate the study. Another way of putting it is that these are the basic identities, or selves, under consideration in relation to a set of substantive political issues. As such, these identities are spatially, temporally and ethically constituted in relation to 'Others'. In identifying these basic discourses, I take as my starting point Jamison's (2001) typology of community (place-based) environmentalism, professional (reformist) environmentalism, and direct action environmentalism to provide my 'basic discourses'.

Having outlined a broad conceptual framework for conducting my analysis, I move on to populate this framework with real collective actors: these are the direct action networks manifested in the actions of the Camps for Climate Action, the 'place-based' Transition Towns movement, and the ENGO coalition Common Cause.

Having identified the 'Selves' of my study, I describe the study's temporal perspective, including the question of number of events to be covered. I move on to describe my approach to data collection and analysis, situating my corpus in the context of Hansen's models of intertextuality. Having conceptualised and operationalised a discourse approach, I address its limitations in conceptualisation and execution. The penultimate section addresses ethical considerations before briefly concluding.

Research approach

There exist very few comparative studies which have compared and traced the development of green movement knowledge and identities in a macro-context, in an era of climate change (see Saunders, 2008 for an exception). Differing collective identities within the same movement industry can cause schisms and sectarian isolation, but they also provide opportunities for brokerage, adaptation and mutual learning (Saunders, 2008, p. 250). Documenting such productive tensions is one task of the research. However, one might legitimately ask whether post-structural discourse theory and a comparative research approach are compatible. The answer is yes, but that "the point of comparison is to further our understanding and explanation of different logics of identity formation and hegemonic practice in different historical conjunctures, and not to construct generally applicable laws of social and political behaviour" (Howarth, 2000, p. 139).

My contention is that the period under examination is a politically salient moment (or a 'dislocatory moment' to speak with discourse theory), which has presented unique challenges for the effective promulgation of 'green' knowledge in public discourse, and has therefore generated what Tilly (2004) would call new "repertoires of contention", power struggles, identities and therefore, public curriculum. As Stuart Hall (Giroux, 2000, p. 354) understood, "pedagogy is at work in all those public spaces where culture works to secure identities". Discourse theorists "are concerned

with how, under what conditions, and for what reasons, discourses are constructed, contested and change" (Howarth, 2000, p. 131). I am essentially interested in answering these kinds of questions in order to gain insight into how a dislocatory moment in time has produced the conditions for antagonisms, from which overlapping but distinct articulations of cultural political projects in relation to climate change arose. Thus, I am interested in applying these questions in order to learn about the implications of these projects for the cognitive and political praxis of climate change activism. The curriculum generated through this process of hegemonic struggle can be ascertained by analysing the presence of movement knowledge in public discourse. Therefore, whilst the process of cognitive praxis documents processes of linking and differentiation *within* the green movement over time, it also charts the hegemonic struggle through which the knowledge produced in particular movement milieus finds its way into arenas of public discourse**.** Plows (2008, p. 101), in assessing the 'success of UK environmental protest' relates that:

> Publics can become directly engaged in protest activity or in other ways encounter the resources and discourses developed by countercultural networks. Routes of transmission include interface at the local community level…, or through encountering movement frames 'mediated' through the media.

It has been claimed through empirical research that "the media are the main source of information and the main factor shaping people's awareness and concern in relation to climate change" (Carvalho, 2010, p. 165)[vi]. It has also been written that bystander publics at large have been learning about climate change from social movements for over thirty years (Clover & Hall, 2010, p. 165). If so, then it makes clear sense to research the mediation of movement knowledge through the print media as *one* significant site of hegemonic contestation.

The two axes of comparison to consider thus far in terms of discourse are between the self-published texts of different activist milieus, and between activist milieus and

more polyphonic arenas of public discourse. However, the popular press represents one discursive arena for the uptake of movement knowledge. What others might we consider? 'Official' policy discourse clearly is another discursive arena, through which the cultural influence of movement milieus may be evidenced. Moreover, as is often the case with protest (whether transient direct action, or a more rooted place-based initiative), the efficacy of movement discourse can be assessed through its success in defining its purpose in the legalistic discursive genre of the court room. Archived court transcripts and legal journals therefore represent another avenue of exploration.

Lastly, as chapter two argued, movement milieus cannot be regarded as hermetically sealed spaces. A genealogical approach to discourse analysis seeks to identify the key academic disciplines, public intellectuals and epistemological commitments associated with the development of movement generated knowledge. This is important because it allows for a more nuanced exploration of the ambivalence of movement power/knowledge. A robust discourse analysis of the cultural politics of green movement milieus in an era of climate change must be cognizant of where movement knowledge comes from, how it travels between milieus, and the paths it takes into arenas of public discourse. A study such as this requires, first and foremost, a robust model of intertextuality.

Operationalising intertextuality

Intertextuality is a concept often ascribed to Russian cultural theorist Mikhail Bakhtin. The Bakhtinian legacy is a dialogical theory of discourse in which all utterances, all texts, are keyed to social, cultural and political histories (Steinberg, 1999, p. 772; Fairclough, 2003, p. 61; Blomaert, 2005, p. 46). Texts therefore draw upon histories of use of contested meanings, whilst attempting to fashion them into new unique meanings and identities. As we know from the previous chapter, in the terms of discourse theory, hegemony can be regarded as the attempted closure of

dialogicality. Hegemonic projects seek to achieve the impossible task of stabilising meaning within an impossible totality.

Intertextual linkages are divided into those that are implicit and those that are explicit (Hansen, 2006, p. 57). Implicit intertextual links are when conceptual articulations rely upon "implicit references to a larger body of texts on the same subject" (p. 57). "Programmatic catchphrases", or even whole bodies of work may be drawn upon without being explicitly referenced (p.57). Intertextual links can be established through direct reporting (an attributed quotation), or indirect narrative reporting (an attributed summary of another text, speech or event but not what was actually written or said) (Fairclough, 2003, p. 49). This study considered both forms to establish intertextual links in constructing the corpus.

Hansen's (2006) work on poststructuralist discourse analysis (PDA) provides a robust framework delineating four intertextual research models. These models are usefully summarized by Hansen in the table below. Each model allows the researcher of cultural politics to answer different questions: Hansen's principle concern is with policy discourse, and so she begins with model 1, and progresses to model 3b concerned with marginal political discourses. In my case, my analytical focus begins with model 3b and progresses all the way to model 1, as I am interested in the journeys of green movement knowledge. The principle is the same, however. Model 1 to 3b is a spectrum along which the multivocality of discourse on particular substantive political issues can be explored (p. 67). As we can see, model 2 "broadens the analytical scope beyond official discourse and its intertextual links to consider the *major actors and arenas within…policy debate*". In constituting the discursive arena more fully, model 2 includes influential voices in the media, corporate settings, as well as the voice of more influential NGOs, employer's organisations and even trade unions (p. 62). The goal of model 2 is therefore to analyse processes of hegemony at work in public discourse. Model 3a includes wider cultural representations, evoking the work of Bahktinian cultural studies, and the

literary analyses of Raymond Williams.

Although Hansen precedes the discourse of social movements with discourse originating in popular culture, the aim is not to locate the autochthonous location of an idea; this is anathema to discourse theory. Public intellectuals who fabricate the discourse found in model 3b on particular topics, are often part of "critical communities" (Rochon, 1998, p. 30), from which new and innovative worldviews, technical and organisational knowledge emerges. These communities incubate new ideas, and it is often social movement actors who promulgate these ideas to the wider public, through strategic framing mechanisms (p. 95). Model 3b, in Hansen's work includes emergent social movement organisations, less powerful NGOs, as well as academic analyses, and is the locus of counter-hegemonic discourse and is fruitful for those interested in analysing "where resistance and future rearticulations might occur" (Hansen, 2006, p. 63).

Table 1 Intertextual research models. Reproduced from Hansen (Hansen, 2006, p. 63)

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3a**	**Model 3b**
Analytical focus	Official discourse: Heads of states Governments Senior civil servants Heads of international institutions Official statements by international institutions	Wider policy debate: political opposition The media Corporate institutions	Cultural representations Popular culture High culture	Marginal political discourses: Social movements Illegal associations Academics NGOs
Object of analysis	Official texts Direct and	Political texts Parliamentary	Film, fiction, television,	Marginal newspapers,

	secondary intertextual links Supportive texts Critical texts	debates Speeches, statements Media texts Editorials Field reporting Opinion-debate Corporate institutions Public campaigns Recurring intertextual links	computer games, photography, comics, music poetry, painting, architecture, travel writing, autobiography	websites, books, pamphlets, academic analysis
Goal of analysis	The stabilization of official discourse through intertextual links The response to official discourse to critical discourses	The hegemony of official discourse The likely transformation of official discourse The internal stability of media discourses	Sedimentation or reproduction of identities in cultural representations	Resistance to the status quo Dissent in cases of models 1 and 2 hegemony Academic debates

Of course, researchers need not adhere to one model—many, such as myself, may be interested in the wider process of epistemic drift and therefore should aim to work across the whole spectrum. On this basis, I resolve to deploy a model that runs from '3b' through to '1'. One good example of an operationalisation of this kind of approach in social movement research is van Bommel and Spicer's (2011) study of the Slow Food movement (SFM).

They employ a model '3b'—model '2' approach in seeking to analyse how the SFM engaged in hegemonic struggle (p. 1718). The researchers first began with "the movement's foundational texts, manifestos, speeches, histories and campaigning literature from websites", and "examined secondary literature on the movement" (p. 1723). Through analysing media accounts, the researchers were able to discern how the movement's cultural politics evolved over a defined period of time. They

empirically demonstrated how the movement linked itself to other actors over time by "broadening the range of floating signifiers they appeal to and by creating increasingly ambiguous nodal points able to appeal to a range of different constituents" (p. 1719).

Using a similar approach, Nerlich and Koteyko (2009) studied how the cultural strategies and knowledge of community-based carbon reduction action groups, as evident in their self-produced (online) texts, translated into popular media accounts. They found that their practical activities around carbon reduction were articulated into chains of equivalence, which linked credible and available tropes to do with dieting (low-carbon dieting), finance ('carbon accounting'), and individual pietistic morality (carbon sinning). Although I have read discourse theory into their more positivist approach, their study showed the contingency and intertextuality of discourse (that these climate activist strategies are contingent upon what signifiers are credible and available), where a nascent ethical identity around climate change can be co-opted back into dominant orders of discourse, which casts the issue in individualistic but familiar terms. Although these examples give an impressionistic flavour of how one might investigate the cultural politics of contemporary movements, surprisingly few studies adopt such an approach.

Actors, events and timeframes

Having discussed how intertextuality can be operationalised, it should be acknowledged that there are other conceptual issues that must be brought to bear when designing my study. A discourse analysis is inevitably a simplification of a messy reality; an interpretative framing of events. As such, choices must be made, and limitations acknowledged. Therefore, in addition to intertextuality, we must consider:

> …whether one should examine the…discourse of one Self or of multiple Selves; whether one should select one particular moment or a longer historical development; whether one should study one event or issue or a multiplicity; and finally, which material should be selected as the foundation for and object of analysis (Hansen, 2006, p. `73).

Selecting the corpus for any study then, depends on intertextuality, identities to be studied, the temporal perspective, and the event(s) to be covered. This is summarised below (figure 1):

Figure 1. Operationalising discourse theory. Adapted from Hansen (2006, p. 81)



Firstly, the study of the formation of selves, or identity, is the raison d'être of discourse theory, which considers that ontologically, there is no essential self. Yet, to avoid misunderstanding of my position I should re-emphasise that although signifiers do not have any intrinsic or stable relationship to anything in the 'real world' (the position of essentialism), neither is identity a free-floating social construction: this premise leads to what DeLanda (2006, pp. 45-6) calls a 'social essentialism'. Rather, cultural identity should be considered to be transversal: it denies

discourse|materiality, culture|nature dualisms. Identities may congeal around particular more or less stable nodal points, but these in my view are the discursive components of assemblages undergoing ongoing processes of (de)territorialisation. Even one self will be internally heterogeneous, and is constructed in a Self-Other relationship, through discursive encounters. Furthermore, one identity may even construct itself by Othering its own previous historical incarnations. Delineating selves is therefore a situated analytical choice. The temporal perspective again is a matter of analytic unit of analysis. One may elect to compare carefully selected salient historical moments over a period of decades in order to analyse the evolution of discourse, or conduct a contemporary synchronic comparative analysis of different selves. Relatedly, an event may be macro-social – an on-going war, the negotiation of the Kyoto agreement – or micro-social, for example contemporary transient protest events within the same historical period.

Once these decisions have been made, one can turn to the practical task of gathering the corpus. Model 1 texts are the least problematic to gather because they are official policy texts, freely available online as a matter of record. Model 2 texts involve the utilisation of media archives. I have personally opted to use Lexis Nexis—a powerful digital archive of UK news, and other selected periodicals. Depending on the degree of thoroughness perceived to be necessary to make a study reliable, discourse analysts might combine digital sources with hard copy archives in order to triangulate for inconsistencies, but this was outwith my personal capacity. Model 3a texts, as popular culture texts, should be by definition easily accessible. However, with model 3b, "[w]hen speaking of social movements and illicit organisations it will often be a matter of selecting any material that might be available" (Hansen, 2006, p. 87). Nevertheless, smaller NGOs, community organisations, and even direct action networks increasingly have web presences from which ephemera that have been archived for posterity can be obtained. Moreover, the range of alternative media sources available online makes this increasingly less problematic.

Identifying Basic discourses

The discussion heretofore, particularly intertextuality, has been concerned with the location of discourse in the context of justifying text selection. To remind the reader, this is necessary in order to present a model of research that can be put to work in order to chart processes of epistemic drift, mutual learning, as well as the historical sedimentation of particular movement identities. Analytically separate from this, Hansen (2006, p. 65) uses the term "basic discourses", in order to delineate the initial research orientation towards the various "political and substantial positions" that one might be interested in. As such, basic discourses are "analytical distinctions of an ideal type kind" (p. 52). These are the "different constructions of identity and policy…which separate the political landscape between them" (p. 52).

Hansen provides three methodological points one should aim to apply in the identification of basic discourses. First, the discourses should be based upon reading a wide variety of sources, media and genres. In this sense, the starting point is based on an in-depth reading of academic accounts, popular accounts, and self-generated activist accounts that has occurred prior to beginning the analysis 'proper'. Secondly, "basic discourses should be built on explicit articulations of identity", whether these articulations are "geographical identities, historical analogies, striking metaphors, or political concepts". Thirdly, the analyst should draw from conceptual histories and genealogies that trace the constitution of a basic discourse "back in history to understand when and how it was formed", thereby equipping the analyst with the basic knowledge to see where "fault lines might be located in the present".

Basic discourses are primary orienting identities, and since identities are heterogeneous ensembles representing impossible totalities, their existence without exception depends on a constitutive outside—an 'Other'. A caveat worth stating is that this process of differentiation may not be explicitly articulated in discourse. A second caveat is the case of universal discourse, for example human rights discourse.

Nevertheless, Hansen contends that universalising discourse on for example human rights or justice is always mobilised in relation to a situated set of identities in a material reality where such concepts are never fully realised For example, claims to universal human rights are made in protest of violations of such rights. Moreover, a non-oppositional identity may be cleaved from previous incarnations of itself in the past: thus the other is temporally constituted.

In general, Hansen (p. 46) usefully describes identity as being *spatially, temporally and ethically* constituted. Temporal constructions of identity likewise can frame Self and Other in several ways: depending on the historical constitution of identity, particular events may be wilfully foregrounded or obfuscated. Of course, "[t]emporal themes such as development, transformation, continuity, change, repetition, or stasis are crucial for analysing the construction of identity" (p. 48). Finally, the ethical dimension of identity straightforwardly speaks to discursive constructions of ethics, morality, and responsibility in relation to Self and Other (p. 50). Each of these analytical distinctions is co-implicated—one cannot be privileged over the other.

I see this spatio-temporal framing of collective identity as compatible with a view of social movement milieus as material-discursive assemblages. As DeLanda (2006, p. 58) argues, drawing on social movement theorist Charles Tilly, the discursive components of social movements:

> …concentrate on unified space and time settings and on actors with clear motivations and fixed attributes, and therefore do not really capture the actual causal structure of a conflictive situation, particularly one that has lasted a long time. These narratives tend to leave out anything related to unintended consequences of intentional action, any concentration of resources that is too slow to be detected by direct experience, as well as any effects mediated by the social environment.

The important point is that such spatio-temporal articulations of identity go on to shape, or reterritorialise, the organisation of material resources, thus having a real

effect on the 'structure' of a 'conflictive situation'. Again, it is important to emphasise the transversality of the discursive and the material.

Figure 2. Identity. Adapted from text of Hansen (2006, pp. 37-54)



Given the above, Hansen's framework seems robust enough to encompass the rich work on collective identity produced through what is referred to as the 'cultural turn' in social movement studies. In fact, whilst providing a satisfactory meta-level framework for situating the study, which encompasses themes of space in its conception of cultural politics, the nuances of collective identity theory in social movement studies allows the refinement of the concept of identity as laid out above. Firstly, aside from meaningful social practice framed in terms of spatio-temporally situated ethical worldviews, movement identities often coalesce around specific repertoires of action, tactics, and organisational styles (Fomiyana, 2010, p. 396). As Melucci (1996, p. 183) recognises, collective identity in contemporary social movements frequently coalesces not around primarily oppositional claims-making, but around organisational and technical innovation. Movement milieus may demonstrate through 'doing', that they are sites of social and technical innovation informed by particular worldviews. Thus, the collective identity of a social movement milieu can be expressed along Hansen's axes of space, time and ethics, but it can also be expressed in the terms of analytically differentiated "knowledge

interests": that is, movements produce and promulgate "technical knowledge", and "organisational knowledge", knowledge pertaining to how we communicate, organise and disseminate knowledge itself (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991, pp. 68-69). It is, however, important to treat these categories as heuristic categories intended for empirical investigation, and not as the Habermasian transcendental 'knowledge interests' they were derived from, because such foundational thinking is anathema to discourse theory.

In an effort to identify basic discourses from which new activist practices have emerged, I begin with Jamison's (2001) typology (see table 2) of different kinds of environmental activism, "based on different forms of practice and, more specifically, on different forms of cognitive praxis" (Jamison, 2001, p. 149). These are community environmentalism, professional (or reformist environmentalism) and direct action environmentalism.

Table 2 'Basic discourses' of environmental movement cognitive praxis. Adapted and developed from Jamison (2001, p.149-170)

Type of action	**Cognitive praxis**	**Examples of knowledge produced and disseminated**
Community environmentalism	Factual, empirical, scientific-technical	Empirical knowledge about local environmental problems, and 'know how' based skills e.g. community carbon foot printing, waste distribution, local food production, recycling schemes, local currencies, and so on.

	Deliberative	Techniques of communication, translation and synthesis of knowledge concerned with making local governance and democracy work. The use and promulgation of consensus-based methods of decision-making.
Professional (reformist) environmentalism	Activist expertise in factual, empirical, scientific-technical matters	Civil society research (CSR) on environmental matters combining the genres of scientific research, investigative journalism and policy.
	Activist expertise in education	Popular educational materials such as training handbooks, manuals, pamphlets, on-line materials, CD-ROMs, DVDs for use in courses, seminars etc.
	Professional intellectual innovation	Innovative concepts and strategies devised by expert 'movement intellectuals'
	Activist expertise in strategic communication	PR, social marketing, lobbying, media strategy
Direct action environmentalism	Moral; Overtly ideological	Meta-social critique; alternative, anarchist, consensus forms of

		organizing, deliberating and acting
	Tactical innovation; Aesthetic Ethics of personal agency: *bio-power*.	Dramaturgical creativity to create spectacle mixed with ideological/ political critique and demands Personal responsibility to put one's body on the line to physically prevent damaging enterprises.

Collective actors involved in cognitive praxis

I have taken as my starting point, three basic ideal-typical forms of collective climate action, which form the starting point for comparison. These three basic types are: 'place-based' community activism; targeted direct action; professional activism. For community activism, the Transition Towns movement will be the object of focus. For professional activism, the ENGO coalition Common Cause (CC) has been selected. Finally, the Camp for Climate Action (CCA) network has been selected as a proxy for high profile environmental DA aimed tackling climate change. I will briefly address each in turn.

Camp for Climate Action (CCA)

In order to study the cognitive praxis of direct climate action the CCA will provide the object of focus. Protest events since the first Climate Camp at Drax power station in 2006 by these (submerged) networks have received wide reaching, high-profile

coverage in the mass media (Plows, 2008). The first CCA at Drax power station 2006 drew from the capacity built by counter cultural networks at the anti-G8 protest in Stirling in 2005, where there was broad uptake of consensus tactics and the set-up of an 'eco-village' (Plows, 2008, p. 101). It has been associated with a young generation of "post-Seattle" activists from the global justice movement, rather than environmental issues, narrowly defined (ibid.). Thus, "its roots lie in grass-roots anti-capitalist activism combining social justice and anarchist perspectives" (Schlembach, 2011, p. 195). Yet, it is also true to say that the global justice movement drew capacity from previous protest cycles of environmental DA protest. What is interesting about the CCA is that first, climate change is thought to be an epiphenomenon of 'root causes', namely capitalism. Secondly, and importantly, there is "an epistemological shift that has arisen with the advent of climate change as the dominant frame of environmental protest, with legitimization of activism resulting partly from the close observance of official sources of climate science" (p. 195). This, of course, is an orienting principle for the epistemological shift occurring in environmental activism in the UK, more generally. Climate change science and climate change politics present unique challenges for public communication and its efficacy.

Transition Towns (TT)

Through its self-proclaimed 'viral spread' from a UK-based movement, the TT movement has become emblematic of place-based activism oriented around climate change and peak oil around the world since its inception in 2005. The Transition Towns movement is a multi-scalar network of initiatives based on grassroots community capacity building faced with the intertwined issues – the 'hydrocarbon twins' – of climate change and peak oil (Hopkins, 2008a, p. 8). The cosmological knowledge of Transition is not easily separable from the development of locally appropriate technical-practical skills ('know how' knowledge), and organizational knowledge appropriate to collective action at the most locally feasible scale possible

all based on the premise of energy descent. Yet, Transition has arguably spread as a successful idea because of the ability of movement intellectuals to expand the range of floating signifiers that it appeals to.

Permaculture is indeed the primary philosophical antecedent owing to the cosmology of the Transition movement, which transcends its locally contingent character (Connors & McDonald, 2010, p. 568; Aiken, 2012). Yet systems thinking, psychology, and ideas from business development have all been integral to the movement's cognitive praxis (Hopkins, 2011, p. 21). In short, the emergence of Transition is fundamentally premised on an eclectic recombination of different bodies of knowledge, oriented towards experimentation and practical application, and learning through doing (Hopkins, 2011, p. 17). Transition discourse simultaneously finds strength in place-based cultural narratives and connectivist 'learning network' metaphors. The latter type of metaphor is used to describe the spread of the movement such that there were 134 'official' Transition Town communities worldwide in February 2009 (Scott-Cato and Hillier, 2010); growing to 159 in May 2009 (Connors & McDonald, 2010). The rhizome-like growth of the Transition movement and its ethos of experimentation and innovation beginning at the local level, mean that rather than the stasis implied in communitarian conceptions of community, local Transition initiatives are better conceived as local assemblages sharing resources and loosely connected by a shared philosophy and underpinning concepts, known as 'Transition Culture' (Scott-Cato and Hillier, 2010; Aiken 2012, p. 96).

Common Cause (CC)

In order to study the cultural politics of professional climate activism, Common Cause (CC) will provide the object of focus. CC exists explicitly to address culture change, and encompasses the well-known public brands, who (especially throughout Europe) have come to be agenda setters for the green movement as a whole,

historically having "take[n] over the mantle of the movement, both in terms of media attention as well as in regard to general public interest" (Jamison, 2001, p. 158).

CC consists of a working group of ENGOs, green independent think tank staff, as well as other civil society organizations (CSOs). It is of interest here as an influential coalescing network of intellectuals oriented towards explicating and promulgating theories of cultural change for campaigners tackling global 'bigger than self' problems. The work of CC has emerged from a collective perception amongst those involved that "current approaches to tackling global challenges are failing", for example, "real UK [carbon dioxide equivalent (CO_2e)] emissions have actually increased by 17% since 1990" (Crompton, 2010, p. 17). The coalition has produced what I regard as two key documents—"Common Cause: the Case for Working with Our Cultural Values", and "the Common Cause Handbook" (Crompton, 2010; Holmes, et al., 2011). At the time of publishing the former document, the working group was convened by chief executives from the Climate Outreach and Information Network (COIN), Campaign to Protect Rural England (CPRE), Friends of the Earth (FoE), Oxfam, and WWF. The working group itself consisted of senior campaign directors and heads of communication from each NGO. By the time the latter document was published, the coalition had expanded to include "Action for Children, Cambridge Carbon Footprint, the new economics foundation and Think Global" (Holmes, et al., 2011, p. 4). The latter document was also written in collaboration with independent think tank "The Public Interest Research Centre (PIRC), who produce CSR in collaboration with various NGOs: their primary interests are in strategic communications in climate change, energy, and economics.

CC, rather than being the face of professional lobbying efforts around ENGO climate lobbying like Stop Climate Chaos for example, is interesting because it foregrounds *cultural concepts* – namely values and frames – as primary *strategic concerns* for ENGOs and their campaigning efforts. As CC gains popularity amongst campaigners, activists, and community organisers, and policy makers it is also

interesting because its influence bleeds into the discourse of the TT movement, and its work has interesting parallels with government social research into behaviour change utilising behavioural economics, social psychology, and sociological theories of practice. As such, the cognitive praxis of CC is interesting because it shares some features of an epistemic community, in that it is arguably part of a wider terrain of territorial colonization of the 'psychagogy' disciplines, whilst its purpose is to directly contest the cultural values and norms, and hence the public pedagogy, of neoliberalism.

Temporal Perspective

In terms of circumscribing the corpora temporally, these milieus have all have risen to prominence during the same broad politically salient moment. The first press mention of Transition found by this researcher was 2005, and the first Climate Camp protest was nominally 2006, but arguably 2005 at the G8 protests. The work of CC has co-evolved alongside these milieus, but its first publication did not emerge until 2010. Nevertheless, the work of CC is based on the praxis of the ENGO sector, from at least 2005 onwards when Friends of the Earth launched its 'Big Ask' campaign. The work of CC has evolved from the same dislocatory moment, recognising the weaknesses of technocratic approaches to climate change combined with the hegemony of market norms, and although the academic work underpinning CC had been developed throughout the 1990s, explicit collaboration with professional activists came later. It was, in fact, in 2008, when the germinal report "Weathercocks and Signposts" (Crompton, 2008) announced that the environmental movement is at a crossroads, with respect to efficacy in relation to climate change. Therefore all three milieus arose from the same political 'moment', and the analysis has a defined time period from 2005-present. Transition Towns and Climate Camp existed on the fringes of public perception from 2005/06 onwards, and have gained in profile and participation since (although the 'submerged network' organising as Camp for Climate Action is no longer organising under this name).

What I am proposing here, is that 2005 marks a wider "politically salient moment" (Hansen, 2006; Emejulu, 2011), where climate change re-emerged with gusto in the public discourse arena, over a decade after Kyoto, eventually producing a dislocatory experience. The cultural politics of each culture of activism reflect the development of their cognitive praxis over time, which in turn have gone on to inform the ways in which such cultures of activism have attempted to convert this dislocation into articulatory moments, constitutive of nascent identities. A "politically salient moment" is a clearly defined point in time "tied to particular events [that are] analytically driven by changes in important political structures and institutions" (Emejulu, 2011, p. 231). Arguably, the next "politically salient moment", for these cultures of activism was the crisis of finance capital in 2008, which arguably reduced the salience of environmental issues, and thus climate change (see appendix 1).

What can we point to in order to substantiate this? We can identify three such signposts which signalled the public salience of carbon mitigation: these were the release of Al Gore's film 'An Inconvenient Truth' in the summer of 2006, the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change published in the autumn of 2006, and the IPCC's fourth report in 2007 (Nerlich & Koteyko, 2009, p. 207; Eastin, et al., 2011, p. 22). An empirical support of the change in public discourse is provided by Nerlich and Koteyko's finding that in the eleven years from 1992-2003, there are ten mentions of the term "carbon footprint" in UK newspapers, whilst in the two years from 2004-2006 alone, the count becomes 918 (p. 207), almost a hundredfold increase. Boykoff's (2008, pp. 553-4) study of UK newspaper coverage of climate change points to two moments post-2000 where coverage spiked: firstly, June/July 2005 where Tony Blair highlighted the seriousness of the issue at the G8 summit, and when proposals over the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme were being debated; second, 2006 when Al Gore's 'An Inconvenient Truth' became a focus and the Stern Review was published. In addition, Grundmann and Krishnamurthy's (2010, p. 131) comparative corpus analysis of newspaper coverage of climate change

found an “exponential rise after 2005” in reporting on climate change in UK newspapers.

Subsequent critical political moments within this overarching time period involve the passing of the Climate Change Act (2008) on the 26th November 2008, committing the UK to 80% carbon emissions cut by 2050, and the passing of the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009 on August 4th 2009, committing Scotland to an 80% reduction by 2050, and the very visible failure of the Conference of Parties 15 to agree a treaty in Copenhagen in December 2009. Of course, the ‘economic crisis’ from 2008 has intersected with the issue salience of climate change in complex ways (see appendix 1).

Plows (2008, p. 95) points to external issue triggers leading to the development of climate movement action: namely, contradiction between the increase of government discourse on the urgent necessity of tackling climate change and their move in the other direction in terms of energy and transport policy. In addition, the contradiction between apocalyptic media narratives and the promotion of individual and household-level actions (turning of lights, washing clothes at a lower temperature and so on), set up a dichotomy that to large swaths of the public, was particularly disempowering and emphasised a tragic disavowal of human agency (Segnit & Ereaut, 2006; Segnit & Ereaut, 2007; Foust & Murphy, 2009). These dislocatory moments provided the starting point and motivation for the innovative and competing approaches of the climate change communication literature proliferated by think tanks and ENGOs. It has also led to the rapid spread of ‘meso-level’ community responses (bridging the micro and the macro) as well as the ethic of personal responsibility mixed with collective solidarity seen in targeted direct action.

At a certain basic level, the green theories of value of various milieus could be argued to emerge from these same dislocatory experiences; they just have differing priorities regarding theories of agency. The Transition movement emerged as the

dominant response to climate change (and peak oil) at the meso-level where people felt able to exercise collective agency beyond small personal actions and without waiting on the state. The protest events of the CCA expressed agency in a different, more oppositional way, focusing on personal responsibility to engage in an agonistic politics with powerful institutional actors. Later on, CC built on academic expertise and campaigning nous in order to re-think how behaviour is related to cultural values. Therefore, conceptualised as one 'moment', the timeframe for this study stretches from 2005 through to 2011 (the end of the data collecting period).

Another important point to make is that from 2006 onwards, the dislocatory effects of climate change in terms of challenging citizens' relationship with the public pedagogy of neoliberalism could be taken for granted: from 2006 onwards, powerful organisations of global economic governance such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have seized on the ambiguity of 'climate protection' as a signifier, and have struggled to articulate it into chains of equivalence based on "globalism, scientism, [economic] growth and efficiency" (Methmann, 2010, p. 357). As I argued in chapter two, the success of suturing together these elements relies on suppressing their contradictory moments that are intrinsic to the tensions in the state-finance nexus: namely, the tensions between the technocratic global rationalism of 'green governmentality', and the 'ethical' discourse of ecological modernization, which seeks to recast efficiency in a discourse of market values and norms (p. 357). Overall, the pertinent question in relation to the cultural politics of the environmental movement is how to identify the teachable moments in all of this.

Thus, a plethora of events are circumscribed by one moment, charting the emergence and growth of three selves (place-based community activism; professional activism and targeted direct action). Furthermore, the intertextual model runs the entire spectrum of Hansen's model. This is represented graphically below (figure 3).

Figure 3. Cultural politics of UK environmentalism in an era of climate change.



Data collection

In this section I explain my approach to data collection and analysis. In keeping with my proposed framework, the table below (table 3) illustrates my text selections in the context of Hansen's (2006) intertextual models explained above. Accordingly, I proceed by explaining my approach from 3b (marginal texts) through to 1 (official discourse).

Table 3 The corpus in the context of Hansen's (2006) intertextual models approach

Cognitive praxis (Self)	**Model 1: Official discourse**	**Model 2: wider discursive arena. The popular press.**	**Model 3a: Popular culture**	**Model 3b: Marginal texts**
Place-based community activism (Transition Towns)	Government websites: social research publications and policy documents. Party political manifestos. Think Tank documents.	UK newsprint from 2005-2011 available on Lexis Nexis (N=207)		TT publications: Key texts: The Transition Handbook (Hopkins, 2008a); The Transition Timeline (Chamberlain, 2009); The Transition Companion (Hopkins, 2011). Transition Culture Website: www.transitionculture.org Transition Network website: www.transitionnetwork.org Transition Scotland Website: www.transitionscotland .org Alternative press: Peace News; Red Pepper; Shift Magazine; Resurgence; Trapese Collective Transition Scotland monthly e-newsletter emails. Key secondary academic analysis: (Scott-Cato, 2008; Bailey, et al., 2010; Scott-Cato & Hillier, 2010; North, 2010; Aiken, 2012; North & Longhurst, 2013) Four key informant interviews:

		Community activist/popular educator 1 (28th May , 2010), Community activist/popular educator 2 (1st June, 2010), community activist/popular educator 3 (Tuesday 8th June, 2010), Peak oil activist/educator (10th June, 2010)
Professional activism (Common Cause)	Government websites: social research publications and policy documents. Party political manifestos. Think Tank documents.	CC publications: Key texts: "Weathercocks and signposts" (Crompton, 2008); "Common Cause: The Case for Working with Our Cultural Values" (Crompton, 2010); "Common Cause Handbook: A Guide to Values and Frames" (Holmes, et al., 2011) Common Cause website: www.valuesandframes.org key secondary academic analysis: (Brulle, 2010; Lakoff, 2010; Corner & Randall, 2011; Jones, et al., 2011) Participant observation notes: The Friends of the Earth 40th anniversary conference, 9-11 September, 2011, Nottingham University Notes from webinar discussion

					with CC movement intellectual Tom Crompton at "Conference on Communication and Environment: Participation Revisited: Openings and Closures for Deliberations on the Commons" Held at Uppsala University between 6-10th June 2013
Direct action (CCA)		Relevant court room transcripts and legal journals available on Lexis Nexis Government document: "Demonstrating respect for rights? Follow-up" (Joint Committee on Human Rights , 14th July 2009)	UK newsprint from 2005-2011 available on Lexis Nexis (N=593)	"*Just Do it*" directed by Emily James. Documentary of a year in the life of climate camp campaigners. 'Promotional' materials from www.justdoit.org.uk	Key texts: Foundational texts: Graeber, D. (2004) "Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology" Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (2006) "Multitude: War and democracy in an age of empire. Pamphlets from the climate camp website: www.climatecamp.org.uk Minutes from the climate camp website: www.climatecamp.org.uk The carbon trade watch website: www.carbontradewatch.org Activist research from the Corner House website:

	www.thecornerhouse.org.uk Press releases from the climate camp website (N=49): www.climatecamp.org.uk Discussion threads From www.inydmedia.org. 'Promotional' materials from www.justdoit.org CCA mailing list. Alternative press: Principally Peace News; Red Pepper; Shift Magazine Selected activist blogs Key secondary academic analysis: (Plows, 2008; Saunders & Price, 2009; Pearse, et al., 2010; Schlembach, 2011) Key informant interview: CCA and Plane Stupid organiser/activist (29th May, 2010)

The key point to note is that the table above is indicative of the wider research process, not exhaustive. It is difficult to give a closed list of texts because the distinction between text selection and analysis is not clear cut. This means that I could not consider a text for inclusion without reading it at a 'first pass', and in doing

so, considering how its language and ideas fit into a wider process of identity construction. It was not important that I collate and analyse every available text related to these cultures of activism in the UK (an impossible task). Just because a particular text is not listed above does not mean it was not used in the analysis. Moreover, just because particular texts were not included, does not mean they were irrelevant. Rather, what was important was that I was confident enough in my evolving interpretation that I recognised it when I began to encounter redundancy and repetition with regards to the processes of linking and differentiation I was interested in. This indicated to me that I had reached a kind of 'saturation point' in my discursive analysis. The presentation strategy of selecting exemplars of particular discursive processes in particular contexts then becomes rather more a matter of craft in giving a convincing, but empirically grounded account of the discursive logics at work in climate activism.

In each case the analysis began with foundational texts from each milieu, where they existed. These acted as nodal points around which a wider intertextual web of debate could be constructed. From here, key arguments from movement intellectuals and their diffuse critical communities, as well as key texts from the climate science epistemic community could be identified. Foundational texts for each culture of activism would be those that both give a clear articulation of identity and are widely read. An example for the Transition movement is the "Transition Handbook" (Hopkins, 2008a), by the movement's cofounder, permaculturist and most influential intellectual Rob Hopkins. An example from Common Cause is "Common Cause: The Case for Working with Our Cultural Values", (Crompton, 2010),written by movement intellectual Tom Crompton, who became a prime mover of the work of Common Cause out of frustration at his own experiences of professional advocacy. An example from the climate camp is "Criticism without Critique: A Climate Camp Reader" (Shift Magazine/Dystophia, 2010). Although the movement itself has no defining movement intellectual, I considered David Graeber as one principle movement intellectual, and his book "Fragments of an anarchist anthropology"

(2004) as a key text, shaping the identity of the movement (listed as key reading on the climate camp website). I also considered Hardt and Negri (2006) to be two movement intellectuals who have directly influenced the cognitive praxis of the Global Justice movement.

In order to strengthen and help to inform my initial reading of foundational texts, I conducted a number of semi-structured pilot interviews (10 in all) in the summer of 2010, with activists either involved in direct action, community activism and professional activism connected with climate change (see appendix 2). These activists were selected on account of their high-levels of general involvement, often with a range of activist commitments. The knowledge gleaned from these pilot interviews helped to strengthen my initial understanding of 'basic discourses', as well as the potential points of both overlap and antagonism between them.

In addition to this, to further enhance my understanding of discourse in action, I draw upon participant observation field notes and reflections from a small selection of key activist events. Between 20th May, 2010 and the 11th September 2011, I elected to take participant observation notes at three events productive of dialogue between DA activists, local community activists, and professional campaigners from the UK and beyond. The first of these events was a pre-trial rally for DA activists who had been arrested for occupying Aberdeen airport taxiway in protest at airport expansion. It brought together community campaigners, professional campaigners, DA activists, sympathetic lawyers, and general supports.

The second was on 18th April 2011 was a 'People's AGM' called "Royal Bank of Scotland: Back to Black". The purpose of this event, coinciding with the Royal Bank of Scotland's (RBS) own AGM was to educate attendees about, and contest the bank's financing of oil sands extraction in the Alberta Canada. To give a picture of the diversity of such events, representatives of the Indigenous Environmental Network (IEN) composed of over 250 tribes were present, and the people of the

Lubicon Cree and the Yinka Dene alliance were directly represented. Furthermore, the UK Tar Sands Network, Scottish Education for Action and Development (SEAD), People and Planet, the World Development Network, and Platform were represented.

Lastly, I participated as a delegate at the Friends of the Earth 40th anniversary, held at Nottingham University between the 9th to the 11th September 2011. This event was full of educational workshops populated by people with involvement in many kinds of climate activism, such as "Power to the people – How is it changing?" in which a diverse array of campaigners in including DA activists explored different approaches to activism and definitions of success. Another example was the Common Cause workshops where delegates tried to negotiate their own local rationalities with such new strategies from the centre. Finally, I draw on my own personal experience such as informal conversations I have had with educators and activists, which have come about through my own (limited) personal involvement.

Movement ephemera such as pamphlets, press releases, radical periodicals, educational resources, research reports and so on, were made easily available by being archived on respective websites. Although a discourse theoretical perspective denies any foundational separation between 'inward' and 'outward' facing documents, it can be a useful heuristic distinction to make. The more outward facing of these documents (climate camp press releases being a good example) provided insight into the movement's *intended curriculum* for potential adherents. This speaks to the development of "sophisticated framing stakes and accompanying resources with a broad (UK) public uptake" (Plows, 2008, p. 103). On the other hand, movement internal debates (blogs, radical and special interest periodicals being good examples) allowed me to capture something of the internal activist *praxis* over time. Again, this speaks to "[a]ctivist network longevity and capacity building, protest counterculture as a social resource" (Plows, 2008, p. 103). This is important as it

gives insight into the recursive and dialogical nature of cultural politics (Steinberg, 1999) involving activists, the wider public, industry and politicians.

Despite various forms of independent media and publishing available to activist-intellectuals nowadays, bystander publics' exposure to social movement activity often remains mass mediated. Despite the fact that activists advance "some aspects of their collective actions frames into media discourse, power asymmetries and prevailing journalistic norms often make this difficult" (Carragee & Roefs, 2004, p. 22). Thus, as a source of social movement public pedagogy, the popular print media is therefore particularly interesting as it continues to "constitute a principle site for the crafting of hegemony in modern societies" (van Bommel & Spicer, 2011, p. 1718)

Newspaper articles were accessed through systematic searches on the Lexis Nexis digital archive. They constituted part of the corpus for Transition and the CCA because Common Cause only exists to produce civil society research and educational materials for campaigners around the notion of cultural change. For the CCA, newspaper articles were found using the search terms 'climate camp' and 'camp for climate action'. This retrieved a total of 593 relevant articles. For the Transition movement I first used the search terms 'transition town' and transition towns'. Then, I used the specific name of individual Transition initiatives, whose activities may have been reported upon, yet not expressly as a 'Transition Town'. Because of the sheer number of Transition initiatives in the UK, I opted to include the names of Scottish initiatives only, in order to keep the study manageable. I identified the relevant groups by interviewing the co-ordinator of the Transition Scotland network and then obtained a list from the Transition Scotland website. In the end, this returned 207 relevant newspaper articles. All news articles dated later than 2011 were excluded. There was a strong arbitrary element to this cut-off point, but to put it simply I had to choose a point at which there was no more gathering of data and only analysis.

I included in my search UK titles across the ideological spectrum from 'quality' through to 'tabloid' titles. Significant CCA and Transition activity occurs in Scotland, but is under reported, in UK titles, so I also included specifically Scottish titles. Lastly, I did include local press, particularly with the rationale that the activity of community-based Transition groups would be more likely to be covered by local titles. Again, for manageability reasons, I looked at only Scottish local titles. Please see appendix 3 for an exhaustive list of newspaper sources consulted arranged by year and newspaper title. On the whole then, although the newspaper corpus covers the UK, it should be noted that there is a Scottish bias to the data.

Using newspapers to study collective action has a rich history in social movement research, and is a widely used approach (Rucht & Ohlemacher, 1992; Earl, et al., 2004).Newspapers are not only useful as sites of hegemonic struggle and for gaining insight into 'front stage' versus 'backstage' representations, but they have also provided me with an economical method of systematically gathering longitudinal data covering multiple places, events, and actors within the UK (Rucht & Ohlemacher, 1992, p. 91). Having outlined my approach to data collection, I move on below to address data analysis.

Data analysis

All texts were uploaded to qualitative research software 'NVivo'. The overwhelming majority of texts were digital and for those few that were not, relevant portions could be scanned and then imported as PDF files. To begin with, texts were organised into basic folders and sub-folders in a consistent way. For each culture of activism, texts were catalogued according to whether they were primary academic texts (predominantly related to climate science, but any relevant sources drawn upon directly by activists); secondary academic analyses of particular cultures of activism (this distinction is not clear cut as in many instances the academics writing such journal articles also have direct involvement in such movements); social movement

texts (including activist periodicals and blogs); newspaper texts; political texts; and finally legal texts (also accessed using Lexis Nexis. Particularly concerning direct action).

To address the strategy for data analysis, I must return to the fundamental concepts outlined above, which structured my coding categories. My aim is to understand how the cultural politics of climate activism is generative of public pedagogy. I have asserted that this occurs through hegemonic struggle. Hegemonic struggle plays out through articulatory practices and is productive of impossible totalities, or as Hansen says 'Selfs'. These 'Selfs' are constructed through articulatory practices which require radical investment in the whole because they are only contingently obligatory, not logically necessary: they are simultaneously entered into other multiple relations, which destabilise the emergent 'Self'. Hegemony is thus the attempted denial of the 'Other', as the condition of the 'Self's' existence. Popular collective identities, are sometimes referred to as 'empty signifiers' (Laclau, 2005) precisely because as the chain of equivalence joining particular partial claims, demands and interests expands, their precarious unity depends ever more on expressing their identity in negative terms: the anti-capitalist global justice movement being a quintessential example.

Thus, the first thing I did was create 'tree nodes' for each culture of activism divided into 'Self' and 'Other'. 'Tree nodes' are a hierarchical way of coding with NVivo. They create arborescent structures with a 'parent' node and 'child' nodes branching off from it. Each child node itself can act as a parent sub-dividing into further parent nodes, and so on. The logic of articulation (or the 'War of Position' if you like) is divided into two basic operations, the logic of equivalence (linking particular democratic demands under a common identity) and the logic of difference (differentiating the emerging 'Self' from various excluded interests and identities). Thus, these categories were added as further nodes to the Self and Other nodes.

I began by reading and re-reading texts looking for patterns in what particular claims, demands, and interests were linked together, and how. At the same time, I was looking for points of antagonism. Thus for both emerging movement identities ('Selves') and their adversaries ('Others'), processes of linking and differentiation were documented. As I have explained previously, the logic of hegemony is about the shifting of frontiers and thus the indeterminacy between the 'empty' (when political frontiers are well established), and the 'floating'. Dislocatory moments create periods of indeterminacy and crisis where the meaning of particular signifiers may become suspended between two or more equivalential chains, creating the potential to shift the frontier between Self-Other. Thus, the next logical step was to create under each 'linking' node, two more nodes called 'empty' and 'floating'. A good example of a signifier whose 'floating' elements became obvious during moments of indeterminacy is 'peak oil' in Transition discourse: concern over peak oil can be linked into chains of equivalence connecting anti-immigration sentiment, energy and resource scarcity, and racial intolerance, as easily as they can be linked into chains of equivalence around sustainability, local diversity and so on.

Returning to Hansen's (2006) framework, the Self is also spatially, temporally and ethically constituted in relation to the Other. Thus, for each 'Self' node, I created nodes called 'Space', 'Time', 'Ethics (worldview)'. The first pertains to how discourse structured spatial boundaries and logics and was structured by them; the second approached temporal orderings in the same way; the third was concerned with the development of ethical worldviews motivating collective action. Finally, I created nodes called 'Organisational-' and 'Technological-knowledge', in order that I was able to code texts according to the different kinds of knowledge involved in the process of cognitive praxis.

In addition to this a priori approach to coding, I also used non-hierarchical ('free') nodes to make some basic categorisations regarding the content of my corpus in order to gain an empirically grounded impressionistic feel for the data. Following

Rucht & Olemacher (1992, pp. 93-95), this more inductive rough and ready coding did not pay too much attention to preconceived theories and hypotheses because, by going beyond the main research orientation and its more highly abstracted categorisations, I was allowing for new interests and therefore questions to emerge (p. 94). In particular contexts, simple content analysis techniques were used where I felt that they could be used heuristically help to illustrate a particular point. For example, quantifying the frequency of key words occurring in key texts, or quantifying the presence or absence of particular themes in particular newspaper articles. This thin empiricism was only intended to be illustrative, not to make any particular objective truth claims. I will leave it to the reader to decide if it is helpful.

One of the chief advantages of NVivo seemed to be that one can code reflexively. One particular piece of text can be coded to multiple nodes. One can capture themes from the ground up, gradually collapsing these codes into larger more abstract concepts, or begin with a more top-down approach that begins with particular research themes and theoretical concepts and then branches off arborescently. Alternatively, one could work with a combination of both approaches. This is what I have chosen to do. On the whole, with the time period stretching from 2005-2011, I was able to analyse discursive changes occurring over time between events, within cultures of activism, and between cultures of activism. I was able to analyse how particular cultures of activism sought to expand their territory and include new actors by expanding the stock of floating signifiers available to them. Consequently, I was able to analyse tensions that developed as a result of such expansion, and opportunities for learning that developed from all of this.

As a brief example, van Bommel and Spicer (2011, p. 1726) inspired me as to how such research, with a similar subject matter and similar theoretical approach, might look in practice. Their table, reproduced below (table 4) shows how a particular nodal point – incidentally that of gastronomy – has been identified as being a capacious enough orienting theme around which the movement has been able to

incorporate new actors. Coded under this nodal point, are a number of floating signifiers, which imbue the notion of gastronomy with meaning and are loose enough to be interpreted to the movement's purposes. We are then given extracts of the actual text underpinning this coding as exemplifications. This is all to illustrate the kind of presentation strategy that is viable using NVivo as a coding and data management tool applied to discourse theory. Having outlined my approach to data analysis, I now turn to address the limitations of the approach I have taken.

Table 4. Example of how to present NVivo coding from a social movement study underpinned by discourse theory: ***"****Shifts in discourse in the Slow Food movement: pre-2000",* reproduced from van Bommel and Spicer (van Bommel & Spicer, 2011, p. 1726).

Period: pre 2000

Nodal point	**Floating signifier**	**Description**	**Example**	**Source (if applicable) and date**
Gastronomy	Taste	Use of fresh, and authentic high-quality products for meal creation	'It's all about the right to consume a meal in beautiful surroundings – the opposite of fast food and the sworn enemy of boring, mediocre supermarket food'	(*Sunday Times*, 23 Dec 2001)
	Slowness pleasure/conviviality	Enjoying the art of cooking with other people to escape the business culture	'Take time and pleasure over preparing and eating our food, it puts a brake on our increasingly frenetic way of life'	(*The Times*, 06 Dec 1997)
	Artisanal	Preference for non-industrialized and	'Real Italian coffee was not just	

	mass-produced food in order to keep the cultures and craft skills alive	a hot drink but part of the Italian way of life. It was becoming increasingly urgent for Europeans to defend their local identity and "spirit of place" against the multinationals'	(*The Times*, 5 Apr 2001)
Local/traditional	Appreciation for the authentic, non-standardized and non-homogenized	'Then we had a big idea to rediscover the osterie – the classic, traditional places where you could eat regional food informally and get good value for money'	Giacomo Mojoli (Slow Food VP) (*Daily Telegraph* 18 Nov 2000)

Limitations of the approach

Product versus process and hidden transcripts

The limitations of my methodological approach are, I think, best summed up by the tensions between social movement discourse as process (verb) and discourse as product (noun) (Melucci, 1996; Benford & Snow, 2000; Oliver & Johnston, 2000; Fomiyana, 2010). . Fomiyana (2010, p. 397) argues the collective identity as product and as process refer to two different things rather than two faces of the same thing. Her analytical distinction is important, and therefore worth quoting at length:

> The ‘product’ definition refers more to a perception of shared attributes, goals and interests (something that can be felt by movement insiders but also by those outside the movement), whereas the ‘process’ definition is more concerned with shared meanings, experiences and reciprocal emotional ties as experienced by movement actors themselves through their interaction with each other. The ‘product’ understanding refers to a sort of ‘shorthand’ reference point for insiders and outsiders that encapsulates key movement frames, issues, tactics, identities, ideologies and orientations. Scholars emphasizing the ‘product’ aspect of collective identity understand it as a sort of public good produced by movements and available to everyone, a ‘public pronouncement of status’ which they see as an important aspect of recruitment or incentives that motivate participation.

In this sense, despite my limited participant observation and pilot interviews, it is clear that my operationalisation belongs overwhelmingly to the ‘product’ definition of collective identity. On the other hand, the ‘process’ approach is usually researched through ethnographic methods (Mische, 2008; Plows, 2008), or the temporary speech situations of focus group research (Melucci, 1996; della Porta, 2005). I initially regarded focus group methodology as particularly promising given my interest in discourse theory because according to Melucci (1996, p. 393), such an approach seeks to:

> break the apparent unity of the discourse of movements and to observe the interactive construction of the unity though differences and conflicts. The particular methodology is intended to address not individual opinions, but the system of interactions in its making…The analysis reveals the tensions between various orientations that are present within the movement, but also within a single group, or portion of the movement.

From this standpoint, the clear limit of reified text is that “the discourse of the leaders and their framing activities are taken, mostly implicitly, as representative of the movement as a whole: the actor is conceived therefore as a unified reality which is interpreted in a transparent way by the leaders and by the organisational discourse” (p. 385). Unwritten and unofficial discourses are what James Scott (1990) would

refer to as the "hidden transcripts" (see previous chapter) in the internal power dynamics of social movements (Estevez, 2008, p. 1947), as opposed to their "public transcripts".

As Whelan (2002, p. 111) points out, the often incidental learning occurring in activist milieus can be devalued by movements and their key figures given their externally focused instrumental goals. In this regard, Cox (1999, p. 63) argues that researchers often risk "systematically misunderstanding" the cultural milieus they study, through overemphasising key activists' more political and externally driven understandings of the meaning of collective action. The constant transformative learning – in the more personal sense of the term – occurring in the development of "reflexive rationalities" (p. 63) arguably also helps us to understand the cognitive development of movements, where such activists can be in a sense thought of as "legitimate peripheral participants" (Lave & Wenger, 1991) who bring new resources, knowledge, skills and values. As Tusting (2005, p. 39) argues, although meaning is produced within communities of practice through ongoing processes of participation and reification, such that "reifications reveal something of a practice that a community is involved in but never all of it".

In the initial conceptualisation of my research design, I considered arranging three focus groups consisting of participants within each culture of activism under investigation, whilst also arranging a focus group combining participants from each culture of activism. Logistical difficulties in coordinating such focus groups led me to abandon this element of the research.

Network analysis

Originally, it was my intention to gather data that would allow me to carry out formal network analysis in order to operationalise elements of a relational approach (see previous chapter). This, I reasoned, would allow me to compare the rhetoric of

participation in ‘horizontal’ networks and ‘open spaces’ with reality, and would give me insight into the power dynamics of knowledge production and cultural politics. Inspired by the social movement research of Ann Mische (2008), I sought to understand how “location at the borders and interstices of several networks or organizational fields” fosters creative thinking, innovation and bricolage (Campbell, 2005, p. 65). In January 2012, I constructed a Bristol Online Survey called “Mapping participation in Transition Scotland”.

As well as asking a number of demographic questions, I asked questions about individual learning, questions about depth, breadth, length and type of involvement, and also asked about involvement in other groups. After discussion with the coordinator of the Transition Scotland network, my survey was advertised through the network’s monthly newsletter in January 2012, and a link was posted on the front page of the Transition Scotland network’s website. The survey was opened on 31st January 2012 and was kept live until the end of March 2012. Despite re-posting the link on the website, I only received thirteen responses. In terms of overlapping personal affiliations, those who responded were involved predominantly with other community organisations or networks, or with permaculture initiatives (table 5). As a result, I did not think that there was sufficient volume of responses, or diversity of affiliation with other cultures of activism to warrant pursuing this line of research. Moreover, I reasoned that if this was difficult with good access in relation to community activism, it would be very difficult with submerged direct action networks. Despite its promise, network analysis was abandoned for this research project. With hindsight, it might have been interesting to conduct in-depth interviews with respondents maintaining overlapping commitments, but in any case, those respondents willing to be contacted did not have the type of sufficiently different overlapping commitments (i.e. anti-cuts activism) that I thought would be fruitful to pursue.

Table 5 Overlapping commitments in Transition Scotland network (listed alphabetically). 13 respondents.

Overlapping individual commitments in Transition Scotland
Anti-Cuts campaign
Clydesdale Development Trust
Community woodland Association
OneWorld
PaganSoc
Permaculture Glasgow
Permaculture Scotland
Scottish Green Party
Towards Transition Glasgow
Urban Roots
World Development Movement
10:10 campaign

Learning from social movements

One final limitation of my research is that in arguing that a public curriculum is produced, I did not carry out any research into the reception of bystander publics. 'Learning from' social movements as opposed to 'in' them is very under-researched. One reason for this is most likely the methodological difficulties of doing so. How do we move beyond the rhetorical claims about the educational effects of bystander publics on social movements, in order to investigate educational outcomes and bystander interpretation of intended curriculum empirically? In the framing literature, studies of 'frame resonance' provide potential as this engages the question of whether or not bystander publics understand issues in the same terms as social movements. However, the inference of resonance often borders on the tautological as "most studies [of frame resonance]…are after the fact reconstructions of a frame's mobilizing potency that impute the influence of a resonant frame" (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 16).

Noakes and Johnston (2005) argue that the closest we have come to a direct study of frame resonance is Gamson's (1992) study of how ordinary "working-class people" negotiate political meaning. Gamson conducted surveys to collect demographic data in a bounded working-class geographical region and went about the task of constructing balanced focus groups based on this. The focus groups explored several contentious political issues (nuclear power, affirmative action, Israel Palestine relations and the economy). Gamson's research team explored the extent to which focus groups and individuals within them relied upon media discourse, which at so-called critical discourse moments" included social movement framing, and relied upon experiential knowledge. One difficulty was that researchers could only say that participants were drawing upon public discourse, but could not specify from which exact source they learned about specifics (Gamson, 1992, p. 26).

In general, Blee and Taylor cite the focus group as a powerful tool for investigating how bystander publics interpret and incorporate a movement's "ideas, goals, practices and identities" (Blee & Taylor, 2002, p. 107). Thus, as I have argued that the mass media continues to represent a major arena for the crafting of hegemony, focus groups could be used to "examine how readers and viewers interpret the traces or elements of collective action frames in news texts" (Carragee & Roefs, 2004, p. 226). Focus groups consisting of non/peripheral participants might discuss specific events, episodes and types of movement activity, portrayed though specific media accounts, as well as through official movement representations. Again, despite considering such a research design, the methodological issues involved in constructing focus groups (i.e. self-selection, sampling of participants) and the logistics in conducting them seemed to me to be beyond my capability as a lone researcher. Thus, I can only point to this as a fruitful avenue for future research.

Ethical Considerations

Given that my research is based on an analysis of publically available discourse, direct ethical concerns are not readily apparent. The three generic foci of ethical issues in social research are 'informed consent', the 'right to privacy' and 'protection from harm' (Fontana & Frey, 2008, p. 142). Accounts from participant observation and text from semi-structured interviews has been anonymised and informed consent was obtained from interview participants prior to interviews being carried out. In the main, what I am analysing is text already in the public domain, either digitally or in print. As such, safety concerns, anonymity concerns, and informed consent concerns do not seem to immediately apply. That, however, does not translate as a lack of ethical considerations altogether. The particular ethical considerations arising from this project I believe are most strongly framed by considerations over the ownership of knowledge and the by now well-known debates over what constitutes "movement relevant research" (Bevington & Dixon, 2005).

Firstly, what is clear from the movement relevant research literature is that movement relevant research is not and should not be a synonym for hagiography (Bevington & Dixon, 2005, p. 191; Frampton, et al., 2006, p. 254; Plows, 2008, p. 1532). Nevertheless, Bevington and Dixon (2005, p. 194) provide an interesting perspective in this regard: they argue that detached scholarship has thrived during periods of movement abeyance, and that research on social movements should focus on a "dynamic engagement" with the issues that movement actors themselves are concerned with, such as mobilisation, organisation, internal conflict, motivation, commitment and activist burnout. Such research would require reflexivity on the part of the researcher, as a primary goal would be to work critically and cooperatively with movement participants in order to "help them to understand their situations more clearly and act on them more effectively" (Foley, 1999, p. 141).

Environmental activism in an era of climate change is no different, with activists and academics apparently continuing to speak past each other. Although researchers benefit from an "institutional space for reflection" (Meyer, 2005, p. 203) that social movement actors often lack, researchers must be aware of the dangers of becoming part of a technology of normalisation through the necessity of working within the boundaries of academic discourse (Yeatman, 1994, p. 37). Melucci (1992, p. 248) suggests that we should approach the relationship as a cognitive and ethical contract between actors, who possess "expertise and information relative to the action itself", and researchers, who "control some cognitive resources" and have the institutional space, time and distance to develop coherent, challenging and novel analyses of action.

Power/knowledge relations *between* movements and the academy are notoriously difficult to navigate. Movements are more than capable of assimilating and incorporating the insights of academic theory and research directly to their own 'organic' theorising and change efforts, and collaborating directly with academics in order to create their own theory without relying directly on social movement theory. The movement researcher relationship has often been characterized by movement participants as an extractive one in which "academic researchers 'milk' their subjects", but developing more collaborative practices is challenging (Edleman, 2009, p. 260). Yet movements, often by their nature, are also assimilative (they strategically frame and they mobilise resources). Must a 'dynamic engagement' always translate as a kind of action research practice?

Rootes (1990, p. 14) some time ago argued that "theory *of* social movements, even without being theory *for* social movements, may yet be useful *to* social movements". Edleman (2009, p. 260) in asking "what can be done to realise the potential synergies between professional researchers and social movements", suggests that mutual understanding of constraints and possibilities will not come through dissolving

completely the researcher|activist distinction but, rather the first step is understanding commitment "along a continuum that has many dimensions".

No doubt, too much research is 'extractive', and disseminated only in arcane academic journals. However, propagating mutual misunderstandings and myths in my mind only serves to obscure the messy realities of how subjects are positioned 'in and against' the (network) space/times of neoliberal logic (Castells, 1996; Harvey, 2006; Hassan, 2009). The perceived objective urgency of the need to organise against climate change (whether through reformist ENGOs, relocalising or taking direct action) exacerbates the need for ideas that find a place in immanent action if one is an activist. On the other hand, those researching social movements often seek to develop theory and gather empirical evidence in order to understand. Moreover, the performative university exerts its own pressures on those who would seek to develop socially useful knowledge, to disseminate according to impact measurements.

As Plows (2008, p. 1532) convincingly argues, engaged research can mean different things in different circumstances: on the one hand, researchers might be involved in, and explicitly identify with, a particular activist milieu. However, from the various intellectual milieus of civil society, particular fields of action often emerge (e.g. nuclear power, renewables, stem cell research, or in this case, climate change), which are nuanced and contested. As a result, engaging with various publics and their cultural representations as they attempt to navigate power relationships and address their various enmities in order to see the bigger picture is important. Hence, my desire to take the approach I have. As argued in the previous section, however, my lack of attention to movement internal processes makes me overly reliant on 'official' narratives.

This limitation is, however, to a large extent borne of lack of capacity as an individual novice researcher with limited time and resources. My experience of

engaging in dialogue across various activist milieus has been an ambivalent one. After many false starts, I began to realize that being drawn into particular milieus as a committed or militant researcher would have me working at cross-purposes, in a piece-meal fashion. Whether it be finding out how to convert peripheral ENGO activists to paying, active members, organizing environmental justice bus tours, or starting my own Transition initiative, I realized I could not feasibly engage in-depth with any milieu without sacrificing breadth and losing my own way. Also, the lack of understanding between activists and academic communities as to what either party might gain is something I have experienced. However, as a novice researcher, I recognise that the balance of who gains what from the researcher/activist relationship is presumably disproportionately in my favour, competing for attention with other commitments, happenings, events, and so on. This means that even if something could be genuinely valuable, communicating why is often very difficult.

To finish this section then, I can only conclude that insights generated from my research might be of use to people involved in environmental action in an era of climate change in a variety of contexts. Whether this proves to be the case I cannot say, but my approach at least does not demand the resources of overstretched activists, whilst being able to gain insight into activist discourse across a spectrum of engagement. It also poses no pressing ethical concerns.

In this chapter, I have operationalized a discourse approach by combining Hansen's (2006) work on discourse analysis with Jamison's (2001) account of the evolution and differentiation of the environmental movement, and then filling this framework with real actors, materials and a timeframe. I went on to discuss the limitations of my study, and in this section I discussed what I see as some of the ethical implications. Having outlined my methodology, the following chapter is the first of three chapters reporting the research findings. I begin with my analysis of the CCA, move on to the Transition movement, and finally cover Common Cause. The chapters have been organised this way because as my understanding developed, I

regarded the identity of Transition as being borne of a frustration with the limitations of confrontational activism. The work of Common Cause has taken some inspiration from the CCA, and from Transition, but its origins are more recent and it draws more on expert actor-networks. Throughout each of these chapters, I try to capture something of the dialogue occurring between them.

Chapter 5

Direct climate action as public pedagogy: the cultural politics of the Camp for Climate Action (2005-2011)

> For me one of the biggest successes you can have when campaigning on any issue is to educate people – be it information, ideas, attitudes or behaviour. Every single person that has ever campaigned, protested, taken action or stood up to be counted was inspired and educated at some point which set them off on that path; whether through reading something, seeing something, hearing something or talking to someone. So, just getting our message and our ways of living, working and being out there was, to me, actually our biggest success (Shift Magazine , 2007)

Introduction

This chapter presents an analysis of the cultural politics of direct climate action (DCA) in the UK, based predominantly on the public discourse of Camp for Climate Action (CCA) from its inception in 2005 to its 'metamorphosis' (CCA, 2011) in 2011. More specifically, I interpret this cultural politics as a form of 'public pedagogy'; a contested term used by scholars who focus on learning and education occurring outside formal institutional contexts (Sandlin, et al., 2010; Giroux, 2000).

In what follows, I intend to explicate what might be considered the *public curriculum* generated by the CCA. The public curriculum produced by social movements is forged through *hegemonic struggle* to articulate diverse struggles and demands under a populist identity (Gramsci, 1971, p. 350; Laclau, 2005; Giroux, 2000, p. 354; Melucci, 1996, p. 75; Laclau & Mouffe, 1987). Such a curriculum is both *explicitly* and *implicitly* articulated.

The CCA has, from its inception, explicitly sought to balance action with creating an open space for public pedagogy (CCA, 2010, p. 21; Shift/ Dystophia, 2010, p. 5). Moreover, it is important to be aware that the *explicit* articulations of the CCA's educational dimensions do pragmatic work: examining a corpus of the CCA's 'outward facing' material[1] in order to examine how strongly its educational dimensions are emphasised in its public communications, I found that around a quarter of texts sought to describe the camp in *explicitly* educational terms. The excerpt below, taken from an open letter to local residents near the site of the 2009 Blackheath, London camp, shows the emphasis placed on praxis (politics/fun; theory/practice; education/action). Portraying the camp as an open, non-sectarian space in which to learn and have fun (italicised below), is arguably an important element of the CCA's impression management strategy.

> For the last 3 years we've organised a week-long event in the summer *to educate each other*, *demonstrate sustainable living* and *learn about different ways we can stop and reverse climate change*…The camps are family friendly and open to all. There's no entrance fee, everyone works on it as volunteers. It's a very do-it-yourself kind of event and we hope we manage to combine things that are too often kept apart*: politics and fun, practice and theory, education and action*…Please do come along and see for yourself, you are very welcome. (Camp for Climate Action, 2009a)

The framing of the CCA as a convivial, 'family-friendly' educational space is often strategically invoked in order to mobilise people, by emphasising social diversity and distancing the camp from activist stereotypes and sectarian activist isolationism:

> The people participating in the Camp for Climate Action are all volunteers, lots of us learning how to do it as we go along. We're a pretty diverse bunch – teachers, nurses, students, couriers, plumbers, graphic designers, doctors, youth workers, lawyers, carpenters, campaigners,

[1] For this corpus (N=52), archived press releases, two self-produced 'newspapers' and an open-letter to Lewisham residents from the Blackheath CCA in 2009 were used.

> artists, carers and many, many more (Camp for Climate Action, 2010a, p. 21).

These explicit representations are contextually important because the focus on diverse educational workshops coupled with a festival-like atmosphere, has been used pejoratively – to question the camp's efficacy and tactics. In fact, the camp's intentional blending of DA and education seemed to create a catch-22 for the CCA's relation to popular media: when conservative media portrayed the CCA as dangerous anarchists, the liberal media was often keen to emphasise the respectability of the camp. This set up a narrative in later camps of 'fluffy' and 'spiky' protesters, or good and bad protesters, which was increasingly perceived as problematic in fora for activist praxis.

Because the CCA's public curriculum is forged through collective struggle, it is dialogical, recursive and contested. Therefore, significant elements of its public curriculum may be considered incidental or even accidental to its stated purpose. Moreover, the CCA is but one collective agent of public pedagogy in relation to climate change, positioned in and against various manifestations of the "pedagogical state" (Newman, 2010), and against the public pedagogies of "neoliberal corporate culture" (Giroux, 2010).

The educative consequences of DCA amongst participants and bystander publics are consistently invoked as metrics of success by activists and academic analysts alike (Plows, 2008). SML scholars have often bifurcated learning into its movement's internal (learning *in* social movements) and external (learning *from* social movements) dimensions (Hall, et al., 2011, p. 114). Although this simplifies messy empirical realities in which such clear boundaries cannot be drawn, it remains useful as an analytical distinction because it draws attention to the argument that bystander publics at large have been learning about climate change "because of the nearly thirty years of work done by activists and movements" (Clover & Hall, 2010, p.

165). In one of the few existing academic analyses of DCA in the UK, Plows (2008, p. 93), in her analysis of what might be considered success in the DCA movement, implicitly utilises this dichotomy:

- "Activist network longevity and capacity building, protest counterculture as a social resource" (learning in social movements)

- "Developing sophisticated framing stakes and accompanying resources with a broad (UK) public uptake" (learning from social movements)

The explicit educational dimensions of the CCA discussed above, belong to the former. On the latter point, the DCA movement, of course, promulgates its own curriculum through self-produced digital and print-based artefacts, yet the mass media remains another important route of transmission. The DCA movement is perceived by activists to have been successful through influencing public discourse, merely by connecting issues – for example, climate change and aviation – usually discussed separately**.**

Yet, by and large, these claims and interpretations of success remain largely speculative. No study exists that that has actually examined the UK DCA movement's intended issue frames in its 'outward facing' discourse, their mass mediation, all in dialogue with movement praxis in various activist fora, over time, in a systematic way. To speak with the last sentence from the opening quotation, this chapter asks, what is 'our message', and in what ways can 'getting it out there' be considered a success?

The chapter is organised in the following way: firstly, I explore the discursive origins and evolution of the CCA. This section serves a dual purpose in that it provides the reader with necessary context, whilst highlighting one important aspect of public

curriculum, through which activists and the broader public learn to link contemporary struggles by locating them in a broader historical context. I move on to outline the substantive dimensions of the movement's public pedagogy, organised around various knowledge interests as the nascent movement struggled to articulate a "populist identity" (Laclau, 2005) in opposition to the "root causes" of climate change. I remind the reader of the 'knowledge interests' developed in Eyerman and Jamison's (1991) cultural/cognitive theory of social movements, arguing that the curriculum of the CCA, as promulgated through articulation of a populist identity, can be split into three analytical categories: cosmology, organisational, and technical-practical knowledge.

Accordingly, the rest of the chapter examines the movement's public pedagogy along these axes. In doing so, I also maintain Rochon's (1998) distinction between critical communities (loose groupings of movement intellectuals who generate codified knowledge) and movement constituents who promulgate such knowledge to a broader public. Importantly, I make the case that what is most educationally generative in the CCA are the productive tensions at the intersections of these knowledge interests: specifically, the relationship between political worldviews and organisational form (cosmology and organisational knowledge), and the relationship between climate science and politics (technical-practical knowledge and cosmology).

Understanding the origins and evolution of direct climate action

Dislocation and the formation of new subjectivities

To understand the origins of the CCA, we must understand the discursive logic of which it is a manifestation, as well as its genealogy. Literatures in behavioural economics and psychology highlighting the species-level psychological challenges of climate change related to its epistemic and spatio-temporal complexity, have in turn produced an important growth industry in climate change communications (Pykett, et al., 2011, p. 306). Such literature has argued that *alarmist narratives* coupled to *political inertia and hypocrisy can* lead to a counsel of despair. However, it also provides the point of *dislocation* from hegemonic discourse from which new identities and ideational resources arise (Brulle, 2010, p. 92). These dislocations arise at "politically salient moments" keyed to significant events occurring in political structures and institutions, which were delineated in chapter six on methodology (Hansen, 2006).

The contradictions between government policy and rhetoric, and between apocalyptic public narratives and exhortations to 'change light bulbs' have, since 2005, provided the conditions for such dislocations, as exemplified below in this climate activist dialogue between those engaged in relocalisation efforts and advocates of contentious politics:

> Over the past few years there has been an unprecedented level of media coverage and initiatives around climate change. Arguments that environmentalists have been making largely ignored for decades have rapidly moved in to the public debate since Blair chose climate change to

> top the G8 agenda in 2005. Since then the scale of the problem, media attention and the striking evidence of the rate of change have left many scared and anxious. *People desperately want ideas for positive action* (Chatterton & Cutler, 2008, p. 3).

Since 2005, nascent relocalisation movements and direct action movements (of which the Transition Towns movement and the CCA are emblematic, respectively) have both articulated this dislocation in terms of the need for grassroots cultural change, whilst offering conflicting understandings of how this might best be achieved. Both cultures of activism are reactions against technocratic and market-based regimes of governance, as well as solutions that frame citizen agency in individualistic terms. For the relocalisation movement, it is about bringing it all back home, and creating *convivial communities of place*, whilst for the CCA it is about speaking truth to power as *communities of struggle*.

This three-step discursive logic – temporal urgency; rejection of the status quo; need for collective solidarity and a DIY approach – is present in both movements and, as we can see below, provided the rationale for the first CCA in 2006:

> 1. Climate change is already happening and its effects will be catastrophic if we don't act now
>
> 2. New technology and market-based solutions are not enough to address the problem tackling climate change will require radical social change.
>
> 3. There is a need to work together in our communities to come up with solutions. We cannot rely on business and government to bring about the radical changes that are needed. (Shift, 2010, p. 6).

This three-step collective action frame, used as a rationale for mobilisation, is explicit in the outward facing discourse of the CCA (figure 4).

Figure 4 Dislocation from hegemonic discourse in the CCA.



Qualitatively, the CCA typically seeks to make state-level contradiction visible to a broader public through targeted action against its local and concrete manifestations. This is exemplified below in this activist quote from a Scottish open-cast mining protest:

> You have a wind farm on one hill and a coal mine on the other. I mean, make your mind up. The Scottish Climate Change Bill is the strongest in the world, and we are very thankful of that, but how are you going to achieve that if you expand coal mines and airports? (McCracken, 2009, p. 8).

Thus, the start point of the CCA's public pedagogy was arguably the public exposure of state policy contradictions. Despite the fact that the CCA emerged from this moment and was successful in assembling a heterogeneous group of new actors, the movement is not new *per se*.

Connecting to the past: articulations of historical equivalence and difference

Invoking a common history of civil disobedience and non-violent direct action (NVDA) is commonly used rhetorical device in order to win over public perception and mobilise bystanders. In this sense, it is a pedagogical device.

> We're standing on the shoulders of giants in terms of the 90's activism against road expansion. But again, we've got to move on the narrative (organiser, 2010).

Table 6 Discursive linkages to a history of civil disobedience. * N=591

Social movement	'Movement generated' texts	Popular press discourse*	Total
First (late 19th C to early 20th C) and second (60s and early 70s) wave feminist movements	5	17	22
Reclaim the Streets (the '90s)	6	12	18
The Civil Rights Movement ('50s and '60s)	2	10	12
The Zapatistas (1994-present)	2	9	11
The Peasant's Revolt (1381)	4	5	9
The anti-nuclear movement (1960's - present)	3	3	6
The mobilisations of 1968	2	3	5
The Diggers and the Levellers (17th C)	1	2	3
The Chartists (1838-1848)	1	1	2

Indian Nationalist Movement (late 19th C - 1947)	1	2	3
Anti-poll tax protests (1990)	0	1	1
The Jarrow March (1936)	--	1	1
Anti-apartheid movement (late '50s early '90s)	2	2	4
Total sources	**29**	**68**	**97**

This stretches far beyond the anti-roads protests and radical environmentalism, to progressive movements that have long-since captured the popular imagination (table 6).

The significance here lies in demonstrating the *temporal scope* of the movement's identity and its ambitions to articulate many particular social justice and ecological concerns under one populist identity (Laclau, 2005). As history has demonstrated the legitimacy of these struggles – or perhaps more correctly, that struggle legitimates – so they hope to lend populist credibility to their own DA tactics:

> We who engage in non−violent direct action are not the creators of tension. We merely bring to the surface the hidden tension that is already alive.
> *Dr Martin Luther King Jr.* (Gee, 2011, p. 4)

Nevertheless, a significant difference to the historical movements cited, is the notion of protesting for less. As this Heathrow protester put it:

> The suffragettes wanted more of a voice, the civil rights movement was asking for more equality. Climate change is about asking for less and that's a real psychological challenge.
>
> (Taylor, 2007, p. 8)

In order to address this narrative discontinuity, the temporal component of the movement's identity must also stretch into the future. Consequently, the notion of intergenerational justice is invoked. Thus, in making the linkage to 1968, the notion of intergenerational justice is used to mark a significant difference to the public between climate activism and its historical antecedents:

> The protest pattern since 1968 has been of young people demanding an abandonment of limits and restraints, and a sober older generation lecturing them on the need for responsibility. Last week saw precisely the opposite. These protesters came here to protest against the disinhibited vandalism of their parents' generation, and to call for a massive slash in carbon emissions now, before the climate starts to hit tipping points beyond which it spirals away from habitability.
>
> (Hari, 2010, p. 2)

The limits of a narrative of austerity became hotly debated within the movement itself. Regardless of this difference, historical direct action movements are invoked in order to *highlight to the public their success and legitimacy*. This normalising work is important, because the counter-framing in public discourse is that of a dangerous and exotic sub-culture. For example, when Ed Miliband, speaking in his old role as Minister for Energy and Climate Change, called for a popular mobilisation on climate change, he clearly meant within the confines of parliamentary lobbying and apolitical community volunteering[2]:

> Ed Miliband, the energy and climate change secretary, recently announced a policy not to build new coal plants without burying some of their carbon emissions - a partial victory for Climate Camp. Miliband admitted to the Guardian last month that environmentalists' pressure was a big influence, but added: "Illegal aspects did not appeal to people. It

[2] It is significant, that Miliband has been inspired by the Transition Towns model of cultural change, which deliberately avoids contentious politics. In fact, the reference to the Women's Institute in this context, was first articulated by Transition movement intellectual Rob Hopkins in 2008. This example of implicit intertextuality, combined with the fact that the Transition Handbook was a top 10 summer read of MP's polled by Waterstone's in 2008, is evidence of politicians learning from the Transition movement.

> alienates them. But when you have a coalition of Greenpeace, the Women's Institute and others engaging in peaceful campaigning, that really does have an effect on people."
>
> (Webb, 2009)

As this hegemonic encounter played out in public discourse, this activist responded:

> 'Given the government is still planning to build new coal-fired power stations and expand its airports and roads, Ed Miliband's call for a public mobilisation on climate change is a clear attempt to co-opt this growing movement. But people aren't daft. They realise that the suffragettes and the civil rights movement didn't win by wearing rubber wrist bands - they won because they were broad-based and willing to take risks, if necessary breaking the law.'
>
> (McVeigh, 2008, p. 29)

Further up the genealogical tree, the British anti-roads movement of the '90s and radical environmentalist networks such as Earth First!, have all inspired the CDA movement (Gee, 2011, p. 4). Again, activist framing attempts to refocus public attention on the successes of these movements, rather than focusing on the cultural stereotypes of the popular media.

However, a difference is that the CDA movement frames itself as being part of a global 'cosmopolitan' identity, with grand narrative ambitions (climate versus capital) that subsume particularistic concerns.

> [Climate camp is] partly inspired by older movements like the anti-roads movement…Environmental struggles in the Nineties were characterised by intense struggles, either in defence of place - for instance, against road builders - or, for early Reclaim the Streets, over the creation of place. Now the place is the entire planet and a clash between what people need

> and what the economy needs. This grand narrative will hopefully motivate a movement equal to the task.
>
> (McVeigh, 2008, p. 29)

In view of this global and systemic focus, the closest relative of the direct climate action movement is the alter-globalisation movement, which in turn was inspired by the Zapatistas, whose 'horizontalist' politics has directly influenced the ideology and organisational form of the alter-globalisation movement (Graeber, 2004, pp. 103-5), and has deeply influenced the CCA. This assemblage began to take shape in 2005 at the G8 protests in Stirling (underlined), Scotland[3]:

> The anti-globalization movement focused on a number of issues…with climate change sometimes playing second fiddle to other movement concerns. *The turning-point for many activists came in 2005. One of the spaces set up during that year's G8 mobilisation in Edinburgh was a purpose-built, non-hierarchical eco-village, consciously designed to create a space for anti-capitalists and environmentalists to meet and share ideas*…Many of the younger activists there had become political during the protests against the Iraq war, and joined the area of the site organised by the student group People & Planet. At daily consensus-based meetings they rubbed shoulders with direct-action old hands from across the world, many of whom were veterans of the summit protests, Earth First!, Reclaim the Streets and anarchist groups. This was quickly followed by the formation of the Camp for Climate Action.
>
> Tim Gee (2011, p. 4, my emphasis)

The highlighted text above is particularly important because the coming together of anti-capitalists protest, the mainstream environmental movement, the newly 'active' and protest veterans, speaks volumes about tensions that would develop within the nascent movement.

[3] The explicitly anti-aviation expansion group Plane Stupid was also formed in 2005.

Dimensions of the CCA's public pedagogy

The previous section provides us with necessary insight into the discursive origins of the CCA, and its temporal articulation of identity. Equipped with a necessarily impressionistic lay of the land, it is possible to now forge ahead and critically explicate the various ways in which the CCA's cultural politics act as a form of public pedagogy. I contend that the CCA's public pedagogy emerges from the articulation of a populist identity, and that the curricular content of this identity centres around three *analytically* distinct 'knowledge interests' (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991, p. 55), which are *heuristic* applications of Habermas's knowledge constitutive interests: these are cosmological knowledge (an application of Habermas's 'emancipatory' knowledge interest, concerned with the creation of worldviews); technical-practical knowledge (the empirical realm of science and technology); and organisational knowledge, which speaks to how knowledge is organized, produced and disseminated through organizational form. In the present context, the technical-practical is primarily concerned with the popularisation of climate science; the organisational with the public demonstration of 'horizontal organising'; and the promulgation of distinctive worldviews in the form of anti-capitalism and anarchism.

These dimensions are major axes around which latent tensions in the movement's ambitions to create a populist identity manifest. I contend that the most generative moments of the CCA's public pedagogy emerged from the tensions between these 'knowledge interests'. Accordingly, instead of treating each dimension separately, the rest of this work is organised around the tensions between organisational form and political worldviews that played out in the movement's attempts to define the enemy, and the relationship between climate science and political worldviews.

I understand the public pedagogy of the CCA to emerge from a struggle to articulate a "populist identity" (Laclau, 2005). According to Laclau (2005, p. 118), a populist identity:

> 'simplifies' the political space, replacing a complex set of differences and determinations by a stark dichotomy whose two poles are necessarily imprecise… [T]here is in these dichotomies, as in those which constitute any politico-ideological frontier, a simplification of the political space.

As an "equivalential chain" joining the claims of particular collective actors through their opposition to a 'constitutive outside' grows, they become united under "*empty signifiers*", so-called *because particularistic claims, demands and interests are linked increasingly only in terms of that which they oppose on the other side of the "dichotomic frontier"* (p. 131). In this case, the call for Climate Action becomes an empty signifier.

Argued above, equivalential chains do not have to be articulated between heterogeneous actors in the same historical moment, but can be forged across time. In this instance, the DCA movement was articulated in an equivalential chain with a variety of historical actors under something like an identity of "Left Civil Disobedience", in opposition to something equally vague which would be defined as "Oppressive Social Structures". In the present (that is 2005-2011), a variety of contemporary actors are united in opposition to particular manifestations of an oppressive Other, which is articulated as the "root causes of climate change". Therefore, I think it is fair to treat the naming of this Other as the first substantive dimension of the DCA movement's public pedagogy, which will be explored. This kind of public pedagogy, is what radical adult educator Michael Newman (1994) calls "defining the enemy".

Defining the enemy

> When we ask who the enemies are we should try to prevent our learners retreating into abstractions…[C]alling the reorganisation of capitalism what it is can be a starting point to resistance. Yes, but it is *only* a starting point. We and our learners need to find out more. Wherever possible we need to give substance to the abstraction. In this case, we need to ask:

> Who are the people, what are the organisations promoting the reorganisation of capitalism? Where do they operate? Can we name them and *do they have an address?* (Newman, 1994, p. 120).

The DCA movement enacts a fundamentally different public pedagogy from the TT movement, oriented around an agonistic politics, which seeks to make particular nodal points of power, and the networked connections between them, visible to the public. What radical adult educator Michael Newman argues above is, I think, related to a qualitative shift in global political economy to what Graham and Luke (2011) have called the "new corporatism". We now see a widely diffused public ownership of corporate assets: through investment strategies such as pension funds and direct shareholdings, a powerful "custodial class" (p. 108), who sit on corporate boards, typically are the ones who invest public money, making it "practically impossible for any individual to know exactly what their money owns" (p. 108).

Related to this, this business class – increasingly separated from actual human industry – has enjoyed increasingly close relationships with the political class, which has led to what David Harvey (2010) calls the state-finance, or state-corporate nexus. Following from this, *accountability*, that is the "literal duty of care in the administration and expenditure of budgeted monies" (Graham & Luke, 2011, p. 110), has become increasingly cleaved from any sense of embodied ethical *responsibility*. Finally then, "sustainable business practices" are consistently subjugated by what Graham and Luke call "overriding concerns", dictated by the short-term corporate profit motive. This is an important point, because the communication of these overriding concerns can be considered a "mass mediated public pedagogy" (Graham & Luke, 2011, p. 117) of the state-finance nexus, where an equivalence is made between general national interest and corporate profit.

In the case of climate change protest, so-called "overriding concerns" are almost always framed in militant particularist terms. In challenging myopic decision-making

and militant particularism, the public pedagogy of the CCA is counterpoised against the public pedagogical efforts of vested interests in public discourse. Table 7 below exemplifies counterpoised frames in coal protest and aviation protest.

Table 7 *Hegemony as competing public pedagogies.*

Protest	Hegemonic frame	Example	Counter-hegemonic frame	Example
Kingsnorth Coal protests	Energy security and affordability "Keeping the lights on" frame	A spokesperson for E.on said: " As a Group, we remain committed to the development of cleaner coal and carbon capture and storage, which we believe have a key role to play alongside renewables, gas and nuclear, in tackling climate change while ensuring affordability and security of energy supplies" (Dutta & Duff, 2009, p. 12)	Climate security over state-corporate collusion "Government hypocrisy" frame	The arguments centre around "the energy gap", spreading the fear that "the lights will go out". ..[T]he government is driven by its concern over "energy security". Whilst the company is driven by the need to generate a profitable return for its institutional shareholders…the Climate Camp people are demanding that "climate security" should be put before shareholder return, and that "energy security" can be achieved by other means than by burning coal (Marriott, 2008, p. 32)
Aviation	Comparative economic advantage and militant	Ian Pearson, minister of state for Climate Change and Environment, says that	Climate security over state-corporate	[Activist explains]: "the airline industry will make a big play of saying it's only 2 per cent. Globally

	particularism "if we don't do it, someone else will" frame	aviation isn't included in the Climate Change Bill because there is no agreement on how to allocate emissions to various national inventories. He denies that his role and the Department for Transport's plans for expansion are at odds. 'The government's principle of sustainable development for aviation is that a proper balance should be struck between economic and environmental considerations,' he says. 'In 2002, aviation added £ 10bn to the UK economy.' He agrees, however, that aviation is making a growing contribution to climate change and that, 'like all sectors of the economy, the polluter should pay the price'. The best way to do this, he says, is for the government to ensure that aviation is included in the EU Emissions	collusion "Government hypocrisy" frame	it is - in the UK, it's more like 6.5 per cent. But it's not the amount, it's the rate of growth that's so worrying.' The rub of Plane Stupid's argument, then, is the apparent contradiction between the Department for Transport's plans for hefty airport expansion, outlined in a 2003 White Paper, and the Department for Environment's pledge to cut carbon emissions by 60 per cent by 2050. 'They're incompatible,' says Thompson. 'The only way the government can set those carbon-cutting goals and not look like it failed its GCSE maths is not to include aviation in the figures.' (Davis, 2007, p. 14)

> Trading Scheme 'as soon as possible'.
>
> (Davis, 2007, p. 14)

Given this situation, the public pedagogy of the CDA movement is a counter-pedagogy aimed at ‘de-black boxing’ the state-finance nexus, in the context of climate change. This involves re-establishing connections between control and ownership, accountability and responsibility, human industry and business interest, calculated out of existence by technocratic and market-based governance networks.

The quote below, taken from a piece of CCA propaganda coinciding with the 2010 RBS protest, argues for the use of finance as a “leverage point”. It shows how the CCA seek to contest the separation of accountability from responsibility, ownership from control, and going concerns and overriding concerns, discussed above:

> All lending and acquisition of debt carries with it risk. If the project or company goes bust, the bank loses money. So banks palm off the risk on to other bodies as much as possible, until the banker is ‘comfortable with the risk’. The risk is passed on to the governments and companies involved in the lending agreements. Environmental and social risks are valued only in financial terms. This process of assigning costs to environmental and human impacts is relevant only as far as taking into account the costs of legal cases arising from health and safety or environmental breeches or the impacts of trade unions. And it’s these risks that banks pass on to the government of the country of the project, risks that normal people usually end up paying for…And that’s where we come in...Looking at the finance sector as a leverage point takes this same logic and applies it to the wider web of communities of interest directly involved in maintaining and profiting from capitalism’s

destruction of ecosystems, landscapes, homes and livelihoods (Camp for Climate Action, 2010a, p. 8).

Of course, identifying "this wider web of communities of interest" is an empirical matter, only made possible by research emerging from intellectuals and organisations that coalesce to form critical communities, opposed to hegemonic epistemic communities. Such grey literature often provides the epistemological basis for social movement agenda setting, and the critical communities that produce CSR, in turn, rely on activist communities to promulgate their work through generating public attention. Table 8 gives examples of key pieces of CSR, which have, at various times, undergirded the public pedagogy of the DCA movement, through addressing issues of political economy, and critically interrogating the practices of, and connections between, specific corporate and political actors. Behind all of these reports lies a deeper concern with democratic deficit at the heart of the state-corporate nexus.

Table 8 The promulgation of civil society research by the CCA.

Date of publication	**Title**	**Organisation(s) involved in civil society research**	**Subject**	**Key Findings/arguments**	**Protest event (year)**	**Example of social movement promulgation**
February 2007	"The Carbon Neutral Myth: Offset Indulgences for your Climate	Carbon Trade Watch	Critique of carbon offsetting	Compares the market of carbon offsets to the Catholic church selling indulgences because of their surplus of good deeds. This	Heathrow, August 2007. Amongst other satellite protests, a group	Climate Care in Oxford was invaded by people dressed as red herrings and the CarbonNeutral Company in London was leafleted. Both offer to "neutralise" the emissions of

	Sins”			allows business as usual by selling false solutions. Offsets amount to carbon colonialism as Majority World communities bear the local costs of offset projects foisted upon them.	took Carbon Trade Watch’s report to offset company Climate Care’s offices, garnering media attention.	consumers and companies by investing in projects which lower emissions elsewhere. "Carbon offsets are ineffective, based on dubious science and lead people to believe they are helping when they are not," said Sophie Nathan, who took part in the CarbonNeutral Company action. (Vidal, 2007, p. 13)
March 2007	“The Oil and Gas Bank: RBS and the Financing of Climate Change”	Track, FOE-S, NEF, People & Planet, Platform Bank	RBS’ contribution to climate change via its funding of the fossil fuel industry	RBS celebrate the finance they contribute to renewables projects, yet remain coy about their fossil fuel investment portfolio, which is far larger. The report finds: “The emissions embedded within loans	Climate Camp at the G20 protests, London April 2009, as well as the October 2010 camp in Edinburgh, 2010.	In detailed estimates published in a report by a coalition of environmental groups, RBS is accused of helping to provide an estimated $16bn (£8bn) to E.ON and other companies utilising coal over the past two years, with HSBC providing $10bn and Barclays $5.79bn. [Duncan McLaren, of FoE-S

				signed between 2001 and 2006 locked in future emissions of 655 million tonnes over the next 15 years, more than equivalent to the UK's entire annual emissions [over that period]" (Minio-Paluello, 2007, p. 4)		commented] "People are coming from all over the country to protest against the proposed new coal-fired power station at Kingsnorth. If RBS and the other banks don't stop financing such climate-trashing projects they risk a similar public backlash."…Environmental groups are looking to target banks that fund coal projects while trumpeting their own green credentials.. They point out that the Co-op Bank, by contrast, has introduced an ethical investment policy prohibiting it from financing any coal, oil or gas projects. (Macalister, 2008, p. 21)
March 2009	"Sub-prime carbon:	FoE-US	Critique of carbon	"The speculative nature of the	Climate Camp protests	"Carbon trading is…nothing more than the proposition

	rethinking the world's largest derivatives market"	markets.	secondary markets has the potential to create a carbon bubble and spur the development of sub-prime carbon. Sub-prime carbon credits are futures contracts to deliver carbon that carry a relatively high risk of not being fulfilled, and could collapse in value" (Friends of the Earth US, 2009, p. 1)	at the European Climate Exchange, London, April 2009	of creating a market to solve a problem - climate change - caused by the relentless pillage of our planet by the marketers. It is immoral and it doesn't work. It's the next sub-prime." (Taylor, et al., 2009, p. 29) (CCA spokesperson Mark Smith, in Taylor *et al.* 2009, *Observer*)

To take a step back and analyse the overall picture, between 2005-2008, the CCA was almost exclusively preoccupied with opposing coal and aviation expansion, targeting local sites that were considered to be manifestations of corporate-state collusion and government hypocrisy. Although it is almost impossible to adduce any cause and effect relationship between such protest actions and changes in policy, plans for a third runway at Heathrow were shelved and plans for new coal-fired power stations were prevented by the introduction of statutory stipulations about the fitting of CCS technology. Regardless, it was claimed that media coverage

highlighted major contradictions to the broader public by bringing aviation and coal expansion into the same conversation as climate change policy.

Post-2008

The global financial crisis provided opportunities for climate protesters to articulate linkages between climate politics and anti-austerity politics. This happened in three ways:

1. The crisis of finance capital caused by 'toxic assets', and the attendant populist suspicion of unaccountable and esoteric financial innovations, provided a discursive opportunity to frame carbon markets as the next 'sub-prime' waiting to happen.
2. The frame of a 'Just Transition' away from fossil fuels gained prominence as climate protesters sought to articulate linkages with worker's struggles and trade unions.
3. CSR organisations, particularly Platform[4], had already been building capacity by researching the financing of environmentally destructive fossil-fuel projects. Banking bailouts prompted questions around public ownership and accountability. RBS was identified as being the biggest investor in climate change exacerbating projects.

Of course, in the post-2008 environment, the public market-place of ideas and political claims was crowded, and particularly in 2009, the resources of the CDA movement were pulled in many directions: anti-coal protest, legal challenges over policing, articulating links with anti-austerity movements, preparing for the COP 15 negotiations in Copenhagen by forging transnational coalitions organising around the Climate Justice frame.

[4] Platform is a London-based activist organisation that produces critical empirical research and educational resources on the oil industry. Their report "The Oil and Gas Bank" (Minio-Paluello, 2007) provided part of the basis for CCA protest against RBS.

Figure 5 Major narrative trends in the CCA (2005-2011).



Figure 5 shows the general pattern of popular press coverage of the four major thematic groupings of my press corpus: coal, aviation, carbon markets and finance. Overall, the critique of carbon markets garners the least attention. This is not surprising, as the critique of carbon markets is a complex and abstract issue which is hard to squeeze into the sound bites and norms of journalistic prose covering protest events. The spike in coverage of anti-aviation protest is represented by the Heathrow protests in 2007. Coal protest has the most consistent coverage across time and, coinciding with anti-austerity protest, we see the rise in the focus on finance capital 2009-2010. By far the most commonly identified corporations in this news coverage are BAA, E.ON, and RBS.

From climate change to meta-protest

Having looked at *intended* issue frames, it is pertinent to note that the second metanarrative of the CCA is dominated by state suppression of the right to protest, through the courts and by the police. Through being drawn into this narrative, the

CCA enacted an *incidental* public pedagogy. In public discourse, this was played out as a 'top trumps' of freedoms and rights: the right to protest versus the freedom of individuals to fly; the freedom of individuals to fly versus people's right to life and a healthy environment because of climate change; the right to break the law to prevent greater injustices caused by anthropogenic climate change. In this game of top trumps, climate science was always used as a legitimating factor.

The large volume of press that the 2007 Heathrow protest attracted can be partially explained by the injunction that BAA attempted to take out against the CCA and all affiliated with it from protesting, under the 1997 Protection from Harassment Act. In the end only certain members of Plane Stupid and anti-aviation group HACAN were formally issued with the injunction. The court case backfired for BAA, adding fuel to the media fire, and mobilising more than it otherwise would have, much to the ire of HAL's prosecuting lawyers. Thus began a narrative, whereupon the CCA inadvertently became a "protest for democracy", exemplified below:

> The Harassment Act has been used many times against peaceful campaigners…If the climate camp protesters were not threatening disruption at Heathrow, would the Guardian have written a leader about the environmental impacts of flying? I think not…By joining the climate camp at Heathrow next week, you will be making a stand not only against climate change, but also against the attempt by BAA to stop people from agitating for a better world. *What began as an environmental demonstration has now also become a protest for democracy* (Monbiot, 2007, p. 25).

From this point in time, this narrative only gathered momentum, as the role of the NPOIU (of which undercover police spy Mark Kennedy was a member), the NECTU, and FITs (see appendix 5) in systematically gathering intelligence on activists, came into the light of public scrutiny.

This meta-protest narrative came to a crescendo in 2009 for a number of reasons, the main one being that 2009 was the busiest year for the movement. The Kingsnorth protest of 2008 was subjected to a very heavy-handed and expensive policing operation. Liberal Democrat justice spokesman MP David Howarth became a political ally of the movement, pushing for an inquiry into the policing of Kingsnorth. There was a media lag effect as the legal repercussions of its policing tactics – including blanket stop and searches, police violence, detention without charge, sleep deprivation tactics – played out. For example, in the Guardian (the single broadsheet title with the most overall coverage), there were 28 articles covering Kingsnorth, with another 27 in 2009. Also, 2009 saw the mass kettling of protesters and use of excessive force by police in the April G20 protests (infamously leading to the Ian Tomlinson tragedy).

In the most general terms, it was the *policing* of the CCA that consumed the highest *proportion* of its overall press coverage. Thus, to the extent that the public were learning anything from reportage on the DCA movement, much of it was to do with protesting for the right to protest itself. From 2007 onwards, press focus on controversial policing tactics consumed proportionally between around a quarter and over a half of annual coverage (figure 6). In the overall press corpus (N=593), 'police' and 'policing' are the second most frequently occurring words, and in the CCA's own press releases (N=49), 'police' and 'policing' were the fourth most frequently occurring words behind the words, 'climate', 'camp', and 'action'! This indicates that even the CCA's own unfiltered outwards facing communications became dominated by policing.

Figure 6. General focus on relationship between the CCA and police from 2006-2011.



It is well known that hegemonic discourse is capable of incorporating particular interests and identities articulated under impossibly vague concepts such as being 'green' or 'sustainable'. Nevertheless, the CCA movement is a collective emblem of what happens when the contradictions within these over-determined subject positions create nascent social identities that cannot be *discursively* co-opted. In other words, where discourse fails, there is always brute force. On this point, David Graeber (2004, pp. 72-3) – a leading anarchist thinker and CCA 'movement intellectual' – is excellent:

> [T]he threat of that man with the stick permeates our world at every moment; most of us have given up even thinking of crossing the innumerable lines and barriers he creates, just so we don't have to remind ourselves of his existence…Contrary to popular belief, bureaucracies do not create stupidity. They are ways of managing situations that are already inherently stupid because they are, ultimately, based on the arbitrariness of force.

In this sense the incidental public pedagogy of the CCA became oriented around the constant reminder of the "man with the stick". Of course, climate protesters themselves are acutely aware of this problem, as evidenced by the on-going praxis on the matter in activist fora:

> *Its struggling with language and its learning as we go along*…We had a clear message that we wanted to say about the system of economic growth and how that's related to climate change,… [b]ut then we also got caught up in talking a lot of rubbish about police…*We really have to avoid that the story doesn't become the police [because] it narrows even more the space to have the systemic critique* (Lewis, 2009)

In truth, this was more than merely a narrative distraction: much of the movement's resources appeared to be increasingly mobilised around tackling 'political policing', on the streets, and through the courts (domestic and European). With the media narrative consumed by this, the categorisation of climate protesters by the police as "domestic extremists", under anti-terror legislation, was itself a public pedagogical trope, against which the movement was forced to rally.

Metamorphosis

After the last large-scale camp, at RBS HQ in 2010, the CCA 'metamorphosed'. The statement released in early 2011, after the decision not to organise any longer under the CCA model was reached, is interesting to note here. The concern that "using the same tactic – mass squatted action camps in antagonistic locations – would become ineffectual" (CCA 2011, *Metamorphosis*) reflects activist understanding that repeating the same form of action over and over leads to stagnation and a diminishing law of returns, both in terms of mobilisation and public attention. Figure 7 gives an impressionistic account of media attention: looking at broadsheet titles, we can see that media attention peaks in 2009 and falls off dramatically, with the 2010 RBS protest receiving relatively little coverage. The Guardian – a liberal supporter of the movement with the most overall coverage – follows the same overall trend.

Finally, there was no camp in 2011. However, these articles almost exclusively focused on on-going legal proceedings against political policing allegations.

Figure 7 Total broadsheet coverage of the CCA (2005-2011).



Activists met in late 2011and decided to discontinue the large-scale 'squatted camps' model in order to engage in a wider war of position with anti-austerity struggle and to use the capacity and material resources of the CCA more efficiently (see appendix 1). This itself signalled important activist learning and marked a desire to link social justice more directly with climate change.

> In 2011 the climate science is as strong as ever – and the need for action on climate change never greater – but the political landscape is radically different. As a movement, to be relevant, we need to move with the time…With the skills, networks and trust we have built we will launch new radical experiments As the financial crisis unfolded we moved to

> directly targeting the root cause of airport expansion and coal-fired power stations: our economic system…We discussed how other movements and groups have responded to changing circumstances in the past to learn from those experience?... How do we best grow a climate justice social movement that is relevant, vibrant and successful over the next few years? What organisational structures, consistent with our desire to tackle hierarchy, will take us to a new level of participation and action?
> (CCA 2011, 'Metamorphosis' statement, n-p)

The CCA assemblage was being deterritorialised and was involved in a larger process of becoming. Interestingly, the use of the word "metamorphosis" as the title for the collectively penned statement of the CCA's dissolution, is exactly the term used by Alberto Melucci (1995) to describe the management of activist "identity work". This draws attention to what has proven to be a rather contentious point in the praxis of the CCA: metamorphosis is about "how activists construct their identities over time as *activists*, rather than in relation to a particular collective identity" (King, 2004, p. 74).

> Activist Mel Evans is looking forward to what happens next: "Climate Camp was always about more than just climate change, it's also about the political and economic context for climate change, and people from Climate Camp are now addressing those issues through UK Uncut and dozens of other campaigns. It may not be called Climate Camp any more, but the methods and the values will carry on." (van der Zee 2011, *The Guardian*)

Thus, whist this metamorphosis is about mobilising resources efficiently, it also reveals something about the maintenance of an activist 'habitus'. This self-identification with an activist vocation has been debated within the movement, and is the focus of much of the coming section.

Politics and organisational form

Shifting frames, shifting scales

Above, I described how "defining the enemy" is a key part of the CCA's public pedagogy as it sought to define a populist identity in opposition to the "root causes" of climate change. I outlined the role of critical communities in "defining the enemy", and the role of social movement activists in publicising these analyses. This may be partly an objective exercise, but building alliances around the geographical contingencies and unexpected geographical connections that are brought to light by movement research, is a task of cultural politics. Such a cultural politics is itself never voluntaristic, but rather emerges from the contingencies/opportunities of particular moments.

What this means is that the movement's organisational form as a loose assemblage is *mechanistically* important, as shifting local, translocal, national and transnational coalitions assemble and then disassemble depending on the most politically expedient, and strategically and tactically intelligent, scale of action at any given time. Thus, in a Deleuzian sense, the CCA was in a constant state of metamorphosis, or 'becoming'. As I have argued, the expressive components of an assemblage in this case work to "territorialise" it, or indeed to "deterritorialise" assemblages such as "the nation state". What this means is that discursive work is needed to reinforce the scale of any given alliance of interest and identity, which is not anterior to the movement's politics, but requires discursive reinforcement.

Activists respond to scalar ambiguity inherent in their direct action politics. In this circumstance scale is not ontologically given, awaiting discovery; it is a way of knowing the world, which emerges through discursive struggle (Kurtz, 2003, p. 893; Delaney, 1997, pp. 94-5). Consequently, this requires cultural work through which

the learning process can be considered an education of attention. This concept resonates with Freirian pedagogy, and his notion of dialectical movement between one's immediate socio-spatial positionality, and more abstract thematic universes in increasing nested scales, as we read and write the world (Freire, 1972).

There are two primary interrelated processes occurring here, then:

1. Activists "force struggles to the geographical scale at which political opportunity structures seemed most favourable at the time" (Kurtz, 2003, p. 895).
2. Activists (re)shape the scale of an activist community discursively for the sake of claims-making.

This of course means that an immanent activist assemblage at any given scale is not necessarily politically coherent, leading to antagonisms, which may or may not be generative of useful learning. Accordingly, how the 'public' is framed in the CCA's 'public pedagogy', is intrinsically keyed to this dynamic socio-spatial dialectic.

Table 9 Shifting frames, shifting scales in the CCA's public pedagogy mediated through the mainstream press.

Protest site	Emergent scale	Activist frame	Example
Heathrow Airport, London, August 2007	Local	Local militant particularism	Perhaps 83-year-old Ethel Bull is The Militant. Leaning on her walking stick, she says to me, "I'm going to be made homeless [if they build a third runway] and I want to know why. Where do you go when you're 83?" She is one of the legion of locals from the surrounding villages of Sipson, Harlington and Harmondsworth who have embraced the camp as one of the last ways to save their homes. Derby Bahia, a

			mechanic, enthuses: "It's fantastic. I've never seen anything so wonderful [as the climate camp] in my life. The only thing I'm worried about is the police….Linda McCutcheon, in her 60s, looks out across the village and says, "If this runway goes ahead, 41 years of my life will be under concrete. My children were born in that house there. I live there. My first family home is just beyond there. All gone." (Hari, 2007, p. 2).
Vestas Wind Turbine factory occupation, Isle of Wight, July 2009	National	Just Transition to 'green jobs' frame	We are writing in solidarity with the Vestas wind turbine workers who have occupied their factory in Newport, on the Isle of Wight, to prevent 600 job losses…[T]this is an inspiring example of workers taking action to defend themselves against the bosses' attempts to make the working class pay for their economic crisis. It is also a crucial struggle in relation to the fight against climate change, for democratic social control which meets the needs of people and planet, not the "needs" of profit and the market. The government says it wants to create 400,000 green jobs. It should begin by saving these 600, and by taking the factory into public ownership as the workers are demanding. The Vestas workers are showing how to fight back. The labour and climate-change movements must mobilise the maximum possible solidarity with their struggle. (Vestas solidarity working group, 2009, p. 31).
Mainshill Solidarity Camp, Broken Cross coal mine, Scottish Coal, South Lanarkshire, August 2009	Local	Environmental justice frame	"Protesters from a variety of backgrounds and from across the UK and the world have trickled into Douglas this week, including scientists, teachers, engineers, artists and students. One is Kirstie Stramler, a climate scientist who used to work for the US government." These people have found a location that has a legitimate beef," she says…She draws a graph on a notepad showing the local rate of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease - when small particles enter the lungs but can't be coughed them out, forming scar tissue and causing shortness of breath." It is one of the things that is pretty much an indicator of opencast mining," she says. All the protesters are impressively well drilled on the issues. And when asked why they are there, they all direct their answers in one direction: the magnetic north of this camp is the impact of mining

			on the local community." There is a community that has been badly hurt by mining projects around here," says Ross Jones, 26, from Edinburgh." Their wishes aren't listened to. Every week they are going to funerals because of the dust and crap that is spewed into the air by the coal mines. And if there are more mines, that will impact the area's health even more." Kirsten Williamson, 24, from Glasgow says:" I'm here mostly to show support for the local Douglas community. (McCracken, 2009, p. 8)
	Transnational	From environmental justice to climate justice	Open-cast mining is responsible for a spike in the number of lung-related deaths in this small area. "It is time that the likes of Scottish Coal and the planning authorities are held directly responsible for their role in these deaths. "Climate change is a killer, both at home and in the 'Global South', where those who have benefited the least from industrialisation are the first to pay the price." (McGinty, 2009, p. 13).
Blackheath Common, London, August 2009	Transnational	Climate Justice "false solutions" frame	[D]espite the fact that the European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme has resulted in no net reductions in carbon emissions to date. No coincidence, then, that the same people who have no desire to move beyond fossil fuels are also the biggest fans of carbon trading…[C]limate activists plan to expose and blockade corporate lobbyists at the Copenhagen summit in December. These are the kind of practical skills they will learn at Climate Camp over this week. In confronting the lobbyists, they hope to open political space for indigenous people, those affected by fossil fuel extraction and processing, representatives of small island states threatened by rising sea levels, and others whose voices are being marginalised (Ainger, 2009, p. 34).
RBS HQ, Gogurburn, Edinburgh, 2010	National	Public accountability "Owned by the taxpayer" frame	You own this bank [RBS]: 84 per cent of it belongs to the taxpayer after the bailouts. Yet it is using your money to endanger you, by financing the most environmentally destructive behaviour on earth, like burning the tar sands. The protesters chose to come here …because they have a better idea. Why not turn it into a Green Investment Bank? (Hari, 2010, p. 2)

	Transnational	Indigenous rights “First Nations solidarity” frame	Activists claim RBS is the UK bank most heavily involved with financing fossil fuel companies around the world and is the UK bank most involved in investing in "tar sands", a particularly carbon-intensive form of oil extraction in Canada…The RBS AGM will be attended by Canadian Eriel Deranger, from the Indigenous Environment Network, who aims to question executives about the impact of their investment in projects affecting her home and community. She said: "I feel it's important to come to Scotland to be a part of the RBS AGM to inform people about how their money is being spent. UK taxpayers' money is being used to destroy my people, my community and my traditional lands. RBS is financing the largest and most destructive industrial project on the planet using your dollars." (Ross, 2010, p. 14).

This draws our attention to learning as a transversal process of ‘translation’ (Santos, et al., 2007; McFarlane, 2011), between different socio-spatial epistemologies where ‘learning’ an emergent scale of action can be considered an “education of attention” (McFarlane, 2011, p. 363). As argued in chapter 3, this requires us to develop a much more careful vocabulary than the pop culture slogan, ‘think globally, act locally’, would lead us to believe. Antagonistic struggles often involve thinking locally and acting globally, as when particularistic struggles “jump scales” in order to mobilise material and cognitive resources in the face of unresponsive local structures (Smith, 2001; Kinchy, 2010). Indeed, increasingly, the DCA movement thinks locally and globally whilst acting translocally and transnationally all at once. Mobile DA activists play a brokerage role in this context, which should be critically examined.

Such contingent and shifting scales, of course, created tensions between the repertoires of action of ‘rooted’ local protesters, nomadic anarchists, mobile ‘moderates’, First Nations activists, trade unionists and so on. The academic commentators Saunders and Price (2009), thus characterised CCA protest sites as “heterotopic” spaces, meaning spaces “of alternative social ordering” located

somewhere between a non-hierarchical space of utopian imaginary, and the social constraints and power relations of reality. It is within these 'heterotopic' spaces where the dialectic between a necessary simplification of political space and particularistic tensions play out.

Tensions between the cosmological and the organisational: anarchism, anti-capitalism, liberalism, and the valorisation of direct action in the CCA

The above section explicated how geographical contingency, political expediency, and cultural politics interact in a shifting politics of scale made possible by the loose networked structure of the movement. I argued that this may result in antagonisms and contradictions, as the nascent movement struggles to assert a populist identity. In my view, the most generative tensions occurred within the space where horizontal organising and DA had become the accepted *modus operandi* of the growing movement. Expanding numbers in public occupations is not equivalent to an expanding space for radical anarchist politics: as one participant wrote, "the camp has been hijacked by a hardcore of liberals" (Charsley, 2007). The original 'submerged network' of the CCA gradually felt more alienated from the space that they had created through their own labour, although, part of the reason d'être of a non-hierarchical movement is, of course, that no one can claim ownership of it.

Genealogically, if there is one principal political ideology which informed the 'cosmology' of the movement, it was anarchism. This movement emerged from the alter-globalisation movement and, more directly, from the G8 mobilisations in 2005. Activist-anthropologist David Graeber can be considered one movement intellectual constituting part of the CCA's "critical community", as his book "Fragments of an

Anarchist Anthropology" (2004) is listed on the CCA websites 'Get Educated' section as useful political reading (CCA, no-date).It is, therefore, perhaps useful to turn to him in order to understand how anarchy is understood and enacted in the alter-globalisation movement. Graeber (Graeber, 2002, pp. 70-1) writes:

> A constant complaint about the globalization movement in the progressive press is that, while tactically brilliant, it lacks any central theme or coherent ideology… [T]his is a movement about reinventing democracy. It is not opposed to organization. It is about creating new forms of organization. It is not lacking in ideology. Those new forms of organization *are* its ideology. It is about creating and enacting horizontal networks.

This notion that the enactment of organisational form *is* ideology, to paraphrase Graeber, has created difficulties for the CCA. These problems manifest around what David Harvey has described as "an all-consuming fetishism of organisational form" centred around "horizontality" and "non-hierarchy" (Harvey, 2012, pp. 125-126). The pertinent question is, how the fetish is reproduced and maintained. In order to explain this, I give an account of how an anarchist base mutated into what Laclau (2005) would understand as a distinctly 'populist' political logic in which 'horizontalism' became emptied of its political content.

A privileging of *form over content* opened up the political space to actors such as NGO participants and so-called 'liberal' protesters, who were happy to abide *superficially* by the espoused organisational form and tactical repertories, which were consequently valorised, whilst the substantive politics moved in other directions (or was, as our activist put it, 'hijacked'). As a result, particular activist-intellectuals argued that the particular 'green' concerns of certain campers were assimilated back into the hegemonic discourse because of a misidentification of "root causes".

The following excerpt, co-authored by climate camp participants writing in radical magazine 'Shift', illustrates the change from 2005 through to the penultimate

national camp in 2009. It is revealing because it speaks to the aestheticisation of protest. Although DA is an intrinsic part of anarchist organizing, in and of itself it is not 'horizontal'. Indeed, dramatic actions are often undertaken by a vanguard of activists, whose aims of 'shutting down' particular sites (whether airfields or power stations) come to seem rhetorical – a front for what is, indeed, a "dramatic lobbying technique":

> When we first got involved with the Climate Camp, a few months before the Drax camp in 2006, it had a very distinct radical feel to it. In its stated principles, government and markets were regarded as the problem that we needed to tackle, and the camp was to be a festival of grassroots resistance…In discussions with friends and other campers, it seemed that many felt that we had made a crucial mistake: we had opened up an exciting political space from where to challenge the status quo, but it was being filled with a message that was no longer our own. *We were becoming a hip, media-savvy campaign of flash mobs and publicity stunts, lobbying for tighter government control of our lifestyles. "Friends of the Earth with D-locks" as one of our contributors wrote in the first issue of Shift.* (Archer, 2007).

The *populist logic* of this is well expressed by this reflection from the Anarchist Federation (2009):

> The direct action climate change movement has moved over the years from being fairly politically homogeneous, to being quite wide and diverse…The result is that it is action against climate change (whatever that may be), not any sense of shared aims and values as a community of activists, that is holding our movement together…[T]he real contradictions inside the movement are starting to show.

Symbolic mediatised direct actions have been credited as a pedagogical marker of success for the CDA movement (alongside more vanguard groups like Plane Stupid), acting as a source of public pedagogy by influencing public discourse. Nevertheless, DA as radical lobbying for state reform and corporate responsibility is, from the anarchist viewpoint, a reorientation of DA away from self-determination. On the

other hand, other protesters argued that temporal urgency of the climate change issue requires political pragmatism:

> [C]onsidering the timescale we don't have the luxury of arguing over whose strategy is the best one. At the moment we're in a quickly descending aircraft, and it's "press every fucking button on the dashboard" time (Anonymous, 2009).

The use of the descending aircraft metaphor captures well the sense of urgency, which more committed horizontalists see as a Trojan horse for what is alternately termed 'green authoritarianism' or 'eco-fascism'. Implicated in this process, activists became frustrated as, what they saw as protest aesthetics appealing to the state, were substituted for building lasting alliances with communities peripheral to protest sites, through the unglamorous graft of sustained dialogue. The activists taking this position seemed to be more aware of the alienating effect of particular activist subcultures, and called for more honesty and less "bravado and bluster" surrounding the potential of horizontally organised camps, and direct action beyond symbolic acts of dramatic lobbying (e.g. Ford, 2008; Basset, 2009).

Two interesting analyses were generated from this activist praxis: first, an analysis of the valorisation of the 'activist' role; second, the misidentification of "root causes". Activist-intellectuals inspired by the CCA's anarchist principles and the French Situationists (Do or Die, 1999), questioned what happens to the movement as a force of public pedagogy from the grassroots, when protesters position themselves as "activist experts": they paint a picture of an unappealing climate martyrdom, the propaganda of which promulgates a hopelessly woolly message. They seem ultimately to suggest a limit to *mass -mediated* public pedagogy:

> Anti-capitalist politics do not translate easily into 'action' but they do make sense and we do not need to water down the messaging to appeal to 'ordinary people'. The media is not a tool for us to use and a reduction of

> anti-capitalist politics to direct action over simplistic lifestyle politics loses us friends both inside and outside of the anti-capitalist movement. Instead of trying to 'win people over' by rose tinting our anger and rage we should speak honestly about the frustration that we all feel and recognise it in the less valorised forms of action that people take every day (Shifter, 2011).

Ultimately, the "political vacuum" identified by particular activist-intellectuals in the CCA, was a result of the fetishization of organisational form, such that the notion of "open space", run by consensus meetings, and so on, became an "open political space of environmental solutions" to the extent that anarchist anti-capitalists could not "articulate [their] own political structure in anarchist terms because of the misconception that [they had] no politics at all!" (a.g.r.o.a.t., 2010, p. 10). Pragmatists, on the other hand, argued that, to the extent that capitalism and the state-corporate nexus could be identified as the "root causes", the temporal urgency of the situation, as dictated by climate scientists, necessitates, in the short to medium term, a struggle to reform these root causes. This line of inquiry leads us directly on to an analysis of the way in which climate science legitimates political argument in the movement's public pedagogy. In this sense, we move from one central fetishism (horizontalism) towards an analysis of another, that of carbon.

Climate science and politics

> 'Historically, greens have had it tough,' says Garman. 'So many of these environmental battles are conveyed as an "Industry versus Greenies" thing. We're lucky, all our stuff is based on science.
>
> (Davis, 2007, p. 8).

How climate science is used as legitimation for contentious politics

A major orienting theme for the CCA is its relationship to climate science. One of the key tropes of the CCA is, as we know, addressing the 'root causes' of climate change. The argument was developed in the previous section that out of a tension between the desire to mobilise new activists through popular appeal, and anarchism as a guiding philosophy, arose an analysis of the valorisation of organisational form and protest tactics, at the cost of political coherence. This section continues to examine the struggle to mobilise around a populist identity by analysing the relationship between the politics of climate change and its science. We begin with the insight from above that *temporal urgency* is itself a public pedagogical tool, which draws its power from climate science:

> Winning a big argument in a democracy is a longer haul than any flights BA has to offer, but...the long grind does not work for environmental activists. Put simply, the greens believe - and most scientific evidence backs them up - that inaction now will cost lives later. That time limit, and the enormous possible consequences of failure, applies to few other causes (Guardian Leader, 2007, p. 28).

One of the most interesting ways in which activists have tried to use climate change to legitimate a political imperative is through court cases following from direct action. In this sense, the actions are high stakes, undertaken by few but with the intention of using a legalistic setting as a wider source of public pedagogy. The basic argument is that (illegal) action taken is justified in light of the urgent need to tackle climate change. The basic premise – of taking action outside the letter of the law in order to prevent a greater evil – is not new, and *flags up a process of learning through protest cycles*. The extract below, from the Guardian, usefully summarises a lineage of such action stretching back to 1996:

> · **2000** Norwich jury found Greenpeace director Lord Melchett and 27 activists not guilty of causing criminal damage to field of GM crops
> · **2000** Five Greenpeace volunteers found not guilty of criminal damage after occupying incinerator
> · **1999** Three women cleared of causing £80,000 damage to Trident nuclear submarine computer equipment
> · **1996** Liverpool jury acquitted four women who caused £1.5m damage to Hawk fighter jet at British Aerospace factory
>
> (Vidal, 2008).

In October 2007, six Greenpeace activists known as the 'Kingsnorth Six', inspired by the burgeoning CCA movement, occupied a smoke stack and painted 'Gordon' down the chimney to highlight the contradictions of New Labour policy on climate change and its support of new coal-fired power stations. The Kingsnorth Six's tactics worked, and they were cleared of criminal damage. Publicity of the case provided the opportunity to build a 'broad church' of alliances, and used expert witnesses to turn the court room, in a sense, into a pedagogical space. The Kingsnorth Six successfully used the defence of 'lawful excuse' to damage property at Kingsnorth power station in Kent to prevent even greater damage caused by climate change. Although the decision was not made by a high court, and therefore cannot set precedent, it subsequently sent shockwaves throughout sympathetic media, the activist community, as well as the wider corporate and political world:

> [A climate activist commented] "It's just a fantastic result. It shows that the public can distinguish between what the government says and what it does on climate change…And that's because here we have the public hearing directly from scientists, unfiltered by the media or by party

> politics, and it makes me very optimistic that we can actually turn this around"
> (van der Zee, 2008, p. 7)

The court room became a public lecture theatre in which NASA climate scientist Jim Hansen, the Tory environment advisor, and an Inuit leader from Greenland, argued the case in climate change terms. The 'dots are joined' between the local actions and the wider global repercussions already occurring as a result of emissions:

> Professor Jim Hansen, one of the world's leading climate scientists, argued that the 20,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide emitted daily by Kingsnorth could be responsible for the extinction of up to 400 species…The court was told that some of the property in immediate need of protection included parts of Kent at risk from rising sea levels, the Pacific island state of Tuvalu and areas of Greenland. The defendants also cited the Arctic ice sheet, China's Yellow River region, the Larsen B ice shelf in Antarctica, coastal areas of Bangladesh and the city of New Orleans (Vidal, 2008).

This reveals how particular activists consider such actions to be productive of public pedagogy in a Habermasian sense. By Habermas's (1979) account, modernity is characterised by testing the validity claims inherent in social arrangements through rational discourse. Public pedagogy arises from the fact that actors engaged in rational discourse with a normative perspective on society, are forced to learn when confronted with contradiction. Although the courts are a good example, this use of climate science as public pedagogy is far more general.

Armed only with peer-reviewed science?

The use of climate science to flag up democratic deficit in the face of objective urgency is heavily used throughout the CCA's history. Perhaps one of the most famous memes of the CCA – emerging from the 2007 Heathrow protest – was "We are armed only with peer reviewed science". What is at stake is the potential of such a narrative to mobilise wider socio-cultural changes.

There are several entangled issues. However, to simplify, the use of esoteric science as a conscientizing force asks certain obvious questions such as, does the notion of scientifically literate, educated, mobile protesters shore up binaries such as good protester/bad protester, or so-called fluffy versus spiky activism, that mass mediated popular culture perpetuates? It is not even that we can rely on press accounts that such a protester is indeed 'typical'. More to the point is the power of such a public narrative in creating a self-fulfilling prophecy.

What is the "peer-reviewed science" that attendees were referring to at Heathrow? Primarily, three items were cited through media reporting: a paper co-authored by NASA professor James Hansen, *et al* (2007) entitled "Climate change and trace gases"; secondly, a working paper from the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research entitled "Growth Scenarios for EU & UK aviation: contradictions with climate policy" (Anderson, et al., 2006); thirdly, the "World Health Report 2002: Reducing Risks, Promoting Healthy Life" (World Health Organisation, 2002). Firstly, it is important to state that the DA movement have acted as popularisers and promulgators of science to the wider public, as seen above. This is educative in itself. Taken together, such protest actions help the public to join the dots between climate change policy, aviation policy, global climate science, and the human cost of climate change. The use of the popular media has been crucial in this respect. In many cases, DA provides the catalyst resulting in the popular press referencing the claims made in these papers (table 10).

Table 10 The CCA as populariser of contemporary climate science

Source	Topic	Example of promulgation through media
Anderson, *et al* (2006)	The contradictions between government climate change policy and aviation expansion policy.	This year, the [climate camp] have chosen Heathrow…for a simple reason. The current expansion in flying is, on its own, a guarantee that Britain will fail to meet even the most modest of its environmental targets…Flying…is growing rapidly. The Tyndall Centre for Global Warming, one of the world's most distinguished scientific bodies, has calculated that air travel alone will take up 134 percent of the Government's greenhouse gas targets by 2050. (Hari, 2007, p. 13).
Hansen, *et al* (Hansen, et al., 2007)	Global climate change, arctic ice melt, and 'positive feedbacks'.	"SIR - Camping at the "Camp for Climate Action" over the past six days has been surreal but exhilarating…We know from the latest science (Hansen et al, "Climate Change and Trace Gases", Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, May 18) that "recent greenhouse gas emissions place the Earth perilously close to dramatic climate change that could run out of control"…By permitting a third runway at Heathrow - and the dramatic rise in carbon dioxide emissions that will inevitably accompany it - the Government is effectively committing itself to the destruction of the world as we know it" (Carlyle, 2007, p. 19)
World Health Organisation (2002)	Estimates of the effects of climate change on human health and mortality.	Next month's Camp for Climate Action will put Heathrow airport at the frontline of direct action on climate change…As individuals, we are not off the hook. It is time to take responsibility. More than

> 150,000 people will die this year from climate change. Their right to life beats our right to the break of our choice.
> (Fauset, 2007, p. 8)

Nevertheless, a movement that is to generate grassroots support must be inclusive and, despite the general journalistic sense of novelty at the esoteric discussions taking place at climate camps, there is something more insidious at work. Note below the equivalence of educated middle class with 'good protester'. That right-leaning press accept the movement's legitimacy, may be seductive to particular activists:

> These "unemployed layabouts" and "stupid hippies" (copyright Talksport Radio) must be the most scientifically qualified protesters in history, with every other person seemingly a science graduate. I recognise an undercover journalist from a right-wing newspaper. "This is terrible!" he says "I've been sent to find stories about drug-addicted layabouts and they're all nice people with PhDs."
> (Hari, 2006, p. 27).

Therefore, it is not the science, but the (inadvertent) legitimation of institutional 'respectability' that is a double-edged sword. Below, in a letter to the Guardian, CCA activists legally banned from protesting at Kingsnorth in 2008, run the risk of inadvertently legitimising the hierarchical power that they oppose by strategically appealing to it:

> We may be arrested and jailed for our determination to be at the camp. The thought of going to prison even for a short period is daunting, but we cannot accept the logic of bail conditions that stop us attending a legal event at which Royal Society professors mix with families. Scientists tell us that from this week we have just 100 months to solve climate change. That's not long; from this moment on every week counts.
>
> (Potts, et al., 2008, p. 35).

The problematical nature of this approach is recognised by movement participants *and* climate scientists alike. First, the understanding of the 'upstream' construction of climate change is suppressed; second, it obfuscates ethical debates over cultural values, norms and political worldviews. Reflecting on the 2007 Heathrow protest in the wake of 'Climategate', Professor of Climate Change at University of East Anglia 2009, recognised these dangers:

> The protesters claimed they were "armed only with peer-reviewed science". They were in fact armed with much more: a powerful vision of a future Britain, a strong belief in the value of natural ecosystems, compelling ethical principles about the rights of the poor. None of this armoury was to be found in the peer-reviewed science they quoted... Producing the "trump card" of science to settle debate is not healthy for a democracy
> (Hulme, 2009, p. 33)

Indeed, this emerged as a key internal debate within the movement, that obfuscating political issues will take us down the path of 'green authoritarianism' as the problem becomes more urgent. From this debate, a critique emerged that the symbolic defining of the enemy as particular corporations is a misidentification of "root causes". This excerpt from Shift magazine stands out as an excellent analysis of what is at stake. It is therefore worth quoting at length:

> [C]apitalism and the state apparatus supporting it could survive climate change, though in uglier forms. Barring a clean energy revolution, this would entail cutting energy consumption by ensuring only a minority carry on consuming. Deepening inequality coupled with exclusion through green taxation; the poor being forced to sell energy quotas to survive; prevention of infrastructure development in nations hit hardest by climate-change under the ruse of sustainability, whilst rich nations aided by stolen majority world resources - including land to grow bio-fuels and organic vegetables - create fortress-like border controls. 'Cut the carbon by any means necessary' campaigners seem asleep to this...*The root causes of this crisis are not particular buildings, particular corporations, or particular politicians, but the wider social, political and economic structures within which we live, our cultural*

> *priorities, and the dominant ideologies of our time*. It is a 'battle of ideas', and this movement needs to wade in with more courage.
> (Archer, 2007)

The notion that this is indeed a 'battle of ideas' has, in a sense, taken us full-circle, from the need to name names and back to 'abstractions': the tensions between politics and climate, as played out between the CCA's 'outward facing' persona in public discourse, and fora of movement praxis, have been generative of an analysis of 'carbon fetishism', drawing on Marx's notion of 'commodity fetishisation'. I conclude this chapter by first of all explaining this analysis. Finally, I consider the implications for public pedagogy by delineating the kinds of questions opened up by an analysis, which takes account of a fetishisation of both organisational form, and carbon.

Conclusion: towards a more dialectical public pedagogy? Beyond the two fetishisms

I have explicated the various ways in which the CCA has acted as source of public pedagogy. I argued that the movement's public pedagogy emerged from the articulation of a populist identity, from which – as a simplification of political space – tensions arose. I went on to illustrate how it became increasingly unclear who the enemy is, and what "root causes" are, as the movement expanded to incorporate new actors.

The analysis of carbon fetishism has been very important to the evolving cognitive praxis of this movement. Larry Lohmann, and his research colleagues at the 'Corner House' – a critical community, which produces research aimed at facilitating discussion and strategic thought in movements for environmental and social justice – have been key in developing these ideas, which have been debated and promulgated by the CCA. The focus on CO_2e emissions, as well as the valorisation of actions that prevent them 'at source' has, in the past, left the CCA open to easy accusations of

hypocrisy by the right-leaning press, such that the movement has been dragged into counterproductive conversations about the morality of activists flying to alternative people's summits and so on:

> CLIMATE change activists opposed to air travel are travelling to a conference in South America ... by plane…The 12,000-mile round trip to the Climate Change and Mother Earth's Rights conference next month involves changing planes at least twice. The flights will generate about eight tons of carbon dioxide greenhouse gases (Lewis, 2010).

The activist-intellectuals in Shift magazine argue that "the central tenet of the notion of fetishism is to create equivalence; the idea that you compare different gases, different places and locality through an idea of carbon equivalence" (Shift Magazine, 2010). The key insight that an analysis of carbon fetishism can bring to the DCA movement's public pedagogy is that "*[i]t's not a question of teaching people in power about science… the fetish distracts your attention from the central relations that you need to talk about when talking about the climate issue; instead you focus on numbers and on things which begin to have dominion over you*" (Shift Magazine, 2010). The online vote for the 2009 camp, by which protesters were encouraged to pick a target for DA based on annual emissions was offered in an article of Shift, as a good example of the fetishistic approach (ibid.).

In this analysis, technocratic and market-based regimes of governance exercise their own public pedagogy through framing such regimes in such a way as to 'black-box' the boundaries of their construction (Lohmann, 2005, p. 210). These obfuscatory practices ride roughshod over socio-material and geographical contingencies and inequalities, through the desire of expert epistemic networks, who – in a process akin to self-fulfilling prophecy – are forced to make questionable equivalences between very different places and practices in order to 'hem in' CO_2e, so as to give it a calculable exchange-value (Bailey, et al., 2011).

Yet, it seems that a counter-public pedagogy aimed at 'de-black boxing' such processes, requires something more than the empirical identification of connections and collusion between the financial class, state actors and fossil fuel industries involved in producing emissions. Yes, anti-capitalism is an abstraction (an empty signifier in discourse theoretical terms) but despite Newman's call for names and addresses, as Paula Allman (2001, p. 127) has argued, "[t]o blame individual capitalists, or corporations, or even institutions set up to facilitate and orchestrate the system and the cut-throat competition that abounds, particularly when capital is in crisis, gets us nowhere in terms of creating a more just society".

Finance may strategically be used as a leverage point, as argued by the CCA: nevertheless, it is essential to keep in mind that class is a role and relation, not a fixed subject position, or a set of cultural preferences; something which populist outrage at corporations misses (Allman, 2001; Harvey, 2010, p. 232). Given that individuals routinely struggle to act and reconcile multiple structurally-constrained roles in their daily lives; given that a large proportion of the UK is dependent on the labour infrastructure targeted by DA; given that the technocratic and calculative rationalities necessary for the fetishistic disavowal of the socio-spatial relations underlying CO_2e emissions are routinized, and performed locally by the employees in these industries every day; a counter-pedagogy would surely have to be dialogical and begin with/emerge from people's situated biographical experience. After all, as activist-intellectual AK Thompson (2010, p. 283) reminds us, Marx's entire analysis of the economic logic of Capital was explicated from a description of the quotidian and mundane experience of encountering particular commodities in the real world.

In this context, as particular climate activists came to recognise, such a public pedagogy should be dialectical and dialogical, centred around the notion of *Just Transition* away from fossil fuels, and cognisant of what fossil fuels represent (good and bad) in terms of relations to nature and uneven geographical development,

labour, institutional arrangements, cultural norms and the rhythms of everyday life that people are 'locked into' (Harvey, 2010, p. 251).

Indeed, as argued through the praxis of the CCA, such a public pedagogy should also involve a commitment to less valorised forms of action. It is no doubt true that direct action is educative to those who partake, as well as to bystanders. In fact, as Thompson (2010, p. 62) would argue about DA in general, much direct action taken by the CCA was arguably educative in a Freirian sense because it involved going beyond the realm of the 'meaning' of an action, and being "informed about issues", towards "exploring the social organisation of power as it was revealed through moments of confrontation". This was certainly the case as CCA participants (and, indirectly, bystander publics through the mass media) challenged undercover police infiltration, kettling and violence, blanket stop and searches, the work of Forward Intelligence Teams, and applications of the 1997 Harassment Act by corporations, through the mass media, the courts, and by making political alliances and having dialogue with police.

As I have shown, activists did important public pedagogical work by striving to normalise such action to potential supporters through efforts to articulate historical and genealogical links to other civil disobedience movements. However, fetishizing a commitment to autonomous, horizontal, direct action can be both alienating, and can lead to political incoherence (Freeman, 1972; Harvey, 2010, p. 125). Yes, the camp attempted to embed democratic and open structures in its organisation, but the ability to attend a camp in the first place (and to participate in the submerged activist networks that organise between camps) is differentiated according to available time and mobility, which is raced, classed and gendered. Secondly, the impetus to attend the camp in the first place is differentiated according to educational level, and the nature of such education, which again, is raced, classed and gendered. Once inside the camp, the commitment to maintenance of a horizontal culture of consensus and openness is subject to the same criticisms. In other words, horizontality is a cultural

logic, or a regulative ideal, anterior to its material enactment (Juris, 2005). How does it reproduce hidden, arcane and distributed forms of power? What organisational and educational possibilities do horizontal forms of organising obfuscate? It is precisely the agonistic view of democracy, deployed in this chapter, which would argue that power/knowledge can never be separated, that spaces of resistance are always simultaneously spaces of domination. As some activists argued happened in the CCA, 'open spaces' allowed reformists, liberals, moderates, pragmatists to a platform to argue a role for state reform, and as such DA became a symbolic lobbying technique, where non-activist bystanders see 'activist' experts protesting their 'cause'.

As a result, a key dilemma in the movement has been how to "diversify, without diluting" the structural critique (CCA, 2010b, p. 42). This is one of the key issues which the Transition Towns movement seeks to address through its cultural politics: this is a movement which recognises the need for less valorised forms of action, rooted in daily life; however, its approach has been to eschew contentious politics altogether (at least in its public discourse) to the extent that its broad church approach has been critiqued as being apolitical. With this we can move on to the next chapter, which examines precisely these issues.

Chapter 6

Community responses to climate change as public pedagogy: the cultural politics of the Transition Towns movement (2005-2011)

> In principle, the notion of political community could operate (let us be hugely optimistic here) at the level of the human species, defined precisely by participation in a democratic political community, with the us then unfortunately depending upon the mobilisation of those old, old dualisms of Humanity versus The Rest, Culture versus Nature, and so on (Massey, 1995, p. 287).

Introduction

The previous chapter gave an interpretive account of the cultural politics of the CCA as public pedagogy. I analysed the movement's discourse as public curriculum, which emerged from the articulation of a populist identity (Laclau, 2005), united against the 'root causes' of climate change. In this context, the CCA's public pedagogy was fundamentally about "defining the enemy" (Newman, 1994). Alongside this political curriculum, the CCA popularised climate science, and sought to demonstrate the viability of non-hierarchical modes of social organisation.

As a "necessary simplification of the political space" (Laclau, 2005) , I argued that emergent antagonisms in the movement's cognitive praxis could be understood as occurring at the intersections between cosmological, organisational and technical-practical knowledge interests: tensions between climate science and political worldviews, and between organisational forms and repertoires and political worldviews, generated movement analyses arguing for less valorised forms of action, rooted in daily life.

A key dilemma which emerged in this respect was how to diversify without diluting the politics. This dilemma is explored in this chapter through an analysis of the cultural politics of the TT movement as public pedagogy. Emerging from the same moment as the CCA in 2005, the TT movement has taken a fundamentally different approach from the outset, indeed based around less valorised, and more rooted, forms of community action. However, the TT movement has eschewed agonistic politics altogether (at least in its public discourse), in favour of a broad church approach based around creating a sense of 'engaged optimism' through prefigurative practices (Hopkins, 2008a).

In this chapter, I argue – as I did in the case of the CCA – that the public curriculum produced by the TT movement can be understood as emerging from hegemonic struggle to articulate diverse struggles and demands under a populist identity (Gramsci, 1971, p. 350; Mouffe & Lalcau, 1985, p. 87; Giroux, 2000, p. 354), structured around cosmological, organisational and technological knowledge interests (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991). On the face of it, the Laclauian theory of hegemony might seem of little utility to an analysis of the TT movement's discourse, because it purposely avoids contentious politics and the articulation of an identity around that to which it is opposed. Nevertheless, I aim to show that the process of articulating a Self through relations of exteriority, cannot avoid constructing Others, even where issues of power and politics are *strategically* suppressed. In other words, to be for something is always to be against something else, whether this remains latent or is made explicit.

Understanding the origins and evolution of the TT movement

Overview and antecedents

The origins of the TT movement and its subsequent 'viral spread', is by now well-documented not just in the academic commentary (Connors, 2010; Bailey, et al., 2010; Aiken, 2012; Barry & Quilley, 2009; Smith, 2011), but in its own literature (Hopkins, 2008a; Hopkins, 2011), and in media representations[vii]. The movement grew between 2005-February 2009 to 134 'official' Transition Town communities worldwide in February 2009 (Scott-Cato and Hillier, 2010), growing again to 159 in May 2009 (Connors, 2010)and growing to 186 by July 2009, with another 802 worldwide communities reportedly mulling the process over (Bailey, et al., 2011, p. 600). As a loosely networked assemblage, this self-mythologising about humble origins and 'viral spread', plays an important *expressive* role in "making the movement appear larger than it is", thus helping "to inspire people that they are part of something 'big'", in order to "generate momentum for further expansion" (Bailey, et al., 2010, p. 603). These representations can thus be considered to be public pedagogical devices.

Nevertheless, as an activist-intellectual engaged in both Transition and direct action put it:

> [W]hat does being a transition town mean; how many people are involved? In Aberystwyth, we have signed up some 100 people to an email list and have a bare handful of proactive members. This from a town with around 25,000 residents (Mason, 2008).

Because the movement's origins are well documented, I will be brief in my overview. The TT movement is a multi-scalar, translocal and transnational network of community-based initiatives based on "a loose set of realworld principles and

practices that have been built up over time though experimentation and observation of communities as they drive forward to build local *resilience*" (Brangwyn & Hopkins, 2008, p. 8), faced with the intertwined issues – the "hydrocarbon twins (Hopkins, 2008a, p. 18) – of climate change and peak oil[viii]. Resilience in the context can broadly be defined in the following way:

> [T]he ability of a system to absorb change while retaining essential function; to have the ability for self-organisation; and to have the capacity to adapt and learn. Resilience can apply to people, places and ecosystem (Adger, et al., 2011, p. 696).

The movement's co-founder, movement intellectual Rob Hopkins, dates the emergence of the idea of Transition to the production of an energy descent action plan (EDAP) for Kinsale, Ireland, by students on a permaculture course he taught at Kinsale Further Education College (Hopkins, 2011, p. 20). Genealogically, if there is one principal philosophy informing the 'cosmology' of the movement, which transcends its locally contingent character, it is permaculture (Connors & McDonald, 2010, p. 568; Aiken, 2012, p. 92). Indeed, the principal concepts of the movement – transition, resilience, community – are derived from permaculture (Aiken, 2012, p. 92). The movement has strong genealogical connections (Hopkins, 2008a, pp. 138-139) to the works of permaculturist, David Holmgren (2004). As Holmgren (2013) describes, permaculture principles were co-developed with the other founding father of permaculture Bill Mollison (1988), through cross-pollinisation of their work at the University of Tasmania in the 1970's, which combined interests in landscape architecture, agricultre and psychology. This all was developed through what Holmgren himself descibes as the first wave of environmentalism, concerned with "Limits to Growth", and living through two oil crises between 1973 and 1979 .

Permaculture, originally a contraction of 'permanent agriculture', started as the principle of modelling agricultural practices on the self-organisation and regulation of natural systems (Hopkins, 2011, p. 98). Over time, the concept came to be

understood as a contraction of 'permanent culture', applying the concept of permanence to one's cultural world (p. 98). In this sense, design-led permaculture has strong genealogical links to older traditions of social ecology, social anarchism and municipal bioregionalism espoused by green movement intellectuals such as Peter Kropotkin, Lewis Mumford, and Murray Bookchin (Heywood, 2007, pp. 275-276; Harvey, 2012, pp. 137-138).

Nevertheless, the idea of TT as an evolving assemblage of actors, ideas, and practices is important, because it allows us to conceptualise its cognitive praxis as a process of intellectual bricolage: Hopkins references the cut and paste culture of Hip Hop in this context, arguing that "many great inventions in music happen when someone thinks 'What happens if I put this with that?'" (Hopkins, 2011, p. 77). For this reason, as in the previous chapter, latent tensions emerge from this heterogeneity through the movement's attempts to articulate a populist identity.

After moving to Totnes, Hopkins describes the ideational mix that led to the creation of the first Transition Town, in Totnes:

> I met…a fellow peak oil educator…We began showing films together and giving talks, and they generated a great deal of interest. Other people started getting involved and bringing pieces from systems thinking, psychology, business development and the power of the internet to spread ideas (Hopkins, 2011, p. 21).

In short, what Hopkins describes as "the emergence of an idea", is fundamentally premised on an eclectic recombination of different bodies of knowledge "built around the stories and experience of…[p]eople who are learning by doing—and learning all the time" (Hopkins, 2011, p. 17). Transition, it appears, is a quintessential learning assemblage (Scott-Cato & Hillier, 2010).

Dislocation and the formation of new subjectivities

To understand the origins of the TT movement we must understand that, although it has very different genealogy to the CCA, it is a manifestation of the same *discursive logic*. Like the CCA, the TT movement constructs a three-step rationale – based on temporal urgency, rejection of the status quo, and a need for collective solidarity and a DIY approach – aimed at mobilising potential adherents:

> If we wait for governments, it'll be too little, too late. If we act as individuals, it'll be too little. But if we act as communities, it might be just enough, just in time (Hopkins, 2011, p. 17).

As in the CCA, this rationale for action is front and centre in the TT literature. Although the TT movement has never courted the media, and has only ever "done one press release", it has nevertheless garnered its fair share of media attention (Hopkins, 2011, p. 25). In my popular press analysis, this rationale was present in 4.9% of the press sample of TT coverage (N=206), as opposed to 9.9% for the CCA (N=593). Below is fairly typical example of this rationale in popular press coverage, which was consistent across the ideological spectrum:

> Maggie Johns, a Hervey Bay Transitioner, signed off her e-mail to me thus: "Before, it all seemed so futile. What was the good in changing a few light bulbs? There are ice-shelves breaking off, for goodness sake! But when you know that *more and more towns are coming online with Transition*, and each has an army of dedicated volunteers, it seems much more do-able." (TT participant, in Leitch 2008, Times).

Both cultures of activism advocate the need for grassroots cultural change, whilst offering conflicting understandings of how this might best be achieved. As argued in the previous chapter, whilst the starting point of the CCA's public curriculum was making policy contradiction visible through targeted action against its concrete

manifestations, the TT movement uses temporal urgency, and policy contradiction as rhetorical devices to justify a community-of-place based on 'micro-politics', opposed to the framing of citizen agency in individualistic terms. In this sense, we can see that what the cognitive praxis of direct action and community activism have in common is a desire to render agency and learning in collective terms, as opposed to the cognitive praxis of behaviour change technologies, which though applying insights from social marketing, and nudge politics, render citizen agency in individualistic terms, thus arguably maintaining the disjuncture between the micro (individual and family behaviours) and the macro (climate change and the monolithic forces of neoliberal politics).

The spatial tropes of *place* and *community* are central to the cultural discourse of TT: the TT movement is concerned with relocalisation through community capacity-building in the face of the "hydrocarbon twins" of climate change and peak oil (Hopkins, 2008a, p. 18). However, part of the success of Transition is that it is about more than the 'hydrocarbon twins': Transition culture aims to create a sense of "engaged optimism" so that participation would *"feel like the most appropriate thing to be doing,…connecting us more with place, with each other and with ourselves*", even if climate change and peak oil were no longer issues (Hopkins, 2011, pp. 29-37).

TT's rationale for relocalisation is therefore not merely 'immanent', but is an 'intentional' normative political project "based on inclusion, local distinctiveness, equality and freedom" (North, 2010, p. 591). As a cultural project, the notion of a sense of place takes on a cosmological role rather than merely an organisational one (Eyerman & Jamsion, 1991), as means/ends distinctions are blurred. This rationale is found across sympathetic popular press representations. A typical example is given below:

> Part of [TT's] growing success is how it meets several needs simultaneously. *It tackles social recession – the sense of disconnection and fragmentation of community* – at the same time as it collaborates on the huge behavioural change that will be required for a low-carbon society. The latter is far more likely to come about in the context of personal relationships than as a result of discredited politicians dictating change. (Bunting, 2009, pp. 31, my italics).

We can see then, how 'Transition' acts as the movement's key empty signifier, around which a plethora of other democratic demands – a sense of place, meaningful relationships, meaningful work, climate change –cluster. In fact, *community* is arguably "the key conceptual motif" of the movement, used not just to describe an appropriate scale of local organisation, but as a 'buy-in' tactic reflecting a grassroots approach (Aiken, 2012, p. 93). As a crude empirical indicator in support of this claim, I found that the word *'community'* occurred more frequently than the word 'resilience', in the movement's two key texts (Hopkins, 2008a; Hopkins, 2011) taken together, and that it was used in 33.3% of news articles in my press analysis (N=207). Community can be regarded as the appropriate 'meso-scale' of agency, which emerged from the process of dislocation from hegemonic discourse. The critique of a more confrontational approach is implicit. As Aiken (2012, p. 93) summarises:

> Talk of carbon footprints, appeals to saving money, or 'do a little, save a lot' styles of approach; these target the individual as the unit of analysis. The alternative to this, projecting blame onto corporations and governments, is seen as equivalent to hiding one's head in the sand. Community here is the meso-layer that is effective.

Arising from the same dislocation from hegemonic discourse, the TT movement seeks to catalyse the dialectic between the cultural politics of communities and the political culture of the state, rather than engaging in direct action, *against* 'the state' as an abstraction:

> If, through the creation of an Energy Descent Plan which has engaged the

> community and which offers a positive vision of a lower energy future, communities have set out where they want to go, then a very dynamic interface is created between communities, local and national government. Communities could set the agenda, saying to government, "Here is our plan: it addresses all of the issues raised by the coming challenges of climate change and energy security, and it also will revitalise our local economy and our agricultural hinterland, but it will work far better if carbon rationing is in place, and if the true costs of fossil fuels are reflected in goods and services." The fear of change is removed for government, and they become swept along in a huge movement for change. Previously non-vote-winning policies become the norm (Hopkins, 2008, p. 76).

Above, we can see how Transition acts as an empty signifier linking democratic renewal, community, local economy, climate change, energy security and agriculture. As argued in the previous chapter, the political implications of this are not necessarily progressive. Carbon rationing and a 'true reflection' of fuel costs, at the extreme end of the spectrum, hints at the kind of green-authoritarianism opposed so strongly by anarchists in the CCA. However, the ostensible idea is precisely that this would *not* be the case, because resilience in the face of climate change and fossil fuel decline will be achieved from the 'grassroots', by emphasising the 'upside of down'; that is, relocalisation fulfilling social needs and shifting cultural values and norms through the creation of convivial community.

Yet, as critiques of the TT movement have argued, the woolly conception of 'community' in its discourse, coupled to the reactionary notion of resilience – often popularly described as 'bouncebackability' – leave little room for an analysis of power asymmetries and political economy (Scott-Cato, 2008; Chatterton & Cutler, 2008; Greer, 2009; Connors, 2010, p. 567; Aiken, 2012, pp. 94-96). As a result, critics of the movement have expressed scepticism regarding the movement's ability to avoid insipid compromise and state cooption.

Therefore, in dialogue with the previous chapter, one underlying question in what follows, is the extent to which consistent invocation of the 'grassroots', combined

with an intentional suppression of a more agonistic approach to 'community as politics' (Shaw, 2007), has the potential to skew the ways in which 'community' in public discourse is used as a pedagogical trope to manufacture consent for on the one hand, a neoconservative discourse of green authoritarianism, and on the other, a neoliberal discourse of self-help and state roll-back.

As a result of this DIY attitude and the recognition of the need to build support for government policy from the 'grassroots', local TT initiatives have been able to mobilise populist support across the political spectrum. Taken as a whole, my popular press analysis (N=207) found that 24.2% of news articles directly reported some kind of rhetorical party political endorsement, whilst only 2.9% featured any kind of explicit criticism. It has been argued by activist-intellectuals aligned with a more radical politics that the TT movement has made negligible direct policy impact (Towers, 2012). Although this is an empirically suspect claim in itself, the point worth making at this juncture, is that Transition has undoubtedly had an indirect influence as politicians have learned *from* the movement.

Connecting to the past: articulations of historical equivalence and difference

As touched upon in the last chapter, the most well-documented instances of politicians learning from TT are the support of Ed Miliband, and the huge popularity of the Transition Handbook (Hopkins, 2008a) amongst MPs upon its release:

> If you want to catch a glimpse of the kinds of places outside the political mainstream where that new politics might be incubated, take a look at the Transition movement. Ed Miliband, the energy and climate change secretary, was one of the first to spot its potential when he described this young and fast-growing movement as "absolutely essential". Other politicians have been similarly intrigued, and last year The Transition Handbook came fifth in MPs' list of summer reading. It isn't hard to see

> why politicians are so interested. The Transition movement is engaging people in a way that conventional politics is failing to do… Hopkins is emphatic that transition groups refuse all political affiliation…But it is intriguing to see how the movement is experimenting with the sorts of ideas those in conventional politics are talking about – localism, decentralisation of power to communities, and an environmental politics that is utopian and hopeful rather than gloomy.
>
> (Bunting, 2009).

As argued in the previous chapter, particular CCA activists argued that the articulation of historical links between climate change activism and the suffragettes, and the anti-apartheid movement by Ed Miliband (Adam & Jowit, 2008, p. 1), was an attempt to co-opt the climate movement more generally. In this sense, such historical linkages can be considered to be floating signifiers, vague enough to be articulated in different chains of equivalence, thus beginning to shift the 'frontier lines' of the wider movement (Laclau, 2005). Clearly inspired by the TT movement, Miliband subsequently attended the 2009 Transition Conference as a "keynote listener":

> This story symbolises the approach Transition takes to politics, of leading by example and of trying to get politicians to experience the buzz being created by Transition initiatives, rather than just protesting. Reflecting later on the experience, Miliband wrote: "Thank you to all the people I met for taking the time to talk to me, and thank you for continuing to be the vanguard of that persuasion." (Hopkins, 2011, p. 27).

Significantly, the discourse of the TT movement articulates no historical linkages to past or present social movements, to the extent that one sympathetic activist wrote "It is as if a nascent idea had been cut out from its social and historical context, planted in a vacuum and expected to grow" (Nicolson, 2009, pp. n-p). Yet, as part of the Transition culture's pedagogical strategy of creating a sense of 'engaged optimism', "rather than just protesting" (Hopkins, 2011, p. 27), the movement has articulated its own *distinct* historical linkages, important in the construction of a populist

undifferentiated ‘we’. In doing so, it has differentiated itself from previous historical incarnations of the environmental movement.

In the TT discourse, two recurring themes stand out: national memory of wartime resilience during trying times in World War II (WWII); and the Cuban Oil crisis of the 1990s, following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The WWII memory of ‘digging for victory’ has been cleverly deployed in TT’s self-produced discourse and widely in the popular press, as a story from our collective past that can articulate many other concerns in the way that Transition hopes to: namely, import substitution in the face of resource scarcity; leading to a concomitant inward substitution of skills, democratisation and sharing of useful knowledge, social solidarity, health and wellbeing, and so on.

Hopkins (2008a, p. 65), in asking “can any lessons be learned from Britain’s most recent national ‘Powerdown’, WWII?”, highlighted that food production rose by 91% (p. 66); that “local authorities set up horticultural committees…teaching practical skills” (p. 66); and that “rationing rebalanced [class-based] inequalities in diet” (p. 67).

As feature pieces on Transition began to appear, this meme was reported on positively in the Right-leaning, Left-leaning, and tabloid popular press, exemplified respectively:

> Between 1939 and 1944, food imports to Britain halved - and the nation responded, nearly doubling domestic food production. Peak oil does not concentrate the popular imagination in quite the same way as Hitler did, but at least the Transitioners will be prepared when, as they predict, an energy crisis occurs (Leitch, 2008, p. 2).

> Some of the inspiration for Transition Towns comes from the Second World War, when the UK was experiencing a prolonged fuel shortage.

> However, people were more self-sufficient then, with good local food networks, less energy consumption per head and strong practical skills, and so were better equipped to deal with the change (Ferry, 2007, p. 18).
>
> When our food supplies were threatened in the last war the government urged us to dig for victory…and we did. Never in our history have we had a more healthy diet. And the fact is that people are responding to Transition schemes (Humphrys, 2007).

As a pedagogical tool, it is recognised that this historical linkage feeds into a process of intergenerational learning through the sharing of oral histories. As well as being oriented around climate change and peak oil, this also began to incorporate themes of self-help in austere times, ensuring that the empty signifier of Transition was capacious enough to seem relevant after the economic crisis of 2008. This was particularly clever since evidence suggests that concern over climate change in the UK and Europe more widely, decreases in times of economic crisis regardless of its objective urgency (see appendix 4).:

> [I]t seems that the combination of credit crunch and environmental concern is driving us to seek out the wisdom of other ages…that for too many years has been brushed off shamefully as the chuntering of old codgers too eager to talk about the privations of war and rationing (Flintoff, 2008, p. 8).

In a similar vein, a documentary film on the Cuban response to their geopolitically-caused oil crisis called "The Power of Community", has been widely used across the UK to raise local awareness by TT initiatives. This more recent historical connection has also made it into wider public discourse:

> Looking for inspiration I travel to south London for a screening of the latest consciousness-raising film promoted by Transition Town Brixton…The Power of Community is about what happened to Cuba after Soviet oil supplies dried up and the US embargo curtailed other imports. It shows how Cubans gradually turned from reliance on carbon-

> intensive agriculture: urban spaces were cultivated, from window boxes to wasteland. The transition took years…but, by the end, even people in cities were producing half their annual fruit and vegetable needs. (Flintoff, 2007).

Generally speaking, it is the *spatial* articulation of the TT movement's identity, through re-embedding our values in a sense of *place*, which is often emphasised as the primary public pedagogical tool of the movement in its own literature and in secondary commentary. However, these historical articulations of the movement's identity as public pedagogical tools, are arguably equally important as symbols of what can and must be achieved in the context of what the peak oil experts call the "petroleum interval":

The notion of the petroleum interval (figure 8) is very clever pedagogical device, because of its simplicity.

Figure 8 The petroleum interval. Reproduced from Hopkins (2008a, p. 71)



It is in this wider temporal context of thousands of years of human history, that we are invited to visualise ourselves as standing at the peak of this brief 200 year blip staring at the downslope, whereupon "further expansion of oil becomes impossible because new production flows are fully offset by decline" (Skrebowski, in Hopkins, 2008, p. 21). Hopkins (p. 70) argues that "[t]he Oil Age can be seen as a 200 year period which enabled us to move away from a primarily local focus and then back to

it again". He argues that our species 'addiction' to oil (more on this later) has enabled "our society to do 70 and 100 times more work than would have been possible without it" (p. 19). Nevertheless, there is no luddic lapse into a globalisation bad/localisation good dualism in TT discourse: rather it is argued that we must find ways of "unleashing" the "collective genius"that carried us to the peak, in order to help us Transition away from living arrangements which have been designed in such away that we are hopelessly vulnerable to disruptions in energy supply.

In this sense, it is useful to remind ourselves of geographer Doreen Massey's (2005) argument against the cleavage of space/time in relation to 'the political': if we interpret them as irreducible (rather than as space as an apolitical totality and dislocation as temporal) then we are better equipped to understand the primary pedagogical device for the movement's cultural politics, which is the articulation of place-based 'cultural stories', as another of the movement's intellectuals Shaun Chamberlain (2009). Since the production of space is relational, and in a constant state of becoming, the temporally sequenced 'cultural stories' so essential to the movement, address both these dimensions.

Given the movement's desire to articulate these historical connections to instances of rapid large-scale change in the face of resource scarcity, and make them seem attractive to the broadest audience possible, it is understandable that an intentionally fuzzy optimism pervades TT discourse: it is designed to inspire, and it has always been explicit that the movement is a translocal social experiment. As a result, TT discourse has shifted over time through praxis. I now turn to outline these shifts.

The discursive evolution of the TT movement

As the TT movement has expanded and matured since 2005, it has responded to shifting social and political contexts, by identifying discursive opportunities in much

the same way that the CCA did. The very indeterminacy of the notion of *Transition Culture* as the movement's principle empty signifier, under which a diverse ensemble of practices, ideas and actors – "the heads, hearts and hands of energy descent" (Hopkins, 2008, contents) – are connected, as well as the indeterminacy of its two key floating signifiers *'community'* and *'resilience'*, imbues the movement's discourse with an inherent adaptability (and, by implication, ambivalence and ambiguity). This lack of a clear vision of "where we are in Transition to", has been identified by the movement's intellectuals in fora for praxis as being the movement's most appealing feature and its main weakness (e.g. Scott-Cato, 2008, p. 96).

If there was any doubt that Transition operates as an empty signifier, as the following quotation in a chapter in the "Transition Companion" entitled "Framing Transition" aptly puts it, "It's a good thing to avoid definitions, they only confuse things" (Hopkins, 2011, p. 73). The premise of the approach is to make belonging to the idea as simple as it can be. As argued above, Transition is a temporal concept, evoking the notion of a collective journey in which a community moves from a state of fossil fuel dependence to a state of resilience:

> [Transition] imagines transforming the place you live…as a journey…[I]t doesn't tell you which way to go, or what your journey will look like but it suggests some of the especially good views along the way, and provides a rough sense of the different types of terrain you will find yourself travelling across. (Hopkins, 2011, p. 14)

Accordingly, in the post-2008 context, the TT movement has had little difficulty in connecting the ideas of community and resilience to the dual contexts of economic recession and state-imposed austerity. My content analysis of the popular press corpus, shows the emergence of a connection between coverage of Transition and economic resilience from 2008 onwards (figure 9).

Figure 9 popular press articles linking Transition to recession



The focus on achieving economic resilience through relocalisation has understandably conferred a certain salience on TT initiatives that they might otherwise have lacked (table 11). In fact, as a practical orientation present in press coverage, this dimension stands just below a focus on carbon reduction (40.6% of news articles), sustainable energy initiatives (46.9%), and local food production (49.8%).

Table 11 Transition and economic localisation in the popular press.

	Number of articles	**Percentage of articles**
Focus on local currency (N=207)	66	31.9%
Focus on local business (N=207)	82	39.6%

Post-2008, we begin to see local economic resilience being linked directly to recession. For example, one largely positive Times article reporting on Transition Totnes's local currency scheme was entitled "Town's pound note bucks the downturn" (Malvern, 2008). Or alternatively, in another account of the Lewes currency scheme in the Daily Telegraph:

> "It would be misleading to say that the Lewes pound was implemented as a safeguard against the downturn," says the mayor [of Lewes]…"But now? Maybe it's one small town's response to the recession" (Walden, 2009).

In the next exemplar, a local news piece on Portobello, Edinburgh's TT initiative, a historical link is manufactured to the depression era '30s by a local movement intellectual, in order to link local currency initiatives with wider economic instability in press coverage:

> Justin Kenrick, a director of Portobello group Pedal, said: "There are a range of reasons that it could work and the most obvious one is that, if it is based on a five per cent discount, you get things five per cent cheaper and that builds up loyalty to the local high street. "The community council here is doing a campaign to support the High Street and it is likely to tie in with that. "Economic conditions seem to be going to get a lot worse and it seems we've only seen the edge of that." In the 1930s, local currencies really took off when there was a bit of an economic meltdown and they did really well during that, so it might be the right time to do it." (Blackley, 2011, p. 3).

Some significant learning has occurred in this regard, which I have evidenced by examining the discursive shift over time between the publication of the movement's key texts published in 2008 (Hopkins, 2008a) and 2011 (Hopkins, 2011). What is apparent is the deft shift in language in response to the ambivalence of the contrived community rhetoric of the Big Society agenda. In the exemplar below, Transition is connected to social justice in the wider context of austerity, through the concept of economic resilience through local ownership:

> Many people are motivated to engage in Transition because a more local economy, in which assets and key enterprises are owned and managed by and on behalf of the local community, offers a far better route to social justice, as well as local economic resilience, than business-as-usual does. This is particularly pertinent in the current economic climate of austerity, with deep cuts and closure of services leading increasingly to a sense of injustice and unfairness (Hopkins, 2011, p. 26)

Transition discourse during this time has been inevitably dragged in to a process of hegemonic struggle, as it is forced to confront the ambivalence of neoliberal localism. Playing a precarious game, the potentially dislocatory effects of recession on Transition discourse become apparent, and in response 'Transition', linking 'community', 'resilience' and so on, now adds 'social justice' to its growing chain of equivalence. As Transition has evolved in this context, social entrepreneurship, as a model of funding Transition-related activity has emerged:

> It has been fascinating to see the emergence of social enterprises in the area of Transition – businesses designed to address a social need and to create employment as well as revenue for the wider Transition process. The art of identifying business opportunities and starting local enterprises in response has now begun in earnest and, as this book sets out, is seen as the next key stage in the evolution of the Transition movement…[P]rojects need to be economically viable, and one vehicle for this is social enterprise. This is gaining a lot of traction and interest, often in the context of the government's 'Big Society' agenda. (Hopkins, 2011, pp. 24-25)

Whilst the words 'enterprise' and 'entrepreneurship' are virtually absent in the 2008 text, they appear a combined 116 times in the later book. Enterprise was most frequently prefixed with the word 'social' in its usage and most frequently suffixed with the words 'and entrepreneurship', so we can infer that this comparison makes sense. Now Transition as an empty signifier comes to represent an increasingly improbable chain of equivalence incorporating energy security, climate change, community, democratic renewal, economic resilience, enterprise and entrepreneurship (two fundamental properties of the animal spirit of capitalism). At

the same time, this shift in discourse is reflected in the popular press. The Big Society agenda was notionally linked to Transition post-2008 in five articles in 2011. As political frontiers look increasingly ill defined, movement intellectual Rob Hopkins is forced to flag up the difference between localism – a synonym of an ideological programme of state rollback – and localisation:

> When the first Transition town was established five years ago [it was about] creating a more sustainable community to reduce their dependency on oil…Now,..[o]ut goes the focus on abstract notions of "peak oil" and in comes an emphasis on "social enterprises", economic development and growth…Mr Hopkins stresses that Transition's particular form of "localisation" is different from the Government's talk of local control. "Localism is about devolving political power to local councils ... Localisation is an economic process that shortens the distance between consumer and producer
>
> (Morrison, 2011, p. 22)

> The aim of Transition is to try to relocalise the economy where it's happening, and be a catalyst for that process of intentional relocalisation. Hopkins is keen to stress that this is very different to David Cameron's interpretation of localism, devolving power from central government. "It doesn't mean putting a big fence up around Totnes and not letting anything in or out. It doesn't mean Totnes will be making its own laptops and frying pans. But it means in terms of food, building materials, a lot more of that can be done locally. Which in turn makes the place much more resilient to shocks from the outside." But what of David Cameron's coalition government? "I think Transition could be part of a genuine Big Society," says Hopkins, "but only where initiatives really give power and assets to the community."
>
> (Siegle, 2011)

Thus, it seems that whilst TT discourse has come to recognise the currency of 'community', evidenced by the significant increase in its use (table 12), it has also become more cognisant of its ambivalence as a floating signifier as it has been forced to confront the impossibility of remaining apolitical.

Table 12 Comparison of key word usage in key Transition texts. **Key:** word count, (weighted percentage of total word count), ranking in terms of frequency of occurrence

Key words (from 1000 most frequently occurring words)	**Total occurrence in key texts**	**Transition Handbook (2008)**	**Transition Companion (2011)**
Transition	2542 (1.79) *1*	483 (0.96) *2*	2059 (2.24) *1*
Local	1111 (0.78) *3*	315 (0.63) *9*	796 (0.87) *2*
Community	961 (0.68) *6*	*202* (0.40) *28*	759 (0.83) *3*
Resilience	318 (0.22) *76*	*77* (0.15) *131*	241 (0.26) *62*

Ultimately, recent TT discourse makes more explicit linkages between relocalisation as a path to social justice in the face of austerity. These linkages are certainly more explicit in the Transition Companion (Hopkins, 2011) than they were in the Transition Handbook (Hopkins, 2008a). The exemplar below references the immensely popular 'Spirit Level' (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010) argument:

> [T]he more equal a society becomes, almost all desirable social indicators, such as literacy and life expectancy, rise, while undesirable ones, such as teenage pregnancies and mental illness, fall. The gulf between rich and poor continues to rise, with many damaging impacts on global society. *Many people are motivated to engage in Transition because a more local economy, in which assets and key enterprises are owned and managed by and on behalf of the local community, offers a*

> *far better route to social justice, as well as local economic resilience, than business-as-usual does. This is particularly pertinent in the current economic climate of austerity, with deep cuts and closure of services leading increasingly to a sense of injustice and unfairness* (Hopkins, 2011, p. 28).

As the movement has grown in visibility, it has become increasingly obvious that it is unable to avoid the contingency and antagonism, which accompanies being positioned 'in and against' the state. Having adumbrated the origins and antecedents of the TT movement, and provided the reader with necessary insight into the movement's temporal articulation of identity, I now turn to the task of critically explicating the various dimensions of the TT movement's public pedagogy.

Dimensions of the TT movement's public pedagogy

As in the previous chapter, I have thus far demonstrated how TT's public pedagogy emerges from the on-going articulation of a populist identity, and that the curricular content of this identity revolves around three *analytically* distinct 'knowledge interests' (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991, p. 55), which are the cosmological, the technical-practical, and the organizational. In TT, the technical-practical is primarily concerned with the popularisation of not just climate science, but also the concept of peak oil. TT discourse argues that these issues should be treated as inextricable. The reason for this is that the movement's cosmology is guided by permaculture, underpinned by the need for holistic thinking. The technical-practical knowledge interest is also engaged in TT through the idea of "reskilling", meaning what urbanist Jane Jacobs called an inward substitution of skills, related to appropriate technologies for living, in all manner of domains as our economies and daily lives localise. The organisational knowledge interest in TT is complex – seeking to reinvigorate place-based knowledge, whilst sharing with the CCA an ostensible orientation towards horizontal and 'open space' modes of organising as well as

'rhizomatic networking'. I contend, as I did in the previous chapter, that these dimensions provide axes around which latent tensions in the movement's ambitions to create a populist identity manifest. Moreover, as in the previous chapter, I contend that these tensions have (to an extent) been, and have the potential to be, generative of learning.

Yet, there is one glaring issue with framing the public pedagogy of the TT movement in Laclauian terms, and that is that although Transition acts as the empty signifier for the movement, which articulates many particularistic concerns through chains of equivalence, this is one of two fundamental conditions. The other is that these particularistic concerns and claims are articulated in an overdetermined totality held together by the creation of a dichotomic frontier between it and the status quo. Transition 'away from' the *status quo* vaguely defined, surely necessitates the presence of an anti-status quo discourse. As I argued in the conclusion of the previous chapter, the TT movement recognises the need for less valorised forms of action, rooted in daily life; however, its discursive approach has been to eschew contentious politics altogether by being publically for things, and not *against* anything. To this extent, the TT movement's discourse exhibits schizophrenic qualities whose public pedagogical implications deserve close attention. In this sense, it is fair to say that the primary substantive dimension of the TT movement's public pedagogy is a kind of 'sleeping with the enemy', if you will.

Sleeping with the enemy as public pedagogy: the strategic suppression of the 'constitutive outside' in the TT movement

What is the TT movement against?

The TT movement "stands against neoliberal visions of a deregulated, neoliberal economy based on free trade underpinned by cheap fossil fuels and externalised emissions" (North & Longhurst, 2013, p. 1425). It stands against implausible 'technofixes'. In being *for* relocalised convivial economies based on non-alienated labour and use-value, it is de facto *against* the logic of capital's spatial fixes/speeding up of time where it rubs up against constraints to its expansion (Harvey, 2006). Thus, sharing a genealogy with movements for Slow Food (van Bommel & Spicer, 2011) and Slow Scholarship (Hartman & Darab, 2012), slowness is understood as counter-hegemonic. In other words, TT's pedagogy, based as it is on the (re)production of space, contains an implicit/latent political economy, which for reasons of impression management is suppressed. For example, in the movement's key texts (Hopkins, 2008a; Hopkins, 2011), the word 'capitalism' is only mentioned in the reference section, nevertheless, in the Transition Companion (Hopkins, 2011, pp. 34-35), it is made crystal clear that on the current trajectory of population growth, the achievement of 3% compound annual growth that of the reproduction capitalism is estimated to require (Harvey, 2012), would increase resource consumption by 1,600% - clearly a fantastical and unachievable figure. Although, rather than using the loaded term anti-capitalism, more affirmative terms such as 'steady state economics', and "Prosperity Without Growth" (Jackson, 2009) are employed.

Thus, although space is brought back into the fold in TT's pedagogy, through the failure to situate their public pedagogy within an ideological framework attending to power, there is a tension between the socio-political and the spatial that requires

unpacking. TT's approach seems to be that, since resource constraints mark the limit points of capital accumulation, there is no point in protesting *against* that which has no future. Rather, as these movement intellectuals argue, the movement aims to "*engage in knowledge production about how to deal with energy crisis and climate change… in the positive sense of a method of thinking in creative ways that make alternative futures possible* (North & Longhurst, 2013, p. 1426). We can, in this cognitive praxis, detect a lack of understanding about the constitutive nature of hegemony.

The question is, whether the bracketing of such functions in the cognitive praxis of the green movement is possible or desirable. Although TT advocate relocalised agglomeration economies based on an inward substitution of skills, how can the movement overlook the macro processes euphemistically termed "structural adjustment" which began in the mid-80s, which through hard forms of money power (particularly the IMF), rewarded states rearranging economies of scale and therefore disciplining bio-power through proletarianisation of massive swaths of the world population who already operated in agglomeration economies? Can so-called 'microcosms of hope' ever be scalable if their pedagogical strategies intentionally skirt the issue of power?

'Them and Us': Transition and the environmental movement

Given the above, the strategic imperative to reach out beyond the usual suspects by avoiding contentious politics, means setting out a positive vision rather than campaigning against things, and constructing Self-Other relations:

> The primary focus is on practical possibilities and opportunities *rather*

> *than on campaigning against current problems.* Successful Transition Initiatives will need an unprecedented coming together of society. They dedicate themselves to openness and inclusion. This principle is based on the need to involve local business communities, community groups and local authorities. It stresses that, in the challenge of energy descent, *there is no room for 'them and us' thinking* (Hopkins, 2011, p. 78).

Yet, in order to maintain this stance, TT discourse has continually been forced to create an Us-Them relationship between historical incarnations of the green movement, as well as the contemporary direct climate action movement. Treating the 'old' environmental movement as 'constitutive outside', TT discourse picks up from the "Death of Environmentalism" arguments made by Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2009), that environmentalism as a special interest, where activists "shock or depress people into action", has been "discredited by history" (Hopkins, 2011, p. 36):

> [Rob Hopkins] is determinedly upbeat in the face of Armageddon and scathing about those who are not. "*The environmental movement has been enormously naive for 40 years* in assuming that the way you make people change is to give them depressing, distressing information," he says. "Take that approach and all it does is to breed apathy, or it feeds a sense of powerlessness. At this time in history the last thing you need is people feeling powerless." (Leitch, 2008, p. 2).

As the critique of the information deficit model (the idea that action follows improved knowledge about issues) gained currency, popular memes reinforcing this dualism began to spread through public discourse and could be detected in the mass media:

> *The whole thing has been described as "a party rather than a protest march"*, and it is to this concept that Hopkins attributes the movement's success. [Hopkins] says: "It is positive and doesn't start out by trying to identify whose fault it is. It looks at what the opportunities are around peak oil and climate change, not the problems." (Lewis, 2008, p. 8).

> Myra Carus, convener of the Highland Green Party…said: " *I was struck by the insistence that whatever a transition initiative does must be fun - that life should be a party and not a protest march*. The transition town

> movement is about people taking control and doing something positive in their own community." (Chetwynd, 2009, p. 3).

The peak oil focus

Another significant way in which TT discourse actively distances itself from the environmental movement is its focus on peak oil. Oil scarcity is thought to be something less abstract and, therefore, more relatable than climate change. This requires careful unpacking because there are a number of nuances to consider. Firstly, peak oil as a mobilising concept is a floating signifier, which is to say, it is a signifier "subject to the pressure of [various] antagonistic equivalential chains" (Laclau, 2005, p. 132). As a floating signifier, it can by definition, be associated with a number of different political responses: these range from cosmopolitan 'think global, act local' forms of relocalisation, to right-wing nationalism, to survivalist 'run to the hills' responses, to justification for further environmentally destructive projects, particularly Tar Sands extraction. Appeals to peak oil as a natural limit can be easily incorporated into the logic of capital, whereby they are invoked as a reason for high oil prices, thus making shale oil extraction financially viable (Harvey, 2010). Thus, 'neutral' appeals to peak oil - meaning those that do not understand it to be something amenable to articulation through hegemonic struggle risk tacit complicity with precisely the kinds of environmentally and socially unjust projects that the CCA protests against.

This quote from Nick Griffin on the British National Party website exemplifies the way in which peak oil is invoked as an argument for xenophobic right-wing public pedagogies:

> We're not just at Peak Oil. We're at Peak Grain, Peak Copper, Peak Uranium, Peak Fish, Peak Rare Earth Metals. All of which mean we're also inevitably at the Peak of the Milk of Human Kindness. From now on, the liberal elite can organise as many National Brotherhood Weeks as

> they like; tribalism and Nationalism will be the main currencies of human exchange (Griffin, n.d.).

As Barry and Quilley (2009, p. 17) recognise, "[t]he tension between overt survivalism and a more reasonable public face suggests the need for a continual process of impression management on the part of both ordinary TT participants and more prominent leaders". The question then is, how does the TT movement distance itself from apocalyptic survivalist undertones, individual self-interest and xenophobia? In the media, TT discourse differentiates itself from the survivalist fringes of environmentalism by comedically representing it as a North American fringe culture, radically different from our more 'British' sense of pulling together and community spirit, by invoking the historical memories of wartime solidarity discussed earlier. This is based on an analysis of TT's self-produced discourse, and of 47 press articles where Transition is directly discussed in the context of peak oil (table 13).

Table 13 Balance of climate change and peak oil as foci in press coverage of Transition

The 'hydrocarbon twins'	Number of articles (N=207)	Percentage of articles
Climate change	92	44.4
Peak oil	47	22.7

Nevertheless, appeals to self-interest in TT discourse *do* appear. Most commonly, these are appeals to people's pockets. Social marketing strategies such as audience segmentation and linguistic nudging through careful 'framing', have birthed approaches to environmental governance where problems are sold to people in an attractive way that distances pro-environmental behaviours from the domain of 'green issues' and 'environmental activists'. Here the cognitive praxis of community activism and the cognitive praxis of professional activism become hybridised. TT initiatives in particular instances seem not to have been immune to this, despite the

rhetoric of collective learning through participatory democracy and community building:

> Williams claims that *householders need to start thinking about energy saving not as something confined to the domain of environmental activists* - but as a way to selfishly save some extra cash for themselves. "*Not everyone cares about green issues, but everyone does care about saving themselves money*," he says. (Bradley, 2011, p. 22).

Here is another excellent example from the Sunday Mirror:

> [O]ne part of the answer [to rising fuel costs] may be something called "transition towns"…they're not just saving the planet, they're saving a fortune in cash as well. It makes good economic sense (Humphrys, 2007)

The most famous initiative (the one that started it all), TT Totnes, received funds from the Government to participate in the Low Carbon Communities Challenge between 2010/2011. In feeding back their lessons learnt from their engagement work, a similar story again emerges. What this also evidences is a process of mutual learning between the state and Transition, which places in question the claims of some commentators who distinguish Transition from 'nudge politics' (Aiken, 2012). In fact, it seems that a part of what Transitioners may be learning to do is nudge and frame:

> Particularly for the hard-to-reach we have focused entirely on messages like 'Fancy some free electricity?' and 'We can give you money towards a solar-PV system… and if you've less than £250 in your pocket after you've paid your household bills each month you could get it virtually for free'. It's all about the money and we don't get into environmental impacts, CO2 emissions etc. This worked really well (Department for Energy and Climate Change, 2011, p. 40)

They used social marketing strategies to target their audience in their community outreach activities.

> We looked at the kind of people in our community and categorised them into 4 groups, and then designed our strategy and materials accordingly. Our aim is recruit at least 30-50% low income households which we think we have now met. Categories include: settlers interested in neighbourliness/technical DIY/home improvements; prospectors interested in income/ property value; pioneers active or interested in sustainability, social justice, community building (Department for Energy and Climate Change, 2011, p. 40).

This social marketing technique is known as "segmenting" and has been advocated by DEFRA and as an approach to encouraging pro-environmental behaviours in the government Strategy Unit's paper "Achieving Culture Change: A Policy Framework" (Knott, et al., 2008). Appealing to people's self-interest on the basis of financial gain and fossil fuel insecurity is a path strewn with difficulties. However, *in principle*, the Transition approach is clear that these issues arise when climate change and peak oil are not addressed together, that is, through a *holistic permaculture approach.* In the passage below, Hopkins disagrees with prominent environmentalists Tony Juniper (Friends of the Earth), and George Monbiot, that these issues require separate treatment, and that the relocalisation agenda can be pursued through invoking climate change alone, because invoking peak oil may "legitimise the case for biofuels, increased coal use, tar sands extraction":

> One of the more absurd phenomena to emerge in recent years is that there are climate change activists who dismiss the peak oil argument, and peak oil activists who downplay climate change. It is as if people have discovered terrain which is somehow 'theirs'… *[T]o borrow from Al Gore, peak oil is as much an Inconvenient Truth for climate change campaigners as climate change is for everyone else.* Both, of course, are symptoms of *a society hopelessly addicted* to fossil fuels and the lifestyles they make possible…We do have a choice about how we respond to peak oil. We can use it as an argument for developing solutions that actually put in place infrastructure that will support us beyond the Oil Age, or we can use it to justify clinging to fossil fuels at all costs…*Climate change says we should change, whereas peak oil says we will be forced to change. Both categorically state that fossil fuels have no role to play in our future, and the sooner we can stop using them the*

> *better. It is key that both climate change and peak oil are given an equal degree of importance in any decision-making processes* (Hopkins, 2008a, pp. 36-37, my emphasis).

So, rather than on the one hand (peak oil) legitimating more extreme practices of fossil fuel extraction "resource nationalism", and on the other hand (climate change) legitimating techno-fixes and carbon commodification, treating them as intertwined apparently logically leads to community building and relocalisation. The key insight of discourse theory here is to point out that there is no internal logical coherence to Transition in this context: such articulations are contingent and require radical investment in the identity of Transition.

This section has looked at the discursive strategies employed by TT to distance themselves from received wisdom in the environmental movement. At the heart of the approach is the notion that climate change and peak oil serve as motivators for imagining how more localised lives might be better. In this context, it is easy to understand the logic of a non-confrontational approach to shifting socio-cultural norms and values. Nevertheless, the now famous critique of Transition by the popular education and direct action group Trapese Collective, recognises the ambivalence of a strategy of intentionally refusing to "define the enemy" (Newman, 1994):

> The Transition Town model is…a model about positive responses and not something that takes positions 'against' institutions or projects. While it may seem obvious to try and limit political wrangling in a burgeoning movement, this position raised some serious questions about the effectiveness of a depoliticised movement…[T]here are many reasons why it is important to be more confident and defiant when calling for transition and actually take a stance against the exploitative and polluting corporate practices that are happening all around us. How can we talk about climate change and peak oil and not deal with politics or side with communities struggling against the expansion of fossil fuel infrastructure? (Chatterton & Cutler, 2008, pp. 4-6).

This seminal critique has provided the springboard for subsequent debate and praxis between these two cultures of activism, which will provide the focus for the remainder of the chapter. From such debates important tensions and dilemmas can be identified. In essence, there are those activists who feel it is counterproductive and ultimately problematic for the TT movement to distance itself from DA protest and advocacy work, whilst Transition positions itself as being stronger for being separate from (but not in opposition to) the protest movement.

Reading across the debates occurring in various fora for praxis, one protagonist, representing the former perspective, cleverly drew on the foundational principles of permaculture, invoking the notion of "edgework": that is, the most fertile spaces and productive spaces for work are often those liminal ones between two or more ecosystems. This 'work' in our case is dialogical work, indeed pedagogical work.

Identifying (productive) tensions in the cognitive praxis of TT through 'edge work'

> One of the observations used a lot in permaculture is the idea of 'edge', that is the point where two ecosystems meet is often more productive than either of those systems on their own. This principle reminds us of the need to overlap systems where possible so as to maximise their potential (Hopkins, 2008a, p. 139).

The Trapese Collective's critique acted as a catalyst for edgework and has been widely commented on since. As I perceive it, the kernel of this dialogue is a debate over *how political and socio-cultural change happens*. As a result, there are several entangled issues revealed through this intellectual praxis between two activist cultures, which I will try to unpack. Nevertheless, at the heart of them all lies the issue of power – its forms, the extent to which it can be bracketed, and the consequences of its obfuscation. The Trapese Collective come to the table with a belief in agonistic democracy, and the assumption that power is a zero sum game:

> The idea of TT is to create a model that everyone could agree to. But if everyone can agree with an idea then what exactly is going to change, and how is it different to what went before? *Change comes through argument and debate* (Chatterton & Cutler, 2008, p. 24).

Trapese exemplify the argument that non-confrontational work at community level does nothing to challenge the status quo:

> [P]roblems will occur along the way if big political debates are brushed aside because we only talk about what we already have in common. Communities must face up to issues such as nuclear expansion, market based solutions to climate change such as carbon trading and offsetting, agrofuels and food scarcity, developments such as airport expansion and resource extraction. These things all occur through active government policies, which try to maintain the economic and political, "business as usual" scenarios. Unfortunately, left unchallenged they could also wipeout the best efforts at local sustainability, like a tsunami in front of a sand castle (ibid.)

In what follows, I will attempt to distil the substrate of this argument by interpreting Hopkins's position, followed by two main counter-points, leading to a chapter conclusion. These points are (and the ordering of the counter-points is, to a degree, arbitrary):

- Point: Being against 'being against' is not naïve, it is a skilful pedagogical/ communicative device.

- Counter-point 1: A discourse of engaged optimism is intrinsically unstable, because to be for things is to be against others, such that, even the quotidian practices of Transition will sooner or later rub-up against power.

- Counter-point 2: Choosing confrontation is a misrepresentation.

I will address each argument in turn:

Being against 'being against' is not naïve, it is a skilful pedagogical/ communicative device

TT aims to break out of the activist ghetto. Its discourse reflects and reinforces this approach, and there is evidence to suggest that it has been successful in building alliances and influencing policy at local authority level in both suburban and urban settings, in ways that s(h)ow the seeds of radical potential, through doing so (Scott-Cato & Hillier, 2010; North & Longhurst, 2013). In this sense, TT reworks the 'in and against' the state argument that refuses to see the state as representational abstraction and a descending form of power (North & Longhurst, 2013, p. 1435).

The radical Left would like to expand the notion of what Transition is, to include repertoires of contentious politics. Hopkins sees this as "missing the point". Transition for him is, first and foremost, a *cultural Transition*. This is a very important concept and will be explicated in the next chapter. It draws on positive psychology, the psychology of change, the power of narrative, reconnecting to 'place' through positive 'visions' and, as such, is skilled at deploying 'frame alignment' strategies (Benford & Snow, 2000).

> Time and again [the Trapese Collective] re-state their belief in a them-and-us perspective…*Yet these extraordinary times into which we are moving extraordinarily fast demand new tools*, both practical and *thinking tools*. It has always struck me that as we stand on the verge of the monumental changes that peak oil and climate change will impose, *to have confrontational activism as the principal tool in our toolbox is profoundly unskilful* (Hopkins, 2008b, my emphasis).

Again, as in the previous chapter, we see the return of temporal urgency as a justification for pragmatism. Hopkins believes that cultural change requires a more sophisticated palette of tools and self-awareness than he perceives exists in the direct action community. Drawing upon my discussion of the 'relational turn' in social movement theory (see chapter 3), differences in TT's strategy can be explained as the strategic and provisional suppression of situationally potent identities and projects in order to communicate across differences (Mische, 2003; Mische, 2008). As Mische argues, this is "a learnt skill" (see italicised in quote below) – a kind of identity juggling – that activists gain through participation in socially heterogeneous networks. Below Hopkins replies to another social movement intellectual involved in both the CCA and Transition, who has argued for solidarity between the two cultures:

> Mason writes "surely a strong environmental movement requires solidarity not isolation?" Absolutely, but two friends can be close friends without sharing a flat or going everywhere together… and indeed they are stronger and more effective as people as a result. My point is that *both approaches are more skilful for standing on their own distinctive ground, being skilful about what they make implicit and what they make explicit*, as well as reaching out far, far beyond the usual suspects… I would argue that those of us who are happy at a Climate Camp (which I wholeheartedly support by the way), and who assume it offers a replicable model for the rest of society, are being very naive in assuming that this model, because it is "right", will convince everyone else that there is a better way to do things…In the protest movements, we take up a position outside of mainstream culture, use language, dress codes, behaviour and forms of protest which at best bewilder and at worst enrage mainstream society, yet we expect them to see the error of their ways and the validity of ours and embark on a radical decarbonisation (Hopkins, 2008c)

This is a subtle but important point: Hopkins contends that critics misinterpret what he is arguing for: not factionalism or "sectarian solidarity" (see Saunders, 2008), but rather, the development of what Mische understands as communicative skill. This is seen by some as a kind of 'closeting' (see italicised in quote) of activist identity that they are uncomfortable with:

> We live our lives in separate stories. In our meetings we are Transitioners and in the "outside world" we are someone else…In Transition Norwich there are people who are activists for Greenpeace, for CND, who go on climate actions and marches, who sign petitions, who organise flash mobs, who fight for the NHS, for higher education, for the forests, for the libraries, who protest against Tescos, against the Northern Distributor road, who lobby politicians and councillors ….We have to see that without talking about our actions, *without coming out about our radical nature*,…Transition does not have the strength or wit or daring to challenge the dominant worldview. It runs the risk of becoming stifled by the tyranny of what Blake called "the polite society", by conventional good behaviours and small talk, and fragmenting as has happened in some initiatives. We are in danger of living in a never-never land of allotments and spiritual clichés. (DuCann, 2011,n-p).

Yet, between the TT approach – a strategic unconditional discursive suppression of one's other commitments – and the 'sing it loud and proud' approach, lies what Mische (2008, p. 359), in the context of Brazilian activist networks, calls the "jogo de cintura – translating from Porteugese roughly as the swing of the hips – in the dance of democratic politics". As she notes (2003, pp. 269-273), and as we have observed in this and the last chapter, this involves playing off the ambiguity of categories ("generality shifting"), and "temporal cuing", that is "the temporal formatting of the stories actors tell each other about their histories, purposes and capacities to intervene". It also involves "identity qualifying", which is the reflexive ability to switch between identities by speaking 'as' someone. This skill, that Mische observed during interviews with Brazilian activists, is something which I have recognised in my own interviewing of climate activists. For example, speaking on the role of capacity building versus activism in a social movement, this respondent used identity qualifying in the following way:

> I suppose it depends what hat I'm wearing. If I was wearing the [popular educator] hat you could say the process is very important in terms of, if you want to build a sustainable, empowering movement …seeing the connections between things. Whereas with [direct action group] Plane Stupid it's very much vanguard;… a small group of people put things on

> the political agenda …I don't like calling myself an activist because…it's almost like your putting yourself on a pedestal. 'I'm an activist, I've got these skills, I've acquired these things and I'm going to teach you how to live your life…It's fine, Plane Stupid is a vanguard group, they don't claim to be movement building, which is good (organiser, 2010)

I would contend that this nuanced and reflexive *jogo de cintura*, is much more *necessary* than TT discourse recognises. Mische's (2008) general argument is that partisanship does not, in fact, destroy civic dialogue, which in practice requires deft manoeuvring between more agonistic and more deliberative communication. Mische (table 14) situates her understanding of activist dialogue around four ideal types of communicative performance, and argues that publics may be prone to breakdown as a result of the weaknesses inherent in any one ideal type if it is overemphasised. Whilst more agonistic forms of communicative performance are prone to the kind of ideological entrenchment that TT seeks to avoid, the combination of Deweyan pragmatism and Habermasian dialogue is prone to bland appeasement, through avoidance of conflict and dispute and a "tendency towards idealism detached from practical and political consequences (Mische, 2008, p. 291). This is what DuCann (2011) is getting at when she asserts that "[w]e are in danger of living in a never-never land of allotments and spiritual clichés".

Table 14 Communicative performance in activist publics. Adapted from Mische (2008, p. 29).

	Focus on ideas	**Focus on action**
Collaboration	Exploratory dialogue (Habermas)	Reflective problem-solving (Dewey)
Social outcome	*Open-ended exchange of ideas*	*Pragmatic institutional relations*
Competition	Discursive positioning (Gramsci)	Tactical manoeuvre (Machiavelli)
Social outcome	*Counter-hegemonic proposals for reform*	*Distributions of power and resources*

This being said, analysing the contents of the Transition Companion (Hopkins, 2011), it is clear that the focus on "dealing with conflict" (Du Cann *et al*, in Hopkins, 2011, pp. 188-191), and "respectful communication" (Hopkins, 2011, p. 101), which begins to address these issues, has emerged from this activist praxis over time. For example, contra the usual differentiation from contentious politics, in the following passage linkages are made to a common history of civil disobedience in relation to women's rights, much like the CCA:

> Unhealthy civility…can uphold established power relationships…Virginia Sapiro has argued, about the historical advancement of women's rights, that 'There was simply no way for women to advance their interests through politics in a civil manner' (Neal, Pickering and Cohen, in Hopkins, 2011, p. 100).

Yet, more than this, DuCann speaks of the need for a public pedagogy that includes political resources for systemic critique – for reading the world (Freire, 1972) – that permaculture as a cosmology is not capable of providing, in her assertion that

"everyone has the right to understand the world they live in". To this Hopkins (2011) responds:

> I think that Transition has been quite skilful over the last 5 years in creating an approach and a vision that appeals beyond the usual suspects…We talk of people being 'hard to reach', but often the language activists use, the way they communicate, dress, speak, and present their arguments means, ironically, that they make themselves 'hard to reach' for most ordinary people. Likewise, "sharing … all our self-education that includes Marxist theory, Noam Chomsky, Naomi Klein, the history of Levellers and Diggers" is almost certain to relegate Transition to being seen as yet another deep green, left wing campaign group. If Transition groups are expected now to make space for the sharing of such insights, are we also prepared to create space for sharing for those who come from very different cultural backgrounds, as well as those who enjoy 'Top Gear', who work in industry, or who drive trucks for a living?

This, to me, is a very confused comment because, although moving beyond the activist ghetto is of prime importance, the works of Chomsky, Klein and Marx cannot be considered as merely the cultural currency of such an activist ghetto: starting where people are at does not mean this is where one stops. Hopkins's response seems to imply 'Top Gear' over here, 'Marxist theory' over there, and never the twain shall meet. Moreover, existing scholarship noting that the TT movement remains over-represented by the 'civic core'; that is middle aged, well-educated and prosperous (Cohen, 2010; Connors & McDonald, 2010; Aiken, 2012), reveals a lack of self-awareness regarding the movement's own cultural biases. Below, I engage with the two strands of criticism of this TT approach.

Counter-point 1: power can't be avoided

Operating at the level of quotidian interventions that everyone can get behind, TT initiatives often encounter power in the form of the "administrative structuring of space", or more colloquially, bureaucratic red tape, which, whilst sometimes existing

for the public good, is nevertheless inflexible and prone to manipulation by vested interests (Mason & Whitehead, 2012, p. 510). This is illustrated in activist reflection:

> Some of us find that saying yes inevitably means saying no…[B]eing involved in local business and local food production means you will be against supermarkets by default and no matter how far you go to speak with those in power and civic office. You get to a point where you are pulling in different directions in subtle and sometimes in subliminal ways, where the business-as-usual model is directly conflicting with Transition (DuCann, 2011).

In reality then, the 'enemy' is often obvious at local level, where TTs are clearly not immune to the necessities of familiar NIMBY politics, exemplified below in this newspaper interview with participants in Paisley Transition Town:

> Protest group Paisley Transition Town (PTT) believe the key to reviving the decline in Paisley's central shopping area lies in local independent shops, not superstores. And they say the proposed 24-hour Tesco on Renfrew Road would scuttle any recovery. Maggie Kennedy, from PTT, said: "If the council grants planning permission for the giant supermarket, it would be failing in its duty to safeguard the viability of the town centre and throwing away all the money it has spent on it. "Tesco will turn Paisley into a ghost town by taking trade away from local shops." PTT say the once-bustling town centre has suffered serious decline in the past year, with the number of empty units in the high street rising from one in eight to one in four - totalling 50 empty shop units. The group say the council should be offering a cash boost to independent shops to help revamp the town centre. Maggie added: "Rates, rents and lease lengths need to come down to realistic level. But Buddies also need to support these businesses and do less of their shopping outside the town." Maggie said: "It is not too late to influence the council's decision. We are urging people to write to the Planning Department objecting to the Tesco proposal." (Stewart, 2009, p. 21).

Although these encounters of power are not as dramatic as those in the previous chapter, they are still forces for learning through "exploring the social organisation of power as it was revealed through moments of confrontation" (Thompson, 2010, p. 62), as this example in the context of an urban food project clearly reveals:

> The more we look closely at this wide range of agricultural projects, the more we begin to understand the complexity of the socio-environmental injustice issues they bring to the surface. From the rules you have to comply with in order to use publicly owned land to the extortionate price of land, particularly in urban and periurban areas; from the regulation of land zoning and allotment leasing, which prevents people from establishing agricultural projects beyond self-consumption; to discriminatory neighbourhood design which makes it common to have densely populated neighbourhoods without decent green space (Tornaghi, 2011).

Or alternatively, in the context of TT Abersytwyth, this activist-intellectual wrote:

> Transition Aberystwyth has already come up against obstacles, such as bureaucratic inertia, that current 'transition culture' will be hard pressed to shift. Frustrated in our attempt to contribute to the Local Authority's 'Masterplan' implementation process for the town, one of our steering group wrote: 'We are beginning to see where the nice transition process meets its concrete boundaries.' (Mason, 2008).

These are all things that have to be *confronted* at some stage.

Counter-point 2: 'choosing' confrontation is a misrepresentation

In a second version of the Trapese Collective's critique, Chatterton and Cutler (2009) argue this point forcefully. They read critique and creativity as a dialectical process, and opine that the privileging of engaged optimism perpetuates that unhelpful dualism between good activist/bad activist that I discussed in the previous chapter. Although Chatterton and Cutler (2009) speak of *activist* resistance, and of potential Majority World allies, I would contend that this also applies domestically where, in people's daily lives, confrontation is often not a choice but a product of structural

violence. What I mean by this is that one's situated biography and social networks – which are classed, gendered, and raced – must be taken into account, if such an approach is not to become inadvertently pathologising:

> One thing that Rob also perhaps misrepresents in his critique is that we do not feel that anyone chooses confrontational politics – it is a response to the often brutal forces people find themselves up against…We need to break out of the bubble we live in.

Despite the fact that there is a clear cultural element to particular repertoires of action, and organizational forms, which may become valorized, this is an important point. As previous research has highlighted (e.g. Griggs & Howarth, 2002, pp. 48-56; (Scandrett, et al., 2012, p. 301), locally rooted communities-in-resistance, with a critical respect for legal and state processes (and perhaps having more to lose in some instances than the more nomadic activist class), may take up DA tactics when all other avenues have been exhausted. As I move on to argue in the conclusion, this requires surely a more dialectical approach to cultural politics as public pedagogy. What is a language of possibility that denies critique? Of conviviality without conflict? Of resilience without resistance? It is, to put it crudely (but then the matter is not all that complex), a language of all agency and no structure, of possibility without constraint: the ideological hallmarks of the creation of a deficit discourse.

Conclusion: towards a more dialectical public pedagogy of (Just) Transition?

In the previous chapter, I introduced the idea of a more dialectical public pedagogy, oriented around the concept of Just Transition, and committed to less valorised forms of engagement which emerges from daily life in all its messiness and contradictoriness. The TT movement, taking the need for less valorised, and more

prosaic, forms of collective action seriously, has moved towards the opposite extreme, engaging in a public pedagogy, which is overtly anti "defining the enemy". From this extreme, the TT movement's public pedagogy, I would contend, is limited by the lack of dialectical movement between a language of critique, and language of possibility, that many radical adult educators (Giroux, 1992, p. 10; Allman, 2001, p. 224) have always argued is essential. A public (or popular) curriculum might begin at either antipode, but the key is the dialectical movement. In this context, the permaculture idea of edge work applied to cultures of activism might be seen as a kind of border pedagogy, understood as the recognition, challenge and reterritorialisation of material, geographical, cultural, epistemological, political and social borders (Giroux, 1992, pp. 28-29).

As I have argued in this chapter, such edge work, thought of as border pedagogy, requires the development of a '*jogo de cintura'* (Mische, 2008), which may require the "strategic suppression of situationally potent identities", but not their complete banishment in all circumstances. Theorists of democratic communication, in the same manner as TT discourse advocates, have often spoken of supressing self-interest in favour of the common good, but what Mische (2008, p. 355) calls attention to is the development of heterogeneous publics "negotiating among many different ways of pursuing…the 'common good', including, in their understanding, partisan pursuits".

This will always be necessary, as it reflects people's multiple and ambivalent positioning as 'at risk from, but economically dependent upon', where the public pedagogy of TT rubs up against more powerful "neoliberal public pedagogies", meaning "the powerful ensemble of ideological and institutional forces whose aim is to produce competitive, self-interested individuals vying for their own material and ideological gain" (Giroux, 2010, p. 486). This, as it was argued in the previous chapter, aligns with the Just Transition approach, which seems equipped to transcend cosy consensus versus agonistic politics to include an expanded role for dialogue

across interests and identities, where people might otherwise feel as though they cannot bite the hand that feeds. Indeed, the incorporation of the adjective 'Just' into Transition is something that has recently begun to emerge from activist praxis (Chatterton & Cutler, 2009; Irving, 2009; Reyes, 2009).

What the relocalisation movements and direct action movements *share*, is a wider belief in open space, a horizontal cultural logic if you will, in relation to organisational form. In this sense, a similar *danger* that they share is an elision of politics with these emergent organisational forms. The very notion of open space is a contradiction in that it must be opened by someone and with some purpose in mind (Nunes, 2005).

Where TT differs is in its simultaneous focus on *roots*, through a pedagogy of place, as opposed to *routes*, associated with nomadic forms of existence, whether a transnational capitalist class (globalisation from below), or a transnational 'activist' class (globalism). Whilst there is an analysis of privilege, related to the capacity of mobility and available time and resources that has developed in the praxis of the direct action movement, it does not seem as though this reflexive questioning has emerged as strongly in the TT discourse. In fact, the perceived success of the rhizomatic spread of the TT movement relies on a number of *unacknowledged mobilities,* that when combined with the "subtle elision of the social with the local" (Amin, 2005, p. 615) may obscure the political economy of participation, and serious questions about power and representation.

As Aiken (2012, p. 95) recognises, the TT movement's view of community is an active one, where communities are "assemblages of enunciation", and therefore fully emergent processes, always unfinished. Indeed the TT movement makes heavy use of "Open Space Technology" (Owen, 1993) as an organisational tool. The first rule of Open Space meetings is "whoever comes are the right people" (Hopkins, 2008a, p. 168). However, I hope by now I have made clear my understanding, supported by

many ethnographic studies of 'horizontal' organising in social movements (Anderson, 2004; Juris, 2008; Nunes, 2005; Juris, 2005), that domination/resistance are inextricable from one another, and intrinsic to any spatial practice.

If the TT movement seeks to enact an *optimistic* pedagogy of place, it should, on the other hand, be dialectically open to a *critical* pedagogy of place and community, sceptical of any ascriptions of naturalness to places, and the 'openness' of Transition practices taking place within them. "The point to emphasize here", as Shaw (2007, p. 31) argues in relation to the politics of community, "is that place structures social relations just as, conversely, social (and economic) relations structure the parameters of choice in relation to place". The very success of relocalisation initiatives is facilitated through networked learning based on exteriority and connectivity. On the other hand, container geographies of local community have been, and continue to be, a policy prescription for the poor (Amin, 2005; Shaw, 2007), whose lack of engagement, lack of resilience, may be spuriously interpreted in terms of having chosen to reject community when, in fact, they "are least equipped and least motivated to play at such lofty community expectations, stripped as they are of the material, institutional, experiential, and possibly also the psychological means" (Amin, 2005, pp. 620-621).

For the TT movement's public pedagogy to become border pedagogy, it must contend with these issues, which are fundamentally about the political economy and structural relations that shape uneven geographical development in the first place. This points us towards a relational ethics of *place* (Massey, 2005), which is something that academics involved in the TT movement have argued for (Mason & Whitehead, 2012), alongside recent accounts of urban Transition initiatives, which argue that "urban cosmopolitanism" provides "institutional thickness", which may be more conducive to systemic change than "local resilience" (North, 2010, p. 1435). As part of a public pedagogy, the critical questioning of borders implores learners to

ask who has the resources, possibly the 'capabilities' (Sen, 1999; Nussbaum, 2000) to produce what spaces and where.

Yet, such efforts may be hampered by particular aspects of the TT movement's public pedagogy, which rely heavily on insights from psychology for the following reasons: to understand our reliance on fossil fuels through the psychology of addiction; to understand optimism as a learnable skill (psychological resilience); and ultimately, to justify an appeal to universal values and the creation of an undifferentiated 'we':

> [P]erhaps the route to real change, long-lasting and deep change, isn't through deepening polarity, but through a re-weaving of what has been torn apart, a seeking of common ground, an appeal to universal values…For me, the idea that "activism as a dynamic force within the whole pattern of Transition strengthens it" is deeply flawed, and risks undoing much of the good work of the last 5 years (Hopkins, 2011).

The following chapter situates these psychological dimensions of the TT movement's culture change theory in the context of a wider shift in the cognitive praxis of the environmental movement towards a questioning of the very 'cognitive' in the cognitive praxis. This shift itself, is the product of a wider shift in all kinds of policy contexts towards what is known as libertarian paternalism, which takes as its starting point a rejection of rational actor theory, of *Homo economicus*, of the Cartesian rationality of the enlightenment subject, and so on.

Consequently, embodied rather than consciously held dispositions, tacit cultural values and norms, and emotion and affect are brought back to the fore. In this context, insights from psychology, cognitive science, and behavioural economics are being deployed through public pedagogies that aim to engage 'bigger-than-self' values as opposed to cultural values that promote material self-interest and individual competition. In one sense, this can be understood as a wider movement towards public pedagogies of the 'commons' directly opposed to the public pedagogies of

neoliberalism (Giroux, 2010). However, it is necessary to critically interrogate this shift, because the seemingly teleological shift towards a common transcultural value base, justified by positivistic appeals to a coalescing epistemic community of culture change experts, could be regarded as totalising, leaving no room for agonistic politics. With this, I move on.

Chapter 7

Professional activism as public pedagogy: the cultural politics of Common Cause

Introduction

In chapter 5, I explored the cultural politics of the CCA, which was oriented around an agonistic politics of "defining the enemy". I developed the argument that as the empty signifier of 'Climate Action' grew, it became increasingly unclear who the enemy was. However, such tensions were generative of intellectual praxis from which several conclusions were drawn. Significantly: (1) horizontalism itself acted as an empty signifier from which internal antagonisms emerged. A key stake was not just the production of *space*, but the issue of temporality. As a CCA organiser intimated to me during an interview "as the shit hits the fan, we've got to be very brash with our tactics and our organisational abilities because we don't have time to waste" (organiser, 2010); (2) whilst 'defining the enemy' was recognised as being a vital component of a cultural politics of bringing the abstract 'down to earth', scapegoating particular sites and corporations based on their actual and potential climate impacts risked miseducating people about 'true' causes: as radical educator Paula Allman (2001, p. 131) has argued, the 'race to the bottom' to see who can get away with the lowest standards of social, economic and environmental justice, is not due to the fact that:

> governments, people and corporations are necessarily greedy, unscrupulous, mean, or uncaring…[I]t is due to the fact that they are locked into historically specific social relations,…and if they are to survive within them, they cannot chose to do other than what is necessary

> to compete in the global market, or for that matter, regional and national markets.

Consequently, an analysis of the "fetishisation" of both symbolic targets and of carbon emissions emerged. This led to the third insight that the public pedagogy of climate activism should be less valorised, and be prepared to engage with people's multiple and contradictory positioning in the micro-politics of everyday life. In chapter 6, I developed this analysis by arguing that such an approach could be discerned in the cultural politics of the Transition movement. Nevertheless, through examining 'edge work' occurring between cultures of direct action and community action, I argued that Transition had moved from one extreme to another through the strategic suppression of a 'confrontational activist' identity. I argued from an educational standpoint that what is important is the *movement between* the quotidian and the abstract; between a language of critique and a language of possibility; between the "hot cognitions" of injustice (Gamson, 1992), and an optimism of the will. This dialectical approach to social movement learning, common in diverse literatures on critical pedagogy and popular education (Freire, 1972; Giroux, 1992; Allman, 2001) is, in my view, a necessary remedial to unenlightening binary debates. As environmental critical theorist Brulle (2010, p. 93) argues, "it is this combination of threats and opportunities, nightmares and dreams – that fuels social movement mobilisation and social change".

In this chapter, I develop my argument by critically examining what cultures of professional activism have contributed to this debate in recent years, and in doing so, how they challenged the assumptions and intellectual praxis of the environmental movement as a whole. The discourses of 'engaged optimism' that prevail in Transition Culture owe to this culture of activism; in fact, there is significant overlap between knowledge workers in ENGOs and intellectuals in the Transition movement. I therefore engage in a little more 'edge work' in this chapter, albeit now moving on to explore the edges between these two cultures of activism.

An orienting idea up to this point has been that the environmental movement can partially be understood in terms of the production of knowledge and its uptake in wider society, through a process dubbed "cognitive praxis" through which a movement is distinguished from others by the "cognitive territory" it opens up for the "creation, articulation [and] formulation of new thoughts and ideas" (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991, p. 55). Nevertheless, in the UK, societal consensus on the objective urgency of tackling climate change sits alongside something akin to collective denial when confronted with the fossil fuel – and particularly oil – rich energy base that ensures our social infrastructures and lifestyles. Thus, climate activism has been likened to building a social movement against ourselves (Monbiot, 2006, p. 215). Thus, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, the TT movement, through praxis, developed an analysis that this state of affairs signals a shift away from the conventional view of traditional green democracy founded on Enlightenment notions of the reasoning subject – collective action and societal change founded on behaviour guided by environmental ethics, shared cognitive rules, and a calculating appreciation of 'the facts' – towards a more nuanced understanding regarding the role of "embodied rather than consciously held dispositions" (Haluza-DeLay, 2008, p. 217). Haluza-DeLay (p. 210) thus contends that "Eyerman and Jamison's conceptualization might need correction, primarily about the role of the "cognitive" in the "praxis". This 'correction', is primarily what I examine in this chapter, through continuing to examine the discourse of Transition Culture, but in dialogue with the cultural work of ENGO working group Common Cause (CC hereafter).

We know now that Transition and CC differ in that they each reflect a cognitive praxis of what Jamison (2001, pp. 151-164) has termed "community" and "professional" environmentalism, respectively. We have seen that the cognitive praxis of community environmentalism is characterised by the mobilization of local knowledge in relation to environmental issues, and the development of technical-practical 'know how'. We have also seen that it is characterized by an orientation

towards techniques of communication, translation and synthesis of knowledge concerned with making local governance and deliberative democracy work. On the other hand, this chapter shows how professional environmentalism is the culture of activism which most blurs the lines most between the knowledge making of critical communities and of epistemic communities with institutional access. Knowledge workers within ENGOs are the experts of green activism: they produce 'civil society research', which is often a particular mix of genres of empirical research, educational materials as well as investigative journalism, and polemic designed to influence policy, practice and the wider public (Jamison, 2001; Hess, 2009).

Nevertheless, to the extent that Transition emerges from the cognitive praxis of community environmentalism, and CC from professional environmentalism, there are significant overlaps in the purpose of both milieus. Namely, both claim to question the Enlightenment myth of rational economic man, through engagement with insights from psychology, cognitive science, behavioural economics, and sociological theories of practice. Intertextuality between their respective literatures evidences mutual learning and the brokerage of ideas by key intellectuals. Moreover, because these milieus have an ambivalent history of engaging with structures of governance – and indeed enacting environmental governance – I conceptualise the knowledge produced in these two milieus as being 'in and against' the pedagogical state. In this chapter, I use discourse theory to critique the notion of a universal progressive value base, implemented through the framing work of idea specialists.

Understanding the origins and evolution of Common Cause

Overview and antecedents

CC is a working group of ENGOs, green independent think tank staff, as well as

other civil society organizations (CSOs)[ix]. The working group produces civil society research oriented towards explicating and promulgating culture change strategies for "campaigners, community organisers, civil servants, fundraisers, educators, social entrepreneurs, activists, funders, politicians, and everyone inbetween" (Holmes, et al., 2011).

CC has emerged from collaboration between idea specialists in ENGOs and psychologists, cognitive scientists, and behavioural economists (Lakoff, 2004; Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Crompton & Kasser, 2009; Cahan, 2010; Maio, 2011). The initial seeds were brought about through ENGO dialogue with these academics (particularly Tim Kasser and George Lakoff) in 2009. Through such collaboration, the foundations of 'enlightenment reason' and rational actor theory are questioned: they cite from a large body of empirical studies which show that, in order to avoid the 'cognitive dissonance' that occurs when objective imperatives to action and values informing social identity collide, 'the facts' are routinely discarded (Crompton, 2010, p. 10). Accordingly, the tacit dimensions of culture are opened up. As I will show in this chapter, what we actually have with CC is a quasi-questioning of enlightenment reason, which, rather than arguing for the development of an agonistic public sphere, favours a consensus model which supposes that "the defects of the enlightenment can only be made good by further enlightenment" (Giroux, 1992, p. 49).

Interestingly, archetypal 'public intellectual' Michael Sandel is an influence (Common Cause, 2011). CC is partially underpinned by his Aristotlean (virtue) ethical critique of how "market norms" "crowd out" other forms of moral reasoning (Sandel, 2012). In this sense, CC is antagonistic in that it is directly opposed to neoliberal public pedagogy. Taken at face value, the basic point is to reassert a holistic sense of the 'moral' in public discourse going *beyond* the 'hot button' approach of 'social marketing' (Gamson, 1992, p. 185), which as Brulle (2010, p. 91) argued (in his own critique of George Lakoff) reduces the long-term mobilisation

potential of society by reinforcing individual self-interest (Brulle, 2010; Webb, 2012). This reinforcing of self-interest and market norms that occurs when campaigners try to use them as a hook for pro-environmental behaviours is what CC calls "collateral damage" (Holmes, et al., 2011, p. 43).

A well-known weakness of 'green culture' continues to be the lack of perspicuity regarding the term 'sustainability' to the point where it has been co-opted as an almost empty corporate trope. An effort is therefore made by CC to redefine 'sustainability' in seemingly more holistic terms (Holmes, et al., 2011, p. 43). As the CC working group argues in relation to climate change, the 'Stern Review' created political traction, but by framing the argument for climate change in the economists discourse of cost-benefit reasoning (spending on mitigation and adaptation now rather than in the future), the review arguably reinforced the primacy of cost-benefit reasoning to the detriment of wider moral imperatives, "because of the tight association between national interest and economic interest" (Crompton, 2010, p. 50). I will go on to unpack this a little in the section below.

By all accounts, this is a step forward for the cultural politics of ENGOs in the context of climate change: this approach has been typologised as 'social marketing', meaning finding the optimum conditions for communication in order to affect behaviours, by drawing on psychological insights. Yet, the term 'social marketing' is perhaps uncharitable in this context, as it implies a kind of insidious expert intent to 'spin' issues, and 'nudge' people in particular directions. It would therefore be more accurate to argue that the cultural politics of CC are partially borne of, but attempt to move beyond, a wider political rationality known alternately as soft paternalism, or libertarian paternalism. The term soft paternalism captures an assemblage of academic insights applied to policy interventions aimed at:

> … governing the irrational brain, governing through people's inevitable irrationality, changing behaviour through affective interventions, and

> cultivating the rational and reflexive aspects of the mind. (Pykett, 2012, p. 219)

Thus, CC (first quotation) and TT (second quotation) mark a departure from the combination of confrontation and rational persuasion embodied in the CCA:

> Unfortunately, the grey matter cannot be ruled off-limits…We can bury our heads in the sand, and insist on the sanctity of Enlightenment reason. Or we can respond to the new understanding of how decision-making processes work (Crompton, 2010, p. 24).
>
> The idea that people change by encountering distressing information, digesting it intellectually, and deciding based on evidence…is not how things happen. Transition also acknowledges that we are emotional creatures (Hopkins, 2011, p. 73).

Formally, soft paternalism is characterised by interventions that guide the citizen subject in the direction that represents the paternalist's interpretation of the subject's 'true wishes' that have been (in the paternalist's eyes) clouded by either an error in reason or an emotional override of reason (Buckley, 2009, p. 15). Jones *et al* (2010, p. 486) through studying the political geography of "actually existing soft paternalism", identify its "*epistemological drivers*" as "behavioural economics, psychology and the neurosciences", and its "*mechanisms*" as "spatial design and (choice) architecture; temporal ordering; measures to rationalize the brain; and prompting social norms via culture change strategies, social motivation and segmentation, and the development of peer-to-peer pressure".

In an UK environmental policy context, DEFRA (2007) has recommended the use of "'wedge behaviours' which take advantage of windows of opportunity in order to promote demand-side lifestyle changes at opportune moments" (Jones, et al., 2010, p. 487). As I discussed in the previous chapter, DEFRA also draw upon the marketing concept of "segmenting" audiences in order to tailor interventions. In terms of developing green "cultural capital", the government white paper "Achieving

Cultural Change" (Knott, et al., 2008) builds upon work done by DEFRA but includes a more sociological perspective alongside the deployment of social psychological concepts, drawing on Putnam's work on bridging and bonding social capital, identifying the importance of developing deliberative fora and, crucially, acknowledging the role of structural constraints in identifying "the capacity to change" as a key caveat in the consideration of cultural drivers for sustainable and low-carbon living.

In a Scottish environmental policy context, Greener Scotland campaigns heavily utilise social marketing approaches targeted at their "ten key low-carbon behaviours" (The Scottish Government, 2013). However, the Environment Social Research team have recently sought to go beyond individualistic social marketing approaches, drawing on a wider, more nuanced and more sophisticated palette of tools, including the work of CC, in the process (Darnton & Evans, 2013, p. 31). They have developed a something called the "ISM tool" (Darnton & Horne, 2013; Darnton & Evans, 2013) as a guide to influencing behaviours through understanding not just the individual (I), but the "social (S) and material (M)" contexts influencing people's behaviours. The guide has been the basis of educational workshops run through the Scottish Government with policy makers as well as professional and community environmental groups. It draws primarily on the epistemological drivers of soft-paternalism as well, namely "social psychology, behavioural economics, and sociological theories of practice" (Darnton & Horne, 2013). It is in this sense that CC, and also TT can be said to be located 'in and against' the pedagogical state, as behavior change experts producing knowledge aimed at re-educating the habitus, broadly meaning sets internalized and durable dispositions held by particular social actors in particular social settings (Haluza-DeLay, 2008). What is of concern in this penultimate chapter is the potential democratic deficit that may occur when expert epistemic communities deploy culture change technologies in the governance of an irrational public, as well as the assumption that the common good can be

unproblematically identified a priori, rather than emerging through hegemonic struggle.

Critical theorist Robert Brulle (2010) has already critiqued US-based environmental campaigning efforts influenced by cognitive scientist George Lakoff for similar reasons. He challenges the hegemony of expert advocacy, seeing it as inherently democratically compromised, and in the long-term reducing the "mobilization capacity" of civil society; he challenges the unidirectional 'short-termist' social marketing approach; he questions some of the intellectual and empirical claims made of core values; and he questions the ability of such efforts to move beyond the discursive status quo of ecological modernization. In what follows, I ask similar questions of CC, asking how the approach differs from 'nudge politics' and 'social marketing' crudely described, whilst exploring dialogue, where it exists, with our previous two cultures of activism, but particularly with Transition.

Dislocation and the formation of new subjectivities

CC emerged from a collective perception that "current approaches" to environmental campaigning "are failing". For example, "real UK [carbon dioxide equivalent (CO_2e)] emissions have actually increased by 17% since 1990" (Crompton, 2010, p. 17). Thus, the impetus from CC emerged from the same dislocatory experiences caused by climate change that prompted the emergence of the CCA and the TT movement.

Like the CCA and the TT movement, the purpose of CC is crystal clear: to place climate change in a wider battle for hearts and minds, against the entrenched cultural values and norms of neoliberalism. One of the drivers for CC is an awareness of the pernicious fragmentation of civil society organisations into issue specialists, as various organisations each seek to claim their symbolic territory in a crowded public

marketplace of ideas. The very name Common Cause signals a statement of intent to articulate new chains of equivalence around progressive cultural values that a body of social psychology claims that we all share (but prioritise differently).

Yet, the work of CC emerges from a double-dislocatory experience, in a similar fashion to that of TT discussed in the previous chapter: the dislocatory experience of climate change under the neoliberal status-quo, and the dislocatory experience from hegemonic approaches to campaigning, namely "flood[ing] the public with as much sound data as possible, on the assumption that the truth is bound, finally, to drown out its competitors" (Crompton, 2010, p. 19). As described above, this places CC in and against the pedagogical state and, more specifically, the interventions of soft-paternalism. Regarding the former dislocatory experience, CC seeks to use psychological insights to argue that Ecological Modernization discourse, in the context of climate change contains fundamental contradictions, or as they put it "incompatible frames" (Crompton, 2010, p. 50). They draw on Michael Sandel's argument that market mechanisms, and (quasi) cost-benefit analyses, when applied to intractable problems such as climate change, are not merely instruments, but come ready-packaged with implicit value assumptions, which become norms:

> [I]n discussing the costs of responding to the challenge, the Review inevitably lapses into debating the *competitiveness* impacts for individual countries: "All economies undergo continuous structural change through time. Indeed, the most successful economies are those that have the flexibility and dynamism to cope with and embrace change" (p.282)… These two frames are incompatible. It is extremely difficult to simultaneously pursue national economic competitiveness concerns and international cooperation, especially when this is based on principles of equity… Directly raising concerns about national competitiveness is one problem. But these concerns are also inherent to economic cost-benefit analysis, which provides the primary motivation for the Review's recommendations. Concepts of self-interest (here national economic interest) are activated through use of economic cost benefit analysis, because of the tight association between national interest and economic interest. The one invokes the other; both are elements of the self-interest frame (Crompton, 2010, p. 50).

CC uses insights from soft paternalism to respond to this dislocation, since, as they put it, "community feeling" and "financial success" are in "psychological opposition". Thus, responding to climate change as a tragedy of the commons requires the nurturing of "bigger-than-self values". Reflecting the situated actor-networks of ENGOs, the literature produced by CC can be described as 'evidence-based' culture change strategy. This reflects a peculiar paradox: whilst it is recognised that technocratic governance is facing a 'legitimacy crisis', "public demand for change is important", and that "feelings are more important than facts" (p. 19), CC is based upon a technocratic approach to culture change, embodied in Lakoff's call for "cognitive policy". For CC, then, unlike for the CCA or TT, the forging of historical chains of equivalence is not a part of its public pedagogical strategy. If anything, CC, like TT, are convinced that the environmental movement must articulate a historic break with itself.

Yet, there is a further dislocatory experience, from which CC has emerged: this is the difference between the 'hot button' approach of social marketing, or what they call the "value modes" approach, which seeks to influence behaviour through appealing to three broad segments of the population characterised as 'Settlers' who value tradition, 'Prospectors' who are extrinsically orientated and need the approval of others through being ahead of the curve, and 'Pioneers' – the traditional 'environmentalist' or 'activist' constituency, who are more interested in ideas than things, are attracted to 'issues' and are interested in the big picture (Juniper, 2012). As discussed in the previous chapter, even Transition initiatives have used this 'Value Modes' strategy for grassroots community engagement.

Thus, a schism has emerged in the ENGO sector between movement intellectuals who advocate the CC approach, and those who advocate for the 'Value Modes' approach, with both sides looking to marshal the empirical evidence from psychology literature to argue their side for the best evidence-based cognitive policy

for the public good. My scepticism over these debates notwithstanding, this is generating rich intellectual praxis within the ENGO sector and beyond. For example, career campaigner Tony Juniper (2012, n-p) argues:

> Having spent 30 years as a campaigner and among other things seeking to change behaviour, I am very clear as to where I think we are most likely to get positive change, and it is in the second approach, whereby campaigns are designed to work with the grain of the fundamental psychological needs that people have, rather than trying to persuade people who are not environmentalists to adopt the values that would cause them to become so… Green groups need to be careful that they don't waste their precious resources in backing the wrong strategy. Time is now short

Note again how the sense of temporal urgency sets the tone when arguing over strategies of cultural politics. Essentially, Juniper's argument is that we neither have time, nor will it be successful to effect culture shift towards the values that sustain an activist habitus, because such values are determined by life circumstances beyond the scope of campaign communications. Thus, insights from psychology should be used more shrewdly. In the context of climate change, Carvalho (2010, p. 173), writing from an American perspective, draws on the results of a survey of over 2000 people, which asked what might prevent them from taking actions. The most popular (33%) of the response options chosen was "I am not an activist". Thus, the following excerpt from the Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR) (a centre-left leaning public policy think tank) commissioned research into climate change communications seems to be eminently sensible strategising:

> We need to work in different and more sophisticated ways, harnessing tools and concepts used by brand advertisers…Desired climate friendly behaviours need to be made to feel simply like 'the kinds of things that people like us do' to large groupings of people…We should not present 'messages' with the implication of rational argument and top-down persuasion. Instead we need to work in a more shrewd and contemporary way, using subtle techniques of

> engagement…The answer is not to try and change their radar, but to change the issue (Segnit and Ereaut, 2006, pp. 27-28)

This approach, and other similar ones emerging from communication think tanks (FUTERRA, 2005; 2010; Segnit and Ereaut, 2006, 2007), has been interpreted by critical geographers as a process of "subconscious subterfuge", designed to 'short-circuit' democratic debate through careful 'lexical nudges' (Jones, et al., 2009). This, so the argument goes, is ethically questionable as it unabashedly promotes the "lexical closing off of response options" as opposed to "winning the argument" (ibid.). Yet, the same commentators point out the difference between the approaches, marking the difference between 'shallow' and 'deep' paternalism, through linking CC to the latter, in an attempt to engender a wholesale ideological shift away from consumerist values (Whitehead, 2011). The question, to reiterate, is whether the means (forms of expert ENGO governmentality) justify the ends. With this, I move on to explore the public pedagogy of CC, by exploring its conception of values and frames, through dialogue with discourse theory.

The public pedagogy of Common Cause: values and frames

Values in CC

CC's understanding of the cultural values draws on academic expertise from the domain of *psychology*. From this domain comes the first postulate of CC; that there exists a universal, trans-cultural 'circumplex' of values. Secondly, CC recognises that values and behaviour are intimately connected. Third, it is proposed that "[f]rames offer a vehicle for promoting values" (Crompton, 2010, p. 11). Cultural values, it is written, "represent our guiding principles: our broadest motivations, influencing the attitudes we hold and how we act" (Holmes, et al., 2011, p. 8). The

particular conception of values articulated is derived, in large part, from the foundational work of social psychologist Shalom Schwartz (Crompton, 2010, p. 28). In his seminal paper "Are There Universal Aspects in the Structure and Contents of Human Values, Schwartz (1994, p. 21) defines values as "desirable transinstitutional goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or other social entity", learned through socialization.

Values, he argued, are quantifiable, categorisable, interrelated in consistent ways and trans-cultural. CC emphasises that "[h]undreds of [worldwide] papers—amounting to literally 100,000s of participants—have also tested the relationships between the values the vast majority of these papers confirming the relationships Schwartz outlines" (Holmes, et al., 2011, p. 58). By their own positivistic epistemic standards, this is "a well-founded model of how human values relate to each other, with measurable impacts on our attitudes and behaviours" (p. 58). Values can be collapsed into ten groups: universalism; benevolence; tradition; conformity; security; power; achievement; hedonism; stimulation; and self-direction. These ten groups and their corresponding individual values are mapped below.

Figure 10 **Value mapping. Reproduced from Holmes, et al (2011, p. 12)**



This mapping is a visual representation of a technique known as "smallest space analysis (SSA)" (Schwartz, 1994, p. 27), in which "the distances between the points reflect the empirical relations among the values. The more similar two values are conceptually, the higher the intercorrelation between their importance ratings, and the more similar their pattern of correlations with all other values" (p. 27). These values can be broadly divided into two axes—self-enhancement (at the opposite of which is self-transcendence), and openness to change (at the other end of which is conservation)—represented in Schwartz' circumplex (Homes, *et al*, 2011, p, 16), below. We can detect an implicit Western deference to a "cybernetic" view of culture, as a closed but complex system of inputs and outputs, reducible to information, and therefore manipulable (Santos, 2008). Certainly, a reduction of culture to what might appear to the layman as a kind of circuit diagram of

mathematically derived proximities between signifiers, correlates to the first two postulates of cybernetics: first, everything can be modelled as an "informational process"; second, informational processes are subject to control and manipulation (Robillard, 2005, p. 247).

Schwartz's theory of values is simplified by CC as being divided into two categories: those deemed *intrinsic* and those deemed *extrinsic*. Intrinsic values are those such as "affiliation to friends and family, connection with nature, concern for others, self-acceptance, social justice and creativity", which are "intrinsically rewarding to pursue" (Holmes, et al., 2011, p. 21). Extrinsic values are deemed to be those "centred on external approval or rewards", such as "wealth, material success, concern about image, social status, prestige, social power and authority" (p. 21).

Figure 11. Schwartz's values circumplex. Reproduced from Holmes, et al (2011, p. 21).



The extent to which this represents an implicit desire to reduce culture to 'Western' binary logic is up for debate. From a discourse theory perspective, the intrinsic | extrinsic binary is subject to a Western metaphysics of hierarchy, whereby the intrinsic is understood as the "privileged essence" determining the contingent

"outside" (Howarth, 2000, p. 37). In fact, participating in a CC workshop with environmental activists at the Friends of the Earth 40th Anniversary conference, I noted that delegates from local groups struggled to reconcile their views on traditional campaigning for the environment – "FoE cannot abdicate its responsibility to educate the public" as one participant argued – with new strategies from the centre. Another participant was quick to draw on her Feminist knowledge, and astutely flagged up the dangers of such reductive binary thinking in creating a deficit discourse where people structurally positioned in ways that prevent them from acting are 'Othered' as being 'extrinsically' motivated. CC, though, do recognise this, arguing that we all possess such values, which express different needs at different times and are reinforced through experience (Holmes, et al., 2011, p. 62).

Thus, from a discourse theoretical perspective, CC's intellectuals can sidestep this critique because they rely on a structuralist (as opposed to a 'post'-structuralist) epistemology through which cultural values are mapped through the organismic metaphor of the 'values circumplex', as the individual components of a closed totality. Thus – and this is an important point – the relationships between values are viewed as the logically necessary internal relations between the components comprising a whole. Since this approach denies the constitutive nature of antagonism, and the externality of relations, CC points towards a kind of teleological progression of the human spirit towards a universal value base.

CC, to be fair, do respond directly respond to the 'Othering' criticism in the following way:

> Doesn't this analysis divide values and people into good and bad? Or even left-wing and right-wing? Values are not 'good' or 'bad' in and of themselves. They are each thought to express different needs, and are therefore each necessary for different purposes….All of us will hold all of the values on the circumplex to some extent. Which of them come to the fore at any given moment will depend on the situation we happen to

> be in (and this effect will be strengthened over time) (Holmes, *et al*, 2011, p. 62).

Furthermore, CC does recognise that that "meeting people where they are" involves recognising socio-material constraints, and "creating spaces for change" (p. 41). Rhetorically at least, there seems to be desire to 'walk the talk':

> A low-involvement experience—reading a leaflet, for instance—is likely to engage with values fairly superficially; while top-down communications may stifle the expression and development of self-direction values. First-hand experience and deeper involvement are likely to have a much greater impact, and self-direction values are more likely to be engaged where self-expression and critical thought are facilitated and encouraged

CC seems to understand that this requires organisational and spatial arrangements congruent with espoused values and an ostensible questioning of the "churchly piety" model of citizen environmental engagement through "paying one's dues" (Szerszynski, in Jamison, 2001, p. 150). The "organisational" knowledge interest (Eyerman and Jamsion, 1991) is engaged here, and the seeds of a dialogical agenda are visible, as the movement cites both Transition Culture and the Camp for Climate Action, as exemplary models of what they are trying to achieve. For example:

> Our relationship with the people we work with can therefore be important. Holding a participatory meeting in a community space embodies very different values from a formal meeting encouraging deference to hierarchical structures. Similarly, financially successful models or techniques often allow limited scope for engagement…An example is the civil society model of professionalised 'protest businesses' with direct debits as the deepest level of engagement. What organisational models best embody the values we wish to promote? *Example: The Camp for Climate Action..in principle…was open to all, and encouraged direct participation on a horizontal, democratic basis* (Holmes, *et al*, 2011, p. 48-49).

In fact, going further, CC's view of values hints at an understanding of what geographers Doreen Massey (1995) and Ed Soja (1996) term the "socio-spatial dialectic" (see chapter 3).

> Our experience of various aspects of our society will help strengthen particular values. Community centres and churches, trade unions, libraries, local sports clubs—institutions that we share and recognise as promoting the common good—may increase the importance we place on equality, social justice, or friendship. Forests and parks may promote appreciation for nature and other intrinsic values. Extrinsic and security motivations may be strengthened through competitive work environments; advertising appealing to status (Holmes, *et al*, 2011p. 68).

Now that we have a sufficient idea of how values are conceived by CC, we need to look further towards the epistemic implications and analytical utility of their understanding of framing as a controllable cultural process.

Frames in CC

In chapter three, I engaged in a reasonable amount of depth, the pros and cons of framing in a climate change activism context. Rather than repeat the critical points, I would signpost the reader to revisit those arguments. Nevertheless, it is useful to reiterate the discourse theory interpretation (Howarth, 2000, p. 3):

> Positivists and empiricists argue that discourses are best visualised as 'frames' or 'cognitive schemata', by which they mean the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate or motivate collective action.

This is the sense in which framing has been taken up by CC. Frames in context are understood as "vehicles for engaging and strengthening values" (Holmes, et al., 2011, p. 39). Therefore, "the way we incorporate them in our language" is said to be "crucially important" (p. 39). Frames are understood after cognitive scientist George Lakoff (Crompton, 2010, p. 11) as:

> [M]ental structures that allow human beings to understand reality—and sometimes to create what we take to be reality…[T]hey structure our ideas and concepts, they shape how we reason, and they even impact how we perceive and how we act.

After Lakoff, CC makes the distinction between "conceptual frames" and "deep frames" (Crompton, 2010, p. 41). Conceptual framing entails:

> …careful use of wording and phrasing such that an audience can be encouraged to focus on and communicate about (or obscure!) different aspects of an event, situation or policy…Particular word choices serve to activate frames that may be more (or sometimes less) helpful in terms of motivating behaviour associated with addressing bigger-than-self problems (p. 41).

Lakoff's description of 'deep frames' – likened to ideologies – seems to be rather more provisional (Crompton, 2010, p. 42):

> [Deep frames] are the most basic frames that constitute a moral world view or a political philosophy. Deep frames define one's overall 'common sense'. Without deep frames there is nothing for surface frames to hang onto. Slogans do not make sense without the appropriate deep frames in place.

Deep frames, we are told, "embed values in the question 'how do I understand the world?'" (Crompton, 2010, p. 46). Values are said to be connected to deep frames through the use of conceptual metaphor. It is therefore possible to connect certain clusters of related values through 'mapping' an easily understood "source domain" frame (they use the example of 'family' and its associations) onto a "less intuitively understood…target domain" that the 'framer' is interested in, such as climate change:

> '[H]umans are a family and must face climate change together', 'poor people in poor countries are our brothers and sisters' (p. 46)

The three binary pairs of deep frames worked up by CC are 'self-interest | common interest', 'elite governance | participatory democracy', and 'strict father | nurturant parent'. If the saliency of a discourse based on the 'commons' and participatory democracy are self-evident to anyone interested in environmental and social justice, perhaps the strict father | nurturant parent is more abstract and needs unpacking.

This pairing was developed from Lakoff's work on constructions of the nation as a family (although primarily in a US context). In such constructions, we can envisage a strict father (state) whose role is to compete, provide for and protect the family in a paternalistic way. 'Mapped' onto the 'source domain' of environmental politics this means "the exercise of authority and control" (Crompton, 2010, p. 53). Conversely, the nurturant parent teaches empathy and respect for others which, mapped onto environmental politics, aligns with "social justice and empathy" (p. 53), and "intrinsic values".

The following passage creates the impression of a coalescing epistemic community, oriented more around normative belief in the applicability of a body of knowledge (cognitive science and psychology) to a particular area, than to an approach based entirely on empirical 'rigour':

> The development of these examples has been informed through extensive consultation with two experts in frame analysis and cognitive linguistics,… and an expert in values and behaviour…There is a high degree of subjectivity to the approach taken in the development of these examples, and future work should shift this frame analysis on to a more empirical basis (Crompton, 2010, p. 47).

Turning to address the pedagogical implications of all this, one might ask, is the development of a 'participatory democracy' frame, not oxymoronic? If participatory democracy connotes transparency and social learning though dialogue, does this not contradict the notion of framing as the engineering of cognition by expert

communicators? It is to these issues I now turn. Brulle has already critiqued the democratic deficit in recognising the importance of cultural values, yet choosing framing, and essentially leaving the making-up of normative deep frames (ideologies) to cognitive scientists:

> [W]e need to move from relying on either of our parents, whether they are strict or nurturant. Rather, we need to leave home and learn to rely on ourselves as competent adults (Brulle, 2010, p. 94)

Although Brulle's critique in many respects pre-empted mine, I think the issue is that his Habermasian understanding of civil society doesn't go far enough. It is not a matter of either reaching rational consensus through participation, or moving frame analysis on to a more empirical basis. Rather, political articulation is a contingent power game, a "war of position". Although it may be understandable for an assemblage of reformist organisations to avoid the loaded term ideology given its pejorative connotations (instead using 'deep frame' as an uncontentious proxy), frame theory has little to say about how such change efforts involve "a long process of self-conscious discussion, debate, and political education", which necessarily grapples with "the relation between people's material conditions or material experiences" and their cultural worlds (Oliver & Johnston, 2000, pp. 196-200).

However, since discourse is inherently multi-vocal, recursive, and contingent, the agonistic approach gives a more coherent account of the relationship between structure and agency. Rather than making the space for antagonism and heterogeneity, what we get is a brand of scientism, which seeks to promulgate a woolly notion of the common good. On the one hand, CC legitimises their approach to values through emphasising the evidence base (Holmes, Blackmore, Hawkins, & Wakeford, 2011, p. 58). Yet, on the other hand, CC's approach to framing rests on contested ideas about 'core progressive values', the empirical credibility of which, Brulle (2010, p.87) has already questioned. Moreover, CC acknowledges the provisional and heretofore subjective nature of the approach (Crompton, 2010, p.

47). Thus, CC gives the impression of a coalescing epistemic community, oriented around a belief in the applicability of expert knowledge (cognitive science and psychology) to cultural politics. Contested scientific insights cannot be simply superimposed onto communicative practices, as though they are free of latent and potentially contradictory political assumptions and beyond lay critique: the supplanting of matters of concern by supposed matters of fact is never a healthy sign for democratic politics (Pykett, 2012, p. 237).

CC view the ethical implications as being solvable through co-production of such interventions, and democratising such knowledge of how to pull ourselves up by our species and overcome our bounded rationality. In effect, citizens may become 'co-producers' of soft paternalist interventions (Jones, et al., 2011, p. 498):

> How can values-based communications and campaigns be delivered in compelling ways, inviting – and achieving – widespread participation, and exhibiting (in their design and execution) those values that they serve to champion? (Crompton, 2010, p. 25).

How indeed: the analysis of values hints at awareness of spatial, historical and material contingency. Nevertheless, Lakoff's framing theory, conjoined with a desire to map a universal progressive value base, and nurturing state metaphor onto environmental politics, reveals ultimately an epistemic community seeking to justify a normative orientation towards a reductionist cognitivism, when in fact (and as Brulle (2010, p. 87) has already noted in his analysis of Lakoff's work), the empirical and theoretical basis of these claims is far from uncontested.

The overcoming of the we/they distinction in matters of politics (and this is very much a matter of politics), is anathema to the political: power can never be bracketed out. I agree with Mouffe (2005, p. 121) when she argues that the drawing of a frontier between the legitimate and illegitimate is always a political decision. Normative political decisions are context specific, wed to particular practices, and

are not “the expression of universal morality” (p. 121). The consequence of thinking that they are is incompatible with the irreducible conflict of values, and as long as values remain universal, I agree with Mouffe (2005) that they remain an instrument of globalisation from above. Thus, we are at an odd juncture, where ENGOs are attempting to engage in adversarial politics through post-political means.

A hybrid cognitive praxis combining the advocacy of participatory democracy with the behaviour and culture change technologies of soft paternalism has been developed at the overlap of the edges between CC and the TT movement. The more dialogical nature of cultural change hinted at in aspects of the CC literature are more fully developed in the literature of the TT movement, and the work of Rob Hopkins, who is identified by CC as being a key exegete of the ‘participatory democracy frame’. Accordingly, the cultural change theory of TT and its convergences and divergences in relation to CC are explored below.

More edge work: Common Cause and Transition

Psychological insight between Transition and Common Cause

Like CC, “psychological insight” is also one of the main epistemological drivers of TT (Hopkins, 2008a, pp. 141-142). Unlike CC, narrative rather than frame is the primary cultural tool. In the earlier TT literature (Hopkins, 2008a), the primary ‘psychological insight’ is a catachrestical application of the psychology of addiction to oil consumption. This idea is based on the ‘transtheoretical’ model of change developed by psychologists Carlo DeClemente and James Proschaska, and explained

in the TT literature by contributing author and popular psychologist Dr Chris Johnstone, who plausibly argues that it is possible to say we are addicted to fossil fuels if we define addiction as "stuck patterns of behaviour that can be difficult to change even when we know they're causing harm" (p. 86).

The value of this approach is that "recognising dependence allows you to anticipate, and deal with, the additional obstacles to change this brings…while pointing us towards proven strategies from the addictions field" (p. 86). Thus, at the early stages of transition initiatives, before any of the hands-on practical "reskilling" related to sustainable ways of working, there are a number of different stages of awareness raising, including pre-contemplation, contemplation and preparation in relation to climate change and peak oil (p. 85). There is also recognition that people may "relapse". As a result, the empty signifier of Transition is now able to be articulated as a "twelve step plan" leading to the creation of an "energy descent action plan". As Connors and McDonald (2012, p.567) observe, these 12 steps are now referred to as "ingredients" (Hopkins, 2011) in order to dampen the prescriptive connotations, yet those with "the mandate for issuing such directives" are those with experience and involvement in permaculture. Thus, those trained up in health psychology are charged with "making the addict aware of the degree of personal responsibility that breaking the addiction will require" (Miller & Sanchez, in Hopkins, 2008, p. 92). Also emphasised is a style of "therapeutic empathy", seeking to "engage as well as educate" with the goal of enhancing "client self-efficacy or optimism" (p. 92).

It was clear to me through key informant interviewing that this discourse was in fact being used enthusiastically 'on the ground', so to speak. The quotation below is from a Transition activist in urban Scotland, who referred to his initiative as a "grassroots community group" (activist, 2010):

> We started by doing a pilot project…and that went really well… [W]e had a group of about maybe five core members in the working group and

> then about twenty volunteers who were trained-up in energy efficiency and motivational interviewing, which is a behavioural change technique from health psychology, which is used to work with people who maybe want to stop smoking, have alcohol addictions or drug addictions and it's a kind of person-centred approach. We've taken that and applied it to energy in a way and just a way of communicating with people that's non-directive and supportive.

The questions I would therefore ask at this stage are: who wields the insights of the psychologist, and who is the patient? Are we all therapists, as well as addicts? To what extent does the psychologisation of change detract from, or stand in contradiction to, the notion of "Transition as an approach rooted in place and circumstance" (Hopkins, 2011, p. 73)? There is a construction of undifferentiated responsibility in such discourse that *could* have the potential to stigmatise people with less capacity to act.

More recently, the psychological insights of CC have found their way into Transition discourse:

> Transition works because it cultivates intrinsic values. It is already showing that a cultural shift towards more intrinsic values is a shift that can inspire sustained change (Hopkins, 2011, pp. 75-76).

The issue is that Transition as an intellectual idea comes from those who are already 'intrinsically motivated' by virtue of their socio-spatial positionality and class position. More attention needs to be paid to this. In the same book, Tim Kasser (academic psychologist and CC collaborator), in dialogue with Hopkins (2011, p. 46), speculates that localisation would provide people with more opportunities to enact intrinsic values, and by linking resilience to happiness, they develop a connection to the positive psychology literature, where resilience is understood as an individual cognitive trait (Seligman, et al., 2009). In this literature, developing

resilience is seen as an important part of "optimism as a learnable skill" (Seligman, in Hopkins, 2011, p. 77).

Again, this is where insights from discourse theory can be productively applied. These concepts deployed by CC and TT, we can position as being 'in and against' the "pedagogical state" (Newman, 2010) (see chapter two). One of the faces of the concept of a pedagogical state is 'moral regulation' (Newman, 2010), which can be read as a neoconservative response to the "crisis of cultural security" of the neoliberal polity (Green, 2007, p. 559). Another face of the pedagogical state is the 'repsonsibilisation' of citizen subjects; meaning encouraging learning as a route to self-provision and self-management (Newman, 2010).

Resilience, as a floating signifier emphasising the "bouncebackability" of individuals and communities, has, in the post-2008 context of austerity, become a key policy trope. Increasingly, insights from psychology are being deployed as state actors aim to teach citizens and families psychological dispositions to cope in tough times, to the exclusion of structural considerations (Harrison, 2013). 'Resilience' is therefore often used to justify maintenance of the economic status-quo, and as a justification for a shrinking public sector.

Furthermore, in policy discourse, resilience is also articulated in the context of post-9/11 "disaster pedagogies" woven into the fabric of everyday lives through security alerts, routines of securitisation, and media promulgation (Preston, Avery, Chakrabarty, & Casey, 2011). Combined with 'community' - another key signifier of TT – the so-called "absent-presence of race" becomes apparent (p.759):

> Community resilience is associated with 'Dunkirk Spirit' and 'Britishness'. In interviews with policy makers…community resilience invoked themes of "localism and romanticised communities as sharing a collective (British) spirit of survival and counterpoised the metropolitan as anonymised and unsafe. "Race is therefore 'absent' in not being directly made, but always 'present' in terms of the racial associations which fetishized Britishness and stereotypically white, rural/suburban forms of social capital.

This is interesting because as we saw in the last chapter, the TT literature invokes precisely this kind of imagery in asking "can we learn anything from Britain's last 'wartime mobilisation' (Hopkins, 2008, p. 65) in order to link resilience for sustainability with relatable cultural mores. As climate change moves into the realm of 'the political', it is necessarily imbricated in a wider politics of economy, development, immigration, energy security and so on. Thus, the utility of 'resilience thinking' will rely on its ability to resist incorporation into hegemonic policy discourse. More generally, 'community' and 'resilience' – as well as being floating signifiers deployed with good intentions by – are policy prescriptions for the marginalised (Robinson, 2007; Levitas, 2005; Worley, 2005).

This signals a key point in my argument. Psychological and therapeutic discourse on its own misses these nuances. Having personally discussed particularly the ambivalence of resilience with people involved in Transition, I have been careful not to misrepresent the particular way in which it is articulated by them. As I have conceded in conversation with activists obviously do not see their idea of resilience as part of a discourse of either austerity or cultural conservatism. Yet, this is to miss the point completely: the radical investment in 'consensus' and 'open space' – "whoever comes are the right people" (Hopkins, 2008, p. 168) – alongside the valorisation of 'grassroots community' as a representational strategy, leaves the movement vulnerable to co-option whilst obscuring actually existing power relations. Another consequence of the penchant for insights from psychology alongside a politics of consensus, is that such a position at its worst, tacitly colludes with neoconservative public pedagogies, which position confrontational activists as 'domestic extremists' – the 'Other' to be feared (see chapter 5).

Can CC learn from TT's use of narrative?

Unlike the concept of framing in CC, "cultural stories "are the primary cultural tool in TT:

> The telling of stories is central to this book…Our culture is underpinned by various stories, cultural myths that we all take for granted…We need new stories that paint new possibilities, that reposition where we see ourselves in relation to the world around us (Hopkins, 2008a, pp. 14-15).

The collective creation of place-based cultural narratives of the future underpins the creation of the strategic twenty-year action plans, from which participants "back cast" in order to achieve their goals (Hopkins, 2008, pp. 104-121). Haluza-DeLay articulates the pedagogical rationale of this clearly:

> [Ecological habitus] would be described backwards from the practices of living socially and ecologically well in place. [W]e can understand an ecological habitus as an expertise developed from a "sense of place" (2008, pp. 213-4).

It has been demonstrated in environmental communication literature that narrative learning as a form of "border pedagogy" (Giroux, 1992) provides the scope for individuals to connect collective 'matters of concern' to their own situated and emergent sense of values (Vandenabeele, Vanassche, & Wildemeersch, 2011, p. 183). As I have argued, border pedagogy is underpinned by a concern to render visible the shifting borders that "undermine and reterritorialize different configurations of culture, power and knowledge" (Giroux, 1992, p. 51). Ironically, this resonates with Transition's adoption of the permaculture concept of the productiveness of the 'edge'. However, Giroux's (1992) idea of "border pedagogy" is connected to a form of politics, in which "agonistic confrontation is the very condition of the existence of democracy" (Mouffe, 2005, p. 29). Working at or on the 'edges' of anything, to me, implies taking risks.

Part of this risk involves addressing confrontation, not pathologically avoiding it. Thus, although telling cultural stories might add something to the cogntive praxis of climate activism that framing doesn't, the pertinent question is, who is telling the story, and who has been framed out? Given that the CC and TT literature lacks any sense of agonistic politics, I move on to offer some concluding thoughts about the obfuscation of power in both CC and TT.

Conclusion: hidden politics, hidden power?

In this chapter, I have interpreted the environmental movement as undergoing a process of meta-learning, through which various milieus are coming to question the 'cognitive' in the cognitive praxis (Haluza-DeLay, 2008). Through applying this insight to the discourse of CC (and exploring overlap and dialogue with TT), I have also made the argument that this questioning of the Enlightenment subject positions each milieu 'in and against' the pedagogical state, as they seek to enact environmental governance through cultural interventions.

Two significant differences between CC and TT are organisational form, and the use of framing and narrative as cultural tools, respectively. Regarding the first difference, it ostensibly appears as though TT has more democratic potential than CC, which despite its rhetoric, is inherently limited by the organisational structures of its core of professional campaigning organisations, depending on the mandate of donors. Therefore, the CC literature reads at times as though the organisations are making an argument for their own planned obsolescence. Regarding the second difference, the dialogical notion of cultural stories is pedagogically interesting, but limited without addressing power more directly.

The main points of commonality between CC and TT are a sharing of insights from psychology and cognitive science, and their intentional avoidance of agonistic politics for the sake of inclusivity. From this perspective, there is arguably a danger

that their culture change theories attempt to provide empirical justifications for woolly political messages, which construct an undifferentiated 'we'. Thus, the singular virtue of a discourse approach to the cultural politics of climate activism, is to argue that "agonistic confrontation is the very condition of the existence of democracy" (Mouffe, 2005, p. 29). Contested scientific insights cannot be simply superimposed onto processes of cultural politics.

As a discourse theorist, my position is that there is no objectively accessible, transcultural, singular notion of the 'Common Cause'; it is articulated through hegemonic struggle. This involves linking together struggles by making contingent and non-necessary radical investments, not striving to prove through science that the values of the political Left are all somehow intrinsically connected to one another through an incremental building of the evidence-base. It is perhaps important to reassert that there is a strategic component to this approach: for example, having the opportunity to speak to Tom Crompton at a roundtable at the Conference on Communication and Environment (2013), I asked if there wasn't a contradiction between their approach to framing (Lakoff, 2010), which is admittedly subjective (Crompton, 2010), and their invocation of the size and reliability of the evidence-base for their approach to values (Schwartz, 1994). His reply insofar as I could interpret it was that one must 'play the game' to be taken seriously in a wider landscape of evidence-based policy making, but that Common Cause is, in fact, about moving beyond issue specialism in the NGO landscape, connecting environmentalism with other social justice issues in a wholesale battle for hearts and minds, and opposing neoliberal values. He argued to participants that Thatcherism was first and foremost a cultural project, and that the Left needs tools to develop a cultural project of equal ambition (Personal field notes, Saturday 8th June, 2013).

From a discourse theoretical perspective, the crucial insight in this regard is that political identities are non-necessary, historically specific formations; refining the evidence-base in order to provide a rational route map to cultural change simply

seems to either miss or disregard this point. Common Causes's programme of 'framing' brings in normativity in all kinds of ways, and necessarily so! It is not a mere issue of moving the analysis of frames onto "a more empirical basis" (Crompton, 2010, p.47). As Stuart Hall (1988) demonstrated, Thatcherism was successful because it articulated a number of disparate claims, interests and identities into a hegemonic project. The connections of the parts to the whole were not 'logically necessary', but were 'contingently obligatory' (DeLanda, 2006). Thus, from a discourse theory perspective, the problem with the idea of the 'Values Circumplex' (Schwartz, 1994) as used by Common Cause, is that it re-enforces the 'organismic metaphor' whereby intrinsic and extrinsic values are all somehow related and positioned in reliable and consistent ways as the logically necessary components of a whole.

The intellectuals of Common Cause have generated a curriculum about culture change, producing educational materials such as the "Values and Frames Guidebook" (Holmes, et al., 2011), for anyone who is interested. In this way they are seeking to democratise the insights of behaviour change technologies, thus moving beyond the hegemony of expert advocacy so that citizen subjects become 'co-producers' of such interventions (Jones, et al., 2010). My concern is that this approach to addressing democratic implications reduces cultural politics to promoting framing techniques and mindfulness skills. It is not that there is anything inherently problematic with this, but in the final instance, the notion of framing always assumes a passive end recipient. As a thought experiment, what would happen all people could be taught to 'know their values and frame the debate', as Lakoff (2004) prescribes? Would we not have an aggregate of individuals, all artificially sure of themselves, unwilling to be reflexive, unwilling to try to engage with 'Otherness' in its own terms? There is an odd combination of things going on here. First, I agree with critical theorist Robert Brulle (2010) that I'm not at all sure that this instrumental approach to communication can ever be compatible with the ideals of participatory democracy. Second, even if framing and communicative

action were not incompatible, I disagree with Brulle and Common Cause's assumption that consensus on the common good can ever be reached through the so-called unforced force of the better argument.

As an alternative, I have posited that Henry Giroux's (1992) notion of 'border pedagogy' is useful. This position, amongst other things, recognises that since the representational practices of cultural politics never fully represent 'the real' - since they are marked by a constitutive lack – our 'values' are never self-evident to those with whom we engage, or ourselves. Thus, a border pedagogy would: (1) allow for a questioning of the political assumptions behind the territorial expansion of particular disciplines (psychology, cognitive science, behavioural economics, and even sociological theories of practice) themselves; (2) refuse to take an a priori stance on what the 'Common Cause' is to begin with; (3) recognise that the idea of 'open' or 'horizontal' space is a non-starter, and ensure that representational strategies do not cloud our analysis of real power relations. The task for the cultural politics of climate change, as it is for all variants of cultural politics, is "[n]ot to overcome the we/they relation but how to envisage forms of construction of we/they relation compatible with a pluralistic order" (Mouffe, 2005, p. 115).

Related to all of this this is the political economy of the formation of movement intellectuals engaging in such debates (Holst, 2002, p. 84). Such individuals are often academics, activists, and consultants at different times. Although they may be called 'movement intellectuals' (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991), forming 'critical communities' (Rochon, 1998), their cultural work reflects a tacit class positioning, very different to the formation of organic intellectuals envisioned by Antonio Gramsci (Holst, 2002, p. 84). This is not to give a deterministic reading of class, but to flag up that the cleavage of the 'political' from the 'cultural' is concerning in such a context. For example, it is written that the "Transition Companion" is the product of "real work in the real world", with "not an ivory tower in sight" (Hopkins, 2011, p.17).

Although CC is aware of the need to address its organisational limitations, I would suggest that one possible answer would be a rebalancing of such organisations towards popular education and away from just advocacy. These tendencies in the case of Transition strike me as particularly concerning because of its representational strategy of asserting its 'grassrootness' using adjectives such as 'open', 'leaderless', 'non-hierarchical', 'rhizomatic', and 'learning network' (Hopkins, 2011, p. 286; Scott-Cato & Hillier, 2010; Bailey, et al., 2010, p. 603). Thought of as expressive components of discursive-material assemblages, such discourse does not describe an anterior material reality. This calls to our attention the potential for such representations to become abstractions that obfuscate more arcane and distributed types of power Attention needs to be paid to how the capacity to contribute to the 'open network' is dependent on intersecting factors such as available time, class, gender, race, education, versatility, cultural and social capital, relative mobility, financial resources, and so on (Nunes, 2005, p. 315; McFarlane, 2009, p. 567; Aiken, 2012, p. 97).

Chapter 8

Conclusion

Introduction

In chapter one I made the case that, in the context of climate change, the most significant educational interventions have often not occurred in formal educational settings, but can arguably be attributed to the activity of social movements. Clover and Hall (2010, p.165) go so far as to contend that "[a]ll of us, no matter whether we are formally informed of the intricacies of climate change or not, have been learning about climate change because of the nearly thirty years of work done by activists and movements".

Be that as it may, a serious knowledge-action gap persists alongside a serious value-action gap (Hulme, 2006). The reasons for this, as I explained, are complex; but as an education scholar, I began by addressing mental conceptions: climate change as a chronic problem – as a complex, emergent, autonomously functioning system – has exposed our species-level cognitive blind-spots (Marshall, 2007). As an environmental-ecological issue, I argued, following David Harvey (1996; 2010), that arguments made about climate change "are complex refractions of struggles being waged in other realms" – including institutional arrangements, labour processes, social relations, technologies and organisational forms – which play out in our situated experience of everyday life. I have argued that important consequences follow from this, in asking what role education has to play in climate change, and what role social movements have to play in such education.

One consequence, I argued, is that, in the context of climate change, social movement milieus challenge society's lopsided 'learning capacity', through the promulgation of insurgent discourses. Thus, I argued, the dominant discourse of Ecological Modernization (EM) frames the issue of climate change in such a way as to make the issue seem tractable through processes of "innovation and policy learning" where "rational and responsive institutions learn, adapt, and produce meaningful change" through technological advances, advances in organisational form, administrative arrangements, and market mechanisms (Bailey, et al., 2011, p. 685). Insurgent discourses critique such processes as components of a technocratic project with three problematic dimensions:

> [T]hey focus on efficiency and efficacy but have little to say about issues of social justice; they seem to be spatially contingent and to generate patterns of uneven geographical development; and they appear to recreate a neoliberal hegemony (Bailey, et al., 2011, p. 699).

The second consequence follows from this one: effective education about the causes of, and solutions to, climate change (conceived in terms of our relation to nature) must engage with issues of culture, space, and political economy. This means an emergent curriculum able to move lithely between the *abstract* (the agglomeration of codified and translated empirically- based knowledge that is global climate change) and the *concrete*, spatially situated, cultural politics of daily life. This involves the development of a relational imagination capable of connecting localised epiphenomena to systemic phenomena. As a cultural issue, I am reminded of Raymond Williams's (1989 [1958]) maxim that 'culture is ordinary'. And thus, the task is to make the abstract as 'ordinary' as possible. In fact, in opening the thesis, I explicated 'culture', arguing, after Williams, for a view of culture that encompasses the "social psychological" ("the sets of values, beliefs, and meanings that individuals carry" (Earl, 2004)), the symbolic/semiotic, and the material, where culture is particular ways of life, situated in time and space (Earl, 2004, p. 510), without being reducible to any of these things. To speak with Freire (1972), enacting such a cultural

politics as a process of public pedagogy is about reading and writing the word and the world.

To put it simply, I argued that activist milieus are increasingly coming to the *explicit* realisation that, whilst climate activism must make a difference, its cultural consequences are equally important. Thus, I argued that climate activism has sought to catalyse the dialectic between the cultural politics of everyday life and the political culture of governance institutions. Through engaging in cultural politics (DA, community, and professional) activists have generated a kind of public curriculum for both activists and the wider public. This 'curriculum', I argued, itself reflected different the cognitive regimes of these three milieus of activism (Jamison, 2001). In fact, through movement praxis, as the dynamics of cultural change have become a substantive knowledge interest, these different milieus begin to explicitly reflect their different understandings of this process. Different ideal typical 'modes' of climate change communication – agonistic pluralism, public participation, and social marketing (Carvalho & Peterson, 2012) – can be mapped as crude types onto the cultural politics of these milieus.

In chapter two, I situated all of this ideational-cultural work in the wider frame of public pedagogy; the reason being that climate change as a complex emergent system is deeply intertwined with another complex emergent[x] system: capitalism. Our current system of production, consumption and exchange, is driven by the largely autonomous logic of capital, which, as new social movement theorists have long argued, increasingly encroaches into our daily 'lifeworlds', and reproduces itself through our 'mental conceptions' of the world (meaning worldviews, ideologies, cultural values and norms). Thus, I argued that the public pedagogies generated through climate activism are necessarily polemical; positioned 'in and against' the "pedagogies of everyday life" (Luke, 1996), the 'state', and against 'neoliberal' and 'corporate public pedagogies' (Giroux, 2005; Giroux, 2010).

I argued in this chapter that people are not merely 'interpellated' by ideology in the sense that they can be described as being in a state of false consciousness. Rather, both climate change and capitalism are complex, emergent, autonomously functioning systems, governed by discursive-material processes, and 'logics' that do not only surpass the intentions of persons and networks, institutions and organisations, cities and states, but human agency in its entirety, even if these phenomena can be causally attributed to humanity.[xi] Often, we *misidentify* causes as a result (greedy bankers and CEOs), or become frustrated when even experts can only speculate about the links between observable tangible weather effects and climate change: the victims of our own 'bounded rationality', as behavioural economists would say. Additionally, I would suggest that as a species, we also are far more aware of the contradictions between our so-called 'objective' beliefs – that climate change is an immediate and urgent threat, and that an economic system based on the imperative of infinite 3% compound growth annually is patently unsustainable in the long term – and our everyday behaviours than Marxist theories of false consciousness would suggest. The implications of all of this, I think, are very important, and I will go on to unpack them in the next section, but for now, I move on with the recapitulation. Ultimately, the purpose of chapter two was to submit that the public pedagogy of climate activism is entangled in hegemonic politics, whether this explicitly acknowledged by climate activists or not.

In chapter three, I suggested that understanding the public pedagogy of climate activism in the context of movement learning, required two co-implicated theoretical strands: a coherent theory of social movements, and a coherent theory of learning. Thus, in this chapter, I explored the contributions of three significant cultural perspectives–new social movement theory, framing theory and discourse theory–thinking through their consequences specifically in the context of climate activism and the character of the learning it may generate. This was important because the tensions between each theoretical approach reflect tensions within and between the real practices of different cultures of climate activism. I argued that there were

valuable insights which could be drawn from these various strands, but that, for my purposes, the agonistic approach to cultural politics found in discourse theory was the most promising approach, both analytically and normatively.

Once I had set up the problems and research questions motivating the thesis, couched my investigation in the wider body of work concerned with public pedagogy, and justified my use of discourse theory through an exploration of relevant theoretical understandings of social movements in relation to climate change and social movement learning, I moved on to outline my research methods, which involved an operationalisation of discourse theory. Working with a dialogical and recursive understanding of discourse, my approach has been to construct a research model capable of exploring the intertextual links between activist milieus (Hansen, 2006), and the process of diffusion of such movement knowledge into polysemic arenas of public discourse from 2005-2011. As such, my corpus consists of 'self-produced' movement texts, including books, pamphlets, website material, blogs, alternative periodicals, civil society research (or 'grey literature' as it is sometimes called), press releases, as well as popular press articles. Through operationalizing the theoretical postulates of discourse theory (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987), I have explored how cultural milieus have attempted to link particularistic 'claims' in chains of equivalence, whilst distancing themselves from others, in order to legitimate their cultural projects. Working with textual reifications, and understanding them as curricular artefacts conferred certain advantages, but also imposed limitations. One obvious major limitation of my approach was that I could, in fact, say very little about the power relations behind the production of such texts, and therefore, one could be in danger of reading such texts as though they somehow represented the 'voice' of particular milieus. I will expand on the strengths and limitations of this study later in this concluding chapter.

Chapters five, six and seven were the substantive examinations of the cultural politics of direct action, community action and professional action as public

pedagogical artefacts. In writing these chapters, I have tried to maintain a narrative thread, whereby the dynamic tensions not just within but between such cultures of activism would be made evident. In stepping back to think about what can be learned from these chapters, I will now move on to revisit the research questions delineated in chapter one. First, I address each culture of activism in turn, and then I seek to synthesise these insights by making clear the unique theoretical contribution made by applying discourse theory to an analysis of the cognitive praxis of climate activism more generally. In moving on to address my initial research questions below, I should reiterate that the theoretical utility of discourse theory can be analytically divided into two strands: first, as a resource for analysing the unfolding political articulations of particular identities in particular moments; and second, as a theoretical resource with normative implications for an adequate conception of the political, which begins with the insight that the justification and assertion of values are the result of articulatory practices suffused with power.

What are the cultural politics of direct action in relation to climate change? What curriculum is generated through this cultural politics?

Out of all three imbricate but distinct cultures of activism explored, direct action against climate change most overtly retains an agonistic conception of cultural politics, and its spatial interventions reveal the obvious materiality of cultural struggle. Firstly, in order to move from the mere dislocatory moment (by definition a moment of indeterminacy, where contingent events cannot be represented by existing structures) towards 'antagonisms', which represent germinal discursive responses, new chains of equivalence had to be sutured together around the notion of 'Climate Action'. Firstly, this involved the articulation of acts of resistance against polluters, into a broader chain of equivalence with a common history of civil disobedience and

the repertoires of contentious politics, which sought to demonstrate the legitimacy of common struggle. This was at once a mobilisation strategy and a pedagogical move, which sought to disrupt the articulation of Climate Action through Ecological Modernization, by contesting neoliberal and corporate public pedagogies, highlighting spatial contingency, and articulating the concept of climate action into a broader identity based around tackling interlocking systems of oppression.

Climate Camps represented attempts to highlight the absurdities of concrete geographical developments in their emergent particularity, set against abstract institutional rhetoric of climate protection. Attempted expressions of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment (Tilly, 2004), through the assembling of bodies, and of heterogeneous interests and identities, demonstrated the practical and political obstacles in the way of creating spaces for an oppositional cultural politics. This was cultural politics in a material sense, not merely in the social psychological sense of 'behaviour change' experts. To speak with Lefebvre, these interventions sought to directly challenge the production of space. Thus, the distinctly agonistic strategy of 'defining the enemy', was an integral part of the public pedagogy of DA. To speak with Giroux (1992), the CCA also enacted a 'border pedagogy' in the way that it sought to 'de- and re-territorialise the accepted geographical boundaries of political discourse, moving lithely in scale between the local, national and global, not to mention moving translocally and transnationally. Through a public pedagogy of defining the enemy, the CCA sought to uncover the messy connections and complicities, which had been disentangled by neoliberal public pedagogies invoking the reified generalities of 'nation-state' and 'market'.

Nevertheless, all of this activity generated pressures, both internal and external, which took their toll on the movement. I made the distinction between 'intended' and 'collateral curriculum'. 'Collateral curriculum' occurred through the reactive articulation of a narrative of meta-protest, as the 'coercive' political power of the state was deployed, to systematically repress protest. The failure of hegemonic social

structures to confer identity on social actors through articulating a coherent discourse on climate change eventually revealed the ugliness and arbitrariness of state-corporate power through the use of systematic surveillance, violence and legal action (c.f. Gramsci, 1971).

However, even at this point, the coercive component of state power in the repression of protest, required hegemonic practice to legitimise its arbitrariness (Gramsci, 1971): to this end, it is clear that post-911 disaster pedagogy constituted part of the hegemonic cultural politics as the identity of climate activists was articulated into a chain of equivalence with 'terrorists' and racialised Others, though the murky legal legitimacy lent to a discourse of 'domestic extremism'.

This signifier of 'domestic extremist' itself is the product of a 'unipolar world' (Mouffe, 2005); of a political system in which there is no room for 'adversarial' politics, thus instead making 'enemies' of those who find themselves excluded from post-political or 'Third Way' (Fukuyama, 1992; Giddens, 2009) institutional arrangements operating as though 'we/they' relations have been surmounted. This reaction to the attempt to foment a populist collective response to climate change, is the product of a quasi-Enlightenment rationalism endemic to our political and academic institutions, fixated on the relationship between the normal and the pathological (Laclau, 2005). Here, once again, it is worth pointing out the difference between 'social logics', operating according to procedural logics and rules circumscribed by what Foucault called 'discursive orders' operating at the 'ontic' level, and the contingent logic of 'the political', operating at the 'ontological' level. It is because hegemonic totalities cannot be derived logically at the conceptual level that they require a radical investment in a lack that has more to do with affect than rationality. Once climate change enters into the realm of 'the political', this is unavoidable. Given the history of the pathologisation of protest (see chapter 3), this created particularly difficult strategic dilemmas for climate activists precisely

because there are such strong grounds for exposing the irrationality of the status quo compared with the rationality of their position.

Thus, as far as internal pressures were concerned, as the empty signifier of Climate Action grew to include more actors and articulate links between more claims, the tensions between the Habermasian ideal and an agonistic conception of the political became obvious. This was because the goal of testing the 'validity claims' of modernity through direct action, and being on the side of science and reason was incredibly alluring to the movement, particularly as this attempted to combine the epistemic legitimacy of climate science discourse with the institutional legitimacy of legal discourse, in order to justify the moral necessity of direct action.

The agonistic deficit manifested itself internally in the CCA in another fashion. The *internal* organisational knowledge of the camp was predominantly articulated around a discourse of 'horizontalism' and deliberative democracy, such that the space to express substantive political antagonisms was systematically reduced. If was felt by some more ostensibly radical activists, that direct action was morphing into dramatic lobbying, as horizontalist consensus decision making structures became conflated with an absence of substantive political positions. 'Horizontalism' and its sister ideal 'spontaneism' are themselves nodal points around which diverse struggles in the global justice movement have articulated themselves, and since the CCA forms part of the same genealogy of dissent, such concepts were assumed in climate camps. Since, the cultural politics of Transition also share this in common with the CCA, I will address the implications of horizontalism from a discourse theoretical perspective separately. For now, it will suffice to say that such tensions, were generative of praxis, from which movement intellectuals produced an analysis of the fetishiziation of carbon. Thus, the valorised role of the activist and direct action was brought into question, through an engagement with situationist thought. This was educative to activists to the extent that it forced reflection upon the need to act, their own situational privilege and the limits of the symbolic appropriation of space.

Secondly, the analysis of a fetishisation of carbon, drawing on Marx's analysis of commodity fetishism, sought to critique the way in which spatial contingencies are eradicated through throwing all emissions (regardless of where these are on the sliding scale of survival or luxury emissions) into relations of equivalence with one another through market mechanisms. Although the mediatisation of direct action was an important channel of public pedagogy, this analysis questioned the wisdom in the view that simply working activities such as flying into a wider narrative with climate change constitutes success. It showed that attempting to block supply-side emissions at source, may be necessary, but it was by no means sufficient. This actually suggested a need to pay closer attention to the intricacies of culture as a social psychological phenomenon in the context of climate change. It also suggested a need to address not just institutional arrangements, but the practices of daily life as the locus for cultural politics. With this, I move onto the cultural politics of relocalisation.

What are the cultural politics of relocalisation in relation to climate change? What curriculum is generated through this cultural politics?

To simplify the above, the CCA was externally agonistic, but internally preoccupied with consensus. To express this in cognitive praxis terms, whilst the 'cosmology' was anti-capitalist and anarchistic, the 'organisational' knowledge interest was Habermasian. However, what has become clear is that these foundational means/ends distinctions do not withstand much scrutiny.

The cultural politics of Transition also obviously seeks to enact elements of a Habermasian cultural politics, albeit eschewing an externally agonistic dimension. The emphasis in Transition Culture on making deliberative democracy work through

open space decision making, as well as promulgating practical skills related to the development of appropriate technologies for living, reflects the wider cognitive praxis of 'community environmentalism' (Jamison, 2001). To understand Transition as a response to a dislocatory moment, I have shown that one must first understand Transition as part of an attempt of the environmental movement as a whole to articulate a historic break with itself.

Transition as an empty signifier, has always been promising as well as problematic from the outset, as it has been able to articulate a vast array of floating signifiers in chains of equivalence able to appeal to a very wide range of interest and identities, thus adapting quickly to change. I argued that it is primarily problematic when its very identity relies on direct action as its 'constitutive outside'; that is as its Other which both ensures its identity in the first place and denies its final suture. Movement intellectuals have argued that the Transition approach is not actually against direct action, but rather argues for the functional separation of both approaches. My argument, drawing on discourse theory, is that this assumed seperability is premised on the fantasy of power-free social relations (whether at the micro, meso, or macro scales as a wealth of feminist scholarship has long since argued). Moreover, I argued, such reasoning leads the Transition approach down a path of tacit complicity with neoconservative public pedagogy which attempts to articulate direct climate action into a chain of equivalence with other forms of 'domestic extremism'.

Transition as a fundamentally open-ended idea, sought to move beyond just 'Climate Action' by linking it with concerns about 'peak oil', the importance of a sense of 'place' and 'community' and perhaps most significantly the concept of 'resilience'. As an alternative empty signifier to 'Climate Action', 'Transition' was able, through its 'theory of anyway' (i.e. these are the things we would do and values we would espouse even if climate change were no longer an issue), to maintain relevance post-2008 by articulating links between relocalisation, social justice and economic resilience.

A key part of my argument was that resilience is an important “floating signifier”. And as Laclau (2005, p. 132) argues, “the 'floating' dimension becomes most visible in periods of organic crisis, when the symbolic system needs to be radically recast”. As I argued, the fact that this is resolved through hegemonic struggle seems to have eluded most of the Transition movement’s intellectuals to-date. In other words, intended use of concepts becomes irrelevant if one is not willing to engage in a wider terrain of struggle for those concepts. This, I would contend is its key weakness.

As a flexible concept, resilience refers to the capacity of a self-organising system (whether person, community, city, ecosystem and so on) to adapt and learn in the face of change, whilst retaining its core functions and identity. As I explained in chapter six, one of the most important contributions of Transition was to shift the cognitive praxis of environmentalism by displacing the notion of sustainability with that of resilience (Hopkins, 2009). At community level this means diversification and modularisation at where it makes sense and is viable (predominantly in relation to energy production, economy, food production) in order that feedbacks are tightened and communities are thus not so susceptible to sudden macro-structural shocks (whether economic or to do with energy supply and the availability of imported commodities. This approach resonates with urbanist Jane Jacob’s (1985) concepts of import replacement and inward substitution of skills.

Thus, rather than engaging in overt systemic critique, Transition is more concerned with enacting an affirmative translocal micro-politics. Its holistic and optimistic approach to cultural politics is thus partly borne of its genealogical origins in the ‘cosmology’ of permaculture, and its catachrestical application of organismic metaphors onto the realm of politics and cultural change. However, some approach Transition in a different way, abandoning the organismic metaphors for an approach based on relation of externality.

In this context, some movement intellectuals (Scott-Cato & Hillier, 2010; Aiken, 2012) have posited that the non-essentialist philosophy of Deleuze is a productive intellectual base for the movement. This very much suits the movement's philosophically pragmatic suspicion of theoretical purism, instead favouring a process of 'what works' and social experimentation. If something works, it spreads locally, and throughout larger national, regional and global networks connected through the internet. In this way, the Transition movement can be considered an overarching emergent assemblage of other learning assemblages. Moreover, in this sense learning is then conceived of as a process of 'translation' between imbricate domains, forcing us to think relationally about how the spaces through which knowledge moves hinders, facilitates, amplifies, distorts, contests or repackages it (McFarlane, 2011, p. 365).

As I argued in chapter 6, 'community' is also one of the key nodal points around which the notion of Transition is articulated. The cultural politics of Transition is emergent, multiple and changing, but one where the reconnecting with a sense of place, and therefore "learning to dwell" is considered vital (McFarlane, 2011). (Re)connecting with place finds Transition's cultural politics at the intersection of culture as social psychological, and as material – as a complete way of life (Williams, 1989 [1958]). In this sense cultural politics draws attention to how Transition's pedagogical dimensions are to do with the "education of attention" (McFarlane, 2011). Yet, Transition culture aims to go beyond this by fostering a relational sense of place – as an unfinished product (Massey, 2005), always in a state of becoming (Aiken, 2012). Nevertheless, as I argued, questions remain around mobility and uneven geographical development, which overly simplistic prescriptions for affective ties with one's 'place' do not get at. In this context, Transition Culture would do well to engage with a wider community development literature on 'contrived community'.

However, in cognitive praxis terms, this is where the 'technical knowledge' interest emerges as appropriate technologies or living, in terms of sustainable scale, can only be generated through the *en masse* 're-skilling' of local communities. This is not purely 'technical', but rather is socio-technical because it is seen as involving the unlearning of tacit cultural values and norms that reproduce themselves through our habitual everyday practices.

Hence the perceived importance of local communities envisioning cultural narratives, in which 'resilient' communities are "described *backwards* from the practices of living socially and ecologically well in place" (Haluza-DeLay, 2008, p. 213). The Transition identity is forged through constructing cultural narratives, which "indicate a possible future" and "bring life to the past" by articulating a coherent cognitive praxis exemplifying sustainable technologies, skills, and forms of social interaction (Hopkins, 2001, p. 230). If this is one cultural tool, another is to apply "insights from psychology" to the question of what motivates change. However, there has been a question mark over what 'insights' are the right ones? Thus tensions opened up between social marketing and intrinsic motivation.

The logic has been that if a cultural movement as significant as Transition is not to be doomed to marginality, it must be something that people want to do. This is why Transition draws upon the psychology of addiction, segmenting, positive psychology, and the social psychology of Common Cause (see next section). None of this on its own is pernicious. What is more troubling is when all of these elements are keyed to a wider project of Transition, into which one makes a radical investment. Transition is borne of a frustration of the rate-of-change being too slow. This seemingly has driven the opinion that radical negativity and critique do not move us forward in that respect. Yet, what I am arguing is that the movement's failure to see that there is no 'beyond hegemony' is what may in the end either confine it to marginality, or see it co-opted back into hegemonic discourse. This is where resilience re-enters the picture, because it is principally a reactionary concept,

particularly when understood psychologically as a component of "optimism as a learnable skill" (Seligman, in Hopkins, 2011, p. 77). Moreover community resilience can be part of a discourse of shoring up boundaries and cultural insidership. In this respect, it is important for Transition Culture to realise that it does not exist in a cultural vacuum. Community, resilience and even peak oil can all be articulated into neoliberal discourse as well as neoconservative discourse, and this floating indeterminacy is only resolved through struggle.

This, as I argued, is particularly concerning when articulated alongside what is in cognitive praxis terms, an 'organisational' knowledge interest preoccupied with 'openness' and 'consensus', because it obscures more insidious, arcane and distributed forms of power. There is a recognition of conflict as natural, but it seems to be regarded as something to be anticipated and micro-managed through processes of respectful communication and emotional awareness, rather than something which structures the fabric of social relations in a productive way.

In Transition, some have advocated using social marketing techniques and crude framing techniques. At times it has drawn on the 'Value Modes' approach (see previous chapter), which actively advocates pressing 'hot buttons' that is, drawing people in though appealing to 'extrinsic values'. This has existed alongside a wider 'cosmological' instinct to change people's worldviews completely. The desire to make Transition something that is intrinsically motivating has been developed substantially by professional movement intellectuals from Common Cause. With this, I move on.

What are the cultural politics of professional activism in relation to climate change? What curriculum is generated through this cultural politics?

Common Cause, as a professional culture of activism, is most directly located 'in and against' social marketing and behaviour change technologies. It is 'against' because it seeks to directly contest the values and norms of the 'market society' (Sandel, 2012), which some commentators have accused behaviour change technologies of merely reproducing by addressing people as individual consumers (Webb, 2012). In cognitive praxis terms, its 'cosmology' is ostensibly anti-neoliberal, with influences from communitiarian virtue ethics (drawing upon Michael Sandel's critiques of the market society). It is 'in' because it seeks to apply, in cognitive praxis terms, technical-practical knowledge from psychology, cognitive science, and behavioural economics to the domain of culture change. In essence, CC has bought into the idea that one can 'do' cultural politics like science.

As a discourse theorist, my position was that there is no objectively accessible, transcultural, singular notion of the 'Common Cause'; it is articulated through hegemonic struggle. political identities are non-necessary, historically specific formations; refining the evidence-base in order to provide a rational route map to cultural change simply seems to either miss or disregard this point. I move on below, to briefly address the issue of dialogue across these cultures of activism, before reflecting on what I have learned about the concept of cognitive praxis itself.

What dialogue can be observed across these activist cultures, and where it exists, has it been generative of praxis, and thus social movement learning?

Let us begin with common ground: what the cognitive praxis of Common Cause, Transition, and the Camp for Climate Action have in common is an internal 'organisational' knowledge interest informed by Habermasian notions of 'open space', 'horizontality' and 'consensus'. Transition initiatives use 'Open Space Technology', Climate Camps are premised on consensus-decision making, and Common Cause clearly believe that Transition (Crompton, 2010, p.57), and the CCA (Holmes, et al, p. 47) are models of participatory democracy to aspire to. Indeed, an ethnographer of, and participant in, the global justice movement (from which the Climate Camp emerged) has argued that horizontalism enjoys the status of a "Kantian regulative idea" hovering over actual networks and open spaces which are "only partial actualisations of the idea they make possible" (Nunes, 2005, p. 297). This is illustrated clearly in the expert below from Common Cause:

> While in practice participation [in the CCA] was inevitably limited by factors such as available time, mobility and experience, in principle the decision-making process was open to all, and encouraged direct participation on a horizontal democratic basis (Holmes, et al, 2011, p. 48).

Yet, issues of available time, mobility and experience go to the heart of the matter. They should not be casually inserted as caveats. So, how do we understand the logic of such statements? Understood in the Kantian sense as an infinite approach towards the ideal, one could argue that the only political option is a vacillation between a regression to naivety (a mistaken belief in the impossible) or a "stance of cynical

distance" (Butler, et al., 2000, p. 233). Neither of these seem like good options. However, this vacillation disappears if we understand 'horizontalism' as a partial object in which a radical investment is made (Laclau, 2005, p. 235). This radical investment in horizontal/open spaces allows for mutual learning and translation to an extent. However, time will tell whether or not actually existing structural exclusions occurring within cultures of activism will create dislocations which question the ability of horizontalism to define the horizon of collective struggle.

Despite a dialogue between these cultures of activism, which suggests a unanimous agreement regarding the principle of applying consensus approaches to communication to internal practices, each culture of activism interprets these differently, and the tension between agonism and rational consensus plays out in different ways. The CCA sought to demonstrate the incoherence of a neoliberal approach to climate governance through targeted interventions aimed at establishing networks of complicity and identifying specific actors as responsible parties. As such, the movement intentionally and inadvertently built up quite a list of adversaries (see appendix 5). A difference between the CCA and both Transition and Common Cause, is a tacit faith in the rationality of an adversarial approach. I have suggested that this dimension was overemphasised as a reaction to the pathologisation of direct action protest historically. Common Cause maintain an antagonistic dimension but it is expressed rather abstractly as opposition to the tacit values and norms of a market society. Transition meanwhile are *de facto* against neoliberalism, but choose strategically to eschew antagonism altogether.

A difference between both Transition and Common Cause compared against the CCA's approach is a quasi-refutation of the Western Enlightenment subject. It is 'quasi' in both instances because in spite of what is stated, there is a tacit belief in the efficacy of expert behaviour change technologies, only used to 'fight the good fight'. As I have argued, it is obvious that many people operate in more than one, or all of these cultures of activism. There is no doubt some truth in the argument that each

culture might be most effective by remaining functionally separate to a degree. Yet, this has generated considerable debate and intellectual praxis. The big mistake to make, as some activists have pointed out, is the failure to see that antagonism and power are both productive and also intractable. Direct action activists have helped to make this point, through dialogue with Transition activists whilst the cognitive praxis of Transition and Common Cause have devoted more intellectual resources to understanding the psychological drivers of culture change. Dialogue between Transition and Common Cause has led to a degree of epistemic drift between both cultures: activist-intellectuals from ENGOs with better institutional access than direct action networks are able to establish contacts with sympathetic academics. Knowledge produced in this milieu is often 'used on the ground' in community initiatives. I now move on to consider what I have learned about the concept of cognitive praxis in general.

What can be learnt about the cognitive praxis of climate activism?

Beyond cognitive praxis?

Discourse theory has provided me with a powerful theoretical and philosophical resource for critically examining how cultures of activism have, in their own ways, attempted to reassert a relationship between structure and agency through their cultural politics. I have demonstrated this through explaining how the time period under examination has produced dislocatory moments arising from attempts to articulate the concept of climate protection into hegemonic discourse, based on a mixture of technocratic managerialism and faith in markets. Although these dislocatory moments have been constitutive of new activist cultures, they nevertheless "remain conditioned by existing ideological traditions and organisational infrastructures" such that the process of articulation is contingent upon

what is available and credible (Howarth, 2000, pp. 121-2). More than this, I contend that the very application of central tenets from discourse theory – particularly, an agonistic concept of the political based particularly on Laclau and Mouffe's radical reworking of hegemony – to the cultural politics of climate activism, represents a unique theoretical contribution both in its application to the empirical material at hand and through the way it challenges the new common sense of consensus. Through analysing the evolving cognitive praxis of environmentalism, what I have found surprising is the sheer extent to which an agonistic conception of cultural politics approach has been marginalised by the hegemony of consensus.

Although it is true to say that the 'cognitive' in the cognitive praxis has been reflexively challenged by movement intellectuals, a false novelty has been attached to the disruption of the Eurocentric enlightenment ideal that this entails. Indeed, it seems that as particular movement intellectuals discovered the 'bounded' nature of our rationality, they projected this discovery onto others as though it was a consequence of the theorising and evidence base generated through psychology, behavioural economics, and cognitive science, thus ignoring the profound contributions to epistemology made by at least a generation of feminist, poststructuralist and critical theorists.

This is why, to grasp what is really at stake within the current cultural politics of environmentalism, it is useful to revisit the debates between non-essentialist, contingent agonistic theories of democracy and the rationalistic Habermasian belief in universal values as necessary to humanist metanarratives of emancipation. The new cultural politics of environmentalism, after Habermas, "believes that the defects of the Enlightenment can only be made good by further enlightenment" (Giroux, 1992, p. 49). It is, to borrow a turn of phrase from theorist Levi Bryant, about "'bootstrapping' ourselves out of the limitations of our cognitive architecture" (Bryant, 2013). Cognitive praxis has thus begun to focus on itself as a process of

‘meta-learning’, which clutches to a belief in the humanist narratives of adult education (Mezirow, 1995) as applicable in the domain of climate change.

The problem arises when culture becomes cleaved from politics, as a positivistic scientism comes to serve the quest for a cosmopolitan, post-political and universal value core adequate to the scale of the ‘wicked problems’ we face. As I have argued, the single most important argument from discourse theory, which can be applied here, is that because there is no foundational ‘people’ or ‘identity’ that can be constructed through essentialist presuppositions, the precarious stability of the social is non-necessary and shot through with power. Therefore, the commitment to ideals of social justice and radical democracy require that we acknowledge that antagonism is constitutive of the political, and abandon “the dream of a reconciled world that would have overcome power, sovereignty and hegemony” (Mouffe, 2005, p. 130).

It has become apparent to me that an agonistic approach is increasingly anathema to the new common sense of environmentalism, yet this is precisely why it is so important a contribution to knowledge. The non-necessary nature of the social entails a hegemonic politics of articulation, through which power can never be bracketed, as it is necessary to the temporary stability of any socio-political order. As I have sought to demonstrate, cultures of direct action, relocalisation and professional environmentalism all enact public pedagogies through articulating chains of equivalence. Each culture of activism has achieved this in two ways: in each case, the mobilisation of actors with diverse interests and identities, through a pragmatic multiplication of tactics and strategies, required the construction of empty signifiers. These are necessary but impossible representations needed in order to bring together such heterogeneous ensembles. Here they were calls for ‘Climate Action’, ‘Transition’, or appeals to a ‘Common Cause’ of ‘Intrinsic Values’. As argued in chapter three, the pedagogical element involves the work of filling such empty signifiers with meaning.

What about political economy?

Adult educator John Holst (2002, p. 84) has argued from another, more explicitly Marxist perspective, that the notion of cognitive praxis is flawed because "Eyerman and Jamison "virtually ignore the political for the cognitive, thus leaving themselves open to an overemphasis on the ideal and not the material…[T]heir dependence on Habermas…taints their perspective" (Holst, 2002, p. 84). This would be a fair point were it not based on such a careless reading: Eyerman and Jamison (1991, p. 62) explicitly state that they use Habermas heuristically to represent tensions between different kinds of knowledge making, and not transcendentally. In fact, in a manner remarkably consonant with the position of discourse theory, one of the theory's originators Andrew Jamison (2001, p.41-2) clearly states that cognitive praxis understands "ecological culture as an ongoing set of both social and cultural processes that contain both elements of both thought and action, and which are both ideational and material".

However, I think that Holst does have a point when he argues that "Eyerman and Jamison's lack of political economy is evident in their conceptualisation of movement intellectuals" in their analysis of environmental and civil rights movements (Holst, 2002, p. 84). As a discourse theorist, I obviously take issue with the notion that the proletariat is an organic category (derived from a dialectical reading of capitalism) and that this category is the *a priori* privileged agent of historical change.

However, as I argued in the previous chapter, such individuals in the world of climate activism are often academics, activists, and consultants at different times. Although they may legitimately be called 'social movement intellectuals' (Eyerman & Jamison, 1991), their cultural work reflects a tacit class positioning. As I argued, the severing of the 'political' from the 'cultural' is concerning particularly when ideas of grassrootsness are constantly invoked as a representational strategy. 'Basism' is the term for overdetermined readings of 'grassrootsness' in education: it

"means that virtue, knowledge, wisdom and everything else reside with the grassroots. And those who are not in sight of the grassroots are classified as elites and academics" (Holst, 2002, p.94). This despite the fact that almost all of the intellectuals in the climate movement are university educated, and many of them move lithely between activism and the academy. Second, to think that a 'Common Cause' can be brought about through cognitive re-framing, ignores that "the particular political economic context of NGOs forces them into fragmented, politically limited projects" (Holst, 2002, p. 94). Instrumental representational strategies are OK, so long as we do not end up deceiving ourselves. For movements to truly engage and mobilise, educational efforts are needed which don't wilfully neglect how "power relations between participants rooted on [sic] structural inequalities" shape cognitive praxis, and engage with how power dynamics and structural, spatial, temporal constraints "intersect in setting up the boundaries of 'insidership' and 'outsidership' (Estevez, 2008, p. 1934). Finally, I would like to finish by re-examining temporal urgency, which seemed to be a strong theme throughout.

Implications for climate change education: the temporal dynamics of meta-learning

From the outset, I have been at pains to emphasise that the public pedagogies of climate activism are positioned against neoliberal public pedagogies (Giroux, 2010). As such, activist-intellectuals have sought to advance cultural strategies, which suppress self-interest frames in favour of a discourse of the Commons. That activist milieus have actively recognised that this places culture in a position of strategic importance is a progressive and necessary step. I have recently heard this referred to in environmental communication circles as 're-commonsing' our discourse. The important questions begin when we begin to examine how one might do this

'recommonsing'. As sociologist Ann Mische (2008) has forcefully argued, democratic discourse requires, not unconstrained communication, but the "strategic suppression of situationally potent identities". In a sense, as I argued, the Transition movement has recognised this, as it has sought to create a discourse, which strategically suppresses partisan discourse in favour of creating ostensibly 'open spaces' for Habermasian 'bridging' rhetoric and Dewian problem solving rhetoric, as opposed to Gramscian positioning (Mische, 2008). Yet, as Ann Mische also recognises, and as I argued, successful democratic communication relies on activists who have, by virtue of their overlapping membership of several groups in networks, learned the tacit skill of how to alternate between more agonistic, more problem solving and more deliberative modes of communication in a reflexive manner. Antagonism is constitutive of the political and the exercise of civility and reason in the public sphere is a utopian vision. The 'ideal speech situation' (Habermas, 1979) must be recognised as just that – an ideal – lest its emancipatory claims become oppressive. This requires reflexivity and being able to differentiate between strategic attributions of 'openness' and 'horizontality', and believing one's own hype, so to speak. Thus, I feel that the following statement on climate change communication sums up my position well:

> Though not simple, the answers have to involve increased pluralism in addressing climate change at all stages of political life. But rather than expecting consensual deliberation, one should expect agonistic pluralism…[A]ntagonism…is in fact a condition of democracy, not an obstacle to it…What are the means for and the implications of applying agonistic pluralism to climate change? Designing spaces and mechanisms of expression for a wide range of views on the problem, including those in disagreement with hegemonic discourses, would be required (Peterson & Carvalho, 2012, p. 318).

Designing spaces and mechanisms is indeed a central problematic. Whether through creating such spaces in local communities, or through the spatial interventions (the 'invented' spaces) of direct action, and through consensus-based decision making, this is what climate activists have sought to do. Yet, a less recognised problematic, as

I see it, is time. If democratic politics can be understood metaphorically as a '*jogo de cintura'* (Mische, 2008, p. 355) – a reflexive swing of the hips - then it dances to its own beat; a different, and slower beat than the drum of capital accumulation, and certainly, a different beat than the drum of the global climatic change.

In exploring the cultural politics of climate change, I have sought to tell a story: the degree to which it convinces, and perhaps more modestly, is compelling (regardless of its veracity) is for the reader to judge. As a piece of written research, there is no master's view from nowhere: my own hermeneutical reading of events and texts is necessarily partial, situated, and a simplification of a messy reality. Nevertheless, I will simplify and abstract from the messy entangled events even more here, for the sake of perspicuity.

Direct action, community and professional cultures of activism have their own genealogies, histories and their 'cognitive praxis', or 'identity', is constituted through their own distinctive actor-networks. As cultures of direct action have sought to 'speak truth to power', their agonistic approach has been derided by other cultures of activism for alienating the wider public, valorising the 'activist' role (the kind of social justice version of the 'entrepreneurial spirit') at the expense of 'everyday life', being unhelpfully focused on problems and conflict rather than solutions and opportunities, and preventing action through ideological retrenchment in a context where we are constantly reminded that *we have no time*.

A time-limited situation, as we all are aware, requires pragmatism. So what works? Well, relocalisation movements have argued that we must make engaging with systemic issues as quotidian as possible. This must mean a cultural politics embedded in communities of place. So far, so good. We must also make the argument that engaging collectively in creating a sustainable future is more rewarding, beneficial and fun than not engaging (thus, tackling the free-rider problem discussed in chapter 3). This has resulted in a strategy of suppressing "situationally potent identities" (Mische, 2008). Somewhere along the line, what has occurred, in

my opinion, is a pernicious elision between 'starting where people are at', and an evacuation of power and politics from the discourse.

Lest we forget that the personal is political, and that power manifests itself in seemingly mundane situations, I argued, drawing on such diverse resources such as the empirical sociology of Ann Mische, the education scholarship of Paula Allman, Henry Giroux, and Paulo Freire, and of course, the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, that antagonism must be a part of our educational discourse: a language of possibility (an optimistic pedagogy of place) must presuppose a language of critique (a critical pedagogy of place). I fear that if such approaches do not address the unexamined effects of their own rhetoric, then they are doomed to marginality at worst and bland compromise at best, again in a context in which we are repeatedly reminded that *we have no time*.

Considering all of this, the Transition movement, and the ENGO sector, has not been beyond applying 'social marketing' approaches to their work either. Thus, audiences have been 'segmented' in identity campaigns, through which activists have sought to appeal to people's image, or their pocket, as incentives for adopting 'green' behaviours. This tactic, it was thought, may play a part in gaining buy-in in the short term. As people adopt particular green behaviours, these may be seen as the thin end of the wedge for opening people up to climate-friendly policies. Yet, pushing the debate forward yet again, the Common Cause coalition (and the TT movement) have drawn on social psychology (Schwartz, 1994) literature to suggest that social marketing appeals to self-interest are indeed counter-productive in the long-term because they only inadvertently serve to reinforce the hegemonic self-interest values that we are rallying against. Meanwhile, those who advocate the 'Value Modes' approach, argue that *we have no time* to reorient the values of society at large.

As a result, we are in a tricky situation, with no obvious answers. We have a complex temporal dynamic here, and three distinct temporal modes (table 15):

Table 15 Competing temporal dynamics in the climate change debate.

Assemblage	Temporal mode(s)	Implications
Political (lifeworld) assemblages	The slow time of democratic dialogue (whether consensus-based or 'agonistic'). The 'fast-time' of digitally networked movements	Social movements exist in hybrid public spaces between network time and in physical spaces, which seek to escape the time/spaces of capital accumulation. We may be able to seek technological solutions through crowd sourcing, but can there be a rapprochement between network time and the slow-time of democracy?
The global climate	The scientific language, and reality, of feedback loops and tipping points speak to a time limited situation in which to act. Actual changes in climate do not occur on a time frame consonant with the risk perception parts of our cognitive architecture.	Disjunction between objective threat and our perception. Climate change is not concerned with the slow temporalities of democratic politics, or the temporal filters through which we perceive 'reality'.
Capitalism	'Fast-time', 'network time': the 'annihilation of space through time'.	The temporal dynamics of capital accumulation have changed the way we work, and socialise, and have indeed blurred the line between the two. Network time overstimulates our evolved attentional capacities, and thus physically disciplines and exhausts us, so that we have time for political thinking, deliberation and debate. Network time has trapped us within a recursive loop in which culture has stagnated.

It is the third row in the above table that I would like to draw attention to. As stated in chapter two, the pedagogies of neoliberalism operate in a particular disembodied temporality: the preoccupations of network time affect our subjectivities and drain our cognitive energies. In my opinion, activist public pedagogies need to contest this, but also to acknowledge it explicitly. This, I would contend, is part of the learning that needs to take place. I do not claim to have any easy answers here, but I have recognised that there is another temporality that must be added to the mix, and of which we must be aware as we continue to learn.

For the sake of simplicity, we can say that we have embodied and disembodied temporalities. We already know, and it is already well-documented in the climate change communications literature, that the disembodied temporality of climate change tests our evolved, embodied, temporal perceptions. In one sense, we have to act quickly and collectively as a species to forge global agreements that would be effective. Yet, the disembodied temporality of climate change does not square with our embodied temporal perceptions of risk. Whilst top-down interventions will not be effective in the absence of democratic participation, deliberation and agonistic democratic encounters operate according to embodied temporalities. Thus, we are faced with the question of whether or not we have time for such lofty democratic ideals (Giddens, 2009).

Yet, on the other hand, simply 'slowing down' can be considered counter-hegemonic (Bommel & Spicer, 2011; Hartman & Darab, 2012). Prefigurative movements can be understood as an attempt to operate outside of these temporalities. This prefigurative 'slow time' is important in the autonomous spaces of the CCA, as well as in Transition initiatives. Indeed, it is a arguably a defining feature of contemporary collective action. In relation to Occupy, for instance, Castells (2012, p. 169) writes:

> Occupied spaces created a new form of time, which some in the camps characterized as a feeling of 'forever'. The routine of their daily lives was interrupted; a parenthesis was opened with an undefined time horizon

I think that it is important to recognise explicitly that this is the case. It is not the case, I would argue, that people are blinded by an ideological veil: our agency is structured to an extent by the temporalities of capital accumulation. Driven by technological and thus organisational change, this has important consequences for daily life, labour processes, institutional arrangements, but ultimately, our embodied cognitive and affective processes. Increasingly, this will force the development of meta-cognitive capacities. This also requires that we recognise the differential endowment of these capacities. Thinking of our relation to nature, the relocalisation movement is right to say that such temporalities are dependent on our ability to consume the energy of fossilised sunlight in every aspect of our daily life. Thus, one way or another, our worlds will get smaller.

Yet, retreat to the local in absence of scaled-up action is not enough. In the so-called "information age" it seems that climate activists don't just seek to produce alternative hybrid spaces between place and flow, but that intellectual praxis for collective action relies on both the fast time of digital learning networks, and the time outside the "tyranny of the moment" (Erikson, 2001). To my final point. Agonistic pluralism arguably would help us to move beyond the impasse of consensus approaches to climate politics. Yet more than this, agonistic pluralism expressed as border pedagogy may be not useful, but necessary, since any climate policy ignoring the poor and marginalised is bound to be ineffective. Climate activists could *learn from* those least equipped to act that, who already know most about the "tyranny of the moment" in day to day life, as Paulo Freire observed. Yet, this itself must become a "generative theme", from which the duelling temporalities of climate and capital accumulation can be discussed explicitly, as they relate back to concrete experience.

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Appendix 1 Timeline of the Camp for Climate Action**.**

Date	Event	Targets	Reason	Example
July 2005	G8 Protests, Gleneagles. The camp emerges from an eco-village and dialogue between environmentalists and anti-capitalists.	The G8 delegates.	Symbol of democratically unaccountable neoliberal project. The focus on climate change emerges partially from political opportunity. Tony Blair champions communique on climate change backed by the Royal Society.	"When we first got involved with the Climate Camp, a few months before the Drax camp in 2006, it had a very distinct radical feel to it. In its stated principles, government and markets were regarded as the problem that we needed to tackle, and the camp was to be a festival of grassroots resistance – much alike the Horizon eco-village that was the base for hundreds of British anarchists and their international allies during the Gleneagles G8 summit a year earlier" ('Open Letter' written by climate camp participants, reproduced in Shift/Dystopia 2010: 7).
September 2006 *September* *October*	CCA Drax, Yorkshire (Plane Stupid East Midlands Airport) (Green Peace action, Didcot)	Drax coal-fired power station (Didcot power station) (East Midlands Airport)	The UK's single-biggest emitter of CO2 and a symbol of the unsustainability of coal as a fuel.	"Last summer's Camp for Climate Action saw hundreds of people take direct action against Drax, the country's largest coal-fired power station…Within weeks, Greenpeace had staged a similar action at Didcot power station, the country's second largest source of CO2 emissions. Then two

				dozen people were arrested after blockading a runway at Nottingham East Midlands Airport, and Plane Stupid, the country's first anti-aviation direct action group, took off". (Bailey 2007, Red Pepper)
August 2007 *October* *October*	CCA Heathrow (PS blockade at Manchester Airport) (Greenpeace 'Kingsnorth 6' occupy smokestack and paint 'Gordon' on the chimney)	Heathrow Airport, BAA .	Protesting against proposed building of a third runway at Heathrow, and therefore the expansion of aviation, serving short-term economic interests. Capacity built from Plane Stupid' s actions and analysis.	Camp for Climate Action, an annual gathering of hundreds of environmental campaigners from disparate groups, will take Plane Stupid's lead and spend eight days campaigning at Heathrow, somewhere they say is responsible for 31m tonnes of carbon emissions a year - more than many countries, including Peru, Cuba and Croatia. 'People can't now contemplate flying without contemplating their impact on the climate,' (Interview with CCA participant, in Davis 2007, *Observer*)
August 2008 *December*	CCA Kingsnorth (PS Stanstead Airport)	Kingnorth coal-fired power station, Eon.	EOn proposed the building of a replacement coal-fired station. The current station is to cease generation in 2013 due to EU pollution laws.	[The proposed station] will emit between six and eight million tons of CO2 every year. More than the projected emissions from Heath-row's planned third runway. To undertake such a project was bound to be

				contentious, and both the company and the government have been striving to make the case for Kingsnorth. The arguments centre around "the energy gap", spreading the fear that "the lights will go out". As with 60 years ago, the government is driven by it's concern over "energy security". Whilst the company is driven by the need to generate a profitable return for its institutional shareholders. But this time the situation is different. The negotiations have been made public, and at the Climate Camp people are demanding that "climate security" should be put before shareholder return, and that "energy security" can be achieved by other means than by burning coal. And to demand that the proposed new power station at Kingsnorth should not be built. (Platform activist James Marriot 2008, The Idependent)
2009 March	Plane Stupid, Aberdeen Airport	Aberdeen Airport	Proposed expansion of Aberdeen Airport supported. The expansion is supported by Donald Trump because of his golf course project.	One protester, Jonny Agnew, 22, from Edinburgh, said: "The reality is that our generation's future is vanishing so that people like Donald Trump and his super-rich friends can jet

					into Aberdeen for a round of golf. The expansion of this airport just cannot go ahead." (Churchill 2009, The Herald)
April	CCA London (G20 protests)		European Climate Exchange, London	This is a symbolic centre where the trade in carbon markets is facilitated. The crisis of finance capital caused by 'toxic assets' provides a discursive and political opportunity to highlight carbon markets as a false solution. The CCA protest dovetailed with a larger 'Financial Fools day' on April 1st, organised in the wake of the financial crisis and set against the background of the G20 meeting. This signals a subtle narrative shift for the CCA as it widens to join with emerging anti-austerity coalitions.	Climate Camp in the City on 1 April is all about reclaiming power from politicians. It's about people taking their future into their own hands, not leaving it up to those who continue to be enchanted by the "magic" of the markets. Carbon trading is the embodiment of this. It is nothing more than the proposition of creating a market to solve a problem - climate change - caused by the relentless pillage of our planet by the marketers. It is immoral and it doesn't work. It's the next sub-prime. So if the G20 want to avoid the entire world giving up on government, they will need to produce a solution to climate change that is not just another business opportunity but a moral imperative. (CCA organiser Kevin Smith, in Taylor et al 2009, *Observer*)
July-	CCA in solidarity with		Vestas Plc,	Solidarity with occupying	The fact that workers,

August	Vestas wind turbine factory occupation	manufacturer of wind turbines.	workers made redundant through lack of demand. The notion of Just Transition enters the narrative.	locals, environmentalists and labour campaigners are all working together reflects how important this occupation is. It's vital to the factory workers and their families, it's vital to the local economy, and it's vital in the fight to avert climate disaster. The Vestas wind turbine factory must be saved. (CCA press release 2009)
August	CCA Mainshill	Broken Cross coal mine, Scottish Coal, South Lanarkshire	Mainshill Solidarity Camp was set up in June 2010. In August the camp was opened as an educational space for a week following the CCA model. The camp opposes the development of the open cast mine because of the unsustainability of coal and also because of the effects of local environmental injustices.	"We've heard so much talk from the Scottish Government. On the one hand it's great that they want to have the strongest climate bill in the world, but it's all just talk if, on the other side, they're expanding the coal industry. "It's a complete contradiction." (CCA organiser, in Watt 2009, *The Herald*)
August	CCA London (Blackheath Common)	Blackheath Common acts as 'training ground' for 'mass action' at Eons	The camp continues to act as an edcautional space in which the links between financial crisis and climate change can be thought through. Also, the camp acts as a training ground for Ratclife-on-	"This year we are camping in London because we want to demonstrate and talk about the links between the crisis happening to our climate and the financial crisis and capitalism. We feel that at the root of both

		Ratcliffe-on-Soar plant. Also used as hub from which to preform dentralised actions in London's financial district.	Soar and activists intending to travel to Copenhagen.	are decisions and practices that are made and enacted in centres like the city of London, and that we cannot divorce the problems of environmental damage from the economics of endless growth that is pushed by the City" (CCA letter to residents, 2009)
October	CCA Ratcliffe-on-Soar	Eon's coal-fired plant in Ratcliffe-on-Soar	In an online vote, Eon's Ratcliffe-on-Soar plant is chosen as the site. It is chosen because it is one of the largest CO2 emitters in Britain.	If we don't turn around our emissions now – so that they start to get smaller - climate change will spiral out of control well within our lifetimes. Small personal steps and letters to MPs are worthwhile, but they're obviously not enough, because things aren't changing – the government is still planning new coal power stations, which is a total no-brainer bad idea when it comes to the climate Our politicians and the political systems we have are failing us. There's too much big-industry money, too much fear of change, too much political capital tied up in the carbon economy to make lobbying MP's enough to meet a challenge of this magnitude. (CCA website 2009: n-p)

December	CCA at Copenhagen COP 15	The COP15 delegates.	The COP15 counter-mobilisations were are thoroughly transnational affair with ENGOs and anti-capitalists all claiming Climate Justice and North South coalitions forming amongst both the reformists and radicals. Climate Campers formed alliances in wider Climate Justice networks to stress the democratic deficit inherent in the talks and highlight alternatives.	“Copenhagen offers a unique opportunity to meet like-minded activists from across the globe…"Amidst all the depression as we start to doubt whether politicians are really going to come up with anything," says Kevin Smith of Climate Camp, "it's really inspiring to look at what the activists are getting on with." The most confrontational demonstrations look likely to kick off with two major actions by Climate Justice Action, a global network of activists and groups that aims to shut down Copenhagen Harbour on 13 December. Three days later, once the world leaders have finally arrived, it wants to take over the UN conference itself and turn it into a "people's summit". "Because the talks are collapsing, people are thinking they might listen to us," says Ed Thompson, a British activist travelling to Copenhagen. "There will be thousands of activists there, and a lot will be willing to commit acts of civil disobedience “ (van der Zee and Barkham 2009, The Guardian)

October	CCA Didcot	Didcot coal-fired power station, Npower.	Owners N-Power, plan to build four new coal-fired power stations in the UK, as EOn drop out.	The single greatest threat to the climate comes from burning coal…Ed Miliband recently announced plans to allow the construction of four new coal plants... N-Power is behind 2 possible plants..As we close old coal-fired and nuclear power stations in the next decade we will lose capacity currently providing around a quarter of our electricity output…According to Europe's leading independent energy experts, Poyry, if the UK was to hit these existing renewables and efficiency targets, there will be no 'energy gap.'..Labour came to power, carbon dioxide emissions have actually increased and this can be attributed in large part due to 'the roll to coal' as well as increased aviation emissions. (CCA press release 2009)
2010 *August*	CCA Royal Bank of Scotland HQ, Edinburgh	RBS HQ, Edinburgh	RBS is targeted in order to make the link between its investment practices in environmentally destructive projects, - particularly Tar Sands extraction in Alberta, Canada - climate change, and the effects on First Nation communities and the devastation of local ecosystems.	We were told the banks were too big to fail. Now the very same people demand austerity from us while lending cash to climate change criminals... In the past year the Camp for Climate Action, along with the UK Tar Sands Network, has been organising with First Nations communities from Canada to highlight UK

		The public 'bail out' of RBS is used as an opportunity to resonate with ordinary people, and highlight the democratic deficit.	involvement in what is being called 'the world's most destructive project'…RBS..underwrote loans to companies operating in the tar sands, to the tune of more than $7.5 billion. Since the initial government bailout of UK banks in October 2008, RBS has underwritten corporate debt and equity worth nearly $2.5 billion to tar sands related companies. This is an enormous investment of taxpayers' money in an energy pathway that is taking us to the cusp of climate chaos. (CCA 2010: 2-8)
November 2011	'Metamorphosis' of the CCA into new forms	n/a	Activists meet and decide to discontinue the large-scale 'squatted camps' model in order to build alliances with the shifting politics of austerity and to use the capacity and material resources more efficiently.	In 2011 the climate science is as strong as ever – and the need for action on climate change never greater – but the political landscape is radically different. As a movement, to be relevant, we need to move with the times…. With the skills, networks and trust we have built we will launch new radical experiments As the financial crisis unfolded we moved to directly targeting the root cause of airport expansion and coal-fired power stations: our economic system. But many worried that using the same tactic –

mass squatted action camps in antagonistic locations – would become ineffectual.

. We therefore held a week-long ‘retreat’ type event at Monkton Wyld in Dorset to figure out what to do.

Over six days, about 70 people shared their experiences and critical reflection. We should not pretend that these discussions were easy. We talked about the limitations of an organisational model built to plan one camp a year, when we now have both the will and capacity to do much more. We discussed how other movements and groups have responded to changing circumstances in the past to learn from those experience?... How do we best grow a climate justice social movement that is relevant, vibrant and successful over the next few years? What organisational structures, consistent with our desire to tackle hierarchy, will take us to a new level of participation and action?

(CCA 2011: n-p)

“Activist Mel Evans is looking forward to what happens next: "Climate Camp was always about more than just climate change, it's also about the

political and economic context for climate change, and people from Climate Camp are now addressing those issues through UK Uncut and dozens of other campaigns. It may not be called Climate Camp any more, but the methods and the values will carry on."

(van der Zee 2011, *The Guardian*)

Appendix 2 List of pilot interviews undertaken.

Position	Organisation	Date of interview
Director	Scottish Education for Action and Development	25th May 2010
Community development worker	Community development organisation working with monies from the Climate Challenge Fund	25th May 2010
Adult Education Officer	World Development Movement Scotland	26th May 2010
Direct action practitioner and popular educator	CCA; Plane Stupid; So We Stand; Workers Climate Action	29th May 2010
Full-time researcher and development officer for Transition	Local Edinburgh Transition Towns initiative	1st June 2010
Communication and New Media Officer (part of Common Cause)	Friends of the Earth Scotland	2nd June 2010
Head campaigner for climate change (Part of Common Cause)	Oxfam Scotland	7th June 2010
Popular educator; Project Officer	Scottish Education for Action and Development; Community Recycling Network Scotland	8th June 2010
Director	Take One Film (film organisation that links filmgoers with activist communities and organisations tackling climate change issues)	8th June 2010
Prominent activist, campaigner, speaker and author on peak oil and climate change	Independent by affiliated with Transition Towns, Greenpeace and more.	10th June 2010

Appendix 3 Newspaper sources consulted

Transition Towns newspaper coverage (2005-2011)

Newspaper Title	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
The Aberdeen Evening Express							1	**1**
The Aberdeen Press & Journal			1	5	15	22	10	**53**
The Berwickshire News				1	1	3		**5**
The Carluke & Lanark Gazette			1		1			**2**
The Daily Mail				1				**1**
The East Lothian News					2	2		**4**
The Edinburgh Evening News		1	5	3	4	12	6	**31**
The Express						1		**1**
The Glasgow Evening Times			1		2	2	1	**6**
The Guardian			4	7	6	3	1	**21**
Hawick News				1	3	4		**8**
The Herald	2		2		1	1	1	**7**
The Independent					3	1	2	**6**
The Mirror			2			1		**3**
The Observer			4	2	1		2	**9**
The Paisley Daily Express				1				**1**
The Scotsman			2	4	1	3	2	**12**
The Southern Reporter				1	3	3		**7**
The Telegraph			1	2	1	2		**6**
The Times			3	6	4	6	2	**21**
Combined annual total	**2**	**1**	**26**	**34**	**48**	**66**	**28**	**205**

Camp for Climate Action newspaper coverage (2005-2011)

Newspaper Title	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
The Aberdeen Press & Journal			7		1			**8**
The Carluke & Lanark Gazette					2	1		**3**
The Daily Mail			11	1	10	2	5	**29**

The Daily Record					3	4	2	**9**
The Edinburgh Evening News					2	12	1	**15**
The Express					8	5	3	**16**
The Glasgow Evening Times					2	4		**6**
The Guardian		1	34	40	118	15	22	**230**
Hawick News								
The Herald			2	1	8	15	1	**27**
The Independent		5	28	16	29	6	7	**91**
The Mirror		1	9		12		3	**25**
The Observer		1	5	10	16	1	1	**34**
The Scotsman			5		14	20	3	**42**
The Star					2		1	**3**
The Sun						7	1	**8**
The Telegraph			16	6	15	5	1	**43**
The Times							2	**2**
Combined annual total	**0**	**8**	**117**	**74**	**242**	**97**	**53**	**591**

Appendix 4 Attitudes towards climate change in the UK

Overview

This appendix draws on survey and polling data and supplements it with relevant research evidence, in order to provide an up-to-date overall picture of climate change attitudes and beliefs. It should be noted that specifically Scottish data was scarce and that the data predominantly refers to Britain or the UK as a whole. This appendix is slightly adapted from a briefing note I produced working in Environment Social Research at the Scottish Government.

Key points

Belief in climate change

- In 2008, around one in ten people in Scotland were not convinced that climate is changing 2013 data suggests that scepticism has increased with around one in five people not believing that the climate is changing.

Concern about climate change

- Concern about climate change has decreased from 2008 to present. However, around 6 in 10 people in the UK are concerned.
- In comparison, British people are roughly twice as concerned about energy security as they are about climate change.

Immediacy of climate change

- Since 2008, the proportion of people regarding climate change as a problem for the future has remained around a fifth. In 2013, around 6 out of 10 people think that climate change poses an immediate threat to the UK. Close to a half think it will have a big impact on them personally (43%) and their local areas (47%).
- Flooding generates the most concern in the UK and is linked to increased certainty about climate change and belief that something can be done.

Responsibility for tackling climate change

- Around 7 out of 10 people think they have some kind of responsibility to tackle climate change, but national government remain overwhelmingly regarded by the public as having the *most* responsibility to act.

Attitudes towards sources of information

- Outside internet searches, government publications and websites were cited as the most popular source of information on climate change. This is not matched by trust in such sources.
- Trust in friends and family is relatively high.
- Distrust outweighs trust across media sources but tabloids are the least trusted and the BBC and 'quality' newspapers are the most trusted sources. Scientists remain the most trusted sources.

Drivers of attitudes and beliefs

- Increased scientific certainty has not led to a long-term increase in the public's certainty and concern about climate change.
- There is evidence to suggest that the single biggest driver for concern and belief about climate change is the economy.
- Economic conditions notwithstanding, media attention, coupled with issue advocacy by political elites are the most important combined factors driving concern over time.

This appendix covers four main areas related to climate change attitudes and beliefs.

- ***Section 1*** examines different aspects of climate change scepticism.
- ***Section 2*** looks at concern about climate change.
- ***Section 3*** looks at how immediate, or otherwise, people perceive climate change to be.
- ***Section 4*** examines attitudes around responsibility.
- ***Section 5*** examines sources of information and trust in them.
- ***Section 6*** concludes by drawing on research evidence seeking to understand what drives changes in concern and belief.

Figure 1 Trend scepticism, impact scepticism and attribution scepticism



Source: Poortinga, et al. **(**2013**)**. NB: TS= trend scepticism: % responding 'yes' to "as far as you know, do you personally think that the world's climate is changing". IS=impact scepticism: % agree that "the seriousness of climate change is exaggerated". AS=Attribution scepticism: % think that "climate change is entirely/mainly caused by natural processes".

1. Scepticism

There are three aspects of climate scepticism[1]:

- 'trend scepticism' (TS) refers to lack of general belief in climate change.
- 'attribution scepticism' (AS) refers to lack of belief that people are causing climate change.
- 'impact scepticism' (IS) refers to a belief that the predicted consequences of climate change are over-exaggerated.

- Despite the increasing scientific certainty of anthropogenic climate change[5], the most reliable evidence suggests that climate scepticism is on the rise.
- In terms of general trend scepticism in climate change, in 2002 only 5% of Scots were of the opinion that the climate was probably or definitely not changing[6]. In 2008 SEABS found that only 9% of Scots were "not convinced that climate change was happening". Although there is no comparable data for Scotland since this period, figure 1 suggests that for the UK as a whole, disbelief in climate change has increased and is currently at its highest level at 19%.

[5] IPCC (2013)
[6] Hinds, et al. (2002)

- Evidence suggests that impact scepticism has actually decreased, with a statistically significant drop of 6 percentage points since 2010 of people thinking that the seriousness of climate change is exaggerated (figure 1).

- Meanwhile, attribution scepticism has remained relatively constant with around a fifth of people believing that climate change is entirely/mainly caused by natural processes (figure 1). The proportion of people holding the opinion that it is caused by a mixture of human and natural causes has remained at just under a half over the same period.

2. Concern

We can either measure concern by asking direct questions about climate change or by assessing its importance relative to other issues: by both measures, the best available evidence suggests that concern over climate change has dropped since 2008 (figures 2 and 3).

Figure 2 Proportion concerned (asked directly) [7]



- Between 2010 and 2013, the proportion either 'fairly concerned/concerned' about climate change dropped significantly by 8 percentage points (figure 3).

[7] Sources: Poortinga, et al. (2013), DECC (2013), Ipsos Mori (2013). NB: Proportions for each year based on annual means of data taken from the UK/ERC tracker (Poortinga, et al., 2013), the DECC (2013) public attitudes tracker and 2013 attitudinal research by DEFRA (Ipsos Mori, 2013). All sources based on nationally representative samples of the British population. All sources asked 'how concerned, if at all, are you about climate change?'

Figure 3 Relative importance of climate change[8]



- An alternative measure is to ask people what issues are the most important to them[9], unprompted, and without the research being couched as 'environmental' to participants.

- On this measure, relative concern for climate change has also dropped (figure 3). The percentage difference between Scotland and Britain over this period is statistically significant, i.e. scots have tended to rate environmental concerns/climate change of slightly higher importance in such polls.

[8] Available from: http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.aspx?oItemId=2440&view=wide; Ipsos Mori Scottish public opinion monitor. Available from: http://www.ipsosmori.com/contactus/offices/scotland/scottishpublicopinionmonitor.aspx. NB: The question asks what people think are 'the most important issues facing Britain/Scotland today'

[9] However, the wording of these issue importance questions potentially generates artificially low responses for climate change because of the way the questions are worded. For example, the questions generally ask what are the most important issues *facing* Scotland/ Britain *today*. However, a question asking what important issues we should be *addressing today, or facing Scotland/Britain in the future*, might generate very different responses. Thus, we should focus not on the figures themselves, but relative change over time.

Figure 4 'What are the 3 most important Environmental issues facing your country today?' [10]



- Finally, it is interesting to note the relative importance of climate change in relation to a basket of other 'environmental' issues: British concern over climate change was 8 percentage points lower than the global average in 2011.

- Moreover, concern over energy security, waste, and overpopulation topped concern for climate change in Britain (figure 4).

- One reason why concern over climate change is not commensurate with the risk it poses, is that it is often perceived as a distant issue. This is addressed in the next section.

Implications for communication campaigns…

The finding that energy security is a greater environmental concern amongst the British population than climate change. This has led some environmentalists to comment that concern about energy security can be used as a "hook by which campaigners can nudge the public towards many, if not all, pro-environmental behaviours" (McLennan, 2011)

However, in lieu of more research, there a good reasons to be circumspect about this: a recent study based on a nationally representative sample of the British population has marshalled evidence that "while concern about energy security appears to be steeped into a traditional worldview, concerns about climate change emerge from a more altruistic self-transcending worldview". They "did not find evidence for the assertion" that energy security concerns "may strengthen public support for the development of new low-carbon technologies and increase the willingness to reduce personal energy demand" (Poortinga, et al., 2012)

3. The perceived immediacy of climate change

People 'psychologically distance' themselves from climate change because they perceive it to be a future problem as well as geographically distant[11]. Temporal immediacy refers to the extent to which climate change is regarded as a problem for the present. Spatial immediacy refers to the extent to which climate change is perceived as a problem which will impact one's locality, country, one's region and so on.

[10] Source: Ipsos Mori Global Advisor Available from: http://www.ipsosmori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive.aspx?page=3&keyword=Global+Advisor.

[11] Pidgeon (2012, p. 89).

Temporal immediacy

- The extent to which climate change has been regarded as 'a problem for the future' has remained relatively stable over time with around a fifth of people holding this view from 2007[12].

- However, between 2009 and 2013 the proportion of people disagreeing that climate change dropped significantly from 64% to 47%, because people became less certain that it is a problem for the present. This based on comparing figures from DEFRA's 2009 Public attitudes tracker and DEFRA's 2013 'Climate risk' survey.

- Research undertaken by DEFRA[13] in 2013 found that close to a half (45%) of people in the UK thought that "we are already feeling the effects of climate change".

- The same research found that relative concern for climate change doubles[14] if asked what are the most important issues facing the UK in the future as opposed to the most important issues facing the UK today.

Spatial immediacy

- A minority of people think that climate change is a problem for other countries rather than the UK. In 2008, SEABS found that 6% agreed that "climate change will only have an impact on other countries, so there is no need to…worry"[15]. Although there are no comparable figures for Scotland, in 2013, around a fifth of people in the UK agreed that climate change would "mostly affect areas that are far away from here".

- A majority – 6 out of 10 people – do agree that climate change poses risks to people in the UK[16].

- Less people (47%) think that their local area is likely to be affected by climate change, rather than their country more generally. This represents a statistically significant drop of 6 percentage points since 2010[17].

[12] Sources: SEABS (Davidson, et al., 2008), DEFRA public attitudes and behaviours tracker (Thornton, 2009), Climate risk acceptability (Ipsos Mori, 2013). NB: All listed sources asked respondents the extent to which they agree/disagree with the statement "the effects of climate change are too far in the future to really worry me". 2008 is Scottish data, whilst the other data points represent Britain/ the UK. There are no significant differences between the UK and Scotland. There was no Scottish data available other than SEABS.

[13] Ipsos Mori (2013).

[14] 5% identified climate change as one of the "three most important issues facing the UK today", whilst 11% identified it as one of the "three most important issues facing the UK in the future".

[15] Davidson, et al. (2008, p. 10)

[16] Ipsos Mori (2013)

[17] Poortinga, et al. (2013)

- Over the same period, the proportion of people agreeing that "climate change is likely to have a big impact on people like me" remained relatively constant (45% and 43% in 2010 and 2013, respectively)[18]. This suggests that climate change *is* viewed as a threat to one's self, locality and country by a sizable proportion of the UK population.

- It has been suggested that extreme weather events influence people's sense of the spatial immediacy of climate change. In 2013, three quarters of people in the UK who think that extreme weather events have become more frequent in the past decade attribute this to climate change[19].

- Moreover, when asked about specific climate impacts, flooding generates the most concern. Whilst only a third of people in the UK think that heat waves will become more common by 2050, around 8 in 10 think that flooding has become more frequent and will become even more so by 2050[20].

4. Responsibility

If people see climate change as an immediate issue, then it is likely that they will favour action. But who is deemed responsible for taking such action? Figure 6 shows who people in the UK see as most responsible for tackling climate change. People were asked to identify the most responsible entity, as well as the three most responsible entities.

Figure 6 Responsibility for tackling climate change



Source: Ipsos Mori (2013)

[18] Poortinga, et al. (2013)
[19] Poortinga, et al. (2013)
[20] Ipsos Mori (2013)

Government

- In 2013, nearly 7 in 10 people in the UK identified 'national government' as one of the three most responsible groups, as well as the most responsible group (figure 6)[21].

- This backs up other research which has repeatedly shown that people think that the greatest responsibility to tackle climate change lies with 'national government'[22]: The overwhelming ascription of responsibility to Government also holds at the European scale[23].

Individuals

- In 2013, 13% of people in the UK think that individuals/households are one of the three groups *most* responsible for tackling climate change[24] (figure 6).
- However, other surveys show that 7 in 10 people do feel as though they have *some* "responsibility to help do something about climate change" [25]. This has remained steady between 2010 and 2013.

- 2013 research has found that nearly 8 in 10 people in the UK agree that "individuals and organisations *who contribute* towards climate change should take on the responsibility of dealing with its consequences"[26].

- However, with this figure it is worth bearing in mind that SEABS found that around a third of people living in Scotland *didn't believe that their "behaviour and lifestyle contribute* towards climate change"

Industry/Business

- Similarly, 13% of people in the UK think industry/business is most responsible for tackling climate change, with 11% putting industry/ business as one of the three entities most responsible for tackling the issue (figure 6).

The governance trap

- These statistics lend credence to the idea that the so-called 'governance trap' - where "both the government and the governed seek to attribute primary responsibility to the other, and thus neither party acts in a decisive way" [27] – is one of the main barriers to effective action in the UK.

- One oft proposed solution to the 'governance trap' is 'local community' as the 'meso' scale of action between the individual (micro) and the state (macro), where people can make the most collective difference.

[21] Ipsos Mori (2013)
[22] Ipsos Mori (2010; 2013)
[23] Eurobarometer (2011).
[24]Ipsos Mori (2013)
[25] Poortinga, et al (2013)
[26] Ipsos Mori (2013)
[27] Spence et al. (2011, p. 89).

- In this context, it is interesting that still only **1%** of people in the UK identify 'local community' as one of the most responsible groups for tackling climate change (figure 6).

5. Trust and significance in sources of information

Finally, in order to form coherent beliefs and attitudes about climate change, the public at large needs easy access to reliable and trustworthy information. However, the most trusted sources may not be regarded as the most accessible or significant.

Figure 7 Percentage of people in the UK who use particular sources but do but not trust them, 2013. Source: Ipsos MORI (2013)



- Current evidence suggests that in the UK, the most popular first stop for finding information about climate change is internet search engines such as Google, with just over half of people in the UK saying they would do this (56%)[28]. However, about a third of people use but don't trust this method (figure 7)

- "Government and Government agencies including their websites and their publications" were the second most popular source of information on climate change, with 37% of UK respondents saying that they would use such sources[29]. However, almost a quarter use but don't trust this source (figure 7).

- Nearly 2 in 5 use but don't trust 'media in general' and 'newspapers', whilst 15% use but don't trust TV as sources of information on climate change.

[28] Ipsos Mori (2013)
[29] Ipsos Mori (2013)

Figure 8 Percentage of people in the UK who trust particular sources but don't use them. Source: Ipsos MORI (2013)



- Scientists remain the most 'trusted but not used' sources (figure 8): 14% would trust but don't use information from scientists working in universities, whilst 11% trust but don't use information from scientists working for charities and green organisations.

Figure 9 Trust in different media sources



Source: YouGov (2013). **Available from:** http://cdn.yougov.com/cumulus_uploads/document/8c3tc68gu3/YG-Archive-climate-change-results-110213-global-warming-trust.pdf

- Turning to focus on media sources, 2013 polling suggests that mistrust outweighs trust for all media sources on climate change, although levels of trust in different media sources vary substantially (figure 9).

- Around 1 in 2 trust the BBC, which perhaps unsurprisingly is the most trusted media source. In comparison, just over 1 in 10 trust tabloid newspapers, which remain the least trusted media source.

- Finally, the role of social networks and family institutions should not be underestimated as trusted sources: in a 2012 poll, 1 in 4 British people identified friends and family as the source they would "trust the most if they were giving their views on climate change"[30].

- 2013 research of the US population found that "Americans are most likely to identify their own friends and family, such as a significant other (27%), son or daughter (21%), or close friend (17%), as the people who could motivate them to take action to reduce global warming"[31].

6. Conclusion: What drives changes in concern and belief?

The pattern of decline in concern about climate change since 2008 in the UK is similar across the Western world[32]. One thing that is clear is that *increasing scientific certainty has not led to long-term increased public concern*[33].

It's the economy, stupid

[30] Ipsos Mori (2012)
[31] Leiserowitz, et al. (2013)
[32] Ratter & von Storch (2012)
[33] Ratter & von Storch (2012, p. 7)

- Research drawing on aggregate public opinion trends from the 27 EU countries (including the UK), as well as the US has found that both concern *and beliefs* about climate change are most strongly determined by economic conditions. This research found that labour market conditions explain opinion trends better than weather extremes, media cycles and partisan politics: "a shift in the national unemployment rate from 5 to 9% in Europe…reduces the percentage of people reporting that global warming is a very serious problem by about 10 [percentage] points"[34].

- This change in *concern* might be explained as a simple public goods dilemma in trying economic circumstances between now and the future.

- However, a change in *belief* is harder to explain: one explanation is that if the perceived steps taken required to ameliorate climate change conflict with those perceived to be necessary to improving the economy, climate change *beliefs* are altered to overcome what psychologists call 'cognitive dissonance'[35]. This may be one factor explaining the apparent rise in scepticism.

It's ideology, stupid

- Controlling for the economy, research into US public opinion between 2002-2010 found that "*information-based science advocacy has had only a minor effect on public concern, while political mobilization by elites and advocacy groups is critical in influencing climate change concern*"[36].

- This reinforces the argument that concern and thus action does not necessarily follow knowledge. As the authors of this study conclude, efforts to address climate change must account for the fact that "political conflicts are ultimately resolved through political mobilization and activism"[37].

- Similarly, a recent study based on a nationally representative sample of the British population found that "the strong association with political preferences shows that the willingness to engage in environmental behaviours is rooted in ideology and deeply held values and beliefs", suggesting limitations to social marketing interventions[38].

The effect of extreme weather: does this matter?

- Three quarters of people in the UK who think that extreme weather events have become more frequent in the past decade attribute this to climate change[39].

[34]Scruggs & Benegal (2012, p. 513)
[35]Scruggs & Benegal (2012, p. 508)
[36] This research found that media attention was itself largely a function of elite cues (Brulle, et al., 2012, p. 169).
[37] Brulle (2012, pp. 185-6)
[38]Poortinga, et al. (2012, p. 818)
[39] Poortinga, et al. (2013)

- Moreover, whilst only a third think that heat waves will become more common by 2050, around 8 in 10 think that flooding has become more frequent and will become even more so by 2050[40].

- Importantly, recent research suggests that *"those [UK citizens] who report experience of flooding express more concern over climate change, see it as less uncertain and feel more confident that their actions will have an effect on climate change"*[41]. Although more research needs to be done, these results support the claims of commentators who suggest that there is a communicative challenge to be met in developing "a narrative that seeks to localize climate impact". It also suggests a greater role for creating spaces for the sharing of local narratives and knowledge.

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[40] Ipsos Mori (2013)
[41] Spence, et al. (2011) NB: These findings are based on a nationally representative quota sample of 1,822, consisting of a core sample of 1,346 and 'booster samples' from Scotland and Wales.

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Appendix 5 Defining the enemy in the CCA

Meta-narrative	General target	Specific target(s)
Climate change	***Aviation expansion***	BAA (Ferrovial)
		Easy Jet
	Carbon commodification	Carbon Offset markets (Voluntary offset markets and the Clean Development Mechanism)
		Carbon markets (The EU Emissions Trading Scheme)
	Biofuel industry	Ensus
	Biomass energy	Forth Energy
	Coal power	Arch Coal
		BHP Billiton
		Drax Group Plc
		Edelman PR (PR for E.On)
		E.On
		Hargreaves Services, Maltby Coal Mine South Yorkshire
		N-Power
		Scottish Coal and South Lanarkshire Council
	Oil	BP
		Cairn Energy
		Canadian Government
		ConocoPhillips

		OptiCanada
		Shell
		Sonangol (Angolan State Oil Company)
		Tullow Oil (Ireland)
		Premiere Oil (UK)
	Finance capital	RBS
		Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citigroup Inc, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, JP Morgan Plc
	General mining	BHP Billiton
		Vedanta Resources
		Orissa Mining Corporation
Democracy	***The police***	National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU) (of which undercover police spy Mark Kennedy was a member) the, and the use of Forward Intelligance Teams (FITs)
		National Extremism Tactical Coordination Unit (NECTU)
		Forward Intelligence Teams (FITs)
	Corporate-state collusion	The Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR)
		The Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC)
	Press misrepresentation	The Daily Mail
		The London Evening Standard
		The Scotsman

Endnotes

[i] As far as the evidential basis for this is concerned, in a Scottish national survey, Davidson et al (2008, p. 31) found in the Scottish Environmental Attitudes and Behaviours Survey (SEABS), that that *educational attainment and socio-economic class and deprivation are the variables with the highest effect on level of environmental engagement*. Using the SEABS dataset, I cross-tabulated aggregated dichotomous social class indicators (socio-economic brackets A through C1, against C2 through E) with the response to the question "do you discuss the environment and climate change with people you know?" I found that 54.4% of respondents in class brackets A through C1 did discuss the environment and climate change, compared with 34.2% of those in class brackets C2 through E. This relationship was statistically significant (Gamma $(\gamma) = 0.24$, (χ^2=92.97 (5 d.f.), $p<0.05$).

[ii] For excellent histories/genealogies of neoliberalism, see the following works of David Harvey (2007), Stephanie Lee Mudge (2008), and Stuart Hall (2011).

[iii] This will be elaborated in depth in chapter three.

[iv] With regard to the alleged 'newness' of such movements, critics have, in my view, demonstrated through historical comparison that in every respect these simplistic dualities between old labour movements and new cultural movements are untenable, and say more about the normative convictions of their theoretical proponents than they do about actually existing social movements from the 1960s onwards. A new academic focus is hypostasised as a 'new' material reality. Calhoun, for example, (1995, pp. 391-392) shows that movements of the 19th century "constantly overflowed the bounds of the label 'labour'", and that the "beginning years of industrialization were particularly fertile for the proliferation of non-materialist movements" concerned with "identity, autonomy and self-realization", a "politicization of everyday life", "non-class or middle-class mobilisation", "self-exemplification", "unconventional means", and "partial and overlapping commitments" (1995, pp. 393-410). Thus, debates over *historical* newness are in Edwards's (2004, p. 128) opinion a "red herring": what NSMT brought to the fore was a more holistic focus on social movements *per se*, where collective actors struggled against the dominance of 'system world' (read state *and* economy as irreducible) logics in determining *how* and *why* we live and work as we do, which could be read back in time to the labour movement and beyond.

[vi] Indeed, to take a Scottish snapshot through analysing the Scottish Environmental Attitudes and Behaviours Survey (SEABS) 2008 dataset (Davidson *et al* 2008), I found that only *0.8%* of all respondents cited environmental non-governmental organisations' (*ENGO)* information as being the most significant source on climate change. The most significant combined source of information overall unsurprisingly is *tv and radio news and documentary* at 65.5%, and *newspapers* (tabloids and broadsheets combined) are cited as the most significant source in *10.3%* of cases. However, there is a large gap between perceptions of trust and significance in relation to ENGOs as informational sources on climate change: The original analysis tells us that ENGOs were cited as the second most trusted source of information on climate change amongst respondents at *25%*, behind independent scientists at *45%* (Davidson *et al* 2008). The least trusted sources were the UK government (*34%*), tabloids (*34%*), business and industry (*22%*), and the Scottish Government (*17%*) (ibid.). This dissonance between trust and significance taken into account, the intersection of green movements and media is made even more interesting. Please see appendix 4 for a fuller up-to date picture of trust in information sources.

[vii] For a succinct and accessible "potted history of Transition" see Hopkins (2011, pp. 20-26).

[viii] Peak oil can be understood as the point at which petroleum extraction reaches its maximum rate, after which production will gradually decline to the point where the energy input/output ratio of extraction is no longer viable. This can apply at varying scales—for example, to a particular field, or globally. See Bentley (2002) for a detailed explanation of the depletion of oil supplies.

[ix] At the time of publishing the former document, the working group was convened by chief executives from the Climate Outreach and Information Network (COIN), Campaign to Protect Rural England (CPRE), Friends of the Earth (FoE), Oxfam, and WWF. The working group itself consisted of senior campaign directors and heads of communication from each NGO. By the time the latter document was published, the coalition had expanded to include "Action for Children, Cambridge Carbon Footprint, the New Economics Foundation and Think Global" (Holmes, et al., 2011, p. 4). The latter document was also written in collaboration with independent think tank The Public Interest Research Centre (PIRC), whose primary interests are in strategic communications in climate change, energy, and economics.

[x] It is important to note the distinction here between emergent and emerging: I use emergent in the philosophical sense, where it describes a system arising as an effect of complex causes and not simply as a sum of its parts (as in relations of internality in a totality). As I have argued, my understanding of emergence arises from non-essentialist process ontologies, and is therefore wholly consonant with the 'materialist' Deleuzians such as Rosi Braidotti and Manuel DeLanda and the materialist poststructuralism of Foucault and Laclau and Mouffe, whose work I try to read tranversally.

[xi] This, incidentally, is where I depart with Latour and his ANT thinking, or perhaps more accurately, rub up against the limits of its utility. Being 'ants' parochially following trails, and refusing the existence of the macro; or asking, 'what is capitalism?', 'where can it be found?', is all a rather futile process if we come to realise that our cognitive capacities to perceive reality and therefore complex causality are evolutionarily shaped, and therefore are not unproblematic windows to the world. Something like Manuel Delanda's assemblage theory is far more useful in explicating a non-essentialist and materialist ontology capable of theorising part to whole relations and therefore emergent macro causality. The same could be said also of David Harvey's dialectical imagination, shaped by Whiteheadian thought, and some more recently emerging work in what has been called Object Oriented Ontology (OOO).